

Elizabethan England.

Elizabethan England:

Being the History of this Country
“In Relation to all Foreign Princes.”

FROM ORIGINAL MANUSCRIPTS, MANY HITHERTO UNPUBLISHED;
CO-ORDINATED WITH XVIth CENTURY PRINTED MATTER
RANGING FROM ROYAL PROCLAMATIONS
TO BROADSIDE BALLADS.

A Survey of Life and Literature

BY

E. M. TENISON

Member of the Society for Nautical Research.

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MDCCCCXXXIII



THE EMPRESS ISABELLA:

Daughter of Emmanuel the Fortunate, King of Portugal.

Wife of Charles V, and mother of Philip II of Spain.

From the original by Titian, in the Prado.

(Photograph: J. Ruiz Vernacci. No. M.P. 415).

It was through the Empress that King Philip claimed the Crown of Portugal; and her portrait is here included partly for its perfect beauty, but still more in hope of dispelling modern English confusion, started by Lodge, Norroy King of Arms, in the late eighteenth century, when he alleged that "the succession was easily gained by Philip II of Spain in right of his wife Isabella, daughter of Emmanuel King of Portugal." (*"Illustrations of British History,"* &c., 2nd ed: Vol. II, note, pp. 126, 127). But Philip's wife Isabella had been of Valois. It was his first wife Mary who was of Portugal: and his claims through her had ended with the life of her son Don Carlos in 1568.

King Philip's own explanation to "the Aldermen, Recorder and Warden of the City of Lisbon," from Madrid 14 March, 1579, set forth persuasively "the great friendship . . . between me and the Sovereign Kings" of Portugal:

"because we proceed all of one blood, . . . and because the Empress my Mistress and Mother brought me up in the same love. . . .

. . . I have taken counsel . . . of men of great learning, . . . and all do find that the inheritance of those Realms doth appertain unto me by right . . .

I am grandchild and child of your natural Princes. . . ."

"A Coppie of the King of Spaines letter. To the Cittie of Lisborne, Englished":

Cotton MS. B.1. ff. 188^a & ^b.

As the acquirement of the vast Portuguese Empire was to make King Philip the most potent Monarch in Christendom, and in 1588 his Armada for the intended conquest of England was to sail from Portugal, not from Spain, the succession controversy of 1579 and the Portuguese war of 1580-83 ensuing, bear directly upon English policy.

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Note on the Spanish State Papers.

AS the English translations of Spanish State Papers selected from the Archives at the Castle of Simancas, though given to the world in the last part of the nineteenth century, seem not yet fully digested, it is useful to define for the general reader of what these Calendars of State Papers mainly consist.

They are chosen to illustrate the relations of Spain to England.¹

For Spanish Imperial and domestic concerns, apart from English affairs, we require to consult the official "Colección de documentos inéditos": unfortunately only available in Spanish.²

The English Calendars of selected matter from papers now or formerly preserved in the Castle of Simancas, may be divided into five different classes. That they are not arranged in this order, but printed chronologically as a whole, has sometimes led to their relative values being confounded.

First in importance is the personal correspondence of the Sovereign with the Popes; and with the noblemen appointed to command the fleets and armies the King intended for the conquest of England. From these letters his intentions can be seen; and his commands are intermingled with observations particularly revealing of his mind and methods. Not least to be observed are his marginal comments upon information received.

Royal correspondence should be taken in conjunction with all first-hand matter bearing on secret projects in relation to Mary Queen of Scots.

In the Second Category, allied to the First, must be placed the communications of Ambassadors, and of the Council of State.

Thirdly, letters from English Catholics adherent to Spain, suggesting, out of their special knowledge, additional means for the subjugation of England. Among these, the proposals of Father Parsons S.J. and Father Cresswell S.J. to King Philip are the most remarkable, and should be weighed in conjunction with the material above mentioned.

Fourthly, subsequent to the conquest of Portugal by Spain in 1580, among vital matters, hitherto insufficiently studied, are secret disclosures by certain double-faced Portuguese, who came to England as professed adherents of Antonio their elected King, but systematically betrayed both him and Queen Elizabeth during a long period of years: as will be shown in due course.

¹ "Calendars of Letters and State Papers belonging to English Affairs, preserved in, or originally belonging to the Archives of Simancas," edited by Martin A. S. Hume.

² Ed: M. Fernandez de Navarrete. Madrid, 1842-95. 112 vols. (B.M. 9195 ccc.)

ELIZABETHAN ENGLAND

For "Elizabethan England" these letters have now been compared with unpublished relevant material in English, Spanish, Portuguese, Italian, French, and Latin.

The clues to perplexing MSS in our own Record Office are oftener to be found by comparison with Spanish and other foreign MSS than by consulting summaries in editors' prefaces. Editors of Calendars, each being employed only to comment upon what is in his own hands, cannot act as guides to the whole. It is especially unsafe to echo verdicts offered in the Prefaces to the Simancas Calendars: the English editor often being unaware of the existence of MSS of certain English Councillors, whose dealings the Spanish Ambassadors sometimes misunderstood, and now and then for particular reasons deliberately misrepresented.¹

Moreover it is not well to depend upon the Calendars of State Papers Spanish, without consulting our own State Papers Spain, and (especially after 1580), State Papers Portugal, both of which are still in process of being calendared; and are not yet published for the eventful years from the summer of 1588 to the end of Queen Elizabeth's reign. Some tied up in bundles in the Public Record Office, the items neither numbered nor classified, are remarkably valuable. Of these unpublished State Papers, Spain, Portugal, and France, many have been selected and translated for "Elizabethan England": the main principle of which is the bringing together of evidence long scattered and never before compared.

Among the Spanish Records, as in our own, a Fifth class of material is preserved, not meriting the name of State Papers, though sometimes quoted (in 20th century commentaries), to support the assertion that "State Papers prove" this or that. But that these news-sheets, and anonymous notes from obscure and ill-informed persons, with unsigned "Advices" based on hearsay, often abound in errors, will become manifest when they are compared with the first four classes of material above defined.

Observe that even letters of Spanish Ambassadors from London are by no means confined to the Ambassador's own experiences: "they say" being a frequent mode of presenting to the King, one week, gossip which had to be contradicted the next.

Historians and biographers in the 17th and 18th centuries often fell into confusion through not being able to draw sufficiently upon State Papers, whether English or Spanish.

Now that State Papers on both sides of the controversy are accessible, and can be supplemented from the Hatfield, Lansdowne, Cottonian, and Harleian MSS, we have less excuse when we err. But that we as a people are more ruled by fashion

¹ These prefaces of Martin Hume show many signs of being influenced by conventional but erroneous English history. In Vol. IV, (1899), his assertion that the Earl of Leicester headed the "Puritans," in a party working against Lord Burghley, is totally mistaken; and will be amply disproved in the present work, which embodies results of the first co-ordinated examination of the combined labours of Burghley and Leicester.

NOTE ON THE SPANISH STATE PAPERS

than by fact in history appears from the common neglect of the Spanish State Papers, even though so large a selection has been in print for more than thirty years.

The modern English delusion that 16th century Spain was in decay, and that our historians can afford to neglect King Philip II,—then the most absolute Monarch in the world, unless we except the Sultan of Turkey,—has resulted in a considerable proportion of essential material being left unread by compilers of recent works aspiring to represent the latest advance in “modern historical analysis.” It is too soon to begin “analysis” without having ascertained what material is of primary importance to analyse.¹

The perpetual industry of King Philip II, and his thoroughness, are exceedingly impressive. Had his application to business not been equalled by the persistent steadfastness of Sir William Cecil, Lord Burghley, and had not England been endowed with “many vigilant eyes to foresee,” and “many valiant hands to fight,”² the ambition of Philip, ex-King Consort of England, to dominate and subdue his late wife’s former subjects would most likely have been fulfilled.

The nature of his projects, the strength of his forces, the long experience and high spirit of his warriors, the subtlety of his diplomatists, the grip he kept upon all his ministers and servants,—and the means by which he was baffled in his plans to conquer the English nation,—is a drama never to be seen in its entirety so long as our academic and popular historians alike continue to underrate the superlatively artful and vigorous foe; and put in his place a dull “procrastinator,” with nothing of the real King Philip but his Christian name.

¹ In “*Sir John Hawkins The Time and the Man*,” by James A. Williamson, Oxford University Press, 1927, lack of comprehension of Spain mars the whole. As this publication claims “perspective” and “proportion,” and as Hawkins’s life-work was a perpetual contest against Spain, it is the more unfortunate that this biographer instead of making such study of the enemy as would have enabled him fully to measure the extent of Hawkins’s service, has neglected both the “Spanish State Papers” and “State Papers Spain,” and has reduced King Philip to a shadow.

² Henry Savile, dedicating his Tacitus “To her Most Sacred Majesty.” 1591.

PART II.

“Particularly the Power of Spain.”

CHAPTER 4.

“THE BALANCE OF POWER.”

SECTION 7.

“A King of their own Nation.”

(The defeat of Dom Antonio by the Duke of Alba: August, 1580).

“The great and deep-rooted hatred which is and ever hath been between the Portuguese and the Castillians. . . . The great desire of the Portuguese to be governed by a King of their own nation.”

“Things which may hinder the K. of Spain,” as noted by Edward Wotton to Sir Francis Walsingham. Received 19 August, 1579. State Papers, Spain, I. 26.

“Forasmuch as I am the direct and real successor to the Kingdoms of Portugal, I have determined to take possession of them.”

King Philip II, appointing the Duke of Alba General of his Army for the Conquest of Portugal. Badajoz, 12 June, 1580. From original: in possession of The Duke of Berwick and Alba.

“ . . . The King of Castile in contempt of all other Judgment would be his own judge, and went about to possesse the Kingdom by violence and force of armes.”

“The Explanation of the true and lawfull Right and Tytle of Anthonie . . . King of Portugall. . . .” 1585. B.M. 1060, c. 33.

“I truste you have herde that on the 25 of June Senior Don Antonio . . . was saluted Kinge.”

“a lettre dated In the porte of Portugall 30 September, 1580.” S.P. Portugal, I. 40.

“I bade him tell me what Don Antonio wanted. He said ‘for himself, nothing. For the Kingdom what had been promised . . . by the Duke of Osuna.’ I told him that I advised Don Antonio in no manner to take upon himself to speak for the Kingdom . . . that your Majesty would sooner lose the kingdom than treat of matters of State with Don Antonio.”

Don Fernando, Duke of Alba, to Philip II, King of Spain. 17 August, 1580. “Documentos inéditos.” Vol. 32, pp. 414-416.

"REBELLION AGAINST THE KING OF CASTILE:"

A Spanish Ambassador's view of the Dynasty of Aviz. 1498.

As the sympathies of Queen Elizabeth and her chief advisers were entirely with Portugal, King Philip's claim to that Crown in 1579 was dismissed by them as a mere fabricated excuse for a war of aggression and conquest. But having seen Lord Burghley's rendering of the situation, we need a reminder that King Philip's rhapsodies about himself as the rightful King of Portugal embodied ideas not invented by him but inherited. Long prior to his first marriage, with Maria of Portugal,—in fact nearly thirty years before he was born,—the Ambassador from Ferdinand and Isabella, to the Emperor Maximilian I, had maintained that not a single one of the Kings of Portugal, from the "Master of Aviz" up to that moment, had been other than "usurpers" of an inheritance due to the descendants of Beatrice of Portugal, the last lawful scion of the first dynasty.

That the Portuguese preferred the illegitimately-born Master of Aviz, in place of the Princess whose husband was King of Castile, appeared sheer perversity to the Spaniards; so John, the victor of Aljubarrota, elected King by the voice of the Portuguese nation, was a "rebel" in the eyes of the Spanish Ambassador.

The zest with which Spaniards in 1580 were to throng to the invasion of Portugal will be better understood if we see what was being argued even in the time of their grandparents.

The Emperor Maximilian having expressed to the Ambassador, Fuensalida, his idea that he the Emperor should own Portugal, Fuensalida boldly retorted that no such claim was tenable, and that it was his own Sovereign who ought to be wearing that Crown:

"... el rey don Iohan, visabuelo de V. als., avia casado con hija vnica del rey de Portugal, y como el rey de Portugal murio, quedo la governacion del reyno en el maestre davis, que fue llamado Rigente, y que ovo discordya entre el rey don Iohan de Castilla y el reyno de Portugal, y ovieron batalla los Castellanos, la qual agora se llama de Gibarota, y que los portugueses, despues de vencida la batalla, tomaron por rey a este Rigente y pusyeronse en rebellion contra el rey don Iohan. . . ."¹

The warning (ante), in a *Note on the Spanish State Papers*, not to depend blindly on our English editors, is specially applicable in this connection:—"Neither the instructions which Fuensalida took from Spain nor the letters which he wrote from England are extant," stated the editor of one of our Calendars; to whom the Duke of Alba replied by the publication of Fuensalida's letters from England, Germany and Flanders, in a volume of over 700 pages (pp. i—c; and 1—625). But although this work was issued so long ago as "*XV dias de Abril de MCMVII Años*," the average English student still remains unaware of the wealth of material therein available.

¹ Letter of vii July, 1498. "*Correspondencia de Gutierre Gomez de Fuensalida, Embajador en Alemania, Flandes e Inglaterra (1496-1509) Publicada por el Duque de Berwick y de Alba Conde de Siruela. Madrid, 1907.*"

THE 3rd DUKE OF ALBA IN HIS 74th YEAR (1581):

Contemporary inscription

"*Fernandus de Toledo dux Albæ Gubernator Generalis ætatis suæ 74.*"

(The date 1574 in the lower corner is later and erroneous).

*From the original at the Palacio de Liria
in possession of The Duke of Berwick and Alba.*

(Artist unknown).

Photograph, Hauser y Menet.

Robert Earl of Leicester's picture gallery of Princes and Potentates included foes as well as friends; and the Inventories taken soon after his death in 1588 show him to have possessed three portraits of the Great Duke (N. & Q. 1862. 3rd ser: Vol. II): one in each of his houses:


Kenilworth: "*The Picture of the Duke Alva with a curtaine.*"

Leicester House: "*Another of the Duke of Alva.*"

Wanstead: "*The Duke Dalva.*"

None of these can now be found; and a portrait by Paul Veronese belonging to the Marquess of Exeter, which was sold in 1888 from Burghley House, and had been catalogued in the early 19th century as "*Don Fernando de Toledo, Duke of Alva,*" had to be renamed "Gentleman Unknown." It represented a stout and jovial person, bearing no resemblance to the awe-inspiring General and Councillor of King Philip.

There is a picture at Hatfield House in the Marquess of Salisbury's collection, head and shoulders, labelled on the back "*Don Fernando Alveres, Duke of Alva, Governor of the Netherlands,*" canvas, 19½ x 14 inches; described in the privately printed *Catalogue*, 1891, No. 21, p. 13, as "*Painted after Titian.*" But although it depicts a man in handsome inlaid armour, and wearing the collar of the Golden Fleece, it resembles neither the face in Titian's picture nor in Key's, nor the portrait painted in old age.



ordinandus et solido dux etiam gubernator generalis
elgio. etatis sua



THE SPANISH CAMP AT CANTILLANA NEAR BADAJOZ, 1580.

From the fresco by Nicholas Granello in the Hall of Battles, Escorial Palace.

(Photograph, Moreno, No. 61.)


Although this painting has long been called "The Duke of Alba reviewing his troops at Cantillana" (*El Duque de Alba revistando sus tropas en Cantillana*) and was included under that name in the "Elizabethan England" Portfolio, 1932, (No. 5), it seems more probable that King Philip, who was notoriously and ignobly jealous of Spain's greatest champion, chose to have the Camp depicted not after the Duke had been commissioned to command the Army "for the conquest of Portugal," but previously when the King himself was expected to lead the expedition. The Royal Arms are shown on the central tent; and the fact that there does not appear to be any figure representing the Duke, makes it likely that although posterity came to associate this fresco with the General whose skill and experience gained Portugal for Spain, the actual painting may have been intended rather to glorify King Philip himself.

This theory is strengthened by the statements in the "*Istoria dell' Vnione del Regno di Portogallo alla Corona di Castiglia*," published at Genoa only five years after the events. As rendered in the English version of 1600:

Though the "Marques of Saint Croix" [Santa Cruz] was appointed to command the fleet, "there was as yet [in May] no General named. . . . The Duke of Alva was generally held the most sufficient, yet few believed the King would willingly free him from prison. . . . *Many believed the King would go to this war in person, both for the inclination they see in him, as for some other signs, . . . for he not only caused his Arms and Pavillions to be ready,*" but also ordered the Royal Standard, "which in that realm is not accustomed to be carried, but in the squadron where the King is in person." ("*Historie of the Vniting*," etc. p. 128.)

Cantillana to-day is a post of the Civil Guard, with a few farm buildings. It is about five and a half kilometres from Badajoz. In the fresco the town in the distance is presumably the "*ciudad de Badajoz*," whence was dated King Philip's Commission to the Great Duke, 12th June, 1580, now first published from the original in possession of the present Duke of Alba (II. 4. 6. ante).

It is extraordinary that in the Hall of Battles to-day, neither Don John of Austria's victory of Lepanto, 1571, nor the conquest by Alba at Alcántara (Lisbon), 1580, are included. As these were the most notable Spanish victories in King Philip's reign,—more famous even than the subsequent battles of the Azores, which are minutely and beautifully represented,—the omission raises the question as to whether "the great King Philip" was so jealous of Don John and of the Duke of Alba as to omit their exploits of set purpose; or whether both campaigns were amply represented among the numerous "history pieces" he caused to be painted to adorn other parts of the great palace; and whether a picture of the battle of Alcántara was among those which perished in the fire of 1671, or whether it exists somewhere in the Escorial to-day? The Palace, with its eighty staircases and four thousand windows, is so vast that few if any visitors have the energy to examine all its treasures: some of which, moreover, are said to have been moved during the 19th century into the Palace in Madrid. Although a Spanish Hall of Battles of the 16th century minus Lepanto and Alcántara is as astonishing as an English Hall of Battles of the 19th century would be if it omitted Trafalgar and Waterloo, the Director of the Academy of History confirms that in the *Sala de Batallas* the only frescoes of the reign of King Philip are those reproduced in the present History, Volumes I and IV. Not in Spain but in Portugal has a contemporary drawing of the Duke of Alba's victory been discovered for the present writer. First published in "*Elizabethan England*," this is placed after the description of the battle; as the reader will best appreciate the sketch when conversant with particulars of the fighting.



LISBON: WITH CASCAES AND BELEM ("Cascales and Bethlehem")

Prior to King Sebastian's African expeditions.

Now first reproduced from "Civitates Orbis Terrarum" (1573-1617).

Braun and Hogenberg, Lib: I. 1573. No. 1. (400 x 280 m.m.).


In 1572 Camoens claimed that Lisbon "reigned supreme among the cities of the world."

Belem was (and still is) famous as the place where Vasco da Gama embarked, in 1497, on his great voyage of discovery ("Partirão do porto de Bethlehem": Damião de Goes, "*Chronica do felicissimo Rei Dom Emanuel*."


A picture plan of Lisbon was drawn after the Spanish conquest in 1580: "*Lasbona citta principale nel regno di Portogallo fu presa dall' armata con l'esercito del Re Catolico all' ultimo d'Agosto l'ann. MDLXXX.*" Collotype, in "*Discurso del Excelentissimo Señor Duque de Berwick y de Alba.*" Madrid 1919. (Between pp. 94-95). "*Marius Cararius Fec. Romae. Anno 1580.*"

(A third view was also published in Braun and Hogenberg's *Civitates* &c., Lib: V, 1617, No. 2).

Topographical differences between 16th and 20th century Lisbon are partly due to the earthquake of 1755.



L I S B O N A .



OLISIPONALIUM PERVE
TVSTAE LAPIDVM INSCRIP
TIONES HABENT VLSITPO
VVLGO LISBONA FLORENTIS
SVM M PORTUGALIAE EMPO

(est. Pring.)

CASCALIA LINDIAE GRI



PART II.

“Particularly the Power of Spain.”

CHAPTER 4.

“THE BALANCE OF POWER.”

SECTION 7.

“A King of their own Nation.”

(The defeat of Dom Antonio by the Duke of Alba August, 1580).

THAT human nature is alike in all ages is a platitude requiring qualification; because though the same attributes are essential to a leader of men in every era, the conditions under which he works vary exceedingly, according to time and occasion, and the forces for and against him. In theory, nobody denies that fairly to estimate the life of any public personage, intimacy with his environment and the nature of his undertakings is requisite. Yet the case of Dom Antonio in modern English has hitherto been dismissed without examination of the one or the other.

Because of how deeply England became concerned in his affairs, we should consider how he stood in regard to his first cousin and greatest enemy Philip of Spain, who was also England's foe. In the succession of events both past and ensuing, Philip II, Queen Elizabeth, and Dom Antonio acted according to their several dispositions: our part is to ascertain how the doings of each affected the others.

Although the Duke of Alba had suffered often from the King's jealousy, King Philip was too sagacious not to know the value of the Duke; the Duke was too loyal to the Crown not to surmount all personal feelings of resentment when it was a matter of increasing the power of Spain. With a nature as persistent as the King's own,—with a sense of duty and dignity which prevented him from complaining against his Sovereign's ingratitude,—the vigour, efficiency, and determination of the veteran General were the most signal misfortune for Dom Antonio.

Frequent reference to “Court factions” should not make us forget that whether in Spain or England “the Crown was the centre”; and that a nation without a King would have been regarded alike by Spaniards or Englishmen as a body without a head. But as the loss of Portuguese independence and the defeat

of Dom Antonio by the Duke of Alba were the same thing, the hatred of Portuguese patriots against the Duke was inevitable.

The way for Spain to wear down the Portuguese resistance was to treat the election of Antonio as illegal, refer always to Henry the Cardinal as the last of the dynasty, and to King Philip as his lawful and unquestionable successor.

The language used on both sides is to be estimated accordingly. When the Duke of Alba is described by the Portuguese as proficient in negotiating "treasons," the answer is that though the Duke had been commissioned for the conquest of Portugal, his hope was to effect it with the minimum of bloodshed. Though using force, it was desired that His Majesty's "peaceable disposition" should be eulogised. If the Duke could buy some of Dom Antonio's officers instead of fighting them, it was the better for his master's purpose of claiming to succeed to the Kingdom and Empire of Portugal by right.

The question of the will of the Portuguese as to who should rule them was not the Duke's business to consider. His principle was to promote the expansion of the Empire of his Sovereign by every means and on all occasions. But if it is unjust to echo the charges brought against the Duke by his opponents, so also it is misleading to adopt without qualification the Spanish official fashion of denouncing Dom Antonio as a "usurper" and "rebel." For manifest political reasons Spain required to treat him as both: but as England was one of the countries which never to the end consented to oblige King Philip in that particular, we have fifteen years of confusion ahead of us (1580-95) unless at the outset we stretch our minds to both sides of the question.

The pretendedly aloof "*Istoria*" of 1585, a brief for King Philip, thinly disguised in Italian, and the "*Explanation of the . . . Right and Tytle of Anthonie . . . King of Portugall*," need to be set side by side. But English commentators to-day do not look at the second, give only a cursory glance at the first; and mostly leave untouched the quantity of available MS evidence on the relations of England to Portugal during the years 1579-85 and onwards.

Haphazard opportunism formed no part of the system of either King Philip, the Duke of Alba, or Dom Antonio. If the Spanish Monarch and his General were a byword for wills of iron, Antonio also had his fair share of determination.

King Philip had at his back the seasoned armies of Spain and the Netherlands, the mercenaries of Italy and Germany, and the means to reward them all. He was soon to be able also to control the men and treasure of the Portuguese Indian fleet, and other resources of an Empire conferred by popular will upon Dom Antonio.

What the people of Portugal gave to Antonio on the 25th of June, was taken away from him by the Duke of Alba on the 25th of August. His reign in Portugal therefore lasted only eight weeks. But it is none the less a mistake for expounders of "the policy of Queen Elizabeth" to treat scornfully as a "poor pretender" the personage to whom Her Majesty used to allude as her "dearest brother the King of Portingale."

While Philip II, in a steadily increasing degree, commanded the substantial and visible advantages, an extraordinary power of endurance was inspired in Dom Antonio by the conviction that right was on his side. His argument was that Philip, by overriding the feelings of an entire nation, had revealed himself to the world as an insatiable "tyrant." King Philip on the other hand, resenting the defeats of his ancestors at the hands of the Portuguese, believed it his duty to acquire the last part of the Peninsula which had remained separate from Spain.

A King in the days of absolutism was expected to be of a higher spirit than other men, and of a larger capacity. No man then wished to be led or commanded by an equal; nor willingly would obey an inferior. "Degree" was a law of the universe. Not only the Duke of Alba's character but his rank contributed to his success in 1580: for the historic consciousness of what great hereditary prestige denoted was strong in all men's minds. It was vital to the interests of Spain that against "Antonio the Bastard" as Philip called his cousin, the chosen instrument was a Grandee of ancient house, whose martial fame dated back to times contemporary with Dom Antonio's childhood.

Of all Alba's services to Spain the most far-reaching, even if achieved with the least fighting, was the conquest of Portugal. The brevity of the campaign should not blind us to the extreme skill with which the enterprise was planned and carried out: not least as to the stratagem by which King Philip arranged for an invasion of Ireland, to enable him to annex Portugal without interruption from the Queen of England. But if we accepted as "evidence" what some of the Spaniards outside England persuaded themselves in 1579-80, we would be exceedingly misled. For example, a letter to King Philip on the 3rd of February, dated from Paris:

"... such is the present condition of England, with signs of revolt everywhere, the Queen in alarm, the Catholic party numerous," and Ireland in rebellion; and such the apprehension "aroused by your Majesty's fleet, *that I really believe that if so much as a cat moved, the whole affair would crumble down in three days, beyond repair*"¹

This is unlikely to have been taken literally by King Philip, who knew England and the English well. But that the Queen of Scots is ready to "send her son to Spain, if His Majesty wishes," and would have him married in Spain, "entirely according to His Majesty's pleasure," is stated on the authority of the Scottish Ambassador. The project advocated is "a rising of the Scots," or of Queen Mary's party in England. If this could be contrived, the Most Catholic King's fleet helping them as soon as it could be spared from Portugal; "with the added advantage which the possession of that country gives your Majesty, it seems as if the affair might be openly undertaken *If your Majesty had England and Scotland you might consider the States of Flanders conquered, in which case you would be a Monarch who could lay down the law for the whole world*"

¹ Juan de Vargas Mejia to the King. 1579-80. Paris Archives, B. 51-56. Cal: S.P.S. III. p. 5.

The Queen of Scotland is courageous; and "deeply offended" with the English, "upon whom womanlike she wishes to be revenged. From what I could gather from the Ambassador, *her view is to marry her son to one of the Infantas, and on his conversion to make him King of England, whilst she will marry whom she pleases; having no doubt thought of the Prince of Parma your Majesty's English pensioners are talking about it . . .*"

But though from Paris on the 13th of February, England was thus represented as crumbling to pieces, on the 20th of the same month Don Bernardino de Mendoza sent very different news from London:

The insurgents in Ireland were "bravely afoot"; but the realm of England was well defended. Not only were more ships being sent to sea, but there was to be a general muster of troops:

" . . . when an alarm is sounded in any part of the country and the beacon fires are lit as a signal, they can collect 25,000 at any given point within twelve hours to prevent a landing, the rest of the force following later " As to the business with Portugal, Queen Elizabeth was "keeping it pending" until she could learn what was to happen in relation to the succession.¹

The same day Mendoza wrote again to the King, describing an interview with Her Majesty. "Alarmed" by "her own evil conscience,"

" . . . she descended from the dais in the Privy Chamber and came forward six paces to meet me.

"Before I could say a word she asked me whether I came as a herald to declare war . . . ; to which I replied that it was she apparently who was going to war with all the world, seeing the great number of men she was raising.

She said that was in order that she might not be thought neglectful; and she would never make war upon your Majesty unless you began it first "

Mendoza describes how, "to keep her in suspense" and persuade her to deviate from plans formed by her Council, "I tried to increase her alarm by ambiguous and significant words"; the result of which was that "she began caressing me with her witcheries" in hope to learn the destination of the Spanish fleet.

It is difficult to believe the daughter of Henry VIII so simple as to suppose she would get the truth by these methods. But the Ambassador thought he had "frightened her very much"; and he tells the King how much better it is for him to deal with her direct, than to give her the chance of referring matters to her Privy Council:² which tribute to the efficiency of the Council it is important to remember.

Having read previous Portuguese intelligence, as sent to Lord Burghley and Secretaries Walsingham and Wilson,³ we cannot have failed to notice that the

¹ Cal: S.P.S. III. pp. 9-10.

² Ib: pp. 11-12.

³ II. 4. 6. ante,

reports, while varying in minor particulars, all tally as to the determination of the people to have Dom Antonio for King. This devotion of the people to him we have observed; and now we come to the fulfilment of Wotton's forecast, that all patriotism and popularity would be of scant avail, because of "the great forces" the King of Spain could command "both by sea and land:

the great means he hath to maintain an army in the field long time
the facility with which he . . hath already . . . corrupted many of the chiefest of the nobility of Portugal, which hunger and thirst after gold."¹

Antonio's own Ambassador was afterwards to admit how insufficient were the extemporised Portuguese troops "to resist so puissant an army as the Duke of Alba brought."²

Seventeen years after Antonio's defeat, a Spaniard from Aragon,—who had been disgraced and broken by King Philip, and hated him proportionately,—argued that the Castilians were not of themselves "better souldiers than the Portugals," and alleged that under King Antonio a force of "about five thousand foot and some thousand horse" had held out "against more than twelve thousand olde soldiers under the Duke of Alua" for "the space of foure monthes and twentie days."³

But this is a lapse of memory: for King Antonio was defeated by the Duke of Alba precisely two months after his election and coronation. The "Spanish Pilgrim," however,—one of the very few of his race who felt compassion for the conquered "Portugals,"—asserted that

"if there had not been such abundance and stir of treasons it may be that the Duke of Alua himselfe had found bad entertainment, and would not have passed any further." But "Portugall was altogether unprovided of Chiefetains and leaders, all of them being latellie slaine in Africa. . . ."⁴

Having treated of the Duke of Aveiro and others of name killed at Alcacer, this Spaniard asserts that "the residue of them which remained unslaine in Barbarie, the Castilian, with giftes and faire promises had so corrupted, that they desired nothing more than to deliver up the realme unto him."⁵

The news penetrated very slowly to England: "a l(ett)re dated in the ports of Portugall 30 September 1580" (not docketed with any note of when received), was not even written until more than four weeks after King Antonio's overthrow by the Duke. As it refers to "our men," it is a contemporary translation of a Portuguese despatch:

" . . the duke of Alva came into alimtegio with his power;⁶ and by treason did

¹ "Things which may help the King of Spaine" 1579. Cit II. 4. (6), ante.

² "The Explanation," 1585.

³ "A Treatise Paraenetical" By "A Pilgrim Spaniard" 1598. (translated from French 1597) p. 72. (Full title and particulars of authorship, under date.)

⁴ Op: cit, 1598. p. 72.

⁵ p. 74.

⁶ Alemtejo, the largest of the 4 Provinces of Portugal, between the Tagus and the Serra do Caldeirão.

bring all into his subjection,¹ wth owte any resistance; and so came to Satiwell,² where was a smale resistance, but onlie the castell; and so, after, cam to Caste caies”³

The Duke (though this is not mentioned) went by sea from Setubal to Cascaes and had the power of his King's Navy behind him.

Cascaes was delivered up to him “wth owte any blodsheddinge” and so the Duke wente still wth his camp to loyras⁴ and there gave his battery to the forte of sainte John by the space of three days”; at the end of which time the Captain of the fort surrendered it. “And that was the begyninge of our undoing because he might have held it tenne yeares.” (Ten months; or more likely ten weeks).

As told in the “*Historie of the Vniting*” of Portugal to Castile, the Duke then returned to “Oeiras, a place both by nature and arte stronge”; from whence he “made no showe to dislodge”; for he calculated that with the aid of the Navy he practically held the whole realm of Portugal besieged. To be conqueror with the minimum of fighting was expedient: and for this he “laboured with all possible devises.” Having by now “almost corrupted” the Captains of Dom Antonio's ships, and of the Tower of Belem, he hoped they would deliver up to him both the fortress and the fleet: which might immediately have happened “if Anthony himself had not gone in person,” and “dispossessed” all the traitor Captains without giving them time to carry out their intention.⁵

After this, Antonio became so apprehensive, says the hostile historian,—“*finding in all men so great feare and so little faith*,”—that he knew not whom to trust, unless that one were “*a religious man, a mariner, or of the baser sort*”;⁶ an indication of which types were the least corruptible.

From the anonymous letter sent from Porto on September the 30th, let us turn to the Duke of Alba's own information as supplied to the King of Spain.⁷ Dated from beside the fortress of St John, on the 17th of August 1580, the opening sentence alludes to “the message” previously sent, as “I wrote to your Majesty”: presumably the offer to Dom Antonio, to which Antonio himself afterwards made reference, saying that had he chosen to compound with the invader he could have been rich and prosperous; instead of which he preferred fidelity to his country, no matter what the cost to himself.

¹ Treason of Portuguese officers. ² Setubal. ³ Cascaes, near Lisbon.

⁴ Forty-three years after the events, these circumstances were still held up as a warning in English political pamphlets: In “the Kingdom of Portugal, there being no convenient Fortresses to give impediment,” the Spaniards “were suffered to enter into the very heart of the land . . .” “*An Experimentall Discoverie of Spanish practises or the Counsell of a Well-wishing Souldier*” etc. Anno 1623. p. 17. (By Thomas Scott.)

⁵ Oeiras. ⁶ “*Hist. of the Vniting*,” p. 209.

⁷ Now first translated from “*Copia de carta original del Duque de Alba al Rey, fecha á San Juan à 17 de agosto de 1580.*” *Archivo General de Simancas, S. de Estado* . . . 414. “*Colección de Documentos inéditos.*” Vol. 32. pp. 414-416. (B.M. No. 9195.c.c.c.)

The Duke relates to King Philip that the Prior of Belem came to him, and, after some conversation in the presence of the Señor of Cascaes, asked for a private audience, which was at once accorded: ". . . he told me, when the Señor of Cascaes had gone, that he who had sent him was D. Antonio, who had summoned him yesterday, and ordered him to come to me."

Dom Antonio's request was that an emissary of his own should hold secret conference with the Duke "on the river by night." The Duke objected that such negotiations "would be very much prolonged," because any third person would be likely to "care more for his own advantage than for the general good"; and if the messenger's advantage "were not provided for, he will disparage any means" which would lead to peaceful conclusions.

Moreover the Spanish General was not prepared to come to terms with a messenger; all he would promise was to hear such proposals as might be offered. The Prior of Belem then announced that if necessary Dom Antonio himself would speak.

"I answered that if D. Antonio liked to come, I would go and meet him in a galley, and would give him a safe conduct; and that he can trust me."

The Prior of Belem replied that this would be the best way "of coming quickly to a decision."

Before proceeding further, however, the Duke enquired "*what it was that D. Antonio wanted?*" The answer (as the Duke informs King Philip) was, "*for himself nothing. But for the Kingdom, what had been promised in the name of your Majesty by the Duke of Osuna.*"

The terms to which King Antonio alludes were such as to leave Portugal practically independent: all offices of State, whether ecclesiastical or temporal, and whether at home or in the Indies, Africa or Brazil, etc., were to be given to Portuguese: all newly minted gold and silver coins to be stamped with the Royal Arms of Portugal without any Spanish addition; and so on.¹ The Duke of Osuna had been ordered to publish these promises, in hope that the Portuguese would then, as of free will, elect King Philip. As they disbelieved his terms, and defiantly elected Dom Antonio, the King of Spain henceforth called them his rebels, and took his measures accordingly.

In August 1580, the Duke of Alba answered the Prior of Belem, as he relates, that he "advised Don Antonio in no manner to take upon himself to speak for the Kingdom," as "nobody would think it well that he should take charge of the interests of the realm . . . that your Majesty would sooner lose the Kingdom than treat of matters of State with Don Antonio."

Antonio had then been reigning for seven weeks. From the Portuguese point of view it was therefore he who above all others had the best right to "speak for

¹ In extenso, "*Hist: of the Vniting.*" pp. 134-138.

the Kingdom." But in Philip's interests it was expedient to treat him as a private individual, to whom terms could be offered only for himself.

There followed between the Prior of Belem and the Duke "much parleying," after which the Prior was authorised by the Duke to "propose to D. Antonio that we should meet to-morrow by night in a galley, in the prow of which I shall have a lantern placed: or that he should send a person to treat with me here, with a signed letter and instructions empowering him to negotiate; and that if I send no message all day, Don Antonio should come to the galley." But he was not to "approach the galley unless the signal is up; . . . if it cannot be to-morrow in the night, because I might be unable to go out, then it would be the following night. Or I would send an answer if he sent a messenger."

The Duke ends by apologising to the King for his handwriting:—

" . . . if my head is not more steady than my hand in this letter, bad would be the news received by your Majesty, whose Catholic person may Our Lord preserve, as is needful for the Christian world."

Though the Duke had expressed willingness to meet Dom Antonio, the way in which his message was worded made it plain that negotiations would be useless: except for Antonio to ask some advantage for himself, which he was too proud to do.¹

The next scene therefore, is the battle of Alcántara: which decided the fate of Lisbon. Upon Lisbon turned the fortunes of Portugal. It was not merely this small part of the mainland for which they were fighting, but the enormous and far-spread Empire which had grown and developed under the dynasty of Aviz, in challenging opposition to the "crown of Castile."

Before we see Lisbon lost and won, let us remember what Lisbon was in the year 1580, "*the best and chiefest of all their Cities, on which the whole Realme depends: It is verie populous, yea many believe that of all the cities of Christendome (except Paris) it contains the greatest number of people.*"

Its situation "is neither wholly plaine nor all mountaines, but devideth into five small hills; betwixt the one and the other of these the plain extends unto the River." The city had been walled in 1373, and of the old walls "some part"

¹ The Duke's letter to King Philip will here suffice on this theme; but in "*The Generall Historie of Spaine*," 1612, and "*Hist: of the Vniting*," 1600, can be seen various suggestions as to why any attempt at negotiation with Dom Antonio was abortive. The reason, however, is most plainly indicated above.

² "*Hist: of the Vniting*," p. 3. "The seate of the cuntry is commodious for all partes of the world; being in the midst of many great Kindomes, fit for the ancient and later navigations: For turning towards the West,"—(should be East and North)—"they discover Gallicya, Biscay, Fraunce, England, Germanie and the other Northern Regions. Before them lieth the Islands of Azores . . . , the fortunate Islands, with the countries called the West Indies. On the left lieth Andelouzia and the Straits of Gibraltar, by the which they enter into the Mediterranean Sea, for the navigation of Italie and Greece. And leaving the Straits coasting Affrick, on the left hand they discover many nations and new people unknown to the ancient, . . . from which places many ships arrive at Lisbone with verie great riches, chiefly from the East Indies, the which the Portugals themselves conquered: besides their traffique with the Kingdome of Castile which lieth behind them."

remained. But the Portuguese had become so prosperous that they ceased to suppose any power would attack them. Though there stood "upon a high hill a ~~very~~ ancient Castell" it had no other strength but in its height, "nor any guard"; and was reserved as a state "prison for noble men." Only at the mouth of the Tagus "on the citie side" was there a fort built in newer fashion, meant to defend the entry to the river.¹

We may best understand what followed by entering into the feelings of men on both sides, as if in the present tense; not as mere

"old unhappy far-off things,
And battles long ago."

King Antonio's visit to the Tower of Belem and his removal of the disloyal officers and putting in of such as he could trust, delayed the Duke's advance: as we see by the evidence of the Duke himself. From the monastery of Belem on the 23rd of August he addressed to King Philip a letter which has remained in its original Spanish until now.²

"Your Catholic and Royal Majesty.

"On the 21st I wrote to tell Your Majesty that I would be coming to lodge here at Belen,³ and would reconnoitre the Camp of the rebels from other points. This I did, and having examined it very thoroughly I found that *they are in an exceedingly strong position, and very well entrenched*. But, in spite of this, I trust to God that I shall be able to approach quite close to them, and do those things which ought to be done, for it would be a disgrace to your Majesty's army to be so near to the enemies and to fail to press them hard and close, to the point of expelling them from here; or at least of giving them a good drubbing.

"*Their galleons, and all their fleet, as well as the fort of Belen, fired yesterday with such effect as to prevent our taking up our position here, until our Artillery got at them; and from the land caused the(ir) fleet to draw off, in the direction of Alcántara; and to place itself under the protection of the coast occupied by the rebel camp.* And there it has remained.

"Last night their artillery withdrew to the Tower, and this morning fighting began. And we pressed them so hard that at this hour, which is eight o'clock, they have surrendered. And although all those who defended the battlements richly deserved to be hanged for having held out so long, it seemed to me better to let them off, for there are none left to whom they might serve as an example."

Here is a testimony to the stout resistance of King Antonio's garrison; but to the Spanish General these men were not patriots; but rebels deserving no mercy. *All the more valuable, from a military point of view, is his description of the trouble they gave him.*

"I have ordered Hernando de Marquine to take command of the Tower with twenty-five men. Your Majesty's fleet will now advance to co-operate with this army, with the eleven ships in the order of which I wrote to Your Majesty. We will then discuss what must be done to-day, for we certainly must bestir ourselves; for it has already begun to

¹ Ib: p. 3.

² "Copia de carta original del Duque de Alba al Rey fecha en el monasterio de Belen á 23 de agosto de 1580 . . ."

Archivo General de Simancas, Sec: de Estado. leg: 413. "Documentos inéditos": Vol. 32, pp. 443-444. (B.M. 9195.c.c.c.)

³ Belen, Spanish; Belem, Portuguese.

rain, and the weather held me in such anxiety when the fleet was off Cascaes, that I could not sleep by day or by night. Now that I have the fleet safe in this port I feel very tranquil.

"I have placed a guard in the monastery, and have taken every care, as Your Majesty commanded; nothing in it has been touched.

"Of what we do to-day, and of what we decide shall be done, I will advise Your Majesty to-morrow. And in order that he may relate to your Majesty in greater detail all that has been done, I send Don Alvaro de Luna, who, as one who has been present, and has served especially well, can render an account to Your Majesty of all particulars it is advisable that you should know . . . "

For King Antonio the loss of Belem, following upon the surrender of the Castle of St. John, was the beginning of the end. It enabled the Duke of Alba to move his camp further in, and take up his position in "the Suburbs of the City of Lisbon, where King Anthony then remained" in the "suburbs called Alcantara, with his Armye consisting of aboute six thousand footmen: and eyght hundred horsemen of his owne kingdome, *the greatest parte thereof beeing smallye experienced in feates of armes.*"¹

These "smallye experienced" troops were confronted by old soldiers, in greatly superior numbers, led by a General whose very name was a terror to foes, a tower of strength to friends. The Duke of Alba, after his undeserved imprisonment and many humiliations since his release, was as formidable as ever. Though his hand might shake when he wrote, this was the only sign of age he showed. Six days after his conversation with the Prior of Belem he was able to be eight hours on horseback, very well and "*tan gallardo.*"²

On the morrow, being "Saint Bartholomews's Day, he issued forth . . . with his whole army"; King Antonio being in a strong position on the banks of the river. "Betwixt the two armies there was no other let than the rockes of the brooke of Alcantara."

Alba, coming to the conclusion that Dom Antonio neither meant to surrender nor to take the initiative, decided to try and dislodge him. But first he would "view the enimie" himself before he attempted any "matter of importance." The sentences ensuing come from one to whom every inch of the ground seems to have been familiar."³

"The left bank of the Tagus, whereon the armies were encamped, is hilly, but yet easy, and is divided by the brooke of Alcantara, as it were into straight lines." At the little village of Alcántara "seated upon a right angle," the brook "dischargeth it selfe into the river. There, upon the brooke is a bridge of stone;" the bankes of both sides beginning from the mouth of the river, running a mile upward, are very high and uncase: Yet upward

¹ "The Explanation," p. 26.

² "El Duque está muy bueno, y tan gallardo, que ha estado hoy ocho horas a caballo sin parar momento." Letter dated from Belen "23 de Agosto de 1580": cit "Discurso del Excelentísimo Duque de Berwick y de Alba . . . estudio de la persona de Don Fernando Alvarez de Toledo, III Duque de Alba." Madrid, 1919, p. 92.

³ For answer to an untenable assumption that the *Istoria* now quoted was written by a Genoese merchant's assistant, see II. 4. 8. App: B. p. 45.

⁴ See Plate 5: newly discovered contemporary sketch.

there lieth a champion ground" (open country) "although somewhat uneven, yet very commodious for lodging.

"Upon the left bank was the Portugals campe, in a manner upon the triangle, where the rocke is highest fortified towards the enemy, with ill-fashioned trenches, and much artillerie."

The Duke so planted his Artillery that as soon as he desired he could rake the foe with his fire. That the Portuguese trenches were "ill-fashioned" is the only adverse criticism the hostile historian in 1585 makes against Dom Antonio's position; of which he writes as if he had himself observed it from the opposite bank of the river.

From the same account of the events of the 24th and 25th of August, a point not to be overlooked is that Alba so ordered his forces that "upon the river which lay on the right hand," and was at that part about "three miles broad," he had the Marqués de Santa Cruz "*with three score and two galleies, and five and twenty ships*, the which, lying but musket shot from their forte, served as a wing to the armie on that side, to answer the horse which were on the other."

By co-operation between the Spanish Fleet and Army, the city of Lisbon was so beleaguered that the Duke could count on its speedy surrender.

In the mediaeval wars between Portugal and Castile, Lisbon when besieged had held out almost a year; and the intending conquerors had gone back discomfited to Spain; so Dom Antonio is hardly to be judged "rash" that he "more regarding the common wealth and lybertie of his Countrey than the safetie and preservation of his owne person, determined to hazarde the battayle rather than lightlye and ignominiously to yield himselfe and his people" into the hands of "the tyrants."

In the force Antonio was opposing, Alba was "Commander of all, both at sea and at land"; and Sancho Dávila was "Lord Marshall of the field."

There had at first been no General of the Horse: "*the Captaines being all Noblemen and men of account, they could not conveniently make them subject to any one of their companions, the place requiring a man of such qualitie as he could not be inferior to the Duke.*"

The Duke's "sonne Don Ferrant" de Toledo was appointed just before the battle. The Italian regiments of Foot had Colonels of well-known name, Prospero Colonna, Vicente Caraffa, Carlo Spinelli. Their General was Pietro de Medici, "brother to Francis the great Duke of Tuscany," kinsman to the Queen Mother of France.

¹ "Hist: of the Vniting," p. 213.

² "The Explanation," &c. 1585, p. 26.

³ "Hist: of the Vniting," &c., p. 134. And see among qualifications for a General, "... *qu'il soit d'une naissance illustre; parce que . . . les officiers n'obéissent qu'à regret à un Chef qui est d'une qualité inférieure.*"

Quoted in "*Reflexions Militaires et Politiques, traduites de l'Espagnol de M. le Marquis de Santa Cruz de Marzenado; par M. de Vergy.*" Paris, 1738, Vol. I. p. 3.
(Not Santa Cruz of 1580, but his descendant.)

As the majority of Portuguese martial aristocrats had been killed two years before in Africa, though King Antonio had in his army noblemen of the younger generation such as Francis of Portugal, Count of Vimioso, and many gentlemen devoted to him, with numerous artisans and peasants, few of his officers combined quality with experience. The Duke of Alba, on the other hand, commanded the resources of the vigorous and flourishing nobility of Spain, reinforced by disciplined and well-led troops from Italy and Austria.

Therein lies the tragedy of the people of Portugal. Set as their hearts were upon being ruled by "*a King of their own nation*," the disaster in Africa in 1578 was one of the main factors in the calamitous upshot of the fight in the summer of 1580. Instead of following present English blind guides who imagine the Spanish nobility under Philip II as "decaying," let us consider why the battle was lost by the Portuguese nation, under the brave but insufficiently supported Dom Antonio, and won for "the King of Castile" by the General who represented the combined diplomacy and material force of Spain.

Though the actual fighting in the suburb of Alcántara could be described in a paragraph, the issues were as large as the battle was brief. And there is no need to ask "What has this to do with Queen Elizabeth?" for the battle which gave King Philip possession of the Portuguese Empire affected the whole world, and encouraged Spanish hopes for the mastery of England. Also, as Queen Elizabeth sheltered the vanquished, and (as unpublished Warrants reveal) gave money as well as sympathy to her "dearest brother the King of Portingale,"—as she was to be his nominal protectress to the end of his life,—it is essential that we realise the circumstances.

A notion that war is important or otherwise according to the number of engagements fought, and persons killed, may be one reason for English neglect to-day of the campaign of 1580. But "*his claim is best to the title of victory . . . not that killeth more enemies, or taketh more prisoners, but that by the battle obtaineth his end for which he fought.*"¹

Precisely because the Duke of Alba was so famous a leader, and also because the Navy was at his disposal, he was able to change the map of Europe, with the minimum of bloodshed, in an astoundingly short time.

He achieved this although the people of Portugal were as hostile as ever to Spain; and their hatred of "Castillians" had been a byword even when Froissart talked with noblemen who had fought at Aljubarrota, the battle first establishing the dynasty of which Dom Antonio was to be the last. At Aljubarrota, though the odds of numbers were in favour of the invading Castilians, they had no odds of quality; the flower of martial aristocracy being then assembled on both sides. But in 1580 it was far otherwise. The Duke of Aveiro—who should have led

¹ "*Aphorismes Civill and Militarie: Amplified . . . and exemplified with Historie, out of the first Quarterne of Fr. Guicciardine.*" Lib: 2. Aph: XXXI. Translated by Robert Dallington (an Elizabethan) 2nd ed: London 1629. p. 124.

his Horsemen against the Duke of Alba's son and the patrician Cavalry of Spain,—had met his death two years before at Alcacer.

If it is true, as alleged in 1585, that the Duke of Alba in '78 had refused to see King Sebastian when the King wished to take leave of him,—and had declined not out of scorn but because he pitied what he foresaw of calamity for the young and courageous but misguided monarch,¹—it is one of the most ironical facts in history that the Duke was the destined instrument to turn to account for Spain the consequences of the death of Dom Sebastian. He performed his task with a concentration, vigour, subtlety, and firmness, immeasurably profitable to King Philip. And however detested he was by the people he conquered, and however keenly we may feel for their plight, the magnitude of his service should be measured by the consequences; not by the length of time he remained in the field, which his own skill made brief.

After "certain skirmishes in which two thousand Castilians were slaine," it was on the 24th of August, "early in the morning" that "King Don Anthonio thought to have done battell with the King of Castiles power."² One account sent to England five weeks later represented the Portuguese army as having consisted of 18,000 men.³ Another specified 9,000 Portugals as against 50,000 Spaniards.⁴ King Antonio's "*Explanation*" (as we have seen) sets his own force only at "about six thousande footemen and eyghte hundered horsemen," and those mostly inexperienced.⁵

His Ambassador afterwards related how on the approach of Alba's old soldiers, not only did certain of King Antonio's men run away, but ran to join the invader: "especially the horsemen, a great part whereof (as afterwards manifestly appeared)" had been "corrupted by the King of Castile." Moreover there was a ruinous lack of powder "in Kinge Anthonie's campe": for owing to previous treachery of the Governors "a great quantity of gunpowder" had been conveyed over the border into Spain; so when Dom Antonio was elected King "there could not be found above 2000 weight of the said powder in all the cite of Lisbon."⁶

A "l(ett)re dated In the porte of portingall 30 september 1580," setting the Duke of Alba's force at "14000 footmen and horsemen, all good soldiers and trained up in wars,"⁷ briefly explains that he "sent a company of soldiers to

¹ II. 4. 2. ante.

² "*The Explanation*," 1585, p. 27. The numbers of "Castilians" slain cannot be checked from the Duke of Alba's despatch of 25 Aug: to King Philip, because in announcing his victory, and stating that "up to the present" he is unable to tell who has been taken prisoner and who wounded of the Portuguese, he does not give the casualties on his own side either. "*Doc. inéditos*." Vol. 32. Sec: Estado leg: num: 413.

³ S.P. Portugal, I. 40. ⁴ S.P. For: Newsletters 90. No. 9.

⁵ "*The Explanation*." But he was "hoping for the like good success that in tyme paste Kinge John the first of that name had, who with sixe thousand Portugalls in a verie lyke quarrell overcame John Kinge of Castile, the first also of that name, with his Armye of thirtie and two thousande men in a battayle fought betweene them nere the village of Algiba Rotta." p. 26.

⁶ "*The Explanation*," pp. 16-17.

⁷ It was more like 20,000. See II. 4. 6. ante.

invade the bridge of 'Alcantra,' and so our men . . . came thither together; but the Duke sent behind their back by the side of Saint Benedict's church a band of Spaniards, and so our camp was 'discomflicted.' . . ."

But though many of the undisciplined army were useless when lured into the open, there were others resolved to sell their lives as dearly as possible. It is the enemy historian who, even while describing how the Duke calculated upon the treachery of some and the inefficiency of others, nevertheless shows that it was only on the second day that the victory was won.

Alba first allowed Antonio to hope that the strong position he had taken up would enable him to stand between the Spaniards and the city of Lisbon, until reinforcements reached him from England. But Mendoza in London had been ordered so to alarm the Queen with threats of war as to make her think her fleet and armies must be kept at home for the preservation of her Kingdoms.

That the dislodging of King Antonio from his well-chosen position outside Lisbon was partly achieved by Spanish artillery, but yet more by the corrupting of his troops, does not rest only on his word and the testimony of those who remained faithful to him. It occurs in the "*Istoria*," wherein is graphically narrated how the Duke delayed the chief conflict from the 24th to the early morning of the 25th; calculating that many citizen-soldiers, unaccustomed to the hardships of a camp, would have gone back into Lisbon for the night to sleep in comfort. He resolved to take sudden and concerted action at the moment when it was least expected. Once he could break up the army which stood between him and the city, he reckoned Portugal would be won.

Though resistance might still be offered in the North, he would be able to deal with it swiftly, when master of Lisbon; the second largest, richest, and most populous city in the Christian world.

At dawn on the 25th of August, Lisbon still belonged to "Antonio first of that name King of Portugall." Before sunset he was a fugitive, never to return except secretly in disguise. And this though no man in all the realm had been more "generally beloved of the people."

Alba's victory demonstrated anew that a people "insufficient" to defend themselves or their chosen Monarch cannot be saved by the riches of their country. Those riches swell the revenues of the conqueror.

In 1580 the spectacle of the great city of Lisbon changing hands after a couple of days fighting, astounded the world; and gave rise to Spanish epigrams as to the "folly" of Antonio trusting in anything so unreliable as the affection of the "base people."

That "love" alone does not suffice, nor good intentions prevent a nation from suffering defeat at the hands of a better organised foe, has been shown over

¹ S.P. Portugal, I. 40. Date given as 25th of August. "*Hist: of the Vniting*," pp. 211-218, places the reconnaissance and preliminary skirmishes on the 24th and the defeat of Antonio on the 25th. Confirmed by the Duke of Alba's despatch, p. 18.

and over again by the stern logic of cause and effect; but in all the story of 16th century Europe there is no other instance of so swift an alteration in the "balance of power," as was accomplished at Alcántara by Don Fernando de Toledo, Duque de Alba.¹

"I do not treat of what happened at Lisbon," wrote Antonio de Brito, one of King Antonio's followers, in a letter to "The Ambassador of England" the autumn after the battle of Alcántara, "for you know it."²

"I will briefly say that they were all corrupted with promises of presents, and then the surrender was brought about by treason, of which the Duke of Alba was always a good negotiator, as is notorious in Portugal."

The persons won over by the Duke were "men to whom the King (Antonio) thought he could entrust his armies and fortresses" as they had been "trained in their profession." The Spanish General, however, "managed so cleverly" that some believed him possessed of more information than was really the case; and to others who might have resisted him "he wrote letters" and arranged for these letters to be intercepted,³ "and brought to the King to destroy his confidence" in his own officers. In this way, says De Brito, the Duke either put out of action or won for Spain all "in whom the King trusted" most for the defence of Lisbon. Even "the more part of the officers" in his own camp "received pay from the Duke of Alba, whereby all were corrupted and in the end traitors."

To say that "all were corrupted" is too sweeping; for there were in Dom Antonio's army "many of the Nobility," who, though not trained as soldiers, were so "passionate" against Spain that they hoped their fervour would redeem their "unexperience"; and they remained "most affectionate" to Dom Antonio even subsequent to his disaster.³

Before sharing in Antonio's desperate adventures, let us study his conqueror's

¹ For the Duke's order of battle and brief speech to his army, also details of how he wore down the opposing forces, as published to the world, see *Hist. of the Vniting*, pp. 211-218, Book 7: always allowing for the historian's animus against Don Antonio, for whose personal prowess we must go elsewhere:

"Antoine, qui s'estoit mis à la tête de ses Troupes, fit prodiges de valeur. Il donna et reçut plusieurs coups: il fut dangereusement blessé à la tête, et se defendit jusqu'au moment qu'il se vit abandonné de presque tous ses soldats."

Don Juan Alvarez de Colmenar, "*Annales d'Espagne et de Portugal*." Vol. II. p. 120.

See also as to the Duke:

Suarez Inclan, "*Guerra de anexion en Portugal durante el reinado de Don Felipe II*," Madrid, 1882, 2nd ed: 1897-98.

Estebanez Calderon, "*De la conquista y perdida de Portugal*." Madrid, 1886, 2 vols.

Altolaguirre y Duval, "*Don Alvaro de Bazán, Primer Marqués de Santa Cruz de Mudela*." Madrid, 1888.

Sanchez Moguel, "*Portugal y Felipe II*." Madrid 1904.

² Antonio de Brito de Pimental (in Portuguese). 17 Nov: 1580 as rendered in S.P. Portugal I. 42. Cal: S.P. For: 1579-80. No. 488. p. 480.

"Anto de brito" appears second on the unpublished list of 48 "names of persons resident in Dom Antonio his house 9th February 1585" (6) under date.

There are acrimonious references to him by Mendoza in *Cal: S.P. Spanish*. Vol. III. (1896).

³ "*Hist. of the Vniting*," p. 225.

account of the victory, as written to King Philip the same day, 25th of August and never till now translated.¹ If the Duke had previously beguiled Portuguese officers with money, his stately and laconic despatch preserves silence on that point. He concentrates on the essentials of the fighting. For English readers his brief narrative should have double significance; for even as he overbore the Portuguese resistance outside Lisbon, so he hoped to subdue the English, and ride triumphant into London.

"Your Catholic and Royal Majesty.

"I have been in much anxiety these days, thinking of what your Majesty will have been going through in consequence of not having news from here in the past eight days. For the last two despatches have been turned back: one recounting our arrival, and the other the taking of Belén.² The storm did not allow them to pass: so they will now go with this. And I will let Your Majesty know at the same time that to-day I went to attack the enemy in his entrenchment.

"It pleased Our Lord to give the victory to Your Majesty. To Him do I give my thanks, and to your Majesty my congratulations: in that what we hoped to-day was to shed little blood and to avoid the sacking of Lisbon; and both these hopes have been fulfilled.

"I send to your Majesty the last orders which I gave to the troops for to-day; everything which they contain was carried out; and nothing failed, except the arrival of the fleet to fight that of the rebels at the same time as we began to attack by land: for wind and tide were wanting; and although I wished to wait for the fleet, I could not do so: for Prospero Colonna . . . passed over the bridge with his arquebussiers, and began . . ."

That Colonna's task was not easy, the Duke testifies, and praises him as having "served Your Majesty with much thought and labour, . . . as also have the two other Colonels, who in spite of suffering from quartan fever insisted on being present. . ." It is characteristic of Alba that though no Commander was more exacting, he was as ready to appreciate gallant service as to rebuke or punish its opposite. After praising "Count Geronimo" as having worked "like a loyal gentleman," he describes how

"in another direction Sancho de Avila attacked with the seven Companies of Arquebussiers mentioned in the Orders; and he was so successful with them, that, taking all the trenches in which the enemy had been firmly established, he overcame the foe. . . . They were killed, or fled from their strong posts, before Sancho de Avila, who, most certainly, Sire, if he had never done aught for Your Majesty but what he did to-day, fully deserves all the honours which I know your Majesty will bestow upon him. But in this matter I do not wish to say anything further in his favour, but I will ask the whole army to testify what they have seen him do to-day.

"Those beyond Count Geronimo de Zodrón's post did their part valiantly: the Cavalry came up on the flank, and continued the pursuit as far as the town.

"Meanwhile the Marqués de Santa Cruz, leaving the ships which were unable to move,³ advanced with the galleys; and getting within range of these galleys the whole fleet" (of the Portuguese) "surrendered."

¹"Copia de carta original del Duque de Alba, fecha en Belén á 25 de agosto de 1580. Batalla y rendición de Lisboa." Arch: gen: de Simancas. Sec: de Estado. leg: nu: 413. "Documentos inéditos." Vol. 32. pp. 455-459. (B.M. 9195.ccc.)

² ante. pp. 9-11.

³ because of contrary wind.

"The pursuit was carried right up to the gates of Lisbon.

"I had recommended all those in command, and all volunteers, when they should reach that point, to do their utmost to prevent the common soldiers from entering the town."

Naming the "officers and gentlemen" who "undertook this work," of averting a sack, the Duke adds that extra to the written orders he told them verbally "what good service they were doing Your Majesty" by preserving the city. Therefore, when some of the seamen landed despite the Duke's previous recommendation to the Marqués not to allow them ashore,—the Prior (the Duke's son) "entered also, and hanged two of them," who had been breaking windows; "and turned the rest out."

"When I arrived on the outskirts of the City, I was told that the Town Councillors wished to surrender. I therefore sent the Prior to hear what they demanded. He sent to tell me they were ready to submit, if your Majesty would grant a general pardon to all the citizens, and would confirm their privileges.

"I told him to answer that there was no other manner of treaty possible than that of obedience to your Majesty as their King and natural Sovereign; and giving themselves up to you to do whatever you thought best, and begging you to show your accustomed clemency.

". . . They came, and brought me the keys, saying they were ready to do whatever I should command . . . and to obey you in all things as their King . . .

"Your Majesty will be good enough to let me know soon what is to be done, and what form their pardon is to take, and what favours are to be granted to them; because until I receive such orders from your Majesty I shall hold up this matter.

"We had been informed that Don Antonio was in a monastery inside Lisbon; so the Prior went and surrounded the building, and searched it thoroughly, but found no one. Some say that he and the Count of Vimioso escaped in a boat, and that Don Antonio was wounded. It is said for certain that the Count was wounded by a shot from an arquebus.

"I send Don Fernando, so that, as one who has witnessed all these events, he may give a full account of them to your Majesty . . . Don Fernando has served your Majesty very well, as also have the Major-Generals . . . and the rest of the officers, everyone doing what fell to his share with exactitude and diligence . . .

"The Marqués de Santa Cruz has served your Majesty, as he always does, with much care and industry . . .

"I ordered the Prior to remain in Lisbon to-night, and not to leave the place to-morrow until he had ejected all the seamen, and whoever else of your army might be inside the town; and to close the gates, which the sailors had broken open when they entered . . ."

At this time Alba seems to have been under the impression that "the enemy," King Antonio and his party, had ransacked the suburbs. In this he was mistaken. But King Philip's General on his entry into Lisbon placed guards to protect the monasteries. And having reported at once to his Sovereign the complete success of the battle of Alcántara, bringing about the surrender of Lisbon, he concludes, "At present there is nothing else of which to inform your Majesty . . ."

Turn now to the vanquished. Seeing that the Duke's entry into Lisbon was not to be prevented, "King Anthonio's most principall and faithfull servants counselled him to provide in time for the safetie of his person, for as long as it

¹ Apparently the Duke did not himself stay in Lisbon for that night; his letter ends "*Del monasterio de Belén á 25 de agosto de 1580. El Duque de Alba.*"

was safe there remained some hope of the recoverie of the libertie of the cuntry," which if he were lost would be "utterly unrecoverable for ever."

This was "by his majestie well weighed and considered." But to save himself and "many of his noblemen and others that were very faithfull unto him" seemed almost impossible. There was only one way to do it, and that was if they could break through a squadron of Horse by which the Duke had thought to debar them from escape.

"And thereupon without delay," carrying "the King's royall standard" aloft, "they all set spurs to their horses, and charged the Spanish Cavalry so suddenly and with such vigour that "with their weapons" they "procured their passage." But so few against so many could hardly have escaped unhurt:

"King Anthonie himself received two great woundes in his head, by staying (and that not without effect) to help Ferdinando Valerosa out of the handes of the enimies. And although the King was greatly troubled and weakened by meanes of those woundes whereat the bloud ranne in great abundance downe his eyes and face, yet more by God's providence than by man's strength . . . , he escaped, with four or five horsemen that continually followed him (of which number was Fraunces of Portugall Erle of Vimioso)";

they cutting their way through, while others of the valiant remnant bore the Royal Standard "another way" to distract attention: for wherever the Standard was, there it was expected for the King to be.

"*The Explanation*" (thus tantalisingly laconic) continues, "Nowe when the King had passed to the Cyty of Lisbon meeting his enemies in divers places," (which means fighting his enemies on the way), "at last he came to the shore side" of the Tagus "which runneth by that end of the City" where Dom Emmanuel de Portugal, uncle of the Conde de Vimioso, had already embarked to fly to Santarem. His barque was in mid-stream. But as soon as he knew Dom Antonio was there, he ordered his ship to be "brought to the shore, that his Majestye might bee receaved thereinto," with Count Vimioso and others.

"Nowe as the King was sayling up the river in the sayde barque towards Santaren," he was chased by King Philip's galleys, which came "verye neare, discharging store of harqebush shot thereat." But just as the Castilian ships were gaining rapidly, three of King Antonio's champions who had been with him in the battle, and had "followed the Standard," "galloped after him in all possible haste to overtake the barque"; making signs from the shore that the King should land. As the bark came alongside, two of the three Horsemen (Anthony de Sousa and Jerome da Sylva) dismounted, one giving his horse to the King, the other "to therle of Vimioso and Emanuell of Portugall his uncle," and the third taking up behind him on his own horse a churchman of the house of Mascarenhas who had escaped with the King. The three horses carrying five men then galloped away as fast as they could, through groves of olive trees, and by "other unfrequented places, till they were in some better safetie."

A few moments more, and it would have been too late; for "scarcely had the

King landed with the three Lords and got to horse" when the barque he had just left was taken by one of the Spanish galleys.

This and previous hairs-breadth escapes heartened Dom Antonio's followers to believe a special Providence watched over him, as the destined instrument for discomfiture of "the King of Castile."

Meanwhile the Duke of Alba entered Lisbon; and not having yet learnt that Dom Antonio had escaped, conjectured him to be hidden in the city; and so "made no great search after him in the fields."

"Insomuch that while the souldiers were busie in spoyling the suburbes, and search was made in the town for him, the King with them of his companie came first to a Village three miles from Lisbon; where, after he had stayed a little to dresse his wounds he passed further from thence by unfrequented waies;" till the same night he reached a country house "a myle from Santarem."¹

"This *quinta* belonged to Peter de Menezes, one of his treasurers, who overtook his majestie in the waie, flying also from thennemye in the company of the Bishop of Guardia. The next day after his majesties coming to this place, he sent his agent to Santarem to declare to the governor and magistrates of the Towne how he was determined to come thither. . . ."

But after two days in Santarem it was evident that the place was not strong enough to stand a siege; and that the only possible course was to retreat north, where the Spaniards had not yet penetrated. Wherefore Dom Antonio "took his journey" to Oporto ("Porto of Portugall"), there to "have convenient place and opportunitie to repayre his armie and stay for ayde," which he expected "*out of Fraunce or England.*"

Of the faithful officers who accompanied him, the chief was Francis, Count of Vimioso, whom he soon afterwards created Lord High Constable; an appointment naturally not recognised by the existing Constable, John Duke of Bragança, whose hereditary office was confirmed to him by Philip of Spain. When, however, in future narratives by King Antonio's champions we read of "the Constable," Vimioso is intended.

Two hundred Cavalry were with Antonio when he left Santarem, and one thousand Foot. But he became so weak from his wounds that he could not sit his horse, nor even bear the swaying motion of a litter. It was not safe to delay; so his men carried him on their shoulders as far as Montemajor. There he remained "six dayes" to rest. Recruiting went on briskly, Vimioso "gathering men together . . . to aboute the number of eyghte thousande":² and Antonio was "receaved and acknowledged as Kinge . . . notwithstanding that the Kinge of Castile" (or rather the Duke of Alba), "had already subdued Lisbon the chief Cytye of the Kingdome."

As to the fate of Lisbon, according to the information received in England, it "was such a spoile that the spoile of Rome was nothings like unto this." The

¹ "*The Explanation*," &c. 1585, p. 28. In a letter of 30 Sep: (S.P. Portugal, I. 40.) Dom Antonio is described as having come into Lisbon "accompanied with the carle of Vimioso and bishop of Giartia only" (Guarda) ". . . but went his way straight . . ."

² "*The Explanation*," p. 29. ³ "*The Explanation*," pp. 29-30.

reference is not to the ancient Goths or Vandals, but to the occasion upon which the troops of King Philip's father had taken the Holy City in 1527.

Writing on the 25th of August the day of the battle, the Duke reported that he was able to prevent the sack of the city.¹ But subsequently the plundering of the suburbs of Lisbon "did laste iij dayes; and in xvj dayes" the correspondent already quoted describes the Spaniards as having "LX gallies and XX grete shippes" laden with treasure; and states that the troops of the Most Catholic King "made grete abuses in the churches" outside the city.

"But at this present the citie is quiett becawse the soldiers doe come no more wthin the gattes: and for the same is kepte a grete watch. All the handie craftes men doe worcke, and all Judges and currisidoes doe followe their busines, as they did before.² The Duke of alva is lodged in the suber(b)s; the Pryor within the citie."³

It was not, however, suggested that King Antonio's cause was hopeless. That though "discomfitted" he safely reached "Montemor and Quimbra" was amplified into his having at Coimbra a great store of "money, precious stones, and the riche sadell and bridell of his predecessors."⁴

Despite his wounds being in his head, he appears to have been able to think swiftly; and after Vimioso had gathered together for him some 8000 men,⁵ as soon as he had sufficiently recovered to mount his horse, he set out with his little army for Aveiro.

¹ p. 19. ante.

² "*currisidoes*": Corrigedores, "who may be resembled to the Pretours and Gouvernours of the auncient Romanes what governed the provinces. One citie hath many townes, people and villages which are subject unto it . . . in such sort that the cities are the heads, and the townes as the members." "*A Treatise Paraenetical*," 1598. p. 158.

³ "the Dukes sonne the grete prior . . ." "lettre In the porte of portugall." 30 Sep: Portugal I. 40. ("The Pryor": "El Prior Don Hernando," a son of the Duke.) The city itself the Duke had undertaken to spare; the troops were therefore only allowed to loot outside the walls. But the "*Istoria*" ("*Hist. of the Vniting*," &c., p. 3), explains that Lisbon "on which the whole nation depended" formerly "hath been walled," and that part of the old walls "continues to this day" (1585); "but for that it hath been much augmented, the part without the walls exceeds the other in greatness." See the view of Lisbon, (ante) by Braun and Hogenberg. The old walls had been built in 1373. They are outlined in red on a map of "*Lisbon from the Quinta de Torrinha, Val de Pereiro*" by Baldwin and Cradock, 1833, in Vol. II of *Maps* issued by Chapman and Hall, 1844.

⁴ S.P., Portugal, I. 40. ⁵ "*The Explanation*," 1585, p. 30.

UNPUBLISHED CONTEMPORARY DRAWING OF THE BATTLE OF ALCANTARA (NEAR LISBON):

*from the hitherto unknown original, in the National Library of Portugal:
"Portraict du sitie et ordre de La bataille donnée contre Le s^r don Antoine
nomme roy de portugal Et Le duc d'Albe Lieutenant et cappⁿ
general du Roy cath. Don Philippe 2. Deuan^t Lisbonne par mer
et par terre en un mesme Jour Le 25 daoust 1580."*

(Black and white; on paper.)

Now reproduced by courtesy of Colonel da Costa Veiga; who discovered it in June, 1933, when Dr. Ruy Travassos Valdez (descended from an officer who entered Spain with the Duke of Alba in 1580) suggested on behalf of the present writer that some contemporary picture of the battle might still be in existence.

(Photograph, Lazarus, Lisbon: for "Elizabethan England").

Half map, half picture, though of the same school as that of the battle of Moncontour, "*Schille fecit, 1569*," (first published E.E. II. 1. 2), this is more roughly drawn. There is no attempt to render the troops to scale: only to indicate their positions so as to make the operations intelligible. That the command of the sea was what enabled Alba to be so swiftly victorious on land, is a main point emerging from his despatches: and manifest also in this sketch.

Despite the inscription at the top being in French, the anonymous draftsman seems to have been a Spaniard. He spells place names the Spanish way: *Belem* as *Belen*, etc.; and as King Philip is "His Majesty" ("*su mag^t*") and the elected King of Portugal is only "*don Antonio*" we may infer this rendering is by one of the conquerors.

Compare the Duke of Alba's letter to King Philip, (ante, p. 12), in which he refers to his anxiety that the fleet should come up the Tagus at the right moment. Notice that King Philip's ships (*naos de su mag^t*) are surrounding Belem between the Tower (*Torre de Belen*) and Don Antonio's ships. Also see the Spanish galleys (*galeras de su mag^t*) coming up the river, interposing between Don Antonio's ships near Palmella, and his other squadron close to Belem.

As to the troops ashore, the bridge mentioned in most of the despatches, *Puente de Alcántara*, is conspicuous, as also *St. Bento*. Notice in the middle of the picture the Spanish General's name, *Dug d'alua*; and to the reader's right "*el prior don Hernando*," riding at the head of Auxiliary Cavalry. (The General commanding all the Horse was Don Fadrique de Toledo). Observe also on the opposite side *Sancho de Avila* (the Marshal of the Spanish army) is directing the Harquebussiers, as described in the Duke's despatches; and that there is behind him another force of Cavalry (*Caballeria de su mag^t*). The Spanish Horse are seen attacking from both flanks.

The Duke of Alba interposed his large army between Don Antonio's men and the city of Lisbon; protecting his own troops by means of the Spanish fleet behind them; which swiftly defeated Don Antonio's fleet.


The city of Lisbon and its immediate environs (for view of which see ante II. 4. 7^b) are not shown in this picture, because the victory was practically won (as the various letters of the combatant show) when Prospero Colonna captured the bridge of Alcántara, and Sancho de Avila at the same time came up with his Harquebussiers.

See, to the reader's left, *Palmela 5 leagues de Lisboa*, and *Almuda*, and in the *Rio Tejo* (Rive Tagus) to the left the *Armada de Don Antonio*; and in the middle *galeras de su mag^t*; and *nao du su mag*. To the right *Fortaleza q tenia por don Antonio* (this is the fort of St. John). See *Torre de Belen*, and *Belen*; and *alojamiento del exercito de su mag*. From left to right *Castilla S. Ben^{to}* and *Arrabal de Sta Catalina* (arrabal, suburb). In the centre see *Puente de Alcántara*; and to the left *Portugueses*; to the right *Gente italiana de Prospero y otros coroneles* (Prospero was the Christian name of Colonna, so presumably a friend of his drew the plan).

Below, to the left of *Puente de Alcántara* and *Rio de Alcántara*, with *tiendas* (tents) *de Do. Antonio* in between, and *jinetes* (light horsemen) *de Don Antonio*. To the left the Spanish Horse *Caballeria de su mag*: and *Sancho de Avila* (the Marshal of the Army) with *Espanoles arcabuzero* (and an illegible word). To the right *Tudescos* (German mercenaries) marked twice over. *Duque d'Alba* (*duque d'Alua*) in the centre; and to the left *El prior Don Hernando* and *auxil^{rs} ligeros*; *arcabuzeros de* (illegible) *acarristes y jinetes*.

Though *Puente de Alcántara* (Bridge of Alcántara) seems like repetition as Alcántara is Arabic for a bridge, the Great Duke's despatches (ante, pp. 18-19) show how once this bridge was captured, the resistance of the Portuguese was broken. A minute account of the operations was published in the 1585 "*Istoria*"; but they are easiest to understand from the Duke of Alba's letter to the King: masterpiece of concentration and lucidity.

L'ouvrage d'artillerie et ordre de la bataille donnée entre les deux armées
nommé par de Joyeuse et le Duc d'Albe Lieutenant et capitaine
général du Roy catholique Philippe 2. devant L'Esperance parmer
et sur terre en l'année 1590.



PART II.

“Particularly the Power of Spain.”

CHAPTER 4.

“THE BALANCE OF POWER.”

SECTION 8.

“For the love of you.”

(*The further efforts of Antonio the elected King of Portugal, 1580*).

“All will see that my country was so dear to me that I was content not only to die in but with it.”

Luis de Camoens to Dom Francisco d'Almeida.
“*Vida*,” &c., in “*Obres*,” ed: Visconde de Juromenha. 1860. I. 126.

“It pleased Our Lord to give the victory to your Majesty. To Him I give my thanks, and to your Majesty my congratulations.”

The Duke of Alba to Philip II. 25 Aug: 1580. (ante).

“God is my witness that all which I have done, and shall do, neither hath been nor shall be to any other end” than “for the love of you and to make equal this balance of justice.”

“*The oration of Anthony to his Soldiers.*”
 (“*History of the Vniting*,” &c., pp. 234-5.)

“The Queen having had news from Portugal . . . they have discussed whether it would not be well to lend part of Drake's money to Don Antonio I learnt that the Queen had received letters from Don Antonio, begging her earnestly to send him powder, cannon, and arms . . .”

Don Bernadino de Mendoza to King Philip, from London.
13 Nov: 1580. (State Papers, Spanish, Simancas. Cal: Vol. III. pp. 63-64.)



THE EXPLANATION.

OF THE TRVE AND


LAVVFVLL RIGHT AND TYTLE,
OF THE MOSTE EXCELLENT PRINCE,

ANTHONIE the first of that name, King of *Portugall*,
concerning his warres, againste *Phillip* King of *Castile*, and
agains^t his Subiectes and adherentes, for the recouerie of his kingdome.

TOGETHER VVITH A BRIEFVE HI-

storye of all that hath passed aboute that matter, vntill the
yeare of our LORD. 1583.

*Translated into English and conferred with the
French and Latine Copies.*



By the commaundement and order of the Superiours.

At Leyden
In the Printing house.
of Christopher Plantyn,
1585.

Title-page, now first reproduced, of "*The Explanation of the . . . Right and Tytle of . . . Anthonie the first . . . King of Portugall, . . .*" B.M. 1060, c. 33.

This has hitherto been classed as one of the few books in English printed by the Dutch firm of Plantin. It has escaped notice that neither type, paper, nor ornament resemble the Latin edition published certainly by Plantin the same year. Likewise it has not been known that the translating was done in London, by a Frenchman "Claud Desailiens, dit Hollyband," for one of Queen Elizabeth's Councillors, "your Lordship" (unnamed).

After reading the letter of Desailiens, it will be seen that this edition described as licensed "at Delft the 15 of Januarie 1585" can hardly have been the first printing; the printed pamphlet having been in the hands of "the King of Portugal" and "Your Lordship" some ten weeks earlier, i.e. the first week of November. (See Appendix A).

EXPLANATIO
VERI AC LEGITIMI
IVRIS, QVO SERENISSIMVS
LVSITANIÆ REX ANTONIVS EIVS
NOMINIS PRIMVS nititur, ad bellum
Philippo Regi Castellæ pro regni recupera-
tione inferendum.

VNA CVM HISTORICA QVADAM
enarratione rerum eo nomine gestarum
vsque ad Annum M. D. LXXXIII.



Ex mandato & ordine Superiorum,

LVGDVNI BATAVORVM,
In Typographia Christophori Plantini.

M. D. LXXXV.

Title-page, now first reproduced, of "*Explanatio Veri ac Legitimi Ivris, quo Serenissimus Lusitaniae Rex Antonius*," &c. *Christophori Plantini*, 1585. (B.M. 1060, c. 31). For purpose of comparison with the English version, purporting to have been issued from the press of Plantin.

Although the imprimatur of the British Museum copy of the English translation reads as "At Leyden In the Printing house of Christopher Plantyn. 1585," the type and paper and the printer's ornament are entirely different from the Latin version which was certainly printed by Plantin. From the wording of the translator's letter, to the peer at whose "command" his rendering into English was published, there is reason to infer the printing of the English edition (No. 1606. c. 33) to have been carried out not at Leyden but in London.

(See Appendix A). "The Explanation," issued in 1585-6 in Latin, French, Flemish, and English (one of the most important political tracts of its day) has been so neglected as not even to be included in the standard Portuguese Bibliography of its subject.

QUEEN ANNA, 4th wife of PHILIP II of SPAIN.

*Now first published from a picture on panel
in possession of Sir Francis Newdegate, G.C.M.G.
at Arbury, Warwickshire,*

Where it has been since Charles II's day, when it is believed to have been delivered over to Sir Francis's ancestor with other Spanish pictures, in part payment for a debt.

(It closely resembles a picture signed and dated by Antonio Moro, 1574, in the National Collection in Vienna.)

Photograph, Duggins, Leamington.

Born in 1549, Archduchess Anna was eldest daughter of the Emperor Maximilian II by his wife Maria, daughter of the Emperor Charles V.

This near relationship did not prevent King Philip choosing this Archduchess his niece, as his fourth Queen, in 1570.

She was mother of Philip, Prince of Asturias, who in 1598 succeeded to the throne.

Her death took place on the 26th of October, 1580, while the Duke of Alba and his Marshal Sancho Dávila were subduing Portugal.

The Queen had been brought to Badajoz, by her husband in expectation of entering in triumph into the newly conquered Kingdom.

Miniatures of her and of her only son, possibly given by her to the 3rd Duke of Alba, are in possession of the present (17th) Duke, and are reproduced in "*Catálogo de las Miniaturas y Pequeños Retratos pertenecientes al Excmo Sr Duque de Berwick y de Alba, por D. Joaquín Ezquerra del Bayo vocal de la Junta de Iconografía Nacional.*" 1924. (Lámina XXX, facing p. 194).





PART II.

“Particularly the Power of Spain.”

CHAPTER 4.

“THE BALANCE OF POWER.”

SECTION 8.

“For the love of you.”

(Spain, England and Dom Antonio. 1580).

THE adventures of the fugitive King of Portugal, after he turned northwards, might have ended far other than they did if the English aid, upon which he was relying, had not been held back by the skilful machinations of Don Bernardino de Mendoza in London. But before we consider what Mendoza said and wrote, we must see Dom Antonio's “*Explanation*” as given subsequently in English:

“When the sayde Kinge Don Anthonio drew neere to this Cytte of Avero hee summoned th’inhabitantes to take his parte and t’open the gates of their Cytie unto him accordinge to theire oathe.

“Uppon refusall whereof . . . he gave in charge to the Earle of Vimioso . . . to doe his endeavour to take it by force,” promising the spoil to the soldiers. “And though it were well furnished with munitions of warre and other necessities, yet the greater part of the Citizens refused to make resistance against King Anthonies men, insomuch that the Towne was taken easily by scaling the walles, and otherwise, and so brought under his obedience. . . .”¹

Although he had promised his soldiers they should have the spoil, he kept them so well in hand that they “exceeded not in their insolence,” and “all things were soon in quietnesse.”²

For three days “his majestie” lodged “in the monasterye of the dominican

¹ Op. cit. p. 30. Though written in 1585, this tallies with information received in England at the time. In the letter of 30 Sep: 1580 (S.P.P. I. 40,) it is indicated that Aveiro was treated with comparative mercy:—When Vimioso captured it “perforce, and delyvered it to his soldiers to be spoild, and made himself stronge wth the municion that was there, and other municion taken out of certain hulkes w^{ch} were there to lade salt,” he “commanded the same salt to be given to them gratis in recompense of their municion.”

² S.P.P. I. 40.

friers": after which he moved to a house the owner of which was absent in Lisbon, "gone to the King of Castile to sue for pardon" because he had previously acknowledged Dom Antonio as King.

"Certaine traytors" in Aveiro were "executed by order of law"; and the King then "continued his journey toward . . . porto of Portugall" (Oporto). "Wee were faire to deliver him the towne upon certen composicion," states an anonymous correspondent on the 30th of September: "and so he is lord of the sheire called interdoro Imino." (Marginal note by Lord Burghley "Antre Dorro e Mino.") The Northern "Portingales" had been long ardently loyal to the Crown, and "many thousands" were eager to join King Antonio.

The outlook was the more hopeful ". . . in that also it is thoughte that this winter the spaniardes shall doe nothinge here becawse the ryver called Mondego is verie grete."

As this river was so swollen that the bridge of Mondego had been broken—or so "wee doe heare,"—this appeared to dispose of one way by which King Philip might come to the extreme north. Insufficient allowance was made for the energy and persistence of his officers; and it was rumoured that the Spaniards were "afeared" the citizens of Lisbon might rebel "by reson of the grete spoile and extortion" they had suffered.

As for persons who had propitiated the foe, "All the noblemen doe repente, becawse the kinge of Hispania maketh so smale accompte of them." Not quite all; for the Duke of Bragança is alleged to have been greeted by King Philip "with these wordes, Welcome Duke, Yours shall be yours and mine yours"

Actually King Philip did not come into Lisbon until the following spring. A contagious fever broke out among the Spanish troops, and penetrated to the camp at Badajoz. That King Philip for a while was exceedingly ill led some in Lisbon to believe Heaven about to remove the Monarch who had determined to rule them against their wills. But the Duke of Alba carried on the business of government; and did not sit down content with controlling the south; his task was to bring the entire Kingdom into subjection. Accordingly, on September the 22nd, 4000 Foot and 400 Horse were sent north, under one of his ablest officers, Sancho Dávila, Marshall of the Army.²

On their way they marched past Aljubarrota, the scene of the overthrow of their ancestors by the forces of John the Great.

Reaching Aveiro, and hearing that Dom Antonio had marched to Porto, Dávila pressed onward with the more determination in that he learnt of the

¹ S.P.P. I. 40.

² Born in Avila, 21 Sep: 1523. Distinguished in Africa, Flanders, &c. Survived till 8 June, 1583. Vide, "*El Rayo de la guerra, hechos de Sancho Dávila, por Jerónimo Manuel Dávila y San Vitores*," Valladolid, 1713; and "*Vida de D. Sancho Dávila, por el Marqués de Miraflores*:" and Short summary of his career in *Catálogo . . . del Palacio de Liria. Le publica La Duquesa de Berwick y de Alba. Madrid, 1898.* pp. 142-144.

gathering of troops for Antonio by three "principal gentlemen" (Edward de Lemos, Martin Lopez de Azevedo, and Anthony de Sousa Coutigno).

Some of the Spanish officers were unwilling to attempt the crossing of the Douro. But their Commander went up stream and selected Avintes as the safest place for embarkation. He then assembled his army; and, recapitulating the progress of events from the landing of the Duke of Alba at Cascaes to the victory on the 25th of August, he asked what excuse could be put forward for hesitation now? "Call to mind that all Portugal, being assembled with their counterfeit King, lodged at Alcántara, a place by nature most strong, furnished with artillery and other arms," yet had been overthrown.

Nearly every Spanish officer of distinction included the art of oratory among his accomplishments; and Dávila could hardly have improved the occasion more skilfully if he had been a Councillor of State:

"Yet suppose not that I acknowledge these victories wholly from your valour, for I think I may attribute it better to his Majesty's right and the injustice of Anthony. Who is there but knoweth that the realm appertaineth by just title unto our King? What judgment seat is there in the world that hath not of themselves given sentence in his favour? And contrariwise who is ignorant that Anthony hath tyrannously usurped the title of King, that he hath neither right nor title to the realm, that he is a bastard, insufficient and incapable of this degree. . . . Therefore the justice of God will make us instruments to punish him."¹

It was not for Spaniards to remind each other that as being a bastard had not prevented Antonio's ancestor John, Master of Aviz, from defeating their ancestors, reigning gloriously for half a century, and founding a dynasty, the people of Portugal were not unreasonable if in place of a foreign conqueror they again preferred a native-born Prince. Precisely because King Philip's claim to inherit the Crown of Portugal had been rejected by the Portuguese, the Spaniards felt the greater necessity to defend it. But Dávila's services were more than verbal. By an astute stratagem he got two-thirds of his force across the Douro, while a third attacked and diverted King Antonio's small and "unexperienced" army.²

Both in the "*General Historie of Spain*" first written in 1583 in France, and in the "*Historie of the Uniting of the Kingdom of Portugal to the Crown of Castill*" issued in Italian in 1585 to show the futility of his continued perseverance against the power, might and right of King Philip, there is expressed a recurring wonder at the affection "Antonio Prior of Crato" evoked from the people. His "grace of nature" is admitted. And though the "*Historie of the Vniting*" is special pleading for the Spanish conquest, every now and then the writer testifies to the merits of the man he abhorred. It seems likely that the historian was the Portuguese João de Silva, Count of Portalegre, who, having himself been won by Spain, was concerned to condemn the "obstinacy" of all "Portugals" who chose to resist. The dramatic mind and pen of this successful courtier enabled him to make his narrative so engrossing that many were drawn

¹ "*Historie of the Vniting*," &c., p. 230.

² Op: cit, pp. 230-234.

to read it in the Italian tongue. Publishing it pseudonymously in Genoa, he could criticise his own countrymen as if with the pen of an impartial onlooker. Had he depicted Dom Antonio as a monster, his eloquence would either have appeared as malice or have been ascribed to ignorance. The system therefore was not to deny that Antonio was beloved; rather to exclaim upon the devotion shown him; and then imply such devotion to have been born of "confused" intellect. Likewise to show that whatsoever Dom Antonio might do or say, and with no matter what motive he had accepted the Crown, his case was hopeless against the combined diplomacy and strength of Spain.

"Antonio Prior of Crato" in the "*Istoria*" was depicted in 1585 with intent to convince the worldly-minded, all over Europe, that they would win scant repute for sagacity if they encouraged or aided a baffled fugitive, against the most powerful and victorious Monarch in the world.

Published the year after the expulsion of the Spanish Ambassador from England and the death of Francis Duke of Anjou, but three years prior to the smiting of the Invincible Armada, this "*Istoria*"—even in its misrepresentations, which are not careless but calculated,—is of deep interest. Not reprinted in English since the one translation in 1600, the few modern English writers who look at it see it through a haze of conventional "standard" history; without contrasting its allegations either with manuscript matter or with contemporary printed statements such as King Antonio's "*Explanation*." In the present work it will be often quoted, subject to those long-delayed but needful comparisons. Even in its English guise the subtlety of the author will be apparent, when we learn the circumstances and events he dexterously manipulated, and become acquainted at first hand with the persons he marshalled upon the stage.

A misleading appearance of impartiality pervades his work. Wherefore "the Prior of Crato" is sometimes allowed to speak for himself. But scenes depicting Dom Antonio in favourable or dignified aspect nearly always go before some skilful depreciation, showing that his graces and his susceptibility to be influenced by the people were the means of his undoing. The intended moral of the story is the same as that preached by Mendoza to Queen Elizabeth: namely the foolishness of attempting resistance to superior force. That any man should be willing to suffer personal loss and hardship rather than compromise on a principle, seemed insane to the composer of the "*Istoria*." The words "duty" and "vertue" run smoothly off his pen; but his own idea of duty was propitiation of the winner; and "vertue" was for him the art of foreseeing who would prevail.

Nevertheless he was too clever entirely to suppress Antonio's statements. Having given the oration of Sancho Dávila, he includes also the appeal of Dom Antonio to his followers, that autumn, 1580, when the Spaniards had crossed the Douro. The English and French aid not arriving, Dom Antonio saw it would be suicidal to attempt a pitched battle. What he is represented as saying reads as if taken down at the time by a spy. It is in the manner of his own letters. But while his words embody the spirit of Portuguese patriotism, the whole book is written in

effort to deride that spirit; and the speech was licensed to be printed only after his forces had been beaten by sea in 1582 and the following year, and many of his supporters executed after the battles.

The fugitive King's expression of hope and confidence spoken in 1580 would have therefore read ironically in the light of intervening events; so their publication was a skilful way to cause distrust of any such sentiments if expressed again. But if on the one hand we note why such an appeal was permitted to be retrospectively recorded in an apology for the victorious King Philip, so also we may consider what different emotions it must have awakened in the hearts of hearers who believed their country's sole hope of independence to be incarnate in the man who thus addressed them.¹

Tyrants, he said, offer false reasons to cover their desires when they strive to enforce their will by arms; but equitable and loving Princes not only submit to justice but strive to be conformable to the wishes of their subjects: "at such time as the succession failed," he had intended to obey whoever should by right be proclaimed King. But as Philip of Spain, despairing to win the Crown of Portugal by right, resorted to arms, then and not till then "it pleased you to name me your King and protector."

This honour had been accepted, less from desire to rule than because he did not see "*any one that could govern you with more true love.*" "How I have behaved . . . you know, who have been always in all things not my subjects but my companions."

That whereas when he had been elected King, the country was ill-prepared for war, the King of Spain had made ready betimes and "plotted many ambushes," was the reason Spain so swiftly gained the advantage.

Recalling briefly the unhappy result of having fought the invader when "*the succours promised by Christian Princes could not come in time,*"—now those succours being still delayed, to wait was the only reasonable course.

For a Commander of irregular troops, it is a melancholy moment when he tells them that all action must be indefinitely postponed. But King Antonio expressed it as encouragingly as was consistent with the truth: "We have already tried the hazard of a battle. If you think good to adventure it again, against an enemy that followeth us, do as you please." But his own opinion was that to attempt "a doubtful battle" would be risking the whole cause. Even in the event of immediate victory this would not achieve the main purpose, the expulsion of the invader from the realm.

"God is my witness that all which I have done and shall do neither hath been nor shall be to any other end" than "for the love of you and to make equal this balance of justice," now overborne "by the might of the greatest enemy" Portugal has ever known.

¹ Op.: cit, pp. 234-236. "The oration of Anthony to his soldiers." Now slightly abbreviated, and spelling modernised.

He trusts his soldiers to share his conviction that now is not the season to fight. But if any man is inclined to dissent, let him consider,

"had I . . . regarded . . . mine own private interest, I had been now quiet, rich, and reconciled with the Catholic King, who hath often sought me by offers and large promises; and you had been tyrannised over . . . as those be that have no Kings of their own. . . . But God forbid that ever I should prefer my own profit before yours, or mine own benefit before the realms whose people have so much loved my progenitors."

"I may well at this time yield unto unjust forces that do oppress me; yet will I never renounce the realm, nor my title; but with new arms and new force I hope again to try . . . so as this sorrow which I now see in your faces should be turned to joy."

"Those arms, that munition, those men, which do not now arrive in time, shall serve hereafter. . . . I know that this love which you have always borne to me and my predecessors shall no ways be diminished by any sinister event." Therefore "although we shall be now separated one from another," yet "shortly we shall be assembled again, to your great benefit and profit, and to the shame and dishonour of our enemies."

Even the hostile narrator admits that "these words did move the hearts and eyes of many."

Then "being retired with his faithful followers, he departed as it were in secret, . . . and going to the Monasterie of Aronca by the unknown way of Vairam and Barcellos, he came to Viana."¹

His intention was to leave the country, but return with an allied army; and his strongest hopes were based on aid from England, "Portugal's most ancient ally." That England and France would combine with him for the dislodgement of King Philip he had reason to believe. Nor need we call him over-confident in this; for it was precisely what Lord Burghley had specified as desirable.

Meanwhile the Spanish Commander kept up the pursuit, and tracked Dom Antonio to Vianna. The city though desirous to defend him, was not strong enough so to do. Moreover whereas Antonio had disbanded his army, Dávila's Cavalry knew themselves about to be reinforced; and it seemed as if in an hour or less they would have Antonio prisoner.

The city capitulated on conditions. But while negotiation was in process, King Antonio, having divided among his companions "his treasure (which was not great)," "arrayed himself like a mariner," and, accompanied by the Count of Vimioso, the Bishop of Guarda, and a few other of his most devoted friends, "tooke boate." Though seen, pursued, shot at, and nearly drowned,—and losing some of his most precious valuables,—he got away.

What was his next move, where he might be concealed, not only Sancho Dávila but even the Duke of Alba was not able to discover. But the strong hand of the Duke kept Portugal in awe; and King Philip at Badajoz recovered from his fever. It was the Queen Anna who died; his niece, whom he had married by Papal dispensation, as his fourth wife. Many were the speculations as to what Princess he would select in her place, and even up to his last years we shall see repeated predictions as to his choice of a fifth Queen. But he did not marry again. His

¹ p. 236. (Viana, north of Barcellos, on the west of Minho, now Vianna.)

eldest child the Infanta Isabella Clara Eugenia, daughter of his third wife Isabel of Valois, became the "pride of his eyes." It is to her that some of his most interesting letters are addressed in connection with Portugal; and of her that we shall hear again and again while unravelling the story of England "in relation to all forrain Princes."

It had been in June, when the birds were singing, and the asphodel and myrtle, with the pink and white and golden cistus, were making the countryside a vast and fragrant garden,—when gentle breezes were wafting across sunlit cornfields the scent of escalonia, while under a turquoise sky the desert wastes of Alemtejo were clothed with mauve and purple thistles,—that the Spanish army had first advanced through Portugal, *Jardim da Europa*, and the people had turned to Dom Antonio imploring him to be their leader and defender.

In the cities, and especially in Lisbon, the plague had been rife; and among its many victims the most illustrious was Luis de Camoens, Portugal's "Prince of Poets," who had urged King Sebastian to the fatal African war. The impassioned patriot, to whom his country owed the celebration of her former conquests and her ancient glories, lived just long enough to see those glories passing away.

He died on the 10th of June, precisely two days before King Philip at Badajoz signed the Commission of the Duke of Alba, and a fortnight before the election and Coronation of Dom Antonio.

"All will see that my country was so dear to me that I was content not only to die in but with it."

In his last hours Camoens was attended by a Spanish Carmelite, Father Joseph Indio, who commemorated the circumstance in a note on the back of the title page of a first edition of "*Os Lusíadas*" (once in the Convent of Guadalazar, now in the library of an English peer):³

"How grievous to see so great a genius brought so low. I saw him die in a hospital at Lisbon, without so much as a sheet to cover him, after having won success in India and sailed 5,500 leagues of sea."

¹ She is known to the English general reader mainly through "*The Great Infanta Isabel, Sovereign of the Netherlands*. By L. Klingenstein. With an Introduction by Edward Armstrong, M.A., F.S.A." London, 1910.

The writer of the Introduction apologises for the Infanta's career as not "romantic," because her marriage with her cousin the Archduke Albert was arranged for political reasons: surely a most natural fate for a Royal personage. He omits to mention that the German biographer, being little acquainted with English and Portuguese affairs, and having a dislike to France and the French, is not always conversant with European political matters.

² "Em fin acabarei a vida e verão todos que foi tão afeiçoado á minha patria que não só me contentei de morrer nella mas com ella." Camoens to D. Francisco d'Almeida, Captain General of Lamengo. "*Vida de Luis de Camões*," in "*Obres*," &c., ed: Visconde de Juromenha, 1860. Vol. I. p. 126.

³ Note first published by Princess Marie Liechtenstein, in her "*Holland House*," 1874, Vol. II. pp. 176-8. Recopied in 1921 for Mr. Aubrey F. G. Bell by Dr. Henry Thomas, of the British Museum, from the original now in possession of the Earl of Ilchester. For this Spanish note and the other annotations, see "*Luis de Camões by Aubrey F. G. Bell. Hispanic Notes and Monographs. Portuguese Series*." Oxford University Press. 1923. Note 103, p. 144.

If we read only thus far it would seem as if the friar had been moved to pity. But he adds,

"What a warning for those who night and day wear themselves out by profitless study, like spiders spinning webs to catch flies."

To dismiss the pageant of valour and victory in "*Os Lusiadas*" as "profitless" because the writer died poor,—as if the test of a poet's achievements must be the weight of his money bags,—is a frame of mind not restricted to this friar. But not by what a writer gains for himself but by what he can give "To God and Posterity" his ultimate reputation stands. It matters the less that the mortal part of Camoens died "without so much as a sheet to cover him," when the epic he left behind was a means to keep the national spirit alive even during sixty years subjection of Portugal; and inspire at last the thirteen patriots whose bold initiative in 1640 ended the "captivity." Defying Spain, they were to crown as King the Duke of Bragança, son of that Duke of Barcellos whose Cavalry at Alcacer had charged again and again, essaying by almost superhuman courage to achieve in the losing battle what was beyond the power of man.

In 1580 King Philip II expected to unite the Kingdom of Portugal to the Crown of Castile in perpetuity; and, instead of suppressing "*Os Lusiadas*," it seemed to him that the more the past record of the Portuguese explorers was remembered, the greater the triumph of Spain in conquering that race after centuries of resistance.¹

If Spanish translations in verse did not at once penetrate to England, the exploits of the Portuguese soon became known through The "*first Booke of . . . the Discoverie and Conquest of the East Indias*" as "*Set forth in the Portingale language, by Herman Lopes de Castaneda. And now translated into English, by N. L. Gentleman . . . 1582.*"

Licensed in December 1581, while Terceira and the other Islands of the Azores were still refusing to accept the sovereignty of the King of Spain, and while an English Captain, Henry Richards, was helping them to strengthen their defences,—they having repelled Don Pedro de Valdez and a Spanish squadron,—the "*Discouerie*" was dedicated "*To the right Worshipful Sir Fraunces Drake, Knight.*"

¹ There were three Spanish translations made of the epic of "arms and the men" of Portugal: the 1st was licensed 1579, in the reign of King Henry, when King Philip had written to the City of Lisbon announcing his intention to "succeed" to the Crown. "*Los Lusíadas de Luys de Camoens, traducidos en octava rima Castellana por Benito Caldero, residente en Corte . . . Con privilegio impresso en Alcalá de Henares, por Iua(n) Gracian. Año de MDLXXX.*"

The 2nd, translated by Luis de Tapia, Salamanca, 1580. (Palau's *Manual*, Vol. II. p. 27.)

The 3rd, Madrid, 1591, while Dom Antonio still lived, was dedicated "*A Philippo Munarcho primero de las Españas y de las Indias*"; a title page being adorned with the Royal arms of Spain, to which the shield of Portugal was added: "*Los Lusíadas de Luys de Camoens, traducidos de Porquenses en Castellano por Henrique Garces.*" Palau's *Manual*, Vol. II. p. 28.

² Title page II. 6. 4. See Translation from "*Historia do descobrimento e conquista da India pelos Portuguezes.*" B.M. 582.c.4.

The sudden subjugation of Portugal by the Duke of Alba changed in a day "the balance of power." As European politics ensuing are not properly intelligible unless Portugal becomes as real to us as to our vividly feeling and vigorously thinking predecessors, we will now—instead of dwelling on the glorious but familiar story of the voyage which won Francis Drake his knighthood,—still follow the fortunes of "Anthonie the most excellent prince, the first of that name King of Portugal" in "his warres againste Philip King of Castile, for the recoverie of his kingdome."¹

Before we look at a letter of Mendoza to King Philip from London on the 13th of November, wherein he refers to news received by the Queen "from Portugal by way of Antwerp," by two sloops which had arrived "in Flushing from Portugal in twelve days," we should enquire from other sources what information Her Majesty had received? Though in the Record Office there does not seem to be anything which reached England about this date, among Lord Burghley's separate papers is an unpublished MS docketed by his clerk "15 Octob: 1580. *Advertisements from Lisbon.*"²

Whereas the letter of 30th of September from Porto was a translation from Portuguese, this written a fortnight later reads as from an English pen. As it is from Lisbon, the descriptions of King Antonio's doings in the north rest only on hearsay. The main interest for us now is that this was the information which Burghley set against the assertions of Mendoza that "Don Antonio" had only a following among the basest people.

The Englishman's rendering of the situation is that the "K of Spayne" prevailed "rather by corruptyon of money and practys, than by trew valew." The narrative begins immediately "after the losse of lisbon." "Don Anthonio the elected K" is alleged to have "fyrst drawen from thence all the tresure, as money and Jewelles and namely that famous saddell and furnytur of horse so much spoken of." (But from other sources it seems that the four Governors had not left much "treasure" in Lisbon for him to take). There is no mention of Antonio having been severely wounded at Alcántara; which looks as if his little group of supporters tried to conceal the fact, in hope to give an impression of unbroken energy.

The English report, pitying the people of Lisbon for the "great Insolencyes" the Spaniards "exercysed upon all sortes and sexes," alleges that the elected King rallied his forces "between Montemor and Qwimbra"; and that "there resorted to the sayd K. Don Anthonio from all partes ayde of men, money and munytion, to make up the Just proporthyon of a great Camp."

Such may have been the rumour; but actually though some 8000 untrained

¹ Subtitle of "*The Explanation*," &c. 1585.

² B.M. Lansdowne MS. 30. 34. f.107.

men attached themselves to him out of affection, munition and powder were scarce. The "great Camp" was not his but the conqueror's.

Dom Antonio destroyed the "bridge of Qwimbre"¹ to prevent the passage of the enemy in pursuit of him: and fortified the place "cheefly with men, and worke and munytion," meaning to make this town "the seatt of his deffence" and the stronghold for his treasure. "Having placed there a great and trustie garrison, he marched to Avero a portt towne," the citzens of which had previously been persuaded "by X princypall persons to give themselves up to the devotyon of the Spanyardes: wth place he tooke by force, sacked yt, and executed as well those that were addicted to the Spanyardes as such natural spanyardes, ministers to king phillip, as he found there."

He is then described as receiving tribute from the clergy, and proceeding victoriously to "the port of portingall" (Oporto—the most notable haven in the Kingdom excepting only Lisbon,)—"where fyrst wynneng a mowntayne over the towne and certain Bullwarkes annexed thereto, turnyng theyr own artillery against the sayd town," he persuaded it to surrender. The resistance had come from a brother of one of the Governors "that had betrayed theyr Contrey to k phillip," and with him had been joined in authority a Spaniard from Galicia.

"After wth explot, all the seaportes and the ynland townes and contrey between Camigna and Dora cam peseably and with great presse and zeale to k Don Anthonio; where he found that he had by contrybutyon, confyscatyon, benevolens and otherwise wth the treasure appertayneng to the Crowne assembled in that place, to the valew of VI millyons of golld, in money and Jewelles.

The said k Don Anthonio hathe at this present in paye 20^m portingall footemen in his Camp; XV^o horse of servyce of the same natyon, XV^o men delyvered out of prisons, V^o taken out of the galleys, a M chosen negros, with 300 Moores a foote, and a C moores a horse backe:" all of which troops, with "a multytude" more people waiting to supply his needs, he was handling "with great dexteryty . . . according to the necessity of the cawse and contrey."

"The Insolencye hath bin so great of the Spanyardes in this . . . usurpatyon, as besydes the villanyes inexpliaities that they do use dailye to all sortes of men and women in the sayd afflycted contrey, they have violently brought into their galleyes of gentillwomen and others of good credityte, to use theyr will of, 2000 sowles, and forced their husbondes and kinse-folkes for money to Ransom them from them."

This last was untrue. The Spaniards exercised considerable restraint, as they did not wish their German and Italian mercenaries to get out of hand. The Duke of Alba's intention was to win even while dominating the Portuguese. But whatever may have been happening in the Tagus, the "great Camp" of King Antonio in the North was mythical. How handicapped he was by small numbers, and shortage of powder, arms and equipment, we have seen, but in November 1580 Lord Burghley could not know. Even if he allowed for exaggeration, he would have calculated that there seemed good means of Antonio holding the North, though Alba were master in the South.

¹ Coimbra, where he had taken his degree at the University 29 years before.

Horse, Portugalls	1,500
Horse, Moors	100
Foot, Portugalls	20,000
Moors	300
Men out of prisons	1,500
Men from the galleys	500
"Chosen negroes"	1,000
<hr/>	
Total	24,900
<hr/>	

Had any such army existed in Portugal King Antonio might never have needed to take refuge in England.

There follows a brief account of the surrender of the Duke and Duchess of Bragança to King Philip, and Philip's assurance that "they shold enjoye their owne": but meanwhile they were to await his pleasure in Spain. And after their departure "Don Anthonio k elected" is represented as having confiscated the Duke's "goodes and movables," regarding the Dukedom as forfeited, and proposing to convey it to "a very faithful nobleman the Count of Vimioso" (which is a distorted version of the fact that King Antonio conferred upon Vimioso the Duke of Bragança's hereditary office of Lord High Constable).

"The marquesse of Villa Reale is wth the k elected in the field," the Marqués "nowe, with the rest of the Portugall nobility," recognising "the extremitie that their own trechery and ignorance hathe brought them into. . . ."

They are represented as deeply penitent; and "becom resolute" to resist the foreigner.

"Of the 3 governors that betrayed theyr contrey to k phillip, II are ded of despair and extreme melancholy:¹ they were despised of the Spaniards: and therewith the sight of the ruine of theyr contrey, which they only had hurte, did towche even the inward points of theyr honor and conscyens, that they could not forbere to utter yt openly in speeche, as they felt it with their deathe."

There is nothing to prove that their deaths were hastened by any such emotion. The Englishman, however, credits the Spaniards with his own scorn for all such Portuguese as Spain had been able to purchase:

"wth lyke sawce, and that worthily" was Cristoffer Vas de Vego Captayne of St Johnes fortresse" (who had betrayed it) "served." This last word is struck out, and altered to "*rejected by ye spaniardes, after that the D of Allva had that place: a notable example and Reward of Trecon and infidelity.*"

Thus ends the communication; and it certainly would have given Burghley the impression that not the Duke but Dom Antonio had the country at his back.

Although on the 9th of November different news had arrived from Spain, that "*Don Antonio is fled no man knows whither,*"² it may have seemed in England

¹ Altered to "ded of melancholy."

² Deservedly.

³ S.P. Foreign. 101. 90 (9).

as if information from Lisbon was more trustworthy than what was given out at Valladolid.

The Spanish Ambassador from London, on the 13th of November informed his Sovereign, then at Badajoz:—

“The Queen has news from Portugal . . . that Don Antonio after having taken possession of the Castle of Feria, and being reinforced by a large number of troops, had sacked Aveiro and captured the town of Viana, from which he had taken twelve pieces of artillery. With these he had reduced the city of Oporto; and this has so greatly elated the Queen that both she and her Ministers have declared it in the most exaggerated manner, besides sending to tell me of it. These people are so evil-minded that they think it will embarrass your Majesty, and *they have discussed whether it would not be well to lend part of Drake's money to Don Antonio for his support.*

“Directly the news was received, the Queen sent orders to Bristol for four ships to sail, on the pretence of going to Ireland, with harquebusses, powder, iron artillery, and corslets, for Oporto, to help Don Antonio. It is said that the Queen discussed secretly with Leicester whether it would be well for a thousand Foot soldiers” to embark secretly from “the various ports in England, without orders from her, to serve Don Antonio; to which end certain Captains have been appointed. . . .

“As soon as the Queen received this news, she despatched Souza, who was here for Don Antonio,¹ to Antwerp, with a letter for [the Prince of] Orange, asking him to assist Don Antonio with men and munitions in conjunction with her. She gave Souza a chain of 400 crowns, and Leicester gave him another worth 130.

“Souza, thinking now that Don Antonio will be able to hold out until help reaches him, abandoned his intention of going to Brazil. . . .

“The Queen has summoned Morgan, one of the English Colonels who served the rebels in the Netherlands, with the object of sending him with the thousand men . . . to Portugal. . . . As I was closing this letter, I learnt that the Queen had received letters from Don Antonio, through France, begging her earnestly to send him power, cannon, and arms, but no men, as he had as many as he wanted.”²

In this last Mendoza was misinformed; for King Antonio asked for both mariners and harquebussiers.

A fortnight later, King Philip wrote from Badajoz to Mendoza that “the Pretender” had escaped:

“Use the most unceasing vigilance to learn whether he has arrived in England. If so, *give a full account of the circumstances of the rebellion to the Queen, and request her to arrest Don Antonio as a rebel, and surrender him to me a prisoner.*

“Assure her how deep will be my obligation to her if she does so, and how just my cause of offence if she refuse; which I cannot believe she will.”³

¹ J. R. de Sousa, his Ambassador.

² Cal: S.P.S. Vol. III. (1896), pp. 63-64. (No reference number to original.)

³ 28 Nov. 1580. Paris Archives K. 1447-24. Cal: S.P.S. 1580-86. Vol. III. p. 69.

APPENDIX A.

"AN EXHORTATION TO ALL PRINCES AND POTENTATES":
"LA JUSTIFICATION DU SERENISSIME DON ANTOINE . . ."

Notes on the Latin, Flemish, and English versions; with identification of the translator.

" . . . King Antonio . . . who hath a just war against the King of Spayne."

William, Lord Burghley, K.G., P.C., Aug: 1581. Unpublished holog: Lansdowne MS. 102.
104.

"Th' ambassador of the moste noble prince, Anthony King of Portugall, Algarbes etc. hath declared unto us, that he hath caused a little treatise to bee made, in the Latin, French and Flemish tongues, containing the justification of the said King Anthony . . . together with an exhortation to all princes and potentates of Christiandome how much it standeth them upon to aid and succour the said King . . ."

Preamble by "*Maurice Erle of Nassau . . . and the counselors of the estate in the . . . low countreis*" . . . giving license to print this treatise in Latin, French, and Flemish. Delft, 15 January 1585: as translated in "*The Explanation of the true and lawfull Right and Tytle of Anthony . . . King of Portugall . . . Leyden . . . Christopher Plantyn. 1585.*" (B.M. 1060. c. 33.)

One of the most interesting but most completely neglected of 16th century political publications is that of which the title page has been now first reproduced, in the section treating of events with which it is largely concerned:¹ "*The Explanation of the true and lawfull Right and Tytle of Anthonic, the most excellent prince, the first of that name King of Portugall, concerning his warres against Philip, king of Castile, . . . for the recoverie of his Kingdom. Together with a Briefe Historie of all that hath passed about that matter until the yeare of our Lord, 1583. Translated into English and conferred with the French and Latine Copies. By the commandment and order of the Superiors. At Leyden In the Printing house of Christopher Plantyn. 1585.*"²

Unread by English historians—who go for their information about the 18th Portuguese King of Portugal to the Spaniards who classed him as a rebel,—this pamphlet was noticed by Dibdin and

¹ II. 4. (8) ante.

² Apparently "*The Explanation*" in its various tongues is unknown in modern Portugal and France. Sr Joaquin de Arango does not refer to it in his "*Dom Antonio Prior de Crato. Notas de Bibliographia*," Lisboa, 1897: nor does it figure in any of the compilations of Vicomte de Faria, viz:

(1) "*Descendence de D. Antonio Prior de Crato XVIII^{tième} Roi de Portugal. Livourne . . . Raphael Giusti. 1908.*" (B.M. 9903. v. 8).

(2) Ib: *Deuxieme ed.*: Ib. 1909. Dedic: to "Monsieur Willem Doude Van Troostwyk envoyé extraordinaire et ministre plenipotentiaire de S.M. la Reine des Pays Bas a Lisbonne," Madame Doude van Troostwyk, (Jonkvrouw Woltera Gerardina Irmgard van Schuylenburch) being described as "Seule descendante de D. Antonio. . . . residente . . . a Lisbonne" (B.M. 9903. v. 9.)

(3) Ib: (1534-1595) (should be 1531, vide 1st ed: p. 12) "*Extraits, Notes et Documents. Tome I. Milan. . . . 36 Corso Garibaldi. 1909.*" (mostly relating to events later than 1600). B.M. 10629.i.

(4) Ib: in *Bibliographica*. 1910. Catalogued as B.M. 11906.dd.11. At present (1928) reported "missing."

Nos. 1-4, compiled on the Continent, do not depict King Antonio's relations with England.

Collier less for its subject than because they believed it to have been the only book printed in English by the Dutch firm of Plantin. It has since been pointed out that Plantin in 1586 was the publisher of Geoffrey Whitney's "*Emblemes*" also in English.¹ But the real interest of "*The Explanation*" is of a different nature from what has been assumed, even as to its printing.

In the edition in English the license runs thus:

"Maurice Erle of Nassau . . . and the counselors of the estate in the . . . low countreis, to all whom it may concern: . . . Th' ambassador of the most noble prince, Anthony King of Portugall, Algarbes etc. hath declared unto us that he hath caused a littel treatise to bee made, in the Latine, Frenche and Flemmish tongucs, conteyning the justification of the said king Anthony . . . together with an exhortation to all princes and potentates of Christiandome . . . to aid and succour the said King . . . The which discourse the said Ambassador is desirous to cause to be imprinted with . . . expedition . . . in the Latine and French tongs by Christopher Plantin, and in the Flemmish tong by Peter Verhaghen printer of Dordrecht."

Wherefore this license is granted at Delft, 15th January, 1585(6) by the Councillors of the Estate, in the absence of Maurice Earl of Nassau.

The same order, in French, appears in the Latin version;² also in the Flemish translation issued at Dordrecht, wherein it is rendered into Dutch and printed at the end of the pamphlet.³

From the license as translated in the English version we might infer that after Lord Leicester's arrival in the United Provinces as Queen Elizabeth's Lieutenant-General, it was decided by our Dutch allies to issue, for the English troops in the Dutch service, the "*Explanation*" already ordered to be printed in three other languages. And in 1866 the editor of the facsimile reprint of Geoffrey "*Whitney's 'Choice of Emblems'*," Henry Green, when alluding to "*The Explanation*" as published

¹ Details, with Title and dedication of Whitney's *Emblemes* under date.

² B.M. 1060. c. 31. Title page, "*Explanatio Veri ac legitimi iuris, quo serenissimus Lusitaniae Rex Antonius eius nominis primus ntitur, ad bellum Philippo Regi Castellae pro regni recuperatione inferendum. Una cum historica quadam enarratione rerum eo nomine gestarum usque ad Annum MDLXXXIII (ornament, hand and compasses and motto "Labore et Constantia":) Ex mandato & ordine Superiorum, Lugduni Batavorum, In Typographia Christophori Plantini. MDLXXXV.*" (facsimile ante, sec: 8, p. 25.)

The license in this Latin volume is "*Donné a Delfte le X^e de Janvier l'an mil cinq cens, quatre vintz et cinq.*" The license in the English copy (1060. c. 33) is dated "at Delft the 15 of Januarie 1585." Except the difference between X and 15—which might be a misprint—it is an exact translation.

³ Title page: "*IVSTIFICATIE van den Doorluchtigen Don Antonio Coninck van Portugael, D'eerste van dien name nopende D'oorloghe die hy ghenootdruct is teghens den Coninck van Spaengien te vueren om in zijn Conincrijk wederom ghestelt te werden. Met een corte ende summiere Historie van alle t'ghene dat deshalven gheschiet is totten Jare 1583. Incluyt. Tot Dordrecht, By my Peeter Verhaghen Woonende in mijns Heeren Herberghe. Anno 1585.*" Small quarto. Black letter. 62 pp., numbered only on one side, 1 to 31. (B.M. No. 1060. c. 32.)

Not to be confounded with King Antonio's 1582 statement issued in French at Tours prior to his expedition to the Azores, "*Sommaire déclaration,*" &c., &c., not in B.M.: but in Royal Library at the Hague; Knuttel, Cat. of Pamphlets, No. 582; issued also in Dutch, No. 584: "*Oorsake van't Oorloch in Spaengien. Corte verclaringhe van de rechtveerdighe Oorsaencken ende redenen, de welcke den Doorluchtigen ende machtigen prince Dom Anthonie Coninck van Portugael, van Algarbes etc. beweecht hebben ende beweghen d'Oorloghe te voeren en te volherden sowel ter Zee als te lande, teghen den Coninck van Spaengien Castilien ende teghen alle deghene die hem hulpe oft bystant doen, oft doē sulzē in wat manieren dat sonde moghē wesen. Ut den Françoyschen gedrukt te Tours in Tourenen. Anno 1582.*" i.e., "Cause of the War in Spain. Short explanation of the just causes and reasons, which moved his Serene Highness the mighty Prince Dom Antonio, King of Portugal and Algarves etc. to go to war on Land and Sea against the King of Spain and Castille, and against all who help him or should help him in whatsoever way. Printed from the French at Tours in Touraine. Anno 1582."

This begins "Dom Anthoine by der Gratien Godts Coninck van Portugael"; and ends "onsen factorij in de stadt van Antwerpen. Ghedaen te Tocurs den XV Dach van May, int Jaer MDCXXXII." B.M. 1060. c. 41. (II. 5 (5)).

by Plantin at Leyden, suggested that "in the absence of contrary evidence there is some probability that the translation was Whitney's work."¹

This, though Green did not say so, is the more plausible in that Leicester, to whom Whitney's "*Emblemes*" are dedicated, was one of the main promoters of King Antonio's cause; and Antonio's elder son Emmanuel "Prince of Portugal" stood on Leicester's right hand when Leicester was proclaimed Governor-General.² As Whitney who had dated his dedication to his very good Lord and patron from London in November 1585, was writing a Preface from Leyden in May 1586, there would "in the absence of contrary evidence" be seeming reason to suppose that Whitney may have been employed to put into English "*The Explanation*" of King Antonio. Nevertheless it was not translated by an Englishman. The translation was not carried out in the Low Countries after Leicester's arrival but in London more than a month prior to his embarkation: before the Queen had even signed her patent to Sir Philip Sidney as Governor of Flushing.

The initiative for an English version apparently did not come from the United Provinces, but from one of Queen Elizabeth's ministers, "Your Lordship" (*Vostre Seigneurie*) unnamed; perhaps Burghley, whose interest in King Antonio's concerns we shall see in unpublished "*Considerations*" in his own hand in 1581, and in subsequent letters from Dom Antonio to him, endorsed by Burghley's Secretary "*The K of Portingale to my L*"; first published in the present work.

That the translator of "*The Explanation*" was a Frenchman, long resident in England, can now be established, from an unaddressed letter in French, undated but docketed "6 Novemb^r 1585. *From Holliband schole-master of Poules.*"

This was Claude Desainliens, a Huguenot, who nineteen years before had dedicated to Lord Buckhurst's son Robert Sackville, "*The French Littleton. A most easie perfect and absolute way to learn the french tongue.*"³ And in 1580 he had published "*A Treatise For Declining of Verbes, Which May be Called The Second Chiefest worke of the French tongue.*"⁴

Approved in his day as a teacher of three languages, his school books are now elevated to the rank of bibliographical rarities. But the only work of historical and political importance hitherto known to have been translated by him is "*The Declaration of the King of Nauarre, touching the slaunders published against him in the protestations of those of the league that are rysen up in*

¹ p. xxxiv.

² Stow's *Annals*, cit. under date.

³ "*Newly set forth by Claudius Holliband, teaching in Paules Church-yarde at the signe of the Lucrece.*" 1566. B.M. 629. a. 35.

⁴ "*Set Forth by Claudius Holliband. Dum spiro spero.* London. 1580, 1590, 1604, 1613, 1633. He issued also "*The Prettie and Wittie Historie of Arnalt and Lucenda: with certain rules and dialogues set foorth for the learner of th'Italian tong: and dedicated unto the worshipfull, Sir Hierom Bowes, Knight. By Claudius Hollyband, scholemaster, teaching in Paules Churchyard by the Signe of the Lucrece. Dum spiro spero. Imprinted at London by Thomas Purfoot. 1575.*" (16^{mo}. pp. 366). (Italian and English on opposite pages.) First "done in the Greeke tong . . . translated into the Spanish . . . turned into the French . . . translated into the Thuscan tong: and now out of the same tongue . . . translated into English." (Brydges *Censura Literaria*, 1807, Vol. III. pp. 68-70). The same year he dedicated "to the worshipful and towarde young gentleman Maister Robert Sackville" (son and heir of Lord Buckhurst) "*The French Schoolemaster.*" (B.M. 7480). And "To the yong gentle-woman, Mistresse Luce Harington" was offered his "*Campo di Fior, or else The Florvie Field of Fovr Languages of M. Claudius Desainliens, alias Holiband: For the furtherance of the Learners of the Latine, French, English, but chieflic of the Italian tongue. Dum spiro spero. Imprinted at London by Thomas Vautrollier, dwelling in the Blacke-Friers by Ludgate. 1583.*" (B.M. 629. a. 36.)

He was subsequently author of "*The Italian Schoolemaister: Contayning Rules for the perfect pronouncing of th' italian tongue: With familiar speeches; And certaine Phrases taken out of the best Italian Authors. And a fine Tuscan historie called Arnalt and Lucenda. A verie easie way to learne th' italian tongue. Set forth by Cla: Holliband Gentl. of Bourbonnois. Dum spiro spero. At London. Printed by Thomas Purfoot.*" 1597. 12^{mo}. (For facsimile title page see Messrs. Maggs Bros. Cat. 503, 1928, Plate XXXVI. Item 989, priced at £38.)

armes in the Realme of Fraunce."¹ This was dedicated in 1585 "To the right worshipfull Sir Phillip Sidney, Knight."²

Holliband (or Hollyband) has been the topic of a complicated thesis in French, a lecture to the Bibliographical Society by a noted and enthusiastic bibliophile,³ and a book based on his linguistic dialogues;⁴ but the letter which reveals him as employed by one of Queen Elizabeth's chief Councillors, in a matter calling for discretion as well as accuracy, has escaped the notice of Holliband's admirers.

Signed "*Claude Desainliens dit Hollyband*" it will require our close attention, for reasons reaching far beyond the modest translator.⁵

The wording is in one respect peculiar:⁶

"Monsieur,

It is about a month or five weeks since your Lordship gave me license to translate and cause to be printed the Justification of his Serene Highness Don Antonio, which I have done; specifying the place of printing, according to your commandment.

My duty was, Monsicur, to present you with the first copy, in gratitude for your goodness

¹ "*With Priuiledge. Truely translated into English according to the French copie. Printed at London, by John Charlewood, dwelling in Barbican at the signe of the halfe Eagle and the key, 1585.*" (B.M. 8052. aa. 22) under date.

² Sig. Aijj, p. 5-6. Signed "Your worships most humble to commaund, Claudius Hollyband."

³ Bibliographical Society Trans: Vol. XVIII, 1916, pp. 253-72. Alfred W. Pollard, "*Claudius Hollyband and his 'French Schoolmaster' and 'French Littleton.'*"

⁴ "*The Elizabethan Home. Discovered in 2 Dialogues by Claudius Hollyband and Peter Erondel. Edited by M. St. Clare Byrne.*" London, 1925.

⁵ This holograph letter was unknown to Miss Lucy E. Farrer whose thesis is entitled "*La Vie et les Oeuvres de Claude de Sainliens*," 1908. B.M. 1065.9.t.21. The schoolmaster does not sign himself "*De Sainliens*" but "*Claude Desainliens dit Hollyband*": and there is no justification for ascribing to him the prefix "De." Miss Farrer (p. 7) says "*On ne sait pas l'origine de la famille de Holyband. . . . Il s'arrogera en 1593 le titre de gentilhomme bourbonnais. . . .*" But "*Set forth by Clau: Holliband Gentil. of Bourbonnois*" is how he printed it in 1597 (note, ante); and this is merely equivalent to "Gent" then so often added by authors who justly claimed the gentility of "vertue" but were not entitled to add "Esquire," a designation then strictly limited to persons bearing coat-armour. Not realising that in 16th century England a scholar of sufficiently good repute was permitted to call himself "gentleman" by courtesy, without claim to noble birth, Miss Farrer elevates Holliband to the rank of a French "*gentilhomme*," a territorial nobleman. While admitting that "*La famille de Saintliens n'est pas mentionnée dans l'Armorial de Bourbonnais du comte de Soultrait*," instead of deducing that there was no such family, Miss Farrer supplied the omission: "*Cependant il a existé un fief de Saint Leon*" with which she decides that Holliband or "*de Sainliens*" are "*bien identiques*." On p. 16 follows an account of later Seigneurs de Saint Lyons, etc.

It is unfortunate that such fanciful flights obtrude into an otherwise reasoned paper. The finding of Holliband's own letter must now establish beyond dispute that his name was "*Desainliens*": which he would certainly not have so written had he been *De Saint Leon*. Nor is it conceivable that a "*gentilhomme*," cadet of Seigneurs de Saint Leon, would have called himself "*Hollyband*."

⁶ Now first translated in extenso from Orig: Holog: S. P. Portugal. II. 17.

"*Mon^{sr} il y a^{eu} environ un^m mois ou cinq semaines que v^{re} seigneurie me donna licence de translater et faire imprimer la justification du serenissime Don Antonio, ce qua i'aye fait, en specifiant le lieu de l'imprimerie selon V^{re} commandement.*

Or mon devoir estoit, Mons^r, de vous en présenter le premier exemplaire, en recognoissance du bien que vous m'aviez fait, mais l'imprimeur m'a prevenu car le jour mesme qu'il le fit venir non seulement a votre Seign^{rie}, mais aussi au roye de Portugal, il me dit, et me fit dire que le livret ne seroit acheve d'imprimer devant troyz jours.

Ainsi pryant V^{re} seign^{rie} m'avoir pour excusé, et en passant noter l'iniure que l'on m'a faite, ie supplyerios le bon Dieu vous donner, Monsieur, en santé, bonne et longue vie.

V^{re} tres humble et tres affectionné seruite^r

CLAUDE DESAINLIENS dit Hollyband."

to me: but the printer has forestalled me: for the same day that he forwarded it not only to Your Lordship, but also to the King of Portugal, he said to me, and sent word to me, that the printing of the booklet would not be finished before another three days.

Thus praying Your Lordship to hold me excused, and incidentally to note the injury that they have done to me, I pray the good God to give you, Monsieur, health and long life.

Your very humble and very affectionate servant

CLAUDE DESAINLIENS dit Hollyband."

Though this was epitomised in the Calendar of State Papers Foreign (1585-6, p. 146) "*Vostre Seigneurie*," Your Lordship, was reduced to "Your Honour," the usual form of address to a Knight; and "*serenissime* Don Antonio" to "Don Antonio" minus his royal prefix. There was no attempt to identify the "*livret*" translated; possibly because of the established modern delusion that the King of Portugal was only a "pretended King" and not worth the attention of serious students.¹

The opening sentence of Hollyband's letter is suggestive:

"It is about a month or five weeks since your Lordship gave me license to translate *and cause to be printed* the Justification of his Serene Highness Don Antonio, which I have done, *specifying the place of printing according to your commandment.*"

In ordinary circumstance the translator would have had no need to specify the place of printing, for the licensed printer would have put his own name and address on the title page. The inference is that the booklet was printed in London, and a foreign printer's name employed,—presumably the name of one of the firms at Leyden or Dordrecht in the employ of the States. But even so, the dates do not tally. Before the 6th of November 1585 the first printed copies of the English version were in the hands of the King of Portugal and "*Vostre Seigneurie*" respectively. But the license to Plantin was not granted until the "X" of the following January.² Possibly there were two English editions, a first called "*The Justification*" etc. as in Holliband's letter of November 1585, and a reissue with the Dutch license added in January '85-6: this last being the only English version now existent.

The political importance of "*The Explanation*" is enhanced for us by this discovery that it was Englished (by a schoolmaster at St. Paul's) at the bidding of some great official. If the responsibility had rested solely with "Maurice Erle of Nassau" and his advisers, the matter published would illustrate only what the United Provinces had decided to countenance. *But the independent and*

¹ An example of how documents are treated when they do not fit with modern conventions occurs in *Hist. MSS Comm. Rep. on the Earl of Ancaster's MSS at Grimsthorpe Castle*. Among the correspondence of Peregrine Bertie Lord Willoughby is a letter docketed by him as "*from the King of Portugal.*" The editor in 1907 added in brackets before the title of King, "*pretended.*"

² The French edition from which Holliband made his translation is not in the B.M. Neither does it appear in the *Annales Plantiniennes* of C. Ruelens and A. de Backer, Brussels, 1865, (B.M. 11899.ff.12), pp. 287-288; but the entries for the Latin and English editions are there taken not from any list made by the firm of Plantin, but from Cat: of Printed Books in the British Museum. In this *Annales Plantiniennes* the title of "*The Explanation*" in English is given, with omissions and slight alterations in the order of words.

It does not figure in any edition in the *Catalogue of the Plantin-Moretus Museum*, by Max Rooses, Curator, (2nd English edition), Antwerp, 1909; (B.M. 011901 de 26). But this is not a complete catalogue of Plantin's publications, only a list of exhibits in the Museum. As the Museum includes records of the printing office (diaries, letters, ledgers, etc., from 1555 onwards) there may be further information obtainable yet. The Curator, however, (p. xii) states that in 1583 Plantin "proceeded to Leyden, and remained there until 1585. He then returned to Antwerp after this town had been taken by the Duke of Parma." This adds to the perplexity; for the Prince of Parma captured Antwerp in the summer of 1585: and the following January '85-6 Count Maurice of Nassau was licensing the *Explanation* of King Antonio to be printed by Christopher Plantin. It therefore seems that Plantin had not yet in '85-6 handed over his Leyden business to his son-in-law Rapheleng, and gone to Antwerp.

The only copy of the French edition the present writer has been able to trace is in the Royal Library at the Hague: "*A Leyden En l'imprimerie de Christophe Plantin, MDLXXXV.*" Cat. Knuttel, 721.

previous publication in England commits Queen Elizabeth, as approving the matter contained; even if it was decided to use a foreign printer's name.

As England and Spain were at open war in October 1585, we may wonder why the booklet should not have borne an English imprint, and have carried the same sort of license from Queen Elizabeth as the Dutch and Latin editions bore from Count Maurice. But unless a copy of the October printed version can be found, we will not be in a position to discount upon it. The point however is that this "*Explanation*," treated by Dibdin as a mere curiosity of a Dutchman's printing of the English language, and ignored by historians (English and Portuguese as well as Spanish,) is politically of much importance, as well as psychological interest: for which reasons it has been extensively drawn upon in the present work.¹

As with all translations during the Elizabethan era, the date is significant: and that this "*Explanation*" was first given to English readers while Drake in the Queen's ship *Elizabeth Bonaventure* was conducting an expedition to attack the Spanish dominions in the New World, and Lord Leicester was appointed to command Queen Elizabeth's Army in the Low Countries, are facts to be borne in mind while reading a narrative which ends with the solemn admonition to the Princes of Christendom, to which attention is drawn in the Dutch official order for publication. Although the 18th King of Portugal was fated to die in exile ten years later, we need not now fail in realisation of the feelings with which his two sons and his faithful followers in 1585 would have read this peroration:²

"Whosoever therefore shall rightly consider all these dangers and great inconveniences which the saide King Don Anthonio hath endured and escaped, may easily judge that all this came not to passe without god's peculiar providence . . . and that some great matter of importance is hid thereunder, namely a great hope . . . that . . . God will use *the sayd king Don Anthonio as a fit instrument to breake the great power . . . of the King of Castile whereby . . . he would else in tyme invade not only all christiandome, but also all the rest of the worlde. . . .*"

Though the prediction as to the breaking of King Philip's power by Antonio was not destined to fulfilment, that Queen Elizabeth believed it possible, and Lord Burghley encouraged her hope, are facts we shall see illustrated again and again, while examining the policy of England, not retrospectively but as it was formulated at the time.

¹ It will be reprinted, edited by the present writer, with addenda of illustrative MSS (unpublished, or if printed not hitherto compared).

² p. 53.

APPENDIX B.

"IN FAVOUR OF THE SAID PHILIP":

NOTE ON THE DISPUTED AUTHORSHIP OF THE "ISTORIA," 1585.

The suggestion in the British Museum Catalogue that the "*Istoria*" published at Genoa in 1585 under the name of Conestaggio was the work of a Portuguese, João de Silva Conde de Portalegre, is the more convincing in view of the likeness of style and outlook—hitherto unnoticed—between the printed book and the actual letters of Portalegre: which last did not see the light till the English Calendar of Spanish State Papers was issued in the 19th century.¹

That "Jeronimo Conestaggio" was not the author of this masterpiece of subtlety appears increasingly likely the more the work is studied. Nevertheless an anonymous "Pilgrim Spaniard"—who from unpublished MSS of 1598 can now be identified with a certain ex-minister of King Philip,²—refers to "Conestagio a Genevois" and "the booke which hee hath written in favour of the said Philip . . . entituled The vnion of the realme of Portugal with the Crowne of Castile . . ."³

Censuring the Italian as "*a great and notable lyar*"—but admitting that "*in that work of his there be many true reports*,"—the Spanish critic describes Conestaggio as "a man of a maligne and perverse spirit . . . a most ungrateful enemy of that nation which hath both advanced and honoured him." "*For we knew him at Lisbon when he served Anthonio Caulo, and afterwards Stephen Lecaro, a merchant of Genoa.*"⁴

Persons of rank in the 16th century—despite the precedent of Count Castiglione in the 15th,—seldom signed their names to their printed writings. Anonymity and pseudonymity were the mode. In Portalegre's case, the need of a disguise requires scant expounding. Some whose reputations he twisted out of shape were unable to retort by running him through the body with a rapier: being themselves dead. But others yet lived; and his collective indictment of the "obstinacy" of all such "Portugalls" as had resisted the combined blandishments and force of Spain was so worded that had he added his name to his eloquence he would have had every "Portingale" his foe; excepting only those who had been purchased or persuaded, and so were in the same case with himself.

That the Genoese Jeronimo Conestaggio copied the MS, or translated it from Portuguese into Italian, and that the translator has been mistaken by the "Pilgrim" for the author, is most likely.

¹ The title of Count of Portalegre was created by King Emmanuel the Fortunate, 6 Feb., 1498, for Dom Diogo de Sylva de Menezes, *de jure e herdade, na sua descendencia masculina*. The 7th and last Count died childless in 1686; when his Countship, and the later Marquisate of Gouvea conferred in 1625, became extinct. The Marquisate was renewed for his sister's grandson in 1714. Vide "*The Nobilities of Europe. Edited by the Marquis de Ruigny*:" London, 1909 (250 copies only): "*Portugal and the Portuguese Nobility*," pp. 239-251.

² Details under date, 1598.

³ The criticisms brought by this Spaniard against the "*Istoria dell'unione*," begin with the protest that "even the verie first word of that book is an vntrueth; in that hee hath entituled it, The vnion of Portugall with the Crowne of Castile," whereas King Philip "in the assembly of estate which he held at Tomar in the year 1581, where the Portugals against their willes, and by force did receive him for their king, promised and sware with a solemne oath never to intermingle the matters and affaires of Portugall with those of Castile, but to keepe for ever the monarchie of Portugall . . . in the same manner as the king's his predecessors . . . paying all the persons, fees and wages . . . as they were payd in the times of the true and good kings forepast."

"*A Treatise Paraenetical*," 1598. pp. 20-21.

⁴ "*A Treatise Paraenetical*," London. 1598. pp. 19-20. (Full title, under date.)

If the "*Istoria*" be read with care, we will see that it would have been an astoundingly astute Genoese merchant's servant who, during a sojourn in Lisbon, could have familiarised himself with the ways of the Portuguese and Spanish Courts, and with the characters of all the chief actors in the world drama. His pictures, even when caricatures, are always recognisable.

Granted that the author of the "*Istoria*" was justly described as a "maligne spirit," there is more than mere malignity in his writings; there is the insight of a privileged position, the outlook of one accustomed to live among others also versed in statecraft and diplomacy. Clever and unscrupulous enough to write the "*Istoria*," he would also have been clever enough to find some convenient underling, upon whose head could fall the anger of those justly offended.

Though the contempt displayed for any heroic virtue which proved materially disastrous, might suggest a habit of buying and selling, proper to Conestaggio, a merchant's assistant, any such reflection on the mercantile disposition would be unfair. Many a 16th century merchant can be shown as generous, honourable, and courageous; while there were some noblemen of hereditary rank and military profession whose readiness to accept Spanish gold had been commented upon by Edward Wotton in 1579, as threatening to prove fatal to the independence of Portugal. It is the latter type of "merchant" which the "*Istoria*" appears to represent.

The Spaniard already quoted, when exclaiming on "the untrueth" of Conestaggio, remarks that "his historie is well written, and in a good style, but most false and full of passion; for he both reprehendeth and injurieth all those of whom he speaketh; yea even king Philip himselfe in whose favour he wrote it."

The "Pilgrim Spaniard" states that because of certain criticisms upon King Philip, His Majesty forbade the circulation of the "*Istoria*" in Portugal.¹

That it had been intended less for native consumption than to influence the outside world we have already divined from the manner in which many of the facts are handled.

In what peculiar circumstances it came into England will yet be considered. No English translation was permitted as long as Lord Burghley lived; but the present writer discovers that the "*Treatise*" stigmatising "Conestaggio" as a "*notable lyer*" was among Burghley's selection of books he was keeping in London at the Court at the time of his death,² *when his last official action was an effort to checkmate the plans of King Philip II*,—in circumstances we shall not be qualified to understand till we have lived vicariously through the eventful intervening years.

¹ "*A Treatise Paraenetical.*" 1598. p. 26

² Unpublished list, forthcoming under date.

PART II.

“Particularly the Power of Spain.”

CHAPTER 4.

“THE BALANCE OF POWER.”

SECTION 9.

“Her Majesty being somewhat perplexed.”

(*Conflicting News from Portugal, 1580*).

“His Majesty being somewhat perplexed in the matter of Portingale, would have you . . . enter into some speech with the Queene Mother, and let her understand that you do greatly mervayle, considering . . . the Perill that might grow both to France and England through the accesse of the Crowne of Portingall unto Spayne, that the King (of France) should deal so coldly”

Instructions to Sir Henry Cobham, Ambassador at Paris: via Lord Burghley: Richmond, 18 Sep: 1580 (see p. 60).

“ . . . (Considering) the weak and broken estate of Ireland, then the uncertain suspected amity of Scotland, and the victorious successe of the King of Spain in Portugal, I cannot but mourne in my heart to see us beset on all sides with so great and apparent danger.”

Sir Christopher Hatton to Sir Francis Walsingham.
26 Sep: 1580. Add: MSS. 15891. f. 18.

“ . . . it is thought that he will withstand King Phellip well ynough, and more, if there come any helpe unto him, for the wch he looketh every day.”

News about King Antonio: dated from “the Port of Portugal.”
30 Sep: 1580. S.P. Portugal I. 40.

“ . . . the third of September there came news to the Court how the Duke of Alva with fifty thousand men hath taken Lisbon . . . and that Don Antonio with nine thousand gave battle, the which endured five hours . . . Don Antonio is fled, no man can tell whither.”

“Spanish Advertisements sent from Sir Henry Ratslyffe.”
Valladolid, 3 Sep: 1580. Received in London 9th November.
S.P. Foreign, 101. 90. No. 9.

NOTE: QUEEN ELIZABETH, DRAKE, AND PORTUGAL: 1580-1595.

Extra to Elizabethan printed matter about Portugal, (most of it hitherto neglected,) and supplementary to English Calendars of *State Papers preserved at Simancas*, our own *State Papers Foreign* have had to be examined. And it has been necessary to compare our *Uncalendared State Papers, Spain, Portugal, and Barbary States* (tied up in bundles in the Record Office, items not yet numbered), with Lord Burghley's writings now at *Hatfield House*, (many published, but too often neglected), and with his unpublished papers in the *Lansdowne MSS*, eked out with material in the *Cottonian* and *Harleian* collections.

Nearly 80 years ago the Visconde de La Figanière compiled a guide to MSS re Portugal in the B.M.: "*Catalogo dos Manuscritos Portuguezes existentes no Museu Britannico em que Tambem se da Noticia dos Manuscritos Estrangieros relativos a Historia Civil Politica e Literaria de Portugal*," etc., etc. *Lisbõa, 1853, Na Imprensa Nacional.*" (B.M. Circle 87a).

He referred to papers as treating of "*Antonio (D). Prior do Crato, pretendente a Corõa de Portugal.*" But only a few relate to Dom Antonio when he was a mere claimant. The bulk of them reveal his dealings with England after he had been elected to the Portuguese throne. They do not refer to him as Prior of Crato, or a pretender, but as "*Dom Antonio King of Portugal.*"

One of the most important MSS, Lord Burghley's "*Considerations*" as to the propriety of a war so early as 1581, with Drake in command, is now first printed, II. 5. 2.

This escaped the notice of Corbett, "*Drake and the Tudor Navy*," 1898, upon whose ideas all later estimates of Drake's relations to Burghley have been founded.

The present work is the first in which a systematic effort has been made fully to ascertain Queen Elizabeth's policy towards Portugal, from the time when Dom Antonio Prior of Crato, on his return from captivity in Africa, "*published his claim*" in 1579, as a competitor for succession to the Crown, until 1595, the year the Spaniards landed in Cornwall, when Sir Francis Drake and Sir John Hawkins were "*stayed*" from sailing to the New World until the Queen was sure they would not be required to defend her at home.

This was the summer in which her "*carissimo fratello Don Antonio Re di Portugallo*" wrote his last letters to England, from his death-bed in Paris, on the anniversary of his overthrow, fifteen years before, by Don Fernando, Duke of Alba, on behalf of Philip of Spain.

THE SPANISH AMBASSADOR: DON BERNARDINO DE MENDOZA:

Knight of Santiago.

From a print published in "Virreyes de Napoles."

Intending war with England, King Philip chose as his Ambassador one of the officers of the Duke of Alba.

Mendoza embodied his own military experiences and ideas in "*Comentarios, de lo sucedido en las guerras de los paisas baxos, desde el Año 1567 hasta el de 1577. En Madrid, por Pedro Madrigal, 1582.*"

In his old age, after he became totally blind, Mendoza still did not rest from serving his country; for he composed and dictated his "*Téorica y práctica de guerra*" (Madrid, 1595), for the teaching of the future King of Spain. It was reissued at Antwerp, 1596, and the same year published in Italian at Venice; and at Brussels in French in 1597; and the same year in English: "*Theorique And Practise of Warre. Written to Don Philip Prince of Castil, by Bernardino de Mendoza. Translated out of the Castilian tongue into Englishe, by Sr Edward Hoby Knight. Directed to Sr George Carew Knight. 1597.*"

Mendoza did not confine himself to his own profession, but commented also on naval matters. As to Cavalry, he preferred Lancers. In discoursing on Artillery, he says he had invented a piece made of metal, firing a shot of one pound weight, which would pierce a two foot wall; but he does not state the charge or the range, presumably not wishing foreigners to copy it.



PART II.

“Particularly the Power of Spain.”

CHAPTER 4.

“THE BALANCE OF POWER.”

SECTION 9.

“Her Majesty being somewhat perplexed.”

(*Conflicting News from Portugal, 1580*).

SO early as February 1579-80 Don Bernardino de Mendoza had written to King Philip that “for months past” he had his spies secretly in the Western ports watching for the return of Drake. As Drake had been fitted out by Lord Leicester and his friends, Mendoza anticipated that he would be sure of protection on his return. But he had been so long away that his patrons had become apprehensive: “They think that if he do not arrive within two months, they must give him up for lost.”¹

“The trade with Spain,” says Mendoza, “is one of the greatest importance to the English, . . . it being the principal source of their wealth and strength, which consists mainly in the great number of their ships. They are daily building more. But the moment the Spanish trade fails them and they are not allowed to ship goods in Spain, they will stop building

“The greater part of their strength will be consumed when the trade comes to an end the principal cause why they have grown so rich in the last ten years being that they have had the carrying of Spanish goods.”

As there had been no Spanish Ambassador in England between the dismissal of Don Guerau Despes at the end of 1571, and the arrival of Mendoza in March 1578, and as trade with Spain had been considerably interrupted, Mendoza’s assertions are more rhetorical than exact. And after giving King Philip to understand that England’s sole trade of any consequence was with Spain, he mentions in another letter “English trade with the Turk,” and the previous departure of “many vessels” to go to the Island of Chios.² He prays that God will punish England “*with a civil intestine war such as they richly deserve.*”³

That such a condition of affairs did not materialise was no fault of the Spanish Ambassador, who schemed to his utmost to bring it about. In the summer of 1580, however, not England but Portugal was the scene of “civil intestine war.”

¹ London 20 Feb: Cal: S.P.S. (Simancas) pp. 7-8. ² Ib: p. 10. ³ Ib: p. 9.

But despite the conquering advance of the Duke of Alba, and his entry into Lisbon in August, it was not at once recognised that his victory was decisive. Several weeks later, from the north of Portugal, whither King Antonio had fled, it could be written of the fugitive, "*yt is thought that he will withstand King Phillip well ynough, and more, if there come any helpe unto him, for the w^{ch} he looketh every Day.*"¹

Shortly before the battle of Alcántara an appeal from King Antonio that Queen Elizabeth should lend him twelve ships, with men, artillery, and munitions, had reached England. It arrived at a time when Her Majesty's chief Ministers had their hands full in making ready to meet a prospective Spanish attack upon Ireland, or England, or both.

Sir Edward Horsey, Governor of the Isle of Wight, had previously written to warn Lord Burghley:

"I received a lettre this day from a marchant of [South] Hampton, beinge presently² in portingale, a very honest substanciall man, whose letter beareth date the XIIIth of Maye, by the w(hi)ch *yt appereth that the great preparasion in Spaine continueth still and is very manifest not to be for portingall but rather for theis northern partes*, by resone that at the groyne there is prepyrd score of victuals and sundrie Gallis in reddiness."³

The Groyne (Coruña) being the Spanish port most convenient for embarkation of troops to be used against Queen Elizabeth's dominions, Sir Edward drew inferences accordingly; adding such intelligence as he had obtained through an English ship "the Cappitaine whome yo^r L(ordship) knoweth, named Clarke." If his Lordship knew Clarke, so also did King Philip. Previously on the 16th May the same year he had written to Mendoza as to "Captain Augustine Clark, an Englishman, with a well armed ship," who had entered the port of Bayonne;

"and having regard to the letters from you he produces, . . . I think of availing myself of his services in Pedro de Valdez fleet there. We learn from this Captain that *they were intending to send a number of ships to Portugal under pretence of trading but that they would carry arms &c. as ballast* . . . Investigate this, and if you find it to be true, take steps with the Queen to stop it. . . ."⁴

If we only read so far, we might suppose King Philip deceived; but he had written the previous day from Badajoz to Cardinal de Granvelle in Madrid:

"as regards the English Captain Clark, it will be advisable, while not offending him, to put it out of his power to play us any tricks. Don Pedro de Valdez should therefore be informed that if he employ him he is to make sure both of him and his ship, until news shall arrive about him from Don Bernardino de Mendoza, and he can then be treated as he deserves."⁵

Mendoza meanwhile had found out the nature of Clarke's business; and on the 18th of June he reported to King Philip that the Duke of Alba had been notified of Clarke's departure from Plymouth: "and had ordered the Marqués de Santa Cruz to capture him, as he deserves punishment."

¹ "Copy of a letter dated from the Port of Portugal" (Oporto) "30 September 1580." S.P. Portugal, I. 40. ² at present.

³ S.P.D.E. CXXXIX. No. 1. Calendared briefly. Now taken from original.

⁴ Paris Arch.: K. 1447.3. Cal: S.P.S. III. p. 29.

⁵ B.M. Add: MS. 28.702. op: cit, p. 36 note.

Unaware of all this, Sir Edward Horsey wrote to Burghley that his informant, in a letter of 24th May, stated Captain Clarke to be "at the Cort of Spain," where he heard "yt spoken by persons of credit" that the troops assembled at the Groyne were not meant to attack Portugal." *"These forces are intended for Irelande."*

Sir Henry Radclyffe also communicated to Burghley what was reported by "the shippe and my Man that arryved at St Sebastians in Biskey the XIX of Maie last":

" . . . for that I think it were very necessary that some more certainty of this great preparation might be understande(d) I have conferred with the M(aste)r of the Bark, and (with) him I sent last, to put themselves in readiness to depart presently² for Spain if your honours of the Counsell should so command them.

"The Bark . . . saileth very well. And if she be there" (i.e. sent back to Spain) "and maye get the start of the Spanish fleet but one tide," she "will be either upon the Coast of England or Ireland, to give intelligence a day or two before them, if any great Navy should come from thence this way."

Such being a probable contingency, Radclyffe sends the Master of the bark to the Lord Treasurer, to receive instructions direct. This escaped the notice of the late Sir Julian Corbett, who in his *"Drake and the Tudor Navy"* depicted Burghley as aloof from and antagonistic to the men of action. By neglect of letters and memoranda to and from Burghley, the delusion has arisen that the vigilance and initiative of the seamen were discouraged by him. One of his admirers in America has published through the Oxford University Press the statement that Queen Elizabeth and Burghley kept peace "in spite of" Hawkins and Drake at sea and Leicester and Walsingham in the Council Chamber.⁴ But the Councillors named as differing from Burghley in policy were working together under Burghley's direction: their respective merits and capacities being far better appreciated by the Lord Treasurer than by their biographers: who too often mistake part for the whole and try to sum up Burghley's policy without having ascertained the same from the MSS of Burghley himself.⁵

The average historian or critic has been apt to select less what represents the era than what seems to support his own views: excluding as irrelevant everything which disturbs his "thesis." A typical example is Bishop Mandell Creighton's

¹ Orig: S.P.D.E. CXXXIX. 1. ² at once.

³ *Sir H. Radclyffe to the Lord Treasurer*. From Portsmouth, 10 July 1580. Orig: S.P.D. Eliz: CXL. 10, endorsed as news "By a Mr of a ship that came from Spane, whome he thinketh very fit to retorne to give Intelligence of ye Spaniards proceadinge wth their Armie" ("he" being Radclyffe).

⁴ Read. "Mr. Secretary Walsingham and the Policy of Queen Elizabeth." 1925. Answered later.

⁵ Having "respectfully" rebuked Conyers Read's "Sir Francis Walsingham" (meaning presumably his "Mr. Secretary Walsingham and the Policy of Queen Elizabeth") for giving too much credit to Walsingham and too little to Burghley, Mr. J. A. Williamson, "Sir John Hawkins, The Time and the Man," 1927, p. 453, in what he advances as a summary of "the actual history" of the years 1590-95, alleges that while Hawkins devised means to overcome the Queen's deficiencies,

"Old Burghley could not or would not supply the deficiency, and together they doddered through their last years in ever growing instability of purpose, the despair of men of action who waited vainly on their word."

As Burghley predeceased the Queen by nearly five years, how Her Majesty and the Lord Treasurer could have "doddered" together "through their last years" is not explained; and far from Burghley being "the despair of the men of action" he was their most potent advocate with the Queen in many a crisis (as we shall see).

"*Queen Elizabeth*:" in which, in the edition de luxe, it is claimed that the pictures are as representative as the text. But a presentation of the life and reign of Queen Elizabeth, without even one portrait of Burghley, Walsingham, or Drake, prepares us for an under-estimate of them all. The object of the exclusion was the ultra-glorification of the Queen.

As to her autocracy, her own pronouncements thereon are many and emphatic. But few Sovereigns have been better served. Nothing is now gained by blindness to the allied labours of the chief Councillors and "martiallists" by whom her power was created, consolidated, and maintained.

And that Burghley was the most constructive influence of all will become apparent partly through the change in the Queen's conduct after his death. As the secret history of the intrigues during her final years will be first unveiled in the present work, the reader is requested to wait, until Her Majesty can be known to her last breath, before attempting to assess the extent of her debt and that of the country to Burghley.

Sir Henry Radclyffe's letter to Burghley, sending him a shipmaster just come from the coast of Spain, is dated from Portsmouth on the 10th of July. The Burghley of "modern history," unwilling to recognise danger until in 1588 the Spanish Armada entered the Narrow Seas,—and even then "scratching his head" in perplexity, as a living writer depicted him,¹—is born of the negligence of historians: who have omitted to compare the dates of letters of warning Burghley received, with the dates of measures he took in consequence.

Riding hard in summer when the roads were good, Radclyffe's messenger should have reached London by the 12th of July. On the 15th appeared a printed Proclamation:

"The Q. Ma^{tie} findeth the continuance or rather increase of the Traitous and malicious purposes and solicitations of such Rebelles and Traitors as Justlie have been condemned by lawe, and doe live in foreine parts" increased by "certeine others that are fled out of the Realme . . . both w^{ch} have wandered from place to place and from one Princes Cort to an other, but speciallie to Rome: and there have falselie and traiterouslie . . . practised . . . to sollicite and irritate all kyndes of estates to conceave displeasures agaynst hir Ma^{ty} . . . and . . . to move them to hostilitie. . . ."

"... therefore she thinketh it good to admonish her good and faythful People that theie continue in their dutifull and humble servie of Almightye god and in good redynes with their Bodies, substance and strenght to withstand anie enterprise that may be offered to this Realm."

"Whatsoever rumors" reach them, whether "by speeches or writings" they are not to be moved therewith" to "alter their dueties and Couradge . . ."

¹ Conyers Read, "*Mr. Secretary Walsingham*" &c., &c., 1925.

² Now first quoted verbatim. Extract from S.P.D. Eliz: CXL, 19. Undated draft, endorsed in pencil "In Grenville Coll: 22 Eliz. 15 July." The editor of the Cal: S.P. Dom. 1547-1580, p. 665, notes this as a fair copy of S.P.D. Eliz: CXL 18 (also undated draft) and as "original of printed proclamation 15 July 1580 from which it varies in many particulars": not stating that printed proclamation is in B.M. No. 6463 (207). The "many particulars" in which it varies are of relatively little importance compared to the main point, viz. the paragraph now italicised, which is word for word the same in the draft and in the printed proclamation.

That the nation should be kept in readiness for any wars that might be forced upon England from abroad was the basic principle of Burghley's forty years in office; and he was able to cope with such complexity of naval, military, diplomatic, domestic, and scholastic matters as would to-day be considered far beyond the strength of any one minister. His offices of Lord High Treasurer and Privy Councillor were the more strenuous, as the Privy Council in emergencies sat every day and often twice a day. Parliaments were few (called mainly when subsidies had to be voted; and the Members of the Lower House were usually admonished to "forbear long speeches"). Upon the Council—though its decisions had no legal validity until confirmed by the Queen,—fell the main burden of administration.

In the drama of national life, while a survey of the doings of the principal persons is essential, there are obscure individuals whose behaviour also should be examined. Among those who have been lifted out of their places and brought towards the front of the stage, while some central figures have been relegated to the background, is the one-time physician of Lord Leicester, Ruy Lopez, a Portuguese, of whose doings much of a sensational nature has been postulated in our own day; without the commentators having studied the European political situation or the affairs of Portugal; and without examining the correspondence of Lopez himself, or observing with precision the dates of contemporary allusions to his dealings.

"*Ill^{mo} e Ex^{mo} S^{or} mio*," wrote Lopez to the Earl of Leicester. (But we will have it in English):

"Being now in the house of the S^r Walsingham I speak to inform your Excellency of that which the Ambassador asks of her Majesty, *praying your Excellency so to deal with her that she may be pleased to consent to things so necessary for the defence of our King of Portugal*, . . ." who will dedicate himself to the service of England "in a bond which shall never break."

Leicester is requested to show himself "a true Portuguese": in which case Lopez will be not only his "doctor and servant (as I am) but slave."

Lopez supplicates that the Queen's attention may be drawn to the requests of King Antonio's Ambassador; and, looking forward to the liberation of Portugal with exalted hopes, and due compliments, he signs himself His Excellency's humble

¹ "*Essendo quiuj In casa del S^{or} Walsingham, m'e parso Avisar' A v.e. sia di quello ch l'Imbasciator domanda da la sua Maj^a pregand^o A v.e. sia meglio co lej ch'sia Contenta d'Consentir per esser cosa Tanitta necessaria per la defensa dil n'ro Reg^o de Portugal, jl quale come dice jl Re Don Antonio sera sempe dedicatto Al seruitio di questo Regno cotre ogni Alro e questo co Tutta en sua possansa e restara una lega Tanti ferma ch' maj se romperà. perilch' Ex^{ll} S^{or} mio prego A.o.e. si monstre in questo vero portogese e io li prometto essertj no solo medico e seruittor (como gia sono) ma schiavo*"

Orig: S.P. Portugal I. 38. (Only an abbreviated translation in modern English is given in Cal: S.P. For: 1579-80, No. 402, where titles, address, endorsement, etc., are omitted.)

servant.¹ The petition entrusted to him to enclose for the Queen from King Antonio's Ambassador, was that she should supply 12 ships with guns, men, and munitions:² 2000 harquebusiers, with officers; as much bronze ordnance as the Queen will allow; the same of gunpowder and iron balls. Payment for all these to be made in Portugal; in coin, jewels or specie, according to Her Majesty's pleasure.

Like much else given into Leicester's hands, this was passed on by him to Burghley, who the previous year had discussed with Leicester and others of the Council what could be done to avert the Spanish annexation of Portugal.

King Philip's measures to prevent Queen Elizabeth sending aid to the Portuguese had begun early. They were skilfully continued by his Ambassador. From London so early as the 23rd of March, Mendoza wrote his master a long description of his conversations with the Queen:

"I told her that the late King having before his death caused your Majesty's right to be declared in the Cortes, the nobles and clergy being of the same opinion, the matter was clear, and there was nothing more to say about it; although some portion of the Lisbon people were against you.

"She asked me whether there would be any appeal to arms, and I replied that as your Majesty's right was undoubted and had been acknowledged by the Government,³ not much force would be necessary."

Lest we imagine this can be taken literally, we should be reminded of the extensive forces which Edward Wotton the previous August had reported King Philip as preparing for the conquest of Portugal. Precisely because his army was so large, and waiting on the border, it was expected to strike terror into the people and overcome them with the minimum of fighting. But none of Queen Elizabeth's Privy Councillors allowed Mendoza to know they were aware of this; and he informed King Philip that they "*would not on any account admit that the Portuguese Crown will be added to your Majesty's possessions.*"

If, however, Mendoza was not always able to fathom the real feelings of Burghley, he had remarkable success in drawing out the Queen's views and "playing" her accordingly. She told him that three men who had been brought prisoners from Ireland asserted that King Philip would "send aid" to the Irish rebels,

¹ "*poi se adopera in negotia d' far libero quel Regno e sicuro quest', detto Imbasciator si Racommada humilmente A.v.e. la suppea faccia di modo ch' poscia veder (si Ben fuse secretam co'me solamente) A la sua Majta per poter dirle Il suo Animo: spettando le Resposta co'gran desiderio faro fine e no' d' pregar Ajoio d' v.e. Ruy loppez. Da Barnelme: 19 de Agosto 1580.*"

Orig: S.P. Portugal I 38. Endorsed "19 Aug: 1580. D(r) Lopez wth a note of Don Juan Souza enc." (Calendared in abbreviated form.) In same Cal: S.P.F. No. 248. 3rd July 1581, a letter of Richard Norris alludes to "the Ambassador of Portugal, namely Ruy Lopez, doctor of Physic." But Lopez, own enclosure shows that not he but Sousa was the Ambassador. The enclosure is not a letter, but a statement in the third person, beginning "*Queste sono le cose ch'il Re di portogallo domande alla M^{ta} della Reg d'Inghiltera,*" signed by Sousa: "*et il Ambassador di Don An^{ro} Reaj Portogalo lo feltro e sotto seritiola di mano propria. Juⁿ Roix de Sousa.*"

² "*Dodici nauj delle sue motto bene in ordini cosi d'artiglieria come dj gente e monicionj.*"

³ Sic in Cal. S.P.S., trans: M. Hume; but the original is likely to be "Governors": i.e. the 4 Governors in whose hands the realm had been left by King Henry.

"under cover of the Pope's name, and also that he had sent bulls to Ireland, which she had in her possession, declaring her schismatic, and ordering them not to recognise her as Sovereign. She had complained of this to the King of France, and would send a person specially to your Majesty with the same object. In the meanwhile she begged me in God's name . . . to write to your Majesty about it.

"I replied that I recognised the Pope as the Vicar of Christ on earth, and the head of the Catholic Church, in support of which I would lose a hundred thousand lives if I had them; but that with regard to other actions he might perform as a temporal Prince I had no concern. . . . As Don Bernardino, however, I might say that inasmuch as all ministers of her realm were constantly dwelling on the tyranny of the Pope, and those coloured pictures entitled 'The Three Tyrants of the World,' with portraits of the Pope, Nero, and the Turk, were publicly sold, she need not be surprised if attempts were made to enlighten them and bring her country back to its former condition by means of the admonition of the Church.

"She began to storm at this, saying that if the Pope or his Majesty sent any help to Ireland . . . she will let out at Flanders and get the French to enter at the same time."

"I replied that having her interest at heart, I warned her that if your Majesty did extend your arm to make war upon her, it would be with such a heavy hand that she would not have time to breathe, . . . much less to do anything in Flanders. She was much upset at this. . . ."

He ends by claiming that "She and her Councillors" were in "dire confusion" But "When some of them told her *she might be sure that the (Spanish) fleet was coming to Ireland or hither, the Queen replied that whilst your Majesty maintained a Minister in her Court she could not believe that you would break with her.*"

Burghley and Walsingham had no such confidence in King Philip. The code of mediaeval chivalry, by which an open declaration of war was considered obligatory upon Christian Princes before rupture of amity, was not thought necessary by Philip in dealing with heretics. And Mendoza invariably writes as if it were "insolence" in Queen Elizabeth to desire to defend herself, and keep the Crown on her head. While he describes to King Philip the artifices he employed to deceive her, he complains against her "tricks" and laments that her Councillors are not frank with him. He warned the King of the hope of England and France to "have the means of cutting your Majesty's claws . . . so that you should not even be able to get Portugal."²

For this and other information Mendoza received the Sovereign's commendation of his diligent ways, and was ordered again to foster Queen Elizabeth's alarm as to the Spanish fleet.³

"The measures you have adopted to obtain news of Drake so soon as he arrives are good," wrote King Philip: "and so also are those for having him proceeded against. Take care that they do not conceal his arrival It will be well to keep us informed as to the result of the attempts to reach Cathay by the Northern ports, though as you say it seems a difficult enterprise."

He bids his Ambassador "enquire very carefully" whether aid will be sent from

¹ Cal: S.P.S. III. pp. 20-22. ² 17 April 1580. Ib: p. 24.

³ 16 May. Ib: p. 29.

England to the Portuguese; and to warn Queen Elizabeth that she will be wise not to allow her subjects to give any such help, even indirectly.¹

From London on the 18th of June, Mendoza reports that four English ships had been sent to Ireland, and that the troops in the shires for the last four months have been kept in readiness; and there has been "*vigilant watching night and day from the beacon towers; which has hitherto only been done in time of war.*"²

The Queen has also ordered artillery, harquebusses, powder, bowstrings, and other warlike stores to be taken out of the Tower and sent to the arsenal at Rochester where her ships are, to be in greater readiness. ". . . she has sent to-day to the Guildhall for the London Companies to raise 4000 infantry, 1000 pikeman, and 3000 harquebussiers." To which he adds that "these folks" are so "unstable" that orders "are given one moment and changed the next." But he reassures the King that "*their constant fear (which I take care to increase) of your Majesty's fleet, causes them to keep the Queen's ships in port Very little hopes are now entertained of Drake's return, as he has been so long delayed.*"

"A Portuguese arrived recently here by sea, who has been lodged in Secretary Wilson's house. I am told that he brings letters for the Queen and some of the Councillors, . . . I suspect they are from Don Antonio, Prior of St John's, as he" (the stranger) "was in loving converse with the Englishmen who are in his favour."³

The next letter (26th June) gives fuller information: and we may wonder who was the spy or traitor at the English Court through whom the Spanish Ambassador could learn the contents of such private letters as those now summarised.

"The Portuguese . . . saw the Queen, and gave her a letter from Don Antonio dated the 10th ultimo. He also brought some letters to the Councillors. The purport of them all was . . . his right to the Crown *in virtue of the Bull granted to him by the Pope.*"⁴ He pressed upon the Queen the obligation she was under to help him, in consideration of the good understanding . . . between the countries; and referred her for information to the bearer. . . .

¹ 16 May. Ib: p. 30.

² In Lambard's "*Perambulations of Kent*," the earliest County history, first published 1576, (reissued 1596), a section is devoted to "*The Beacons in Kent*": "*As in Warre celeritie availeth no less than force itself, So the right honourable Sir William Brook, Lord Cobham, and Lord Chamberlain of her Majesties Household, (Who hath been sole Lieutenant of the Shire since the first of her Majesties reign) forseeing how necessary it was to have the Forces of the Counties speedily drawn together for the encounter of any hostility: and finding that upon the firing of the Beacons . . . not only the Common sort but even men of place and honour were ignorant which way to direct their course, and thereby (through amazedness) as likely to run from the place affected as to make to the succor of it, caused the true places of the Beacons to be plotted in a Card*" (marked on a map) "*with directive lines so many sundry waies. . . . And now if any man shall think that this laying open of the Beacons is a point not meet to be made publick, I pray him to give me leave to differ there is no secret hereby disclosed whereof the enemy may take advantage, seeing that the Beacons stand open to the eye. . . .*" (Ed: 1656, pp. 65-67.)

³ Cal: S.P.S. III, pp. 35-37.

⁴ What Mendoza meant by the "Bull" granted to Dom Antonio by the Pope it is difficult to understand; because from Antonio's own letters to the Vatican the inference is that Pope Gregory while claiming the sole right to judge of his legitimacy, did not pronounce upon it. II. 4 (5) ante.

In the letter to the Earl of Leicester there was also a request that he would help the gentleman in getting an audience of the Queen. . . . "

This emissary "*told the Queen that not only was Don Antonio legitimate, as would be seen by the proofs; but all the Portuguese people were in his favour, and wished him for their King, they being armed on his behalf to resist your Majesty's entry into the country.*"

They would, however, need aid in munitions. The Queen is represented as answering guardedly that it was not for her to help any competitor unless his right was acknowledged.

Mendoza goes on to allege that "these people are well aware that Don Antonio has not the slightest right, and that what he says is all lies." (On this presumably our historians have relied when they substitute "the Pretender" for the title "King Dom Antonio" in such of Queen Elizabeth's documents as they quote. But in 1580 far from Her Majesty's Privy Councillors being "well aware" that Antonio had not "the slightest right," they were soon furnished from Portugal with all particulars as to his election).

Mendoza concludes his letter with complaints of the increased rigour of Queen Elizabeth against English Catholics. But this was the result of his own threatening that King Philip's Navy was intended to attack England or Ireland. Catholics "who had been imprisoned and were released on bail" had now been "sent back to prison" because in the expectation of a possible Spanish invasion, the Queen did not wish to leave at large any whom she supposed might join the foe if he landed.

"In the County of Lancaster they have arrested sixty men for attending mass," relates Mendoza. "When the order arrived the people in the neighbourhood said that if the Queen was going to punish them for that, she would have to imprison all the County.¹ I understand that the cause of this is that one morning lately certain Latin papers were found about the Streets of London in the form of a Papal Bull declaring the Queen schismatic, although many people think that this is nothing but a trick of the heretics themselves to sound the Catholics. By God's mercy the latter are increasing daily . . . thanks to the preaching of the clergy who come from the seminaries in Spain and Portugal."²

In this last sentence we get the reason why the Crown legislated against the seminary priests; it being subsequently made High Treason for them "to withdraw any person within the Queen's dominions from their natural obedience to the Queen . . . or to withdraw them . . . from the religion now established to the Romish religion."³

King Antonio's Catholicism, however, was not to prevent Queen Elizabeth from sympathising with his plight: as his zeal for his faith did not take the form of wishing to annex her Kingdom, or assist such of her subjects as were favourable to the Pope. His sole object was to gain her assistance against his cousin of Spain.

On the 16th of July, Mendoza informed King Philip that "the Portuguese who . . . was here on behalf of Don Antonio has left for Antwerp, as I

¹ This County remained a stronghold of Catholicism. See Catholic Records, Vol. IV (1907), "*Lord Burghley's Map of Lancashire, 1590.*" (Facsimile). ² *Ib.*: pp. 37-38.

³ 23 Eliz.: Cap. 1. "A Collection of the Several Statutes . . . relating to High Treason. . . . 1709."

understand to endeavour to get the merchants, with permission of [the Prince of] Orange to send some arms and munitions. . ."

He adds that "they"—presumably his own underhand informants at the Court—tell him that the Queen "is going to send a gentleman secretly to Portugal," and that he "goes as a spy, under cover of bearing letters to the Duchess of Bragança and Don Antonio, rather than to do anything of importance."

"Although a rumour is current here that the populace had proclaimed Don Antonio as King, and that consequently a number of English ships would go to help the Portuguese, it is only a baseless story invented by the merchants . . ."

Mendoza's later letter, of the 7th of August, affords insight into his methods with Queen Elizabeth:

" . . . knowing her character . . . and that the only thing necessary to bridle her is to treat her with spirit, and get her to contradict and countermand some of the advice given by her Councillors, I replied that not only had God given your Majesty the heritage of the Crown [of Portugal] but the great power with which she was acquainted, not only to maintain it,—which was easy, as all the Portuguese were rejoiced to be your vassals,—but also to punish the Portuguese who assisted those who dared to resist a right so clear and just. . ."

Two incompatible assertions are here yoked together; for had all the Portuguese rejoiced to become subject to Spain, King Philip would not have required an army to conquer the country and punish many who resisted. But according to Mendoza the Queen was "impressed so much" by this assurance that with "meekness" she assented, and bade Mendoza congratulate his master.

The Ambassador continued that King Philip's "right was so undoubted that it would be a scandalous thing" for any Portuguese to oppose it, or for anyone to countenance such opposition. And *"even if this were not so, I said . . . she would be obliged . . . not to offend a King who had so strong an arm and so long a sword."* He added that Don Antonio had no following because the Portuguese had "nearly all voluntarily surrendered."

It might be supposed that Mendoza, having stigmatised it as a lie that Dom Antonio had been elected King, would have been embarrassed when that news proved true. But he derided the "proclamation of Don Antonio as King" as of no consequence because his party was so "weak." To emphasise this weakness he distributed in writing to many Englishmen "intelligence of the small chance" of success for Antonio.²

It was at this juncture that there arrived in England Antonio's own Ambassador. On the 15th of August, Mendoza wrote, ". . . On the 10th there arrived here by sea a Portuguese named Juan Rodriguez de Souza, a man 32 years of age, a Knight of the Order of Christ." He brought letters from Don Antonio to "the Queen, the Earl of Leicester, and Secretaries Walsingham and Wilson."

¹ Cal: S.P.S. Simancas, III, p. 46.

² Ib: p. 46. This cannot now be found.

The refusal of Castilio, the Portuguese Ambassador sent by the four Governors, to receive any communication from Antonio, was a fact of which Mendoza heard from Castilio himself. When Sousa told Castilio "that his master was King Dom Antonio," Castilio answered that the late King Henry had proclaimed Don Antonio illegitimate and "as such having no right to the Crown."

Mendoza tells King Philip that "no notice" had been taken by Queen Elizabeth of Antonio's envoy. In this he was mistaken: as we could infer from one of his own news items in the same letter,—namely that besides the ships which had previously left England with arms and munition for Portugal, two more hulks had been loaded with further supplies. That they were detained on the English coast by contrary weather was Antonio's ill-fortune; but that they were authorised to sail might have indicated to Mendoza that the Portuguese knight's errand was not fruitless.

"As I was closing this," he adds, "I have been put into possession of a letter written by this Portuguese to Leicester, asking him to get him audience of the Queen." Mendoza alleges that the answer given had been a reminder of King Philip as being the only King of Portugal of whom Her Majesty was aware¹ (a statement inconsistent with Lord Burghley's refusal to recognise any Spanish rights in Portugal). On the 21st of August the Queen—surprising as this may appear—personally discussed the situation with Mendoza, telling him that a Portuguese had come with a message from Dom Antonio "as King of Portugal, which she could not admit that he was."

She was soon to admit it very thoroughly; and even on the 21st of August, Mendoza tells King Philip that despite Her Majesty's seeming aloofness, the Portuguese envoy had been entertained to supper the same night by Leicester at Leicester House.²

On the 16th of October, Mendoza was congratulating King Philip on the "capture of Lisbon with which God has blessed your Majesty. *I have not reported it to the Queen as your Majesty commands . . . as she refuses to give me an audience. . .*" This is an intercepted letter. It ends, "*they are very vigilant in seizing my despatches . . .*"³

Meanwhile Drake, of whom his countrymen had almost despaired, had come home in triumph:

" . . . the 26 of Sept . . . we safely with joyfull minds and thankful hearts to God, arrived at Plimoth, the place of our first setting forth, after we had spent 2 years 10 moneths and some few odd daies beside, in seeing the wonders of the Lord in the deep, in discovering so many admirable things, in going through with so many strange adventures, in escaping out of so many dangers, and overcoming so many difficulties in this our encompassing of this heathen globe . . ."⁴

¹ Ib: p. 48. 14 Aug: (15 Aug: in margin, p. 47.) ² Ib: p. 50.

³ B.M. Add. MS. 28.420. Op. cit. pp. 52-54. ⁴ "The World Encompassed." p. 108. ed. 1652.

Mendoza's next letter, also intercepted, tells how Drake had come to London, and had been with the Queen "for more than six hours": the Councillors present being Lord Burghley, the Earl of Sussex, the Lord High Admiral (Edward Earl of Lincoln), the Comptroller, Sir James Crofts, and Secretary Wilson.

"... Drake asserts that had it not been for two Portuguese pilots whom he took from one of the ships he plundered and sunk on the coast of Brazil, ... he could never have made the voyage. He has given the Queen a diary of everything that happened during the three years he was away ..."²

Mendoza continues to report Drake at Court; "highly favoured" by the Queen, who declined to receive the Spanish Ambassador officially until she had more certain news as to the affairs of Ireland. Nevertheless she sent him word that if he applied to come as a private individual into her presence, she would not refuse.³ Mendoza describes his audience, and how the Queen protested that Drake had not injured any of King Philip's subjects; whereat ensued a long argument in which Mendoza tried to alarm the Queen, and to sow distrust between England and France.

He was successful in making her doubt the amity of France; and on the 8th of September instructions were sent to the English Ambassador in Paris, Sir Henry Cobham:

"Hir Majesty being somewhat perplexed in the matter of Portingale, and yet not altogether persuaded that the King of Spaine is so fully possessed thereof as by the Spaniards is given out, would have you of yourself (in case you find the matter not altogether desperate) enter into some speech with Queen Mother, and let her understand that you do greatly mervayle, considering . . . the Perill that might grow both to France and England by the Spanish Greatness through the accesse of the Crowne of Portugall unto Spayne, that the King (of France) should deal so coldly"

Cobham is to let the Queen Mother understand that she herself is held to be "greatly affected to Spayne; for if she had been otherwise inclyned" a business so vital as that of Portugal "would not have been neglected. . ."

It is to be deplored that the King of France favours those of his Council who are most eager to advance the interests of Spain. Cobham may add that he learns from friends "not unacquainted" with Queen Elizabeth's disposition and intentions, that if the French King "would have dealt frankly . . . and called about him such of his Privie Councill as are not suspected to be affected to Spayne, *hir Majesty would most willingly have joined with the King in assisting the Portingales against Spayne. . .*"

The Queen wishes "these and such like speeches" to be made as from Cobham himself, for "the sounding" of the Queen Mother's humour; indicating to her that the Queen of England would still be "content" to join with any French action on

¹ Add: MS. 28, 420. Op: cit. pp. 52-54.

² London, Oct: 16. B.M. Add: MSS. 28,420; with A "Report of Captain Luis Cabretto to the King on Francis Drake's Voyage." Op: cit, pp. 55-57. But the "diary" is not in the P.R.O.

³ Ib: p. 60-62.

behalf of the Portuguese. All this is to be said only if the case is not yet "desperate"; or if the Queen Mother can be brought to favour it. If otherwise, and if Cobham learns for certain "that the King of Spayne is entirely possessed" of Portugal, then Her Majesty requires him to "forbear to deal therein," until her further pleasure is known.¹

When this letter was written, King Antonio was a fugitive. But the end was not yet. His adventures, sufferings, narrow escapes, renewed hopes, acute disappointments, and further rallyings, were to be many and prolonged; and in all, or nearly all, his future doings, England, whether secretly or openly, was to take part.

¹ (Draft,) dated "Richmonde the 18 of September 1580." *State Papers . . . left by William Cecil Lord Burghley*, ed: Murdin. 1759. pp. 345-346.

APPENDIX.

THE TREACHERY AND EXECUTION OF DOUGHTY.

On a later occasion, in 1585, we will find Don Bernardino de Mendoza from Paris informing King Philip that he had sent a spy to sea with Drake. This was at a time when there was no Spanish Ambassador in London, when the secret arrangement had to be made from France. That there also was a traitor in the expedition of 1577-80 affords another proof of Spanish skill in suborning Queen Elizabeth's subjects. The tragedy of this especial case consists in the fact that the offender, Thomas Doughty, had long been trusted by Drake as his particular friend.¹

An absurd story that Doughty was ordered by Lord Burghley to frustrate Drake's plans has been given a place in professedly serious political history in our own day. Another grotesque tale is often repeated, as to Doughty being sent to sea by the Earl of Leicester with orders to Drake to hang him.² We should turn to the description of Doughty's execution in the authentic contemporary notes of the voyage: by Drake's chaplain, Francis Fletcher.³ It is there related that the plots to overthrow the whole

¹ Drake's feelings we only know through a third person; for the journal which Mendoza states him to have kept for the Queen, is not now to be found. There is in P.R.O. a hostile account of the voyage in Spanish. (S.P.D. Eliz: Cal: Addenda 1580-1625; 27. No. 95). Also the answer of Laurence Elyot, John Chester and others, the gentlemen and some 50 of Drake's followers, as to the value of his prizes, &c. (S.P.D.E. 94. 17. II. Cal: 1547-80). Neither the Cal: S.P.D. Addenda 1566-79, nor Cal: S.P. Colonial, East Indies, &c. 1513-1616, nor Ib: America and W. Indies 1574-1660, or Ib: Addenda 1574-1674 appears to contain anything bearing on this voyage. Nor is there anything in the Calendar of High Court of Admiralty Indictments.

² Answered under date 1584-85, when the libels were published.

³ "*The World Encompassed*." See B.M. Cat: under "Francis Fletcher, Preacher."

"*Sir Francis Drake revived . . . Collected out of the notes of F.F.*" 1653. E. 679 (11).

"*The World Encompassed . . . collected out of the notes of F.F.*" 1628. G. 6519. Another edition 1636. 303. f. 15.

Also "*A Collection of Voyages and Travels*, 1748, 456. f. 15.

Hakluyt Society, "*The World Encompassed*," 1854. R.Ac: 6172/14.

English Circumnavigators, "*The World Encompassed*," 1874. 10027 a a 9.

And there is an edition prefaced by the late Sir Richard Temple, Bart., &c.

action and murder Drake and those most faithful to him, had been thought out "*before the voyage was begun . . . the very model of them was shewed and declared to our generall in his garden at Plymouth, before his setting sayle.*" But Drake could not believe that "a person he loved so dearly" as Doughty could intend anything of the sort:

"And therefore, *he did not onely continue (to this suspected and accused person) al countenance credit and courtesies, . . . but encreased them, using him in a manner as another himselfe, and as his most intimate friend; . . . imparting unto him all his counsell.* . . ."

His final disillusion was the more painful. The trial of Doughty by "all the Captaines and gentlemen" was one of the most dramatic events in history:

"the generall was most of all distracted; and therefore withdrew himselfe, as not able to conceale his tender affection, requiring them, that had heard the whole matter, to give their judgments as they would . . . answer for it unto their prince, and unto Almighty God. . . ."

"Therefore they all, . . . the chieftest of place and judgement in the whole fleet, . . . adjudged that He had deserved death"; but the manner thereof they "remitted to the generall."

"Now after this verdict was thus returned unto our generall (unto whom . . . her maiestie before his departure had committed her sword, . . . with this word: *We doe account that he which striketh at Drake striketh at us*) he called for the guilty party, and caused to be read unto him the several verdicts which were written, . . . our general proposed unto him this choice," whether he would prefer to be "executed in this island? or to be set aland on the maine? or returne into England, *there to answer his deed before the Lords of her maiesties Councell.*"

Doughty was given until next day to consider. He thanked Drake, and chose execution; "desiring onely this favour, that they might receive the holy communion once againe together befor his death; and that he might not die other than a gentleman's death."

Both requests were granted: "a communion was celebrated" by Drake's chaplain, who tells the story; and the "condemned penitent gentleman" showed "great tokens of a contrite and rependant heart." After the sacrament, Drake and Doughty "dined also at the same table together, . . . each cheering up the other, and taking their leave by drinking to each other. After dinner, . . . without any dallying, or deferring the time," Doughty "came forth and kneeld downe, preparing at once his neck for the axe, and his spirit for heaven."

He "desired all the rest to pray for him, and willed the executioner to do his office": (That he was beheaded,—instead of hanged like a felon,—was a special concession.)

" . . . he left unto our fleete a lamentable example of a goodly gentleman, who in seeking advancement unfit for him, cast away himself. . . ."²

What he had been promised from Spain we do not know. But we have seen the offers made to Hawkins in 1571; and we will again and again find King Philip's agents wooing Queen Elizabeth's subjects: with varying degrees of success,—and some notable failures.

¹ His manner of meeting his death was held to expiate his crime. Drake as the General was obliged to punish one who had stirred up mutiny, and almost overthrown the whole action; but that as his private friend he could take the Sacrament with him in token of forgiveness was well understood at the time, though it has excited needless bewilderment since.

² "*The World Encompassed*," 1652, pp. 31-33.

PART II.

“Particularly the Power of Spain.”

CHAPTER 4.

“THE BALANCE OF POWER.”

SECTION 10.

“Go strong an arm and so long a sword.”

(*The Hispano-Italian invasion of Ireland. Sept. 1580*).

“ . . . if King Philip have Portugal, with his West Indies and with their East Indies, he might . . . embrace and crush the world : Therefore it behoveth his equals to lame him of one of those arms.”

Richard Topclyffe to the Earl of Shrewsbury. 16 March, 1579-80.
Talbot MSS. F. f. 377.

“ I said . . . she would be obliged . . . not to offend a King who had so strong an arm and so long a sword.”

The Spanish Ambassador, telling King Philip what he had stated to Queen Elizabeth. 7 Aug: 1580. Cal: S.P. Spanish. III. p. 46.

“ Let us not forget that his sword is presently drawn . . . If . . . we safely shut up the postern gate, we are sure to repulse the peril ; but if our enemy make himself the porter, it will be then too late to wish we had the keys . . . ”

Sir Christopher Hatton to Sir Francis Walsingham (as to King Philip's intentions). 26 Sep: 1580. Harl: MS. 416. f. 200.

“ The fort was yeilded, all the Irish men and women hanged ; and more than foure hundred Spaniards, Italians, and Biscaines put to the sword ; the cornell, capteins, secretarie and others to the number of twentie, saved for ransom.”

Holinshed's *Chronicles* (Hooker's version), under Anno Reg. 23.

¶ A View of Valyaunce.

Describing the famous

feates, and Martiall exploits of two
most mightie nations, the Romans
and the Carthaginians, for the
conquest and possession of
Spayne.

Translated out of an aun-

cient Recorde of Antiquitie, writ-
ten by Rutilius Rufus, a Romaine
Gentleman, and a Capitaine
of charge under Scipio, in the
same Warres.

VERY DELIGHTFVLL

so reade, and neuer before this
time publyshed.

¶ Imprinted at London, by

Thomas East. 1580.

(B.M. No. 589. a. 20.) A typical popular work, reminding Englishmen of the ancient Roman Conquest of Spain; issued in 1580, the year the Spanish Army under the Duke of Alba conquered Portugal.

The dedication by Thomas Newton is to Sir Henry Lee, Master of the Armoury to Queen Elizabeth.

For Sir Henry Lee's final appearance as the Queen's Champion at her accession-anniversary tournament in 1590, when he resigned in favour of George Clifford, Earl of Cumberland, see under date.

PART II.

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(*The Hispano-Italian invasion of Ireland. Sep: 1580*).

IN the great world-drama of “the balance of Power,” the difficulty is that instead of the scenes and acts following in orderly manner as on the stage, many events occur simultaneously. We must look in succession upon happenings which took place at the same time and reacted swiftly on each other. If we often remark on Queen Elizabeth’s procrastinating humours, we should remember the slowness with which news travelled, and the impossibility in each country of knowing what was happening in the other at the moment of writing. Though Her Majesty’s ministers whether in Portugal or Spain forwarded all intelligence as quickly as they could, yet the “*Spanish Advertisements sent from Sir H(enry) Ratclyffe*,” Ambassador at Madrid, described as embodying tidings from Portugal, received at Valladolid, on the 3rd of September, are endorsed as not received in England until the 9th of November.¹

“Right Worshipful Sir.

“It may please your Worship to understand that at the date of this, being the 3rd of September, there came news to this Court how the Duke of Alva with 50,000 men hath taken Lisbon: and hath ransacked the suburbs: and that Don Antonio with 9000 gave battle against the Duke, the which endured five hours, so as there is slain upon both parts to the number of 8000.

“*Don Antonio is fled, no man can tell whither.*

“The merchants of Lisbon hath given the Duke of Alva 600,000 duckets upon condition that his men and soldiers shall not ransack the city.

“*The Isles*” [*of the Azores*] “*as yet is not taken*, but the Earle of the Hollie crosse” [Marqués de Santa Cruz] “with his fleet hath besieged [Lisbon] and hath taken seven great ships of Don Antonio.

“*The Indies fleete is come to Seville the fifteenth of August with Eight million of gold and silver.*”

¹ Headed “Spaine. From Valle de leith the third of September 1580”; and endorsed “9 Novemb: 1580.” Newsletters, S.P. For: 101, Vol. 90, No. 9. Not signed. In the same hand a similar MS, 9a, which has the last part underlined. Both possibly decoded from a cypher.

This last statement is important from a military point of view, showing that the conqueror would thus have more than enough means to continue the war until the Azores could be captured. But it has been dropped bodily out of the version of the letter printed in the Calendar of State Papers;¹ where also it is omitted that in Spain the harvest of corn and wine has been good: a fact likewise bearing on the main issues.

The report mentions that corn is being sent to St. Anderos for the Pope's ships. A sentence is then underlined: "*The talke of this contrey is still that the holle army goeth for englande, but most serteine the Popes men goeth for Irland.*"²

Seven weeks before this letter reached Queen Elizabeth, "the Pope's men" had landed from Spanish ships in the County Kerry. On the 12th and 13th of September the first invaders arrived at Smerwick;³ only three or four ships; but a grand fleet was discernible upon the coast.⁴

At what date this intelligence was received in England is not clear; but on September the 21st, the Privy Council at Richmond, sending out letters calling up recruits from Ireland (as appointed by previous letters in July), added "albeit their Lordships hope there wilbe no neade thereof": (which may merely have meant that the Lord Deputy, Arthur, Lord Grey of Wilton, and the Earl of Ormond were expected so to deal with the invader as to make him swiftly rue his attempt).

By the 15th of September it had been realised in Ireland that some of the enemy were Italians: four of the ships were described as having transported the "Pope's army," and four more and a galley were stated to be near.⁵

As Admiral Sir William Gorges was close to Cork with three of the Queen's ships,⁶ there was the less alarm. But on the 18th it was understood that not only had 500 Spaniards landed, but they had possessed themselves of a fort, and strengthened it for their own munition and treasure.⁷ The country people were driving their cattle inland for safety;⁸ and the same day it was notified that Her

¹ S.P. Foreign. 1579-80. Addenda. No. 581.

² From orig: S.P. Foreign, Newsletters 90. No. 9a. The P.R.O. Index to printed Records does not show this as printed. But it is given in Cal: S.P. Foreign, Addenda, No. 581, down to "Pope's men goeth for Irland," the sentence about the fleet and the harvest being, however, omitted; also the Calendar does not include the date the news arrived at Valladolid. The language of the Calendars is not always the language of Elizabethans; and the published renderings do not always include all the main points. Comparing of Calendars and originals word by word is so lengthy a process that the best system is to use the Calendars to find out what matter exists; and then procure exact copies of the originals. Except in a few instances (where other matter supplies the most necessary particulars) this principle has been followed in the present work.

³ Two ships on the 12th and one on the 13th. S.P. Ireland, Vol. 76. No. 31. Thomas, Baron of Lixnaw to the Commissioners of Munster at Askeaton. (The earliest reference in Cal: p. 251.)

⁴ Sir Warham St. Leger to Lord Burghley. Ib: No. 36 & 36¹. p. 252.

⁵ Acts of the P.C. 1580-81. p. 205.

⁶ 14th Sep. M'Carthy to Sir Warham St Leger. S.P.I. 76. No. 37, enclosing (15th Sep) (37¹) A merchant of the Dingle to the Earl of "Clancarr," to the above effect. No. 37¹¹, Baron of Lixnaw to Earl of "Clancarr," asks his aid against the Spaniards, Ardath, Sep: 14.

⁷ Limerick. 17th Sep: Ib: 38. ⁸ Ib: No. 40. Enclosing 40¹.

⁹ Sep: 18. Youghal, Thos. Grant to the Mayor of Waterford. Ib: No. 41.

Majesty's ships were required in haste.¹ Then follows the surprising intelligence that the fleet, under Sir William Winter and Sir William Gorges, had sailed for England on the 22nd.

The very same day on which Gorges and Winter departed, or rather "at night" of that 22nd of September, Thomas Earl of Ormond, from "The Great Castle" of Kilkenny wrote to Sir Francis Walsingham that he had received and sent on to the Lord Deputy news of the arrival of Spanish ships and men at Smerwick.² This was confirmed by letters from the Mayor of Limerick.³

The "Considerations" which moved Winter and Gorges to leave Ireland for England at this juncture appeared to themselves (on the 23rd of the month) good and sufficient.⁴ But two days later, on the 25th, the Mayor and others in Waterford reported to Secretary Walsingham that 27 Spanish sail had anchored at Smerwick, Ventry, and Limerick Haven.⁵ The ill-timed departure of the English fleet was what had enabled them so to do. By the 30th it was known that the enemy had disembarked his ordnance.⁶

Though no man can suppose the Lord Deputy other than earnest in his official responsibilities, he was at first sceptical as to the reality of the Spanish invasion. And though on the 1st of October, Sir Henry Wallop, the Treasurer for Ireland, wrote to Secretary Walsingham that the Earl of Desmond had joined the invader,⁷ on the same day he sent a cypher note, seeming to cast doubt on the arrival of the Spaniards;⁸ and on the 5th of October the Lord Deputy wrote to the Queen from Dublin that the Spanish landing "may prove but a false rumour."

But a letter from Wallop to Walsingham from Dublin on the same date describes the Lord Deputy as having departed "*yesterday* . . . towards Monster, . . . the night before havynge resevyd letters from my L. of Ormond, of his preparations against th' enemies"; but he was not then "fully advertysed what

¹ Ib: 42, with enclosure of Sep: 15.

² Ib: No^s. 51, 52. "Beinge at Cloghgrenane on my way to my L(ord) Deputie . . . I received certaine letters from Mounster advertizing th'arryval of som spanish shippes with some forces in them, at smerwick, w^{ch} l(ett)res I have sent . . . post haste to the L.L. of her Mat^{ies} Counsell there and to the L. Deputie . . ."

³ "(I) thoughte fitt . . . to retorne westwards towards suche places as by the service I shoulde be occasioned (to protect): since which tyme I have received l(ett)res from the Mayor of Lymericke and others, confirming . . . that which was advertysed, with reporte of th'arryval of eight shippes . . ." Orig: S.P. Ireland 76. No. 53. (On the 28th he was at Cork. Cal: S.P.I. p. 155.)

⁴ Ib: 55.

⁵ Not all warships: some argosies. Cal: p. 255. No. 58, and enclosure 581.

⁶ The Queen's soldiers were short even of shot. Ib. No. 76. Report to Lord Deputy, Lord Gray of Wilton, enclosing letter from Capt: Thos. Clynton, Sep: 26. If he had had 10 shot, Clynton says, he woud venture a course with the great gallego, for all her 32 oars.

⁷ S.P. Ireland, 77. 1. ⁸ Ib: 2.

⁹ "The advertisements (that) came so thyck this last wyke of Strangers arryval have for these iiij or v dayes slackted mootch; and one I receaved but ij dayes past y^t falsified the same, so y^t may prove but a fals rumor razzed either by some duble diligencies to coollor former blottes by them . . . or else of purpoze to w^tdraw y^e forces hence." Ib: 77. 12.

force they were nor what Chefftayne they had. . .” Wallop encloses information which came to “his L(ordship) and me . . . whereby ys certaynely contynued the landyng of Strangers . . .”¹

Meanwhile all this delay gave the Spaniards and Italians time to fortify themselves at Smerwick; and though the Earl of Ormond had been at Cork by the 28th of September,² it was not till the 12th of October that he had his first skirmish. On the 31st he is described as “chasing wild Basques and straggling Italians.”³

Severely handicapped by lack of victuals and munition, Ormond, on turning back in search of the Lord Deputy, intercepted Desmond at “Killenturnye” with 500 of the foreign invaders.⁴

The Lord Deputy, Arthur, Lord Grey of Wilton, is now credited in England with being a formidable soldier. Amply warned by the Privy Council in July, it is a mystery why he was so unready to meet the “Strangers” in September.

Spain and England were nominally at peace, since 1578, when an Ambassador from King Philip was established once more at Her Majesty’s Court after an interval of seven years. But even if Philip had postponed his intended war on England under his own style and title, that he should strike at Queen Elizabeth through Ireland in the name of the Pope was a contingency for which Burghley was prepared. The present notion that Burghley kept Queen Elizabeth’s Generals short of troops, is as mistaken on this as on later occasions. A manifesto was issued to the Bishops in England, on St. Michael and All Angels Day, to admonish the clergy to contribute Light Horse for service in Ireland.⁵ Already the Commissaries of the Shires had furnished lists of persons keeping Horses for Defence of the Realm as obliged by law, and of those who undertook “Voluntary Increase” of that burden.⁶ Many measures were taken to prevent the trouble spreading to England. Don Bernardino de Mendoza wrote from London to King Philip that “*During the last six weeks, five hundred English gentlemen have been imprisoned here on the charge of being Catholics, there being fears that they might rise in consequence of the news from Ireland.*”⁷

The story he sent on the 30th of October was that the Pope’s troops in Ireland had routed the Earl of Ormond and killed him with the greater part of his men.⁸

What was actually happening we shall soon see.

While “the Pope’s men” and King Philip’s had been landing at Smerwick in Kerry, there was a renewal of negotiations in France and England as to Queen

¹ Ib: No. 13. ² S.P. Ireland, 78. No. 71.

³ S.P.I. 78. Cal: p. 255. B.M. Add: MS. 26.056. C., Cal: S.P.S. III. pp. 57-59, is a Spanish and Irish despatch from “Limerick, Wednesday 19th October, 1580,” expressing hope that “the whole of this country may . . . be brought to submit to the holy Catholic faith.” The Earl of Ormond is described as the “principal enemy of our cause.”

⁴ S.P.I. Cal: No. 71. ⁵ S.P.D. Eliz: CXLII. 30 Cal: (1856). p. 677.

⁶ Ib: p. 676. Sep: 9th. ⁷ Cal: S.P.S. p. 62. ⁸ Ib: p. 63.

Elizabeth's marriage with the Duke of Anjou, the heir presumptive to the Crown of his brother. To follow the Will o' the Wisp Rumour in all its vagaries is superfluous. Sufficient to say that the private remonstrances of Sidney and the public protest of Stubbe the previous summer had not influenced Queen Elizabeth. And even Leicester was coming round to favour the French alliance. The Archbishop of York wrote to the Earl of Shrewsbury that "the Earl of Leicester, Mr Hatton, and Mr Walsingham have earnestly moved her Majesty to go forward with the marriage" for her "safety."

What Hatton privately felt he confided to Sir Thomas Heneage. Describing his own "love" for her Majesty as "no less" than that of the one who "by the greatness of a kingly birth and fortune is most fit to have her," he enclosed a letter for the Queen and a ring.²

Eight days later Hatton wrote again, vowing "myself, my life, and all that I am or is me" to her service, thanking her for her "sweet" words, and her "rare sentence and matter"; and making a bold allusion to "Frogs,"—(the Duc d'Anjou and his train).³

In a long letter to Sir Francis Walsingham dated "from Hatton House this 26th of September 1580" in reference to the "evil news of the affairs of Ireland," Hatton begs that the Queen will not economise at the wrong moment:

"... let nothing be spared, either of treasure, men, munition, or whatsoever else, to save that Kingdom, being, as you know, the principal key of this her Royal seat. . . Resist the beginning; and so . . . end this mischief before her other potent enemies might find time and opportunity to work their malice upon us."

The "great prosperity of Spain" has further emboldened King Philip: "*Let us not forget that his sword is presently drawn; and then with what insolent fury this his victory may inflame him against us.*"

That "an ancient malice" is in his heart, "*thoroughly rooted and rankly grown for these many years*" is "*known to all men that do bend their eyes to behold the course of his actions.*"

"Timely to foresee" and "*most manfully to resist*" Spanish machinations is what Hatton urges:

"... in Ireland and Scotland the entries and ways to our destruction" are "most aptly to be found. *If then we safely shut up the postern gate, we are sure to repulse the peril; but if our enemy make himself the porter, it will be then too late to wish we had the keys.* . ."

Even though he was one of the ministers employed to arrange the French marriage, Hatton privately to Walsingham reveals emotions remarkably like those

¹ Lodge's "*Illustrations*," Vol. II. p. 162.

² "11th Sep: 158" fourth figure away: presumably 1580. Holog: Harl: MS. 416. f. 200. P^t Nicholas' "*Life of Sir Christopher Hatton*." (1847). pp. 155-156.

³ S.P. Dom: Eliz: "This 19th of September, 1580." Ib: pp. 156-158.

for the public expression of which John Stubbe had suffered so terrible a punishment.

It is "the malice of France," he says, which has been stirring up an antagonism among the Scots. And that France is still "governed and directed by Guisians" seems to him ominous. He anticipates a possible European combination against Queen Elizabeth; but still more he dreads the results of her own parsimonious habits:

"One thousand pounds employed now in time might haply not only buy her Majesty's present safety, but undoubtedly save her the expense of three score thousand before many years."

"With the disposition of France, which lieth now in her Majesty's arbitrament, I dare not meddle; for she only knoweth what shall become thereof. . . . *But if her Highness means to marry, I wonder she so delayeth it.*

"If she do but temporise, and will leave it at the last, what may we look for then but that the Pope with Spain and France will yoke themselves in ireful revenue, according to their solemn combination so long ago concluded against us."

Far from Hatton being engrossed in dancing and dalliance, and indifferent to matters of State, his warning in September 1580 could hardly be more solemn:

Contemplating "first *the weak and broken estate of Ireland*, then the uncertain and suspected amity of Scotland, the dangerous action of the French, tending to the subversion of the Protestant, the irrevocable losses and overthrows received lately by the States of the Low Countries, *and the . . . victorious success of the King of Spain in Portugal*, I cannot but mourn in my heart to see us beset on all sides with so great and apparent dangers."¹

This was written three days before Michaelmas: and three days after the English fleet under Winter and Gorges had so inopportunately left Ireland (23 September,) just as ships and men were most urgently wanted to impede the landing of the enemy reinforcements. Not until the 6th of November did Her Majesty's ships arrive back in Irish waters.²

The presence of the fleet then made possible the carrying out of operations on land; especially as the Spaniards were "disappointed" of 4000 Irishmen they had been promised under the Earl of Desmond. In the fighting that ensued, there were 600 Spaniards and Italians slain; and "munition and vittayle great store" captured. Her Majesty "had here at this service but 800" men; but those few acquitted themselves most gallantly.

¹ Add: MSS. 15891. f. 18. Ib. pp. 159-161.

² On Martinmass Day (11th of November) an unsigned report was sent to Sir Francis Walsingham to let him know that "the vj of this monethe my Lorde (Deputy) beinge in Campe between Dingley and Smerwicke, newes came to his Honor" of the return of "Sr Willm Winter in the haven of Smerwick with the Revendge, the Swiftsure, the Fyfe, and the Merlyon, and other shippes of her Ma^{tie} and also of three barques fraughted from Lymerick and Corke wth victuelles S.P.I. 78. No. 27. (unsigned).

Next day, 12th of November, the Lord Deputy sent the Queen a full report of the capture of Smerwick. Guns had been landed from the fleet. The besieged made a stout defence: "The fort requited our culverins until two of their best pieces" were "taken away"; and finally the Papal troops "were reduced to musket and harquebus fire with which to answer."

After a parley, they surrendered. The Spanish spokesman alleged that he had not been sent by King Philip, but by "John Martinez de Ricaldi, Governor for y^e King at Bilbao" (which amounted to the same thing). The principal Italian officer declared "they were all sent by the Pope for the defence of the Catholic faith."¹

We may remember the warning that the Spanish fleet at St. Anderos was intended to attack Queen Elizabeth's dominions. This is confirmed by the examination of "Pedro Mandia, Spaniard born in Bilbao," who on the 31st of October admitted that the ships which came to Ireland had sailed from "St. Andros." Two of the fleet had been separated from their consorts by a storm; four "came home"; and those four which first arrived at Smerwick had looked for the coming of six sail more. This Spaniard (erroneously) rated the soldiers landed only at 400, of whom 50 were Italians "brave and lusty," and 350 Spaniards sick and diseased, their Colonel and Captain-General an Italian named "Cornallia." Their great artillery in the fort, he said, consisted of 8 cast pieces, 3 of brass and 5 of iron; their arms 300 calivers and 200 pikes.²

On the 10th of October a Frenchman who had been captured by the Spaniards, and rescued from them, also testified that five ships and a galliot were from St. Anderos. The army was estimated by this Frenchman at 1000. But 250 men and part of the munition had been separated from them by foul weather and since captured by the "Rochellers."

According to the same Frenchman, only 800 soldiers were landed in Ireland, of which 80 were Italians, "proper men"; and there came with them in the "great ship" of "four hundred tons" a Bishop who "had the name of the Pope's nuncio." But these Spaniards were poor "Byswynes" (*bisoños*, pressed men); and though they were well supplied with arms, not all knew how to use them. Of harquebuses and calivers they had four or five chests full; pikes, "good store"; "close pieces" five, the highest a "saker"; of chamber pieces 6 or 7. They were expecting four or five more sail from Biscay, with further supply of men and munition.³

On the capture of the fort, victuals to last "half a year" were found: also "armor, morrions, Callyvors, musketts, pykes, swords, flasks, harquebushes . . ., powder, shott, Barrells of Bullets and other kind of furniture," enough for 3000 men; also "sondry tooles": and a treatise, "*De Re Militare*," subsequently translated and presented to Philip Sidney.⁴

¹ S.P. Ireland 78. 29. ² Cal: S.P. Foreign. 15. 79-80. No. 477.

³ Cal: S.P. For: 1579-80. No. 477. 3. ⁴ p. 78.

On the 11th of December, from London, Mendoza, sending King Philip a long account of the affair at Smerwick, represented the garrison as not making "the slightest resistance" but surrendering immediately on the promise that all their lives should be spared; but the "Viceroy" breaking his word and slaughtering 507 men and some women on the 10th of the month, and also hanging 17 Irish and English, including a priest.

The editor of the English translation, Hume, quotes a few words from Camden's *Annals*, as to this massacre being "against the mind of the Lord Deputy, who shed tears at the determination that the Captain should be spared and the rest promiscuously put to the sword"; and he adds in the Calendar that the slaughter remains none the less a dark stain upon the honour of the Deputy. Hume omits to quote the previous paragraphs of Camden, wherein we see that the Lord Deputy, far from making any such promise as Mendoza alleged, had defined to the garrison of Smerwick the circumstances which put them outside the range of terms given in lawful war. According to Camden, instead of surrendering immediately they had resisted a bombardment "for foure dayes." The Spanish and Italian Commanders only gave in because their own soldiers were "seditiously offering violence" to them, and they were not able to hold out any longer.

When they "hung out a white flag *on the fifth day and craved parley*," it was "*denied them, because they had joyned themselves with the Rebels, with whom it was not lawful to have any parley.*"

"*Then they craved that they might depart with bag and baggage; but neither was this granted. . . . And the Lord Deputy (inveighing very bitterly against the Bishop of Rome) demanded them to yield without any condition.*" To which perforce they assented.

He immediately took council what should be done with the prisoners. And "forasmuch as those which yealded" equalled his own army in number, and danger still threatened him from Irish "Rebels who were above 1,500 strong, and the English were so destitute of victuals and apparell that they were ready to mutine unless they were relieved out of the Fort by the spoyles of the Enemy, and there lacked shipping to carry away the Enemies," it was then concluded "against the mind of the Deputy" that only the Captains should be spared and the others put to the sword (as already quoted by the editor of the Calendar in a fragment which is misleading when divorced from the paragraphs which go before it).

As the Sovereigns of Spain and England were supposed to be at peace, the Spanish Ambassador in London must have known that the invaders were not entitled to the courtesies of "*buena guerra.*"

Arthur, Lord Grey of Wilton, was a most unlikely person to dissolve into tears or permit the carrying out of measures he did not approve. His name therefore must remain for ever associated with the slaughter, which he himself reports without sign of distress.

Camden alleges that "*the Queene wished it had been left undone, . . . detesting from her heart the cruelty, though necessary, . . . and hardly did she allow of the reasons thereof . . .*" On the contrary, she wrote "great thanckes and commendacons" to the Lord Deputy for his "happie successe," which she took as a proof of God's "love and favour" towards herself. Not only did she not demur to putting the rank and file to the sword; she deplored the mercy which Grey vouchsafed to the officers:

"In this late enterprise performed by you so greatly to our liking, we could have wished that the principal persons, . . . to whom you have promised grace, which we will see performed, *had been reserved for us to have extended either justice or mercy as to us should have been found best.*"

And it would not have been mercy; "*for a principal should receive punishment before an accessory*"; and such as might be tempted to repeat "so wicked an enterprise," might be deterred if they saw that the officers as well as the inferiors "received punishment according to their demerits."

Not content with this, the Queen adds, in her most involved style,

"The mightie hand of the Allmightie power hathe showed manifeste: the force of his strengthe in the weaknes of feeblest sexe and mynds this yere to make men ashamed ever hereafter to disdaine vs, in w^{ch} Action I joye that you have bin chose(n) the Instrument of his glory . . . Your loving Soveraygne, *Elizabeth R.*"

In the hand of Walsingham's secretary it is marginally noted "*This was wrytten in Roman hand by her Ma^{tie} on the top of the l(ett)re.*"

By quoting Camden's story about Grey's "tears" and omitting Grey's terms, the English editor of the Calendar of State Papers Spanish has given a wrong impression. However harsh the Lord Deputy's treatment of the vanquished, it was no violation of any promise. But Mendoza's letter, alleging the garrison in Smerwick to have surrendered immediately, caused King Philip to comment with a cold disdain upon what he deemed the spiritless conduct of the soldiers. Nevertheless they had served his purpose, by keeping the English fleet away from the coasts of Portugal and Spain.³

Twelve days after Mendoza's report, the "*names of such officers who were*

¹ *Annals*. ed: 1635. pp. 214-217.

² S.P. Ireland. Vol. LXXIX. No. 13 Draft, docketed "December M(inute) from hir Ma^{tie} to ye L. Grey L. Depute of Ireland. Entered 12 Decemb^r at Westm^r." A fair copy of No. 14 draft; with another (partly torn) draft, written on the reverse of an outer cover which had been addressed to the Lords of the Privy Council. The drafts corrected and revised by Walsingham. For Burghley's alleged views, see note E.E., p. 77.

³ The editor of Cal: S.P.S. (1896) Vol. III, Martin Hume, does not say which edition of Camden he is quoting nor give page reference; and he allows the statement of Mendoza to stand, that the Lord Deputy gave his promise and broke it. Hume should have ascertained that Gray had declared to the Spaniards and Italians *before their surrender* that by joining with rebels they had forfeited consideration. Hume adds that "The cruel deed was partly entrusted to Sir Walter Raleigh": (Cal: S.P.S. III. p. 70). Raleigh's methods in Ireland neither then nor at any time were illumined by mercy; but in 1580 there was no "Sir Walter Raleigh." Four years were to run before "Rawley" was dubbed knight "at Greenwich on the Twelfth day 1584" (5). (Metcalf's *Book of Knights*, 1885. p. 135.) In 1580 Raleigh was Captain of 100 men, and was paid by the Crown 4/- a day. See "*Sir Walter Raleigh in Ireland*" by the late Sir John Pope Hennessy. London, 1883, (where however the letters are often given without volume or ff. references to the MSS, most of which had already been printed by Edwards in his biography of Raleigh).

taken in Ireland" were sent to the Earl of Shrewsbury.¹ These officers were willing to give from 1000 to 6000 ducats each for their ransoms, according to rank.

"It was my fortune," adds Shrewsbury's informant, "to see the chiefest banner displayed in the fort, being of three several colours, green, yellow, and red. The cross, with a serpent crawled in scutcheon, had those words of Italian written, 'For Christ and the Church give me victory': Above that was the cross keys, and a certain posey which was blotted out, not to be read, and above the same were three crowns.

"Much munition was taken; . . . and in rifling up the baggage Captain Rawly has found a great number of letters, which have discovered some matters of secrecy. . . ."

Ridicule has been cast upon the King of Spain in our own day, as if he had supposed Ireland could be dominated by 800 to 1000 men. Detached from the events with which it was connected, this expedition has been imperfectly understood. It is, however, the explanation why King Antonio, in the Northern fastnesses of Portugal, did not receive the expected reinforcements from England.

By a combination of policy and arms, Philip II at slight cost had won an advantage from which, so far as Portugal was concerned, not all the sacrifices and efforts, the sufferings and exploits of his cousin Antonio the popular King were to dislodge him.

From Lisbon—not Seville, Cadiz or Coruña,—“the magnificent, great and mightie Armada” was to sail in 1588. Nor was the “captivity” of Portugal to Spain to end till seven and thirty years after the funeral of Elizabeth Regina.

The baffled invasion of Ireland by “the Pope’s men” inevitably resulted in an increase of severity towards the Catholics in England; and in measures being devised to prevent the return of others from abroad. A Proclamation, of 10th January, 1580-1, “*for the Revocation of Students from beyond Seas, and against the reteining of Jesuits*,” was to have far-reaching results.³

¹ Talbot MS. G. f. 53. List not included with covering letter printed by Lodge. But S.P. Ireland, LXXVIII, 29, is “The names of the chiefest soldiers in y^e forte” (as spelt in the MS.).

“1. Collonell Sebastian de San Joseph Italus ex Civitate Bononiae.

2. Dominus Cavalerius Vardrich Jerosolimitani ordinis qui erat locum tenens Collonell.

3. Dominus Capitanus Didacus de Baldes hispanus qui habet 200 milites.”

And 9 others named; 4 of whom were Italians and 2 Spaniards; one of these last being also a Knight of St John of Jerusalem. The Captain of Artillery was “Dominus Angelus Aconius.”

² Tho. Bawdewyn “To the right honorable my very good Lord the Earl of Shrewsbury.” Talbot MS. G. f. 53. Lodge’s *Illustr.* 1838. Vol. II, pp. 185-187.

³ Dated “about the twelfth” by Holinshed, ed: 1808, iv. p. 434 (and Stowe, (1631) p. 688), and by Father Parsons, *Punti della Missione d’Inghilterra. Copiato dall’ originale dettato et in parte scritto dal P. Personio*. C.R.S. Miscell: IV (1907) pp. 2-3 (sec: 2 referring to Father Parsons’ book “secretly printed in England. . . . *Reasons why Catholics refuse to go to Heretical Churches*.”) Also see C.R.S. II. pp. 28, 179-181.

When Parliament, which had been prorogued in 1575 met again at last in January 1580-1. Mr. Wentworth “made a motion for a *public Fast and daily Preaching*.” (D’Ewes *Journals of all the Parliaments*, p. 283). The fast was to be appointed for one day only, “but the Preaching to be every Morning at seven of the Clock before the House did sit; that so beginning their proceeding with Service and Worship of God,” their “consultations and actions” might gain Heaven’s blessing.

This threw the Members into a commotion; and there were heated arguments *pro* and *con*. When it was “put to Voices” 100 were against it, and 115 favourable: “And so it was Ordered” that the Members should meet at the Temple Church a fortnight hence. “Discreet” preachers were to be selected, who should “keep convenient proportion of time,” and treat of Spiritual matters; without “intermeddling,” “innovation” and “unquietness.”

"*The Bill against disobedience to her Majesty in respect of the usurped See of Rome,*" was how the Parliamentary Journals expressed it, after Sir Walter Mildmay had given the House of Commons an oration on "the implacable malice of the Pope," and referred to Queen Elizabeth's "settled Monarchy" as attracting afflicted foreigners to come "from a raging and tempestuous sea to a calm and quiet Haven." Recapitulating the Northern Rebellion of 1569, the Pope's "maintenance" of the rebels and fugitives, his Bull "against our most Rightful Queen," FitzMaurice's and the Earl of Desmond's revolts, and "*the late Invasion of Strangers into Ireland,*" Sir Walter rejoiced that "maugre the Pope and all his Friends" the Queen "standeth fast," and the foreign invaders had been "cut in pieces":

"so as now this seemeth to be our present state, a blessed peaceable and happy time. But yet seeming our Enemies sleep not, it behoveth us not to be careless, . . . but rather to think that there is but a piece of the storm over, and that the greater part of the tempest remaineth . . ." as threatened by "the determinations of the Council of Trent, and the combination of the Pope with other Monarchs. . ."

All this "is cause sufficient to make us the more vigilant, and to have a wary eye to their doings, . . . however smoothly they speak or dissemble . . . it behoveth her Majesty not only to provide in time . . . for the continuing of this peaceable Government, but also to be ready with forces to repress all attempts, . . . either by enemies abroad or by evil subjects at home."¹

Preparations must be made both by sea and land. But Her Majesty need not "*as other Princes are fain to do*" hire foreign mercenaries "*hardly gotten, costly, and dangerously kept.*" She could raise sufficient defenders among "*her own natural subjects, ready and easy to be levied, that carry with them willing, valiant, and faithful minds,*" such as few nations could compare with. These, however, could not be supplied with arms and munition without expense. So Parliament was called to remember "duties to God, our Queen and Country"; and equip England's defenders in such sort that enemies might be discouraged from hostile attempts; or if so attempting, should meet such united resistance as to bring "*confusion to themselves, honour to our most Gracious Queen, and safety to all of us.*"²

The business carried through by Parliament in eight weeks included Bills for "*maintenance and strengthening of the Borders against Scotland*" and "*fortifying of the frontiers*"; repairing Dover Harbour; providing Armour and Weapons; and taking measures for "*increase of Mariners and Navigation.*"

There were also Bills against Slandorous Words; and for reformation of

¹ D'Ewes, *Journals of H. of Commons*, p. 286.

² *Journals of the Parliaments*, p. 288. The Committee formed for this purpose included all the M.P.'s who were Privy Councillors, and the Recorder of London; Lieutenant of the Tower; Sir Henry Radclyffe, Mr. Philip Sidney; Sir Henry Lee, Sir Thomas Cecil, Mr. Peter Wentworth, Sir Robert Stapleton, Sir Thomas Perrott ("Parrot") and many others especially well qualified.

disorders and abuses in Sheriffs and their officers; for the preservation of Pheasants and Partridges; the recovery of Debts; "*touching wrecks of the Sea*"; for "*the true making of Woollen Cloths*," and the "*abolishing of certain deceitful stuffs used in the dying of Cloths*"; "an enquiry into the defaults of weavers"; and a Bill "*against erecting Iron Mills near unto the City of London or River of Thames*"; a Bill for the preservation of Woods; also for the restoration in blood of Philip Howard Earl of Arundel; "*a Bill that the Children of Aliens . . . born in England shall not be reputed English*." Also a Bill for a Subsidy by the Clergy. As Churchmen were not called upon to fight in the wars, it was deemed only just that they should aid with money as well as prayers those to whom they owed their safety.

As to such Members as were negligent, a £20 fine was imposed upon every Knight of the Shire who had absented himself from the Session without permission, and a £10 fine for those of lesser rank.

On Saturday the 18th of March (1581) the Queen came into the Upper House and took her seat on the throne. The Commons were called in to attend upon her. Mr. Speaker (expressing their "faithful love and due Obedience," and their "perfect unity in the general society of this Commonwealth,") advised "*the exercise of the Sword of Discipline*" to repress errors; and declared a determination to be "vigilant and provident" against mighty foreign enemies abroad and disobedient subjects at home. Finally as it was their hope "*that it might please her Highness to have such good care . . . for the maintenance of Mariners*" and of navigation,—"*the very strength and Walls of Her Majesty's Realms and Dominions*,"—they offered her a Subsidy, which they besought her to accept.

The Lord Chancellor then gave them the Sovereign's most hearty thanks for so "willingly and frankly" granting this "Subsidy and two Fifteenths and Tenths," to afford the means for the "general service and benefit" of the country. And thus ended the brief but memorable Session.¹

¹ 23rd Eliz: 16 January, 1580-1; prorogued 18th March till 24 April; and then till 29th May, 1581; and 17 more prorogations; Classed as the same Parliament as that of 14th Eliz: 1572 and 18th Eliz: 1575, its final dissolution was not till 25th Eliz: 19th April 1583. (See Table.) For details, business carried out in 8 weeks, 1580-1, see D'Ewes, "*Journals of all the Parliaments*." H. of Lords pp. 266-276; and Commons, 277-310.

TABLE SHOWING DATE AND DURATION OF PARLIAMENTS
HELD DURING THE FIRST 24 YEARS OF QUEEN ELIZABETH'S REIGN:

Though New Year's Day festivities were held at the Court on 1st January, the official year began on 25th March; hence the double dates in the table, the first Parliament beginning in 1558 by Elizabethan reckoning but in 1559 by ours.

In the Table what appear like 7 Parliaments are counted as 4; because the Queen herself so reckoned them.

Other Tables will ensue in later volumes.

A total of 10 Parliaments in a reign of 44½ years,—some sitting only a few weeks, and the longest less than six months,—will bring home to us that it is futile to try to adapt Elizabethan history to a "constitutional" thesis. The power was vested in the Crown.

Daily business of State was done through the Privy Council. Parliament was summoned only when required; and did not sit a day longer than "Her Majesty's Will and Pleasure" would allow.

REGNAL YEAR	PARLIAMENT CALLED	PARLIAMENT PROROGUED	PARLIAMENT DISSOLVED
1st Eliz.	(1) 25th January 1558-9	8th May 1559
5th Eliz.	(2) 12th January 1562-3	10th April 1563	
8th & 9th Eliz.	13th September 1566	2nd January 1566-7
13th Eliz.	(3) 2nd April 1571	29th May 1571
14th Eliz.	(4) 8th May 1572	Adjourned 30th June 1572	
18th Eliz.	8th February 1575-6	15th March 1575-6	
23rd Eliz.	16th January 1580-1	18th March 1580-1 (& 19 further prorogations*)	19th April 1583

* D'Ewes: "The Journals of all the Parliaments . . . of Queen Elizabeth," &c. (1682). p. 310.

APPENDIX.

LORD BURGHLEY AND THE IRISH.

In Sir John Pope Hennessy's "*Sir Walter Raleigh in Ireland*," (1883), p. 15, Lord Burghley is stated to have "condemned the massacre" at Smerwick. But Burghley's "*Remembrances for Ireland December 1580*" do not contain any expression of opinion in that connection (S.P. Ireland, Vol. LXXIX, No. 48). Neither does there seem to be in the Hatfield Calendar, or the Calendar S.P. Foreign, or of S.P. Spanish, a reference to Burghley objecting to the Lord Deputy's harshness. The notion that Burghley and Walsingham then and afterwards held opposite views as to Ireland seems to have originated with Froude. Sir John Pope Hennessy (p. 47) says:

"Lord Burghley wrote to Sir Henry Wallop, the War Treasurer for Ireland, on the 10th of June, 1582, 'that the Flemings had not such cause to rebel against the oppression of the Spaniards as the Irish against the tyranny of England.' In repeating this sentence of the greatest statesman of the sixteenth century Mr. Froude observes with truth that Lord Burghley possessed the rare quality of being able to recognise the faults of his own countrymen. ('*History of England*,' Vol. X, p. 604)."

There is not in the Record Office any letter of Lord Burghley to Sir Henry Wallop of 10 June 1582. The letter of that date is from Wallop to Burghley.¹ He begins by acknowledging Burghley's letter of 26th April, which "I received not untill the 2nd hereof." This letter has never been found; its contents can be estimated only from Wallop's answers. He takes it section by section. In the sixth paragraph he says,

"When yo^r Lo(rdship) wrighteth, that *as things be uttered, yt is no marvell that the people have rebellious hartes; for the Fleminges had not such cause to Rebell by th^e oppressions of the Spanyards, as it is reported the Irish people have: Yf all were true that perchance is informed, I should be of yo^r Lo: mynde*, but for that (though it be not altogether so well as is to be wished, neither may warres permytt the same,) Yet in trooth *yt is not by much so evell as is reported. . . .*"

In paragraph 5, Sir Henry Wallop explains,

"May it please yr Lo(rdship) the complaints of exactions uppon the Countrey, and commyttinge men for orderly complaininge, is also sufficiently answered by the former lett^re from the Lo: Deputie and Counsell: Whereto I conclude wth yo^r Lo(rdship) that the most parte of souldiors are disordered persons, and notwithstanding any ordinances to the contrary will do sondrie outrages, *for which dyvers of them have been executed.*"

Continuing his sixth paragraph, Wallop answers the reports of "those informers" whose utterances had evoked Burghley's protest. He maintains that the oppressions by the Queen's forces could not have caused the rebellion, as there were not any soldiers in Munster when James FitzMorrice began to make trouble. Her Majesty had then not 500 Foot nor 200 Horse in "all Ireland." The actual causes of the rebellion were the great affection of the Irish to the "Popish religion," their hatred for the English, the "disdain" the one nation has to be governed by the other: and the Irish desire to govern themselves.

Wallop's letter is a much more lucid description of the conditions than could be realised from the Calendar summary. The natural inference is that it would have convinced Burghley. Some of Burghley's ideas how to govern Ireland,—as specified in his instructions to Walter Earl of Essex,—are published for the first time in the present work.² Towards the end of Burghley's life, we will find Hugh O'Neill, Earl of Tyrone, writing of and to him as having been ready always to consider "just causes." And that Burghley was less harsh towards the Irish than Gilbert, Grey, or Raleigh, need

¹ Orig: S.P. Ireland. (Eliz. to Geo. III) Vol. XCIII. No. 17.

² Ante. II. 2. 3.

not be disputed. But so far as we can tell from the reply of Wallop, Burghley had objected not to "English tyranny" in general (as Froude supposed); *but to the oppressions perpetrated by some of the Queen's soldiers in particular.* To the troubles of Ireland we will return: especially in regard to Sir John Perrott, that Lord Deputy who won the love of the Irish and incurred the enmity of his own countrymen. And we will treat of the attempts of Robert Earl of Essex in 1599 to transmute the ancient discords: he then being ruined from the English Court. For the present, it suffices to say that as Ireland was disaffected to England, it afforded King Philip and his successor an easy means of enhancing the difficulties of Queen Elizabeth.

"WRITTEN IN THE SPANISH TONGUE":

Litchfield's tribute to the enemy's discipline,

Finished 9 Dec^r. 1581. Licensed 27 Nov^r. 1582; published 1 January 1582-3.

The present English notion that the Spaniards in King Philip's day were "behind the times" in martial arts, is the less reasonable in that many of our Elizabethan military text books were translations from the Spanish. After the surrender of the invaders at Smerwick, the victors were not too proud to study "*De Re Militari*" found in the fort. Subsequently it was issued as "*A Compendious treatise entituled, De re militari, containing principall orders to be observed in Martiall affaires. Written in the Spanish tongue, by that worthie and famous Captaine, Luis Gutierrez de la Vega, Citizen of Medina del Campo. And newlie translated into English, by Nicholas Lichefield. Januarij primus, 1582. Imprinted at London by Thomas East.*"¹

The translator hoped that "*by good observation and imitation,*" of Continental discipline, his countrymen might reach a "*like perfection.*"

This epistle is now republished for the first time since its initial appearance in print in 1582-3.

"To the right Worshipfull Maister Philip Sydney, Esquire.

"This little treatise (Right Worshipfull) entituled *De re militari*: beeing lately found in the Forte in Irelande, where the Italians and Spaniards had fortified themselves, by fortune came vnto my hands by a souldier of good experience, who lately served there: which after I had perused (I take the deuise of some better vnderstanding then my selfe in those affaires, which very much liked and allowed the worke) I was greatly boldned and encouraged to enterprise the translation of the same, partly because these principall orders are alwaies to bee obserued in warlike gouernement, and chiefly because in our English tongue, I finde not the lyke extant, for the necessary instruction and generall commoditie of our common Souldiers: which briefe introduction (being common in our language) may be an inducement to beter knowledge, and further vnderstanding, wherby in time our seruitors by good obseruance and imitation, may attaine the lyke perfection, that all other forreine Nations doe generally embrace.

"And finding not any more forward then your Worship, to further and fauour this Martiall knowledge (beeing of your selfe most ready and aduenturous in all exercises of feats of warre and chiuallry) I have therefore presumed (as unknowen) to dedicate this briefe worke vnto you, which as a simple token of my good will, I doe humbly pray you to accept in good part, not doubting but that vnder your protection the same shall be sufficiently defended and well lyked, and those imperfections in mee the translator, the better borne withall, wherein I haue rather obserued the true and litterall sence, then anye waies varied from the order of the matter, as the authour setteth it forth.

"And euen so referring my selfe and slender trauell vnto your courteous acceptation, wishing you that increase of worship and prosperitie, as euery wayes your noble minde deserueth, doe euen so take my leaue. From London the 9. of December. 1581.

Your Worships humblye to commaund,

NICHOLAS LICHFIELD."

¹ In Captain Cockle's "*Bibliog: of English Military Books*," 1900, No. 29, p. 26, the title of this treatise is only given in an abbreviated form from "*Haslitt. III. 60*," Cockle evidently not being able to find the book itself. He noted from Arber's Stationer's Register, (1582) "*27 Die Novembris. Entered to Thomas Easte . . . A Treatise Concerninge principall orders to be observed in martiall affaires . . . vjd.*" The only copy known to the present writer is that in the Bodleian Library (from which the title and dedication are now taken).

PART II.

“Particularly the Power of Spain.”

CHAPTER 5.

“OUR REALM SHALL BE HIS SANCTUARY.”

SECTION 1.

“A King anointed and crowned.”

(Queen Elizabeth's welcome to Dom Antonio, 1581).

“ . . . my intent and right to the Crown being most manifest, yet I did in orderly and quiet manner proceed to the demanding of the same, only by the way of Justice ; as on the other side the King of Spain . . . prepared his forces to invade the realm, meaning to obtain the same by conquest.”

Dom Antonio to Queen Elizabeth. 1580. (Unpublished B.M. Cotton MS. B.1. f. 201.)

“Lastly from Us you shall give him most hartly thanks for his honourable offers he may assure himself that our realm shall in all cases of his necessity be his sanctuary, to which effect We have sent him Our safe conduct required, which Our pleasure is you shall deliver unto him.”

Queen Elizabeth's orders to Edward Wotton in relation to Dom Antonio of Portugal. 1580. (ante.)

“ . . . because of his State, who was a King anointed and crowned.”

Sir Christopher Hatton, Vice-Chamberlain: referring to Queen Elizabeth's reception of Dom Antonio.

“Journals of all the Parliaments During the Reign of Queen Elizabeth.” pp. 408-409. (Under date, 1587).

NOTE: "THE GENERALL HISTORIE OF SPAINE."

In the reign of James I, eight years after the Treaty of Peace, there was issued "*The Generall Historie of Spaine, containing all the memorable things that have passed in the Realmes of Castille, Leon, Nauarre, Arragon, Portugall, Granado, &c.*, and by what meanes they were united, and so continue vnder Philip the Third, King of Spaine, now rayning.

"Written in French by Leuvis de Mayerne Turquet unto the yeare 1583. Translated into English and continued unto these times by Edvard Grimston, Esquire. London: Printed for A. Islip and G. Eld. Anno. Dom. 1612." (Large folio: 4 inches thick. B.M. 933. i. 8).

The translator, dedicating his work jointly to the Earl of Salisbury and the Earl of Suffolk, also explained his position to "*The Reader*":

"Gentlemen, in the last edition of the Historie of France, I did willingly omit all matters acted by the Spaniards, wherein the French were not principally interested," having decided to produce a separate Spanish History. "And for that I would not long leave you in suspense, I promised within the yeare to publish this Historie of Spaine: wherein (not withstanding my publike service, and many other difficulties) I have forced my selfe to keepe my word, . . . though it be with some prejudice to my health. I will not use many compliments in the behalfe of the Author, his worke shall plead for him selfe: This historie was written by a Frenchman, who is yet living, a man of grauitie and judgment: It is no translation, but a collection out of the best writers that have treated of that subject. His chiefe Authors were *Stephen Garebay, Ierome Surites, Mariana, Ambrose Morales, Iohn Vasee*, a Fleming, with many other Spanish, Italian and Latin writers, out of which he hath . . . as it were united and tyed together the discourse of all those realmes, . . . by reason of the warre, accords marriages, and other treaties and alliances . . . yet he hath so distinguished them all, you may easily read any one . . . by itselfe. . . .

"This Historie comes but to the winning of the Terceres, . . . 1583. He hath finished the rest unto these times, I my selfe have scene in his studie at Paris, but he hath not yet put it to the Presse, so as I have been constrained to the continuance thereof, . . . I have been assisted by some worthy gentlemen in the relation of some great actions. . . .

"You must not hold it strange if you find a great part of Philip the second's raigne barren of any great actions done in Spaine: his chiefe designes were against foreine States, imploing his bravest men abroad, either against France, England, or the united Provinces, at the Indies, or at Sea; all which actions are . . . related . . .

From the year 1530, I have not directly followed my Author, for I have both inserted divers things out of other Authors whereof he makes no mention, and have related some more at large than he hath done. . . .

". . . My last suit must be for my selfe and the Printer. . . ."

Critics—it is pleaded—should spare their "spleen," until they have achieved a similar task; when they will understand what labour it is both to write and print a large History.

The version used throughout the present work is this of Grimston, which goes on to 1605 (p. 1337), and contains supplementary "*Observations touchinge the state and gouernment of Spaine*," which will be quoted later, under date. (Pp. 1344-1375, treat of Rulers of Spain, genealogically, and pp. 1375-1380 of "*The titles and families of all the Dukes, Marquesses and Earles of Spaine*.")

Produced as this was while Portugal was ruled from Madrid, the references to the Portuguese are mostly from Spanish sources; and require much supplementing from our own "*State Papers Foreign, Portugal*," upon which the present writer has drawn extensively. Despite errors—hardly possible to avoid when State Papers were not accessible—the "*Generall Historie of Spaine*" abounds in interesting matter, and deserves to be brought out of oblivion.

HISTOIRE GENERALE D'ESPAGNE.

COMPRISE EN XXX. LIVRES:

ESQUELS SE VOYENT LES ORIGINES ET antiquitez Espagnoles, les entreprinſes de diuerſes nations en celle region, des le commencement: les guerres des Romains, tant contre les Carthaginois, & naturels Espagnols, que celles qui ſe ſont demenees entre eux en Eſpagne durant leurs diſſenſions ciuiles: le regne des Viſigots: inuaſion des Arabes, & Sarrazins: reſſource des Chreſtiens, & naiſſance & progres des Royaumes d'OVIEDO & LEON, NAVARRE, CASTILLE, ARRAGON, PORTUGAL, GRANADE, & autres Principautez: avec tous les ſucces & euenements, tant en paix qu'en guerre, depuis le commencement de cette Hiſtoire, iuſques à la conqueſte du Royaume de Portugal faiſte par Philippes I^{er}. Roy d'Eſpagne.

EN FIN DV LIVRE SONT LES GENEALOGIES DES
Princes qui ont domine en Eſpagne.

Par LOYS DE MAYERNE TROUVET, Lyonnois.



A PARIS,
Chez ABEL l'ANGELIER, au premier pillier
de la grand' ſalle du Palais.

M. DC VIII.
AVEC PRIVILEGE DV ROY.

This is the earliest edition in the B.M. (C.75. i.8); but it is reproduced now instead of under date 1608; because the Azorean fighting (1581-83) was described very near the time, and the first edition appeared in 1586, dedicated "*Au Roy de Navarre Henry III, premier Prince & Pair de France,*" "*ce xv d'Aoust, M.D.LXXXVI.*" This dedication (3 pp.) is repeated in the 1608 edition; and a later (2 pp.) dedication added, to the same Monarch: "*Au Roy, Henry, Roy de France III de ce nom, et de Navarre III.*"

The work is drawn from Spanish historians. See Note opposite.

PART II.

“Particularly the Power of Spain.”

CHAPTER 5.

“OUR REALM SHALL BE HIS SANCTUARY.”

SECTION 1.

“A King anointed and crowned.”

(Queen Elizabeth's welcome to Dom Antonio, 1581).

THE King of Spain having declared himself appointed by God to be inheritor of the Crown of Portugal, it followed that he did not treat his Portuguese opponent as a rival Sovereign, but as a presumptuous private person, guilty of usurpation, and beyond the range of pardon or reconciliation. But though proclaiming Antonio a rebel and outlaw and setting the enormous price of 80,000 crowns on his head, “*notwithstanding this temptation, there was not anyone did attempt . . . to reveal him, in eight months that he went wandering up and down the realme after all these miseries.*”

His whereabouts were known to numbers of poor gentlemen, priests, and peasants; but although he was “pursued and sought for in all places, with the greatest care and diligence that might be,” none of the Portuguese would betray him.¹

Nevertheless the Spanish King, having the chief martial force, with the Duke of Alba as his General, remained master of the situation; and the fate of Portugal should stand as a perpetual warning to all who believe that the destiny of nations is decided by speech-making, or passive good intentions; or by any factor except the power (as well as the will) to remain independent of foreign conquerors.

¹ Louis de Mayerne Turquet: “*The Generall Historie of Spaine, containing all the memorable things that have past in the Realmes of Castille, Leon, Nauarre, Arragon, Portugall, Granada, &c., and by what meanes they were united,*” &c. First published in French, 1586. Earliest B.M. ed., 1608. (See ante). “*Translated into English, and continued unto these times by Edward Grimeston.*” London. Printed by A. Islip and G. Eld. 1612. (Large folio.) Lib: 30. p. 215.

King Henry's Viceroy of India, "Don Lewes de Altaide" declared he would not recognise as Lord of India any King not chosen of the Portuguese; and it is alleged by a Spanish ex-Minister of State that it was by Spanish means he was "made away with poison . . . and there succeeded him . . . a most ungrateful and notable Traitor who . . . delivered up the Indies to the enemy."¹ The assumption that Portuguese officials who died suddenly at this juncture were poisoned is not one which it is fair to accept; but the death of Dom Luis certainly facilitated King Philip's swift annexation of the East Indies.

Had the new Viceroy of India, and the rulers of Brazil chosen to live or die in the old heroic way, they might have kept India and much of South America for the Crown of Portugal, and from thence have carried on a maritime war against King Philip. Had the Captains of Ceuta, Tangier, and Ardzillan been of the spirit of their ancestors, they would have remained firm in refusal of Spanish sovereignty; as also would the Governor of Madeira. But times and men were changed; except in the Azores, where the Governor Cyprian de Figueiredo de Vasconcellos declined to acknowledge King Philip's mastery. Had every oversea Governor behaved with the same daring as Vasconcellos, the King of Spain would have had on his hands a war spread over three continents. From India, Brazil, and Africa, the Portuguese could have combined to demonstrate their imperial temper. But that a great and famous Empire lasts only so long as it possesses a sufficient number of men in whom an ardent national pride is combined with efficiency, has been often proved. Yet the lesson is forgotten again and again.

Partly because of illness, but also to give more time for the Duque de Alba to tighten the Spanish grip upon the Portuguese, King Philip waited until 1581 before he assembled the Estates of Portugal, introduced himself as their Sovereign Lord, and nominated his eldest surviving son Don Diego aged five, as his successor.

With expressions of paternal benevolence he had proclaimed a General Amnesty. Published on the 17th of April 1581, it was far from general; the exceptions numbering over fifty, beginning with "Don Antonio, Prior of Crato."

What Lord Burghley thought of this, appears from some of his later instructions in 1587, when the King of Spain was complaining that the Queen of England supported the "Prior of Crato and other his rebels," making the withdrawal of English support to "rebels" a condition of Spanish reconciliation. In England nowadays we usually assume in Burghley a pacific acquiescence to this demand. What he actually did say was, "*In common reason, Don Antonio publishing his claim as a competitor to the Crown of Portugal, cannot be comprehended within the term of a rebel*"²: i.e., that Antonio had never accepted King Philip as his Sovereign; but had made his own claim in 1579, when King

¹ "A Treatise Paraenetical," 1598. pp. 79-80.

² *Memoranda for dealings with Spain*. Forthcoming, E.E., Part III.

Henry the Cardinal invited all candidates for the Crown to state their cases; the King of Spain included.¹

The majority of current explanations of Elizabethan policy consist of echoes of other modern impressions; the expounders not realising how the power of the Queen was built by the combined labours of Burghley, Leicester, Walsingham, Hawkins and Drake; all impelled by the same determination to save England from being absorbed into Spain.

When the great Spanish Empire is regarded as "crumbling to decay"; when the annexation of Portugal by Philip II is nevertheless taken as a matter of course, the subsequent increased menace to England being underrated, "the policy of Queen Elizabeth" towards Portugal inevitably appears in a shape remote from the facts.

Mendoza's letters on the plots in which he was himself engaged are exceedingly valuable. But to take our ideas of English statesmanship from caricatures composed by England's enemy, instead of from Burghley the author of the policy, is a distortion which should no longer be countenanced.

Bishop Creighton's epigram that Queen Elizabeth's "imperishable claim to greatness" consisted in her having "fixed England's attention upon itself," is devoid of practical meaning: for seldom has there been an age when foreign affairs excited wider interest, or were better understood. The Queen was prouder of her many languages even than of her small white hands. To draw off her glove

¹ Current English writers if touching upon Dom Antonio's pedigree and "claim" give no references; but they appear to have used a translated "*Genealogie of the Kings of Portugall . . . with the pretendants to the Crown*," printed in the "*Historie of the Vniting*" etc. 1600 (a brief for King Philip). Beginning with the Burgundian Count who was father of Affonso Henriques 1st King of Portugal, the compiler omits to mention that Affonso was *elected* after his victory at Ourique. In regard to the founder of the next dynasty, "I can called of good memory," though it is stated that this John I was son of King Pedro "by Therasia Gallega his concubine," there is no explanation how the son of a concubine became 10th King of Portugal: viz. by *election* after his defeat of the Castillians at Aljubarrota. "*Anthonie the Bastard*" is mentioned among the grandchildren of Emmanuel the Fortunate; but not a word is said as to his *election* as 18th King of Portugal. The "*Genealogie*" ends:

"17. Henrie Cardinell . . . (succeeded) 1578 . . . died . . . 1580 . . . was the last of the house of Portugall, to whom succeeded

18. Philip, sonne to Charles the fift, Emperour"

The English translation of this did not appear till after Dom Antonio was dead; and Burghley's policy reversed by the Queen. But the Italian "*Istoria*" printed in 1585 may have been the reason why at the end of the same year the English translation of King Antonio's "*Explanation*" was published, defending his legitimacy and describing his election.

That our editor of "*The Acts of the Privy Council*" indexes "Antonio, Don, Portuguese pretender," is the more incongruous as in all the Council references Antonio is called "the King of Portugal." It was not in England but in Spain he was styled "*Il Pretensor*."

When Conyers Read in 1925 in "*Mr. Secretary Walsingham and the Policy of Queen Elizabeth*" (Vol. III, p. 479) indexed Antonio similarly as "Portuguese pretender" (a habit likewise of all our editors of State Papers) he revealed that he misunderstood 15 years of Queen Elizabeth's policy (1580-95); for insistence on Antonio's rights as "*a King anointed and crowned*" was a main point of that policy. No English historian appears to have consulted Sir Christopher Hatton's speech in 1586-7, describing the Queen's wishes and intentions. "*Journals of all the Parliaments During the Reign of Queen Elizabeth . . .*" pp. 408-409. (B.M. 2072.g.)

and give a stranger her jewelled fingers to kiss, and at the same time compliment him with a few words in the tongue of his own country, to keep herself minutely informed upon political happenings all over the known world, and assimilate Continental culture while preserving an air of haughty independence,—this was Her Majesty's rôle. And the Patent she gave, authorising Sir Humphrey Gilbert to seek strange lands and make for her an extended Empire in regions yet unknown, is the exact opposite in spirit to the insularity for which she was commended in 1896 by Bishop Mandell Creighton.¹

Queen Elizabeth was two persons: first, to her Protestant champions, in theory, the ideal Vicegerent sent from Heaven,—“*a most renowned Virgin Queen whose like on earth was never seen*”: learned, affable, wise, witty, accomplished; upon whose life and prosperity England's welfare depended. Second, in private, she could be distressingly erratic; alternately vacillating and peremptory. But she never lost the devotion of her chief Councillors, Leicester, Burghley, Hatton, and Walsingham; who, for the sake of the principles the Sovereign was supposed to embody, concealed her faults, gave her the credit for their own talents and labours, bore with her “humours,” faced her outbursts of temper, told her truths she did not desire to hear but which it was urgent for her to know: and served her to the utmost of human capacity “for the honour of England.”

On nearly every occasion when she was meditating action against Spain, there arose some person at the Court who proceeded to put her out of conceit with whichever Councillor was the most potent influence in favour of the undertaking. And as to 1580-81 there remains in Burghley's own writing a description of his Sovereign's “heart breaking” conduct, which he ascribed to “calumniation” by his underhand foes.

So intimately were Leicester, Burghley and Walsingham allied in their labours that it is often difficult to find which of them originated measures carried out

¹ Few standard works on the Elizabethan era are more riddled with errors, misquotations and wrong dates than his “*Queen Elizabeth*.” “*Elizabeth's imperishable claim to greatness*” Creighton alleges to have rested upon her having “*felt rather than understood the possibilities which lay before England*, and she set herself to the task of *slowly exhibiting and impressing them on the national mind*. She educated Englishmen to a perception of England's destiny, and for this purpose *fixed England's attention upon itself*.”

The last words show oblivion of the Royal Proclamations, and of a succession of speeches by Her Majesty's command; for far from having “fixed England's attention on itself” she pointed out the foreign menace, and drew upon English purses accordingly.

Bishop Creighton commends her for having “played” France and Spain “off one against the other”; without mentioning that war between France and Spain had been in process by King Philip before she came to the throne.

“*In her position towards her Ministers she represented in her own person the vacillations and fluctuations of popular opinion*,” says Creighton. But “popular” patriotic opinion did not fluctuate or vacillate as to the need to resist England's enemies. When Creighton goes on to say of the people that “*she was eliciting from them their meaning, and educating them to understand it themselves*,” and adds that “*For this purpose she must seem to govern more absolutely than she did*,” it becomes plain that his Queen Elizabeth is a creation of his own imagination. As he purported to reveal “the real woman” and “the real Queen,” but could not show what he did not himself understand, to be emancipated from his confusing influence is one of the first needs for the student.

by them all. When Burghley fell under the Queen's displeasure, it usually denoted the ascendancy of some power antagonistic to all three. In such emergencies, Leicester and Burghley depended upon the fidelity of Sir Christopher Hatton, a very different man from the mountebank appearing under his name in Naunton's "*Fragmenta Regalia*" and in the Victorian Lord Chancellor Campbell's "*Lives of the Lord Chancellors*."¹

It has hitherto escaped notice that Burghley chose Hatton as his intermediary with the Queen when "the late sharp and most heavy speeches of her Majesty to myself" had deeply offended him.

The MS, docketed in Burghley's own hand "*my writing of sp(eech) to be delivered to Her Majesty by Master Vice Chamberlain*" dated "14 Martii 1580"(1), affords a revelation of what patience he required to exercise in relation to his arbitrary and capricious Sovereign. Called into her presence on "Matters of the Low Countries," he had been subjected to a storm of "indignation" in regard to the Queen of Scots. As it had been in vain to reason with the Queen in the mood she was in, he asked leave to absent himself: "wounded" by her unjust rebukes, uttered "in the hearing of my Lord of Leicester and Mr Secretary Walsingham."² But "now, finding the bitter burden of Her Majesty's displeasure rather increased" than lightened, he believed this should be imputed less to the Queen's spontaneous feelings than to "some secret enemies" of his own:

"And therefore, though I cannot imagine that any person is my Enemy for any private offence committed by myself, yet being so publicly known as I find it to be that Her Majesty is so grievously offended against me as my enemies perceive her ears to be open to any calumniation to be devised against me, I, seeing I cannot devise any remedy against the malice of men for things past," can but hope for the future "upon Her Majesty's gracious interpretation by experience of my proceedings."³

As "evil disposed parties" seemed bent upon distorting his actions, he preferred for the present "to withdraw myself from all voluntary public acts of State" unless expressly commanded otherwise by the Queen.

That the contrast between "the clearness of her former favour," and the "darkness" of her present displeasure was not due to conduct of his own, but arose from misrepresentations to which the Queen had given ear, is the point. But he was still "*ready to do and serve without regard of pain or peril*," provided he could return to her presence and be informed what would content her.

This episode was a repetition of what had happened long previously on Burghley's return from Buxton, as confided by him to Shrewsbury; and it is one of the keys to the Queen's character. Even against those upon whose combined abilities and loyalty she was dependent for the carrying on of the daily business of State, she could be worked up to nurse groundless grievances. The numerous

¹ John, Lord Campbell: "*The Lives of the Lord Chancellors and Keepers of the Great Seal of England, from the Earliest Times till the Reign of George IV.* 1846-7. (7 Vols.)

² Holog: Unpublished Lansdowne MSS. 115. 20. (spelling modernised).

³ Word nearly illegible.

private condolences of Leicester, Burghley and Walsingham, to each other, when each in turn was the object of her wrath, or when all three at once were in trouble, were not intended for the eyes of posterity. Seldom have hard-working men exercised more patience towards an often perplexing woman, whose power had been created by themselves. Her reminder to her Parliament, in her old age, that "the cares and troubles of a Crown" made the place of Majesty more glorious to the beholders than pleasant to the bearer, is of universal application. But that her woes were frequently due to her own accessibility to the underground influence of "secret enemies" of her best Ministers will be demonstrated many times, before we see the fall of the curtain upon the complex drama of her life.

Though Burghley did not long remain in the "darkness" of disfavour, the Queen's uncertain humours reacted upon his health. Previously he had been anxious as to the fate of his younger children, and doubtful if he would live long enough to see them satisfactorily settled. His incessant labours were not performed out of exuberant physical energy, but with frequent pain and increasing bodily fatigue. In 1581 he could look back upon twenty-three years of ceaseless effort; and now, owing to the acquirement of the Portuguese Empire by the King of Spain, the necessity for vigilance was increased, and the hardest struggle was yet ahead.

It was some two and a half months before Drake's return home that commands had been issued to the English people to hold themselves "*in good readiness, with their bodies, substance and strength, to withstand any enterprise that may be offered to this Realm.*" And Mendoza reported to King Philip the increased preparations for defence following upon the proclamation.

That Ambassador's subsequent expressions of chagrin when Drake, whom he hoped was lost at sea, came into harbour after three years absence, are easily to be understood. Nothing could have been more opportune for England, and more embarrassing for Mendoza, than that Drake should return triumphant in September 1580 at the very juncture when the Spaniards with the "Pope's men" were invading Ireland.

When Drake went to sea in 1577 there was not any Spanish Ambassador in England, nor had there been since Don Guerau Despes was expelled in 1571. But in the autumn of 1580, when Mendoza so vehemently denounced Drake as a *corsario*, it was Mendoza's own position which was anomalous, while the Spanish troops were fortifying themselves in Kerry. The surprising thing is not that Mendoza strove to distract attention from that incongruity, but that English writers to-day so often accept his speeches without analysis of the relevant circumstances. By forgetting the Royal Proclamation of 15th of July, (which, without mentioning Spain, was a clear announcement of readiness to meet hostilities from any adversary whatsoever,) and by omitting to examine Burghley's transactions during the absence of Drake, Corbett in 1898 formed an entirely mistaken estimate of the conditions into which our greatest seaman came back. To have depicted Burghley as

¹ Proclamation (Draft), S.P.D.E. CXL. 19. Printed version B.M. 6463 (207).

"fearing" Drake's success, and the Master of the Horse (Leicester) as "sulking," and Drake's other patron Sir Christopher Hatton as proficient only in dancing and flattery, is the measure of Corbett's lack of acquaintance with these strenuous, far-seeing, and united Privy Councillors. Though Burghley's 1579 memoranda were published in 1759, many of the disclosures have not yet penetrated to standard history; and Corbett did not notice Burghley's hope for a combined action of France and England against King Philip "*if he should get the Crown of Portingale*." Likewise Corbett did not realise that it was while nobody knew whether Drake was alive or dead that the Queen had sent Dom Antonio an assurance that her realm should be his "sanctuary." Moreover as in 1580 the raising of sufficient money, by "*honourable means*," to exchange defensive for offensive measures was the main desire of Burghley, Drake was particularly welcome to him. But Corbett assumed that Burghley's use of the word "honourable" was a stern rebuke to the Queen for her patronage of the "pirate"!

When Francis Drake "on Tuesday the 4 of April 1581" was dubbed Knight "at Depford neere Greenwich by the Queenes Ma^{tie}, being in the shippe wherewith he had travayled about the world,"¹ however angry Mendoza felt at this defiant retort to his own protestations, the influence of Burghley with the Queen was once more in the ascendant.

That Burghley had been out of favour in the early spring affords one reason for the continued failure of Queen Elizabeth to give help direct to the fugitive Antonio.

He came first to France; thence to England. But in Portugal the news was reported the other way about:

"... searching the Prior throughout the realm," says King Philip's apologist in the 1585 *Istoria*, "they had intelligence from Flanders that he was arrived in England, from whence he should go into Fraunce to demaund succours, understanding also there was hope he should obtain them."

The coast of Portugal was therefore re-fortified, "especially the rocke of Saint Julian"; for it appeared that "the people generally of the realm" were "little inclined to King Philip" and would have welcomed the return of "the Prior." The same historian—writing ten years before King Antonio's death,—comments upon how "strange" it was that the fugitive had been able to remain in Portugal in disguise from the time he escaped by boat from Vianna in October 1580, until June 1581, when he "embarked also in secret."

Though the "diligence" of King Philip "was admirable, for all Judges, all Capitaines, and all soldiars were carefully employed . . . yet they could never finde him." In spite of the commands issued that none of the people were to consort with him and aid him, many "did boldly receive him." Though the Duke of Alba in Lisbon "had so many spies" and won so many of Dom Antonio's friends, "that it seemed undoubtedly he should fall into his hands," yet "*there was never one amongst so many in whom he must of necessitie trust, that*

¹ MS. cit. *Book of Knights*, ed. Metcalfe, 1885. p. 134.

ever sought to betraie him for . . recompense; although some laboured to save themselves."

"The Prior" had "an extraordinarie gift of nature"; for when his fortunes were lowest, the people not only were not to be turned against him, nor won by King Philip's promises and proclamations, but they contrived for him "safely" to go about the Kingdom, even after he was under sentence of death.¹

All ports were watched to prevent his getting away. But early in June "he went to Settubal, where by the help of a woman he hired a Flemish ship for six hundredth crowns"; and with a Franciscan friar and "tenne of his faithfullest servants he imbarked by night . . ." and was far on his way before King Philip or the Duke of Alba knew he was gone.

His many narrow escapes, and the proofs he had received of the popular devotion, inspired in him, and those with him, the conviction that he was being reserved by the Almighty for a great constructive purpose: wherefore all ordeals and hardships were accepted as a test of fortitude and a heaven-sent preparation for power and triumph to come.²

On the 15th of June Sir Henry Cobham, Queen Elizabeth's Ambassador in France, sent word to Secretary Walsingham, from Paris, that a personage had landed at La Rochelle the previous week who was rumoured to be "Don Antonio." England was more promptly informed than Spain; for it seems not to have been until the 8th of July that King Philip heard it had been alleged a "few days after the 20th of June" that Antonio was coming to France; some said Brittany, others Normandy. His actual movements were not then known to his foes.⁴

On the 27th of June, Thomas, Earl of Sussex was writing to Lord Burghley, who was at Theobalds,

"My good Lord

"I hope soon to hear . . . that the air of the country had brought you health . . . The Queen's Majesty has licensed me to repair unto the country, but in fine has stayed me, which I do think doth grow upon the arrival of Don Antonio, whom the Queen would have to be kept secret, although indeed it is openly spoken of.

"My opinion is, it had better he had never come hither if her Majesty mean to do nothing for him; and seeing he landed in France first, I do surely think his first coming hither is not without consent of that King . . ."

(But the matter turns really upon the Queen's decision as to the Duke of Anjou:)

"By letters from Sir Henry Cobham it seems that the King will do little in the causes of Portugal and the Low Countries before the conclusion of the marriage. . . ."⁵

(Here again we have one of many reminders of Lord Burghley's reasons for pressing the French match).

¹ "Hist: of the Vniting," &c., pp. 259-260.

² "The Explanation," &c. (1585.) ante. ³ S.P. France. (1581) VI. 64.

⁴ So we can infer from intercepted letter in S.P. Spain. I. 69^a: but King Philip may have had other and earlier news.

⁵ "God send you perfect health Your Lordship's most assured T. Sussex."
Cecil MSS. (no number) Lodge, *Illus*: II. pp. 189-200.

Many reports were sent by Mendoza from London to King Philip in Portugal as to Don Antonio's arrival in France, at a time when Antonio was in no such place. But from the 26th of June onwards, Mendoza's information bears some relation to facts:

"I wrote on the 24th that I had learned of the arrival here of a Portuguese with two trunks He went to stay in the house of Juan Roderiguez de Souza, his guide being a Portuguese physician of the Queen called Dr. Lopez. . . . Dr. Lopez went straight to Nonsuch where Leicester was hunting; and Leicester saw the Queen immediately after." Souza and Lopez then started for Dover, the Doctor telling a friend of his "an Italian, that he was going to meet Don Antonio, who was already in England, having come from Calais, and landed with eight or ten Portuguese who accompanied him disguised as sailors."

"Although I have on other occasions reported the arrival of Don Antonio at other places, it now appears more likely to be true than before."

Rumour says the Portuguese who has come to London is Don Antonio himself. "In case this should be so, as I have already prepared the Queen in the way your Majesty ordered, I have sent to ask for audience The person who has seen the man describes him as being under the middle height, with a thin face, and very dark, the hair and beard grey" Having once met Antonio "sixteen years since in Madrid," Mendoza believed he would be able to recognise him if he saw him.²

On the 4th of July, Mendoza describes to King Philip an audience of the Queen in which he taxed her with the arrival of Don Antonio, demanding that he be arrested and handed over to Spain. "She said she did not know yet" whether she would help Don Antonio or not; "*but she would not arrest or surrender anyone to be killed*"

Mendoza was now certain Antonio was in England; having seen "a person who has spoken to him."

"When they passed through Rochester he [Antonio] went to see the Queen's ships, and gave the man who took him only once round in a boat 14 crowns, and 4 to the oarsmen. I do not hear that he brings much money or jewels, as they have even to supply him with shirts here The Queen has had him lodged two miles from Greenwich at a place called Stepney in the house of an Alderman who was Lord Mayor last year."

He had there been visited by Leicester and Hatton, at night; and secretly received by Queen Elizabeth "at the end of last month." In the afternoon, when he had been with Lord Leicester and Secretary Walsingham, "Captains Drake, Winter and Hawkins, who are pirates and seamen were present; and a conversation took place about their going to the Island" [Terceira in the Azores] "encouraged by the hopes which Don Antonio held out to them. The matter of the succour has been dealt with very energetically in consequence of the arrival here of a ship with letters from St Michaels, dated 11th ultimo, from the Bishop

¹ The formal appointment of Lopez as a physician to the Queen is not dated until the following October.

² Cal: S.P.S. III. pp. 138-139.

³ Mendoza had ascertained from the Portuguese Ambassador Castillio (who acted throughout in the interests of Spain) that "there is no treaty in the tower of Tombo" (where the Portuguese State Papers were kept) by which Don Antonio could be claimed from the Queen of England: "so that Don Antonio must be demanded by virtue of the treaty with the Low Countries." Cal: S.P.S. III. p. 143.

of Angra, for Antonio de Castilio" [the Portuguese Ambassador] saying that the islanders of St Michael had refused to admit King Philip's Governor, or accept His Majesty's "pardon." Mendoza states the other Azores to have submitted to Spain (which was not the case).

The Queen's Ministers "are determined to send help thither at once in four vessels," which Winter had prepared to send with Drake from Plymouth. The Ambassador then reports to King Philip that he "*told the Queen, in order to alarm her, about the galleons and troops which your Majesty had ordered to be sent to Terceira; and I am doing my best to stop the sending of this succour,—although I cannot imagine by what artifice I can contend with this people, . . . their venom being such that they think only of troubling your Majesty by every means.*"¹

"Notwithstanding all my efforts, the only thing I succeed in doing is to retard somewhat the execution of their designs. . . . In order to stop their fury . . . *it is important that your Majesty should instantly write to the Queen regarding the surrender of Don Antonio.* . .

"The Earl of Leicester went this morning to see Don Antonio, and told him what had passed between the Queen and me. *He [Antonio] said that he was at Tomar at the Coronation of your Majesty, and the taking of the oath of allegiance to the Prince; and that he had spent 20,000 crowns upon those who had concealed him, and contrived his escape, which he said was most difficult and dangerous, as he was being hotly pursued.*"

That the elected King of Portugal, the grandson of Emmanuel the Fortunate, mingled in disguise with those who partook of the triumph of the King of Spain, and heard the swearing to the baby Prince Diego of oaths that he had hoped would some day be taken to his own son Dom Emmanuel, would make a scene to test the pen of a Shakespeare. But Mendoza scoffs: "All this is only to persuade them that he has many adherents in Portugal, although *he confesses that the Duke of Alba pressed him so closely that he could hide himself no longer, and he therefore had to escape . . .*"²

We must now take up the story from King Antonio's "*Explanation*" as written by his Ambassador, and published in four languages in 1585:³

"About the same tyme, when Kynge Don Anthonio was (as is aforementioned) come to Calais, hee stayed not long there, but passed with all expedition into England, from whence he presentlye dispatched a Caravell towarde the saide island of Tercera, with letters to Ciprian de Figueredo advertising him of the successe of his voyage, and howe he was arrived in England"

When a summons had been sent by King Philip II to all the dependencies of Portugal to acknowledge him as their Sovereign, the Governor of the Azores was a veteran officer, "Cipryan Figueredo de Vascogoncelos, established there by King Sebastian before his going into Aphrica": this appointment being in respect of the "great wisdom and experience" of Vasconcellos, "linked with a singular and commendable constancie and courage."

On receipt of the command to do homage to the King of Spain, "after good and mature deliberation . . the same governor together with th'inhabitants of the Islands answered how

¹ This tone of injured innocence is humorous in its disregard of the "trouble" given, a few months before, to the Queen by the landing of King Philip's troops in Ireland.

² London, 4th July, 1581. Cal: S.P.S. III. p. 145.

³ English translation, 1585. B.M. 1606. c. 33. (pp. 39 & 38).

they were bound by oath to kinge Anthony, and in regarde thereof could not acknowledge the King of Castile" during the lifetime of Antonio. Wherefore they then "*resolved to defende themselves againste all force (wherewith the King of Castile threatened them)*" until either they heard of their own King's death, or that he should send them "expresse commandment" to surrender.

"*With this answer the king of Castile was highly offended: and therefore, within short space after, prepared an armye by sea, amounting to about 3000 men, whereof Peter Baldez was Captaine.*" (i.e. Don Pedro de Valdez.)

His Spanish Majesty's Commander against the Islands arrived with a "well appointed" Navy, "in the beginning of June 1581, neere th'isle of Tercera the strongest of all th'islands of Assores: and albeit the same Islande remained unfurnished not only of souldiers but also of armour, gunpowder and other necessities fit for the warres, yet by Ciprian Figueredo his Vertue and industrie . . . th'ennemie was repulsed with the losse of about 700 of his Spanyards, all old souldiours and amongst them many of the chiefe gentlemen that first sette foote on land, who were all presently slayne: which spectacle cast such a feare into the rest of th'army remaining in the shippes that none of them durst come alande, insomuch that Baldez with this foyle was returned to Portugal. . . ."

The method by which the invaders were "presently slain" was peculiar. The inhabitants of Terceira awoke one morning to find seven large Spanish warships anchored off the bay of Salga, and Spanish troops in process of landing. Drawing together all possible fighting men, the Islanders also collected herds of wild cattle from the pastures close by. When their soldiers were massed on the beach as if to confront the foe, they rapidly formed into two long columns, leaving a wide space between. Then through this alley came the wild cattle, in a sudden and violent charge, skilfully manoeuvred by picadors on horseback. The surprise threw the Spaniards into confusion; and before they could rally, the Islanders fell upon them and captured all such guns as had been landed. Few of the invaders survived to return to their ships.¹

There are discreet omissions from "*The Explanation*": because England and Spain in 1581 were not yet ostensibly at war; wherefore then, and in 1582, Queen Elizabeth's ships in the service of Dom Antonio did not fly the English flag. Their Captains nevertheless acted under Her Majesty's orders.

Dom Antonio previously in 1580 had asked Queen Elizabeth for twelve English ships. Those subsequently allotted to his use numbered fourteen, of which four were of the Royal Navy. In a peculiarly unreliable report which will be examined in its place, the ships promised to him by Queen Elizabeth are magnified to "forty." How many actually were at Terceira in the summer of 1581 is uncertain; but Simon de Varro, a Portuguese priest, wrote "To the most Christian Queen of England," testifying to the value of English aid:

"Kings and Princes are wont to be well content when they are well served by their vassals. Your Majesty may be so with the services which Captain Henry Richards has done in this island, in aid of our Lord the King, to the satisfaction of all loyal persons; because *he came for the salvation of this land in the greatest*

¹ p. 38. Walker's *Azores*, 1886. pp. 255-257.

The expedition of Valdez and his repulse are described in "*Hist. of the Vniting*" &c. 1600; and "*Generall Hist. of Spaine.*" (1586). 1612.

necessity it ever had, and after that we defeated all the people that Dom Pedro de Valdes had in the country, even when Dom Lope de Figueirao had come to his aid with 22 ships.”¹

(Valdes was the same who as Vice Admiral of the Armada seven years later was to surrender to Sir Francis Drake aboard H.M.S. *Revenge*, when the conquerors of Portugal were to be foiled in their efforts to annex England.)

“God brought Captain Henry to our company with a prosperous voyage”: resumes Varro; and his “coming animated and cheered the good, and confounded the bad. . . *By his presence he achieved so much that we may say that by his means the conservation of this island is in great part due to the realm of England, that most ancient ally of Portugal*, by whose help it has twice been restored from the hard captivity of the Castilians.”

The priest rejoices that “these good deeds” were done by “so friendly a Kingdom” as England, “in which our King now is.” Urging that upon England depends the liberation of Portugal, “so unjustly tyrannised over by Spain,” he emphasises the importance of holding Terceira, the largest of the Azores: and assures the Queen that “the maintenance of this Island by our Lord God for its natural King, with so great miracles,” is not without deep spiritual meaning:²

Such is the importance of the Island that “I dare to say that without it the King of Portugal could never be King of his realm.” “*It is the key of all the navigation of Spain; and those who hold it have no necessity to go to the Indies, nor pass into the South Sea.*” If early that summer King Antonio could have had but “four English galleys in this island,” more than ten millions of gold might have been collected (by intercepting the Spanish fleet).

Whereas in “*The Explanation*” of King Antonio’s “*Right and Title*,” Dom Cyprian de Figueiredo de Vasconcellos is highly eulogised as Governor of the Azores, in October after the successful fight, Father de Varro from Terceira besought Queen Elizabeth to influence King Antonio to make fresh arrangements “for the government of this Island.”

Not too much reliance (he warns her) is to be placed upon “Portuguese loyalty with its fair words.” He knows some who prefer rather to “defend the false” than serve their Sovereign: in which category he includes his own brother, now governing the Island of St. Michael’s for the “King of Castile.” (Of the nine Azores, St. Michael’s was the only one which as yet acknowledged King Philip.)

Apologising for so long a letter “of a poor friar to so excellent a lady as your Majesty,” Varro wrote also to Sir Francis Drake, commending the timely arrival of “Captain Henry.” As Don Pedro de Valdez, repelled by land, was reinforced by “Don Lope de Figueirao with another fleet of 22 sail,” some of the Tercereans had

¹ “Dom” in original. Altered to “Don” in Calendar. But though Don is right in relation to Spaniards, the Portuguese priest used the Portuguese form “Dom.”

² “*sem misterio.*”

begun to fear; but "God to preserve us in our good purpose," delivered "Captain Henry" from "the midst of 30 ships of the enemy"; and on his coming into port, such was the effect of "his valorous endeavour" that he put new heart into the defenders.¹

Two days after his victory, there arrived at Angra the caravel despatched by King Antonio to bring news of his favourable reception in England. It was sent back to him with particulars of Dom Cyprian's defence of the Island, and with renewed assurance of the loyalty and service of the people.

"At the retourne of this Caravell into Englande, Don Anthonie was there still, *preparing an Armie wherewith he proposed to meete the fleete which was to come that yere to Spain and Portugall from thest and west Indies . . .*"²

The secret history of the projected Islands enterprise was a scheme unsuspected by Drake's chief biographer in 1898. We will therefore turn to Lord Burghley's hitherto unknown MSS in this connection, embodying the London merchants' views, and his own, and those of Sir Francis Drake. And it will be surprising to every reader to find how nearly a "*verie greate and roiall warre*" was undertaken by Elizabeth Regina, in conjunction with her "dearest brother Don Antonio King of Portingale," in the summer of 1581.

¹ S.P. Portugal: 14th October 1581. Cal: S.P.F. 1581-2. No. 367. In Dec. 1581 (Nos. 425, 442,) Captain Henry Richards was still in the Azores.

² "*The Explanation*," 1585. p. 39.

PART II.

“Particularly the Power of Spain.”

CHAPTER 5.

“OUR REALM SHALL BE HIS SANCTUARY.”

SECTION 2.

“To serve Don Antonio King of Portugal.”

(*Lord Burghley's hitherto unknown plan for a great war in 1581*).

“ . . . Give a full account of the circumstances of the rebellion to the Queen, and request her to arrest Don Antonio as a rebel, and surrender him to me a prisoner.

Assure her how deep will be my obligation to her if she does so ; and how just my cause of offence if she refuse, which I cannot believe she will.”

King Philip II to Don Bernardino de Mendoza.

28 Nov: 1580. (Paris Archives K. 1447. 24. Cal: S.P.S. ante.)

“ . . . the voyage of Sr Francis Drake . . . with the shippes to serve Don Antonio King of Portugal, . . . who hath a just war against the King of Spain.”

Lord Burghley's "Co[n]sid[erations] of ye entrp[ri]se for ye Azores Ilands."

21 and 23 Aug: 1581. Lansdowne MS. 102. 104 and 31. 81.

(Now first published).

“ . . . so great and magnificent a Prince as your most Catholike Majestie, who embraceth within the circuits of your Dominions the whole Diameter of the earthly Globe, and possesseth more land at this day than all the Monarchs of the world. A most opulent Prince in Armes, Men, Money, Souldiers, Captains, Ships, Victuals, and all other provisions of warre: . . . a Prince who, like a Moderator or Arbitrator seemeth to hold in his hands the bridle of Empire, both of the sea and land.”

Observations said to have been addressed to King Philip II, after the conquest of Portugal:

“*An Experimentall Discoverie of Spanish Practises or the Counsell of a well-wishing Soldier,*” etc.

(No name of printer.) Anno 1623, p. 23.

NOTE ON THE ARMORIAL BEARINGS OF SIR FRANCIS DRAKE.

That Captain Francis Drake was a *caballero* (gentleman) was firmly stated by his cousin John Drake to the Inquisition. But that he was an upstart, "*homme de rien*," was asserted by disaffected English abroad; and Camden, not writing his *Annals* of Queen Elizabeth till the next reign, harped upon the "mean" ancestry of the circumnavigator of the Globe. Drake's origin was "mean" compared with the pedigrees of the two successive Lords High Admiral of Queen Elizabeth, Edward Fiennes, 9th Lord Clinton, Earl of Lincoln; and Charles, 2nd Lord Howard of Effingham, Earl of Nottingham, both already of the great nobility before receiving Earldoms in 1572 and 1597 respectively. But Francis Drake, one of the twelve children of the Reverend Edmond Drake of Crowndale in Tavistock, came of a family which for a century or more had been in the position of small gentry in Devonshire. That he attached more importance to his ancestors than to himself, may be inferred from his use of his paternal crest, an eagle displayed, rather than the new one of a ship and globe granted to him by the Queen in commemoration of his circumnavigation voyage.

As he claimed to be a gentleman by descent, and as we shall see the Spanish Vice-Admiral Don Pedro de Valdez accepting him as such, we can put aside the familiar but foolish anecdote in Prince's "*Worthies of Devon*" (1701), that Sir Francis assumed a Drake coat of arms to which he had no right, and thereby incurred the resentment of Bernard Drake of Ashe, the most important Devonshire landowner of that surname.

The late Lady Elliott-Drake of Buckland Abbey pointed out that Dr. H. H. Drake had elucidated the matter, and shown that "all this" about a brawl between the Drakes "is pure fiction: for on the contrary Bernard Drake and Sir Francis were the best possible friends, and there is documentary evidence to prove that kindly feeling lasted as long as both lived."¹

"It is true," continued Lady Elliott-Drake, "that in the grant of arms to Sir Francis Drake, dated June 20, 1581, there is no mention of his having the right to bear any arms other than those given him by the Queen; but the document is so profusely decorated that very little room is left for the writing . . . a great deal that is in the original draft at the Heralds College has been left out, apparently for want of space.

"This was probably the reason for the more important omission, which caused Sir Francis to object to the grant as imperfect and consequently the day after its delivery, Robert Cook, Clarenceux, handed to Sir Francis a fresh and properly worded document" in which the new arms were described as "*an augmentation of the coat . . . previously borne*."

Lady Elliott-Drake refers to the Clarenceux's memorandum about this in the Bodleian Library (Ashmole MSS), and to a further memo more recently discovered at the Herald's College (fol. 164) in which Clarenceux stated,

"Sir Francis Drake may by privilege of his birth and right descent from his auncester, bear the arms and surname of his family, to wit a Waver Dragon" (i.e. a wyvern) "geules, with the difference of a third brother, as I am credibly informed by the testimony of Barnard Drake of (blank) in the county of Devon Esquier, chief of that coat armure, and sondry others of that family of worship and good credit."

"Barnard Drake of —" can have been no other than Bernard (afterwards Sir Bernard) Drake of Ashe. Lady Elliott-Drake adds (note 2) that prior to 1574 Bernard Drake of Ashe had used as his arms "*argent, a chevron gules, between three halberts sable*," but had discovered, circa 1574, that this

¹ "*The Family and Heirs of Sir Francis Drake*," London, 1911, p. 52 (B.M. 9903.18).

was the wrong coat, and that the wyvern *gules* ("waver dragon") had been borne by his forbears: whereon he reverted to it. This change may be taken as correct for the Drakes of Ashe; though it had no "official sanction . . . until the Visitation of 1620" (which is to say Bernard Drake did not trouble to pay the Herald's registration fees; an omission not uncommon among gentlemen whose position was well assured).

Remarking that Prince's anecdote about Sir Bernard Drake of Ashe wrathfully repudiating Sir Francis as a kinsman was not invented until long after the deaths of both, Lady Elliott-Drake, having dealt with the question of the *coat of arms*, added as to Drake's *crest*, that "before the Queen's grant of arms as well as afterwards" down to the sealing of his last Will, he invariably used the "eagle displayed," which had been "*the crest of the Tavistock Drakes a century before his time.*"

Lady Elliott-Drake could not find "a single instance" of Sir Francis sealing either public or private writings with "the new ship crest." (lb. p. 54.) That "from the time he was knighted he used the arms the Queen gave him, quarterly with his own waver dragon," but still used the inherited crest, should not be ignored by his biographers. Heraldry in Queen Elizabeth's day was a living language, comprehensible even to men who could not read. And in a religious era, no such phrase as the "accident of birth" had been invented; it being universally felt that each man's nationality and ancestry were of the Almighty's selecting. Inequality therefore did not create ill-feeling; especially as the most popular Elizabethan heraldry books set forth that by brave deeds the "*simple*" could become "*gentle*"; and that even as by base, ungenerous, or disloyal conduct, a gentleman or a peer could be rebuked as "ungentle" and "derogated" from his ancestors, so, on the other hand, a man of low degree could by courage and virtue "*nobilitate*" his blood. (This doctrine was no novelty. King Alfred the Great had formulated it.)

For many centuries the prestige of "nobility" and "gentility" remained high, because rank was regarded as the result of valiant actions. (To the cheapening of titles we will come in the final volume of the present work; King James I having scattered knighthoods so profusely, and created so many peers, that he diminished the hitherto great dignity and significance of honours.)

When Sir Francis Drake received knighthood, April 1581, and an augmentation of arms, June 1581, such recognition of his services was of far more value than our present generation can readily understand. That even so, he still attached weight to his hereditary gentility, and sent back to the Clarenceux King of Arms the document in which his obscure but honest predecessors received insufficient justice, is typical of an age when respect for parents and ancestors was almost as universal as love of country.

UNPUBLISHED ENGLISH CHART SHOWING THE AZORES
IN RELATION TO THE COASTS OF PORTUGAL, SPAIN, FRANCE,
AND SOUTH OF ENGLAND AND IRELAND.

In colour, on vellum: $16\frac{2}{4} \times 22\frac{7}{16}$ inches.

(See Portfolio, No 6).


Notice the soundings at the mouth of the English Channel. Also the remark *Variatio Compassi Nulla*. So early as 1542 the Portuguese and Spaniards had wished to fix a point between Flores and Fayal as the Prime Meridian, because at that point there was no deviation of the Compass.

Endorsed merely "*sea cost*," this undated chart may have been made for Lord Burghley from a Portuguese source in 1581; possibly prior to his drawing up his "*Considerations*," now first published, on the "*verie greate and roiall*" aid he wished Queen Elizabeth to give, under Sir Francis Drake, to "*Don Anthonio King of Portugall*."

The Azores were described to Queen Elizabeth in 1581 by Simon Varro as "*the key to all the navigation of Spain*." So long as they held out against King Philip, the Spanish conquest of the Portuguese Empire was incomplete.

As it can be demonstrated that Queen Elizabeth in 1581 and 1582 had ships and troops at Terceira, and she appears to have kept 2 Companies of Foot in garrison in Angra till the Spanish victory of 1583, the reason Burghley needed such a chart will be manifest: now that the long-buried story of his actions in regard to the last of the dynasty of Aviz will be revealed, from Burghley's own MSS and from the writings of Dom Antonio.

If any Naval reader is inclined to regard this MS chart as possibly of later date and based on a chart printed by Wright, in 1599, to illustrate operations of 1589 (hitherto supposed to be the earliest English chart of the Azores, facsimile, MacLhose's Hakluyt, Vol. VII), putting them side by side, divergences will show that the charts are not from the same hand. Also that Wright's islands are slightly different in shape, and he misplaces Angra the capital of Terceira. He fills in many more names on the coasts of England, Ireland, Spain, and Portugal; but does not draw any division between Spain and Portugal: whereas in Burghley's chart not only is the frontier shown in heavy (though incorrect) outline, but Portugal is painted in a conspicuously different and brighter colour to emphasise it as a separate Kingdom.



HOLOGRAPH LETTER OF KING ANTONIO TO QUEEN ELIZABETH:

3 Oct. (1581). Italian: signed "*il marinaio de E.R.*" (the seaman of Elizabeth Regina).
From the original in possession of The Marquess of Salisbury, K.G.

(No. 98. 176.)

The first specimen of King Antonio's hand to be reproduced in facsimile.

Dated "*a Diepe 3 di Octobre*" without any year, this has been placed conjecturally by the editor of the Hatfield House MSS among correspondence of 1588 (Cal: Vol. XIII, p. 383). But in October 1588, King Antonio was not at Dieppe; he was in England, holding frequent verbal consultations with Sir John Norris and Sir Francis Drake, in circumstances never hitherto treated in detail. (Unpublished, particulars under date.)

There is another way of dating King Antonio's letter: namely by his reference to the intended service of "*felipe estroci.*" Colonel-General Philip Strozzi, cousin of the Queen Mother Catherine, met the King of Portugal at Dieppe in October 1581, for consultation as to the projected expedition to the Azores. The letters of our Ambassador in Paris contain numerous allusions to "Strozzi"; as also to the ensuing tragedy of his death (fully described, II. 5. 5.). By October 1588 he had been dead six years and two and a half months.

In reading King Antonio's letter to Queen Elizabeth, with its expressions of respect and devotion, the peculiar circumstances should be borne in mind: including Her Majesty's refusal to surrender his person to King Philip, whose letter of 14 Aug: 1581, from Lisbon, to his "dearest sister" on the theme of her harbouring a "rebel" is first translated and published in the present work.

" SIR FRANCIS DRAKE, THE NOBLE ENGLISH KNIGHT: "

in his 43rd year, from the earliest known print

(15 $\frac{1}{2}$ x 12 inches).

With Latin verses:—

" Here, dear reader, is the exact likeness of the great unconquered leader Draeck, who, after circumnavigating the whole world successfully, came back to England his native land, on September 28th " (" IV. Kal. Oct ", i.e. the fourth day before the Kalends of October) " in the year of the Incarnation 1580, after setting sail from port on the 13th of December in the year 1577."

No. 10 of pictures of Drake in the British Museum Catalogue of Engraved British Portraits. Anonymous; ascribed to J. Hondius. Presumably printed in the Low Countries.

Notice the coat of arms: the hereditary arms of the Drake family, quartered with the augmentation given by Queen Elizabeth to Sir Francis, 20 June, 1581, in commemoration of his voyage round the world. Observe the inherited crest of an eagle is used; not the new and personal crest of a ship and globe. (See Note on Drake's armorial bearings, pp. 99-100.)

In B.M. Print Room an engraved portrait of Drake by Robert Vaughan (No. 13 of Drake's portraits in Catalogue of Engraved British Portraits) has the fess wavy between two mullets. No. 12 has the same arms, issuing from a cloud; but the contemporary print now selected is more representative.

A head and shoulders portrait of Drake " aetat. suae 42 " was published with an undated map, " *La herdicke enterprinse faict par le sieigneur Draeck d'avoir circuit toute la terre*"; and there was also a map " *Vera totius expeditionis nauticae descriptio*" by Hondius (Josse Hondt). These are not here reproduced, because available from the British Museum, " *Sir Francis Drake's Voyage round the world. 1577-80. Two Contemporary Maps. . . . London. 1927.*"

Sir Francis Drake, though twice married, had no child to whom to transmit his honours. His heir was his brother Thomas; and he is now represented by The Lady Seaton, in whose possession, at Buckland Abbey, Devon, Drake's drum, "Queen Elizabeth's jewel," and also the scarf believed to have been worked for Sir Francis by Queen Elizabeth's Maids of Honour, have been proudly preserved.



*Habeat Lector caudide iſortibꝝ ac inuictibꝝ Ducis Draeck ad vnum Imaginem qui
vno ſettratum orbe, duorum annorum, et meſium decem ſpatio, Zephirus ſuauis
tibiꝝ circumducto, Anglian ſedes proprias, q. Cal Octobr, anno a partu Virgi:
nis i 1520 reuiſit cum antea portu ſoluiſſet ſd, Decem: anni i 1577.*

PART II.

“Particularly the Power of Spain.”

CHAPTER 5.

“OUR REALM SHALL BE HIS SANCTUARY.”

SECTION 2.

“To serve Don Antonio King of Portugal.”

(Lord Burghley's hitherto unknown project against Spain, 1581).

WHEN Drake in 1577 had planned his voyage of circumnavigation, (encouraged especially by the Earl of Leicester, Sir Christopher Hatton, and Philip Sidney), there had been “*great hope . . . that her Majesty might then have become the chief Commander, and in manner Imperial Governor of all Christian Kings, Princes and States*” (as the astrologer Dr. Dee expressed it to Sir Edward Dyer). By the time Drake came home in the autumn of 1580, the world conditions had so changed in consequence of the battles of Alcacer and Alcántara that such audacious projects on the part of England stood no chance of fulfilment. The overthrow of King Sebastian by the Moors, and the Duke of Alba's conquest of Portugal for King Philip,—the falling of the Portuguese East Indies, Brazil, parts of North Africa, and many other possessions, from the hands of England's ally Portugal, into the power of England's enemy Spain—had brought King Philip within reach of his object to rule “over the whole world.” Wherefore we will now consider the situation in Portugal, and certain hitherto unknown relations of Burghley and Drake, rather than repeat particulars of Drake's voyage, as familiar as glorious.¹

Though King Philip's expedient of bringing about an invasion in Ireland in 1580, to keep Queen Elizabeth's mind and forces employed, had been entirely successful in preventing her despatching to Portugal the twelve war ships, with men, arms and ammunition, for which the dispossessed Antonio had made appeal,

¹ Since Corbett's “*Drake and the Tudor Navy*,” 1898, and Mrs. Z. Nutall's “*New Light on Drake*,” Hakluyt Soc: 1914, see H. R. Wagner's “*Sir Francis Drake's Voyage around the World*,” San Francisco, 1926.

Antonio's Ambassador nevertheless aroused considerable sympathy for him in England. Before Philip of Spain entered Lisbon in the spring of 1581, and even before Antonio in disguise had escaped from Portugal, a suggestion "touching the reported suit of the King Don Antonio" for the Queen's aid, had been written to Lord Burghley by Ralph Lane (who eight years later was to act as Muster Master to the forces of Drake and Norris in the too-long delayed "Portingale Journey").¹

"From my poor lodging," on the 7th March 1580-81, Lane's proposals were sent in private to the Lord High Treasurer.²

First: that King Antonio should crave the Queen's leave to hire in England 5000 of her soldiers, and a fleet. The levy should be made openly in Her Majesty's name, not as for the King of Portingale, but "in shew" for the reformation of Ireland. Second: the said "K" should secretly covenant with the Queen that the force would be used against the powers of the Spanish King and the Pope, if they attempted to attack Her Majesty's dominions while these troops and ships were in preparation.

Lane enters into the charges; and proposes that if the English fleet for King Antonio be ready before there should occur any renewed demonstration of hostility on the part of Rome or Spain, this force should not be detained for defence near home, but should be allowed to take a bold initiative and go at once to the Spanish coast.

The "platte" to this effect was submitted to Burghley; with the request that if he thought the Queen could thus be best served, her consent should be notified to Lane; who, through "Mr St Jhon," could suggest to the Portuguese Ambassador to move the plan to Her Majesty. (Lane seems not to have known of the requests already made by the Ambassador Extraordinary).

Unhappily for King Antonio, but fortunately for Spain, Burghley in the spring of '80-81 was smarting under the Queen's displeasure. A tempest of her rage exploded upon him in March. In his own notes on Her Majesty's "heart-breaking" behaviour, Burghley (as we have seen) inferred there must be some secret intrigue against him.³ The clue may now be found in Mendoza's statement to King Philip that the surest way to prevent the Queen from aiding Dom Antonio was to influence her against her Privy Council.⁴ The Ambassador's combined underhand subtlety and open threats kept her in a state of agitated apprehension, which she vented on her best servants.

When Burghley withdrew from the Court, the matter of aid to King Antonio languished; and while Mendoza in England was forwarding his master's interests, Philip II in person was taking possession of the Kingdom the Duke of Alba

¹ S.P.D.E. CCXXII. 97.

² Unpublished Cotton MS. Galba. D. II. f. 110. Endorsed "7 Martij 1580 Mr. Raffe Lane Don Antonio."

³ Lansdowne, MS. 115-20. First published II. 5. 1. p. 87 ante.

⁴ Cal: S.P.S. numerous examples.

had conquered for him. A description was composed celebrating his arrival in the capital city, under his new title of "King Don Philip the First of Portugal."¹

It was not suspected by the victor that mingling in disguise among the crowd which unwillingly watched the triumphal entry of "the Most Catholique King," was his first cousin the elected King of Portugal: a fact the dramatic irony of which is enhanced when we reflect how the desperate plight of Antonio was doubly the result of his fidelity to his country. According to an account of the situation written later by an Aragonese,—who after long service of King Philip, was disgraced by him in peculiar circumstances, and fled out of Spain,—His Majesty in 1580

"made great promises to Don Anthonio, to the intent that hee might cause him to renounce his right, which he had in Portugal by reason of his electio(n). *He offered to make him Viceroy of Naples, with 400 thousand Crownes of yearely rent, and the collation of the offices and benefices of that kingdom. Moreover he would have given him 500 thousand crowns to pay his debts and to defray the charge of going to take the Gouernment upon him . . . Whereunto Don Anthonio made him this answer . . . that he had rather die in an hospitall than do a thing so hainous, wicked, unjust and against his conscience;* for that the laws had taught him thus much, that hee might not contract for that which appertained to another. For, when he was chosen at Santaren, he had then sworne, and afterwards againe at Lisbon (when he was confirmed king by the deputies of the cities and townes of Portugall, which came thither to take their oath for their allegiance, and to doe him homage) that he should *never accord nor fall to any agreement with the enemy, without leaving Portugall her full and perfect liberty.*" His refusal to be bribed into breaking his oath, "may serve to shew how much better a Catholicke, and how lesse ambitious the king Don Anthonio was than King Philip."²

Though this anecdote appears in a political tract by an ex-minister who hated King Philip, and though the treatise was not printed in France until two years after King Antonio's death, the story of his reply to Spanish solicitings tallies with Antonio's own assurance that he could have been highly favoured had he thought it consistent with his duty to accept the offers of "the King of Castile."

The saying that he would rather die in hospital than accede to terms unfavourable to his country, recalls the fate of Camoens, who had breathed his last in a public hospital in Lisbon, two days before the Duke of Alba's Commission

¹ "*Las Festas que se fizeram na cidade de Lisbõa, na entrada del Rey D. Philippe primero de Portugal. Por Mestre Affonso Guerreiro. Impresso com licenca do Conselho Real, e Ordinario. Em Lisbõa. Em casa de Francisco Corea . . . Com priuilegio Real. Anno, 1581.*" (No illustrations except design on title page, and ornamental initial letters in text). (B.M. C.33. c. 40.) License dated 24 July 1581, by which time King Antonio was in London. The first publication not producing the desired effect another of the same kind but more elaborate was licensed on the 17th October, and dedicated to "the King of Portugal" the "Invincible King of Spain . . . ; the first of Portugal":

"*La Entrada que en al reino de Portugal hizo la S.C.R.M. de Don Philippe, Invictissimo Rey de las Españas . . . primero de Portugal, assi con su Real presencia como con el exercito de su felice campo.*

Hecho por Isidoro Velazquez Salamantino audante en Corte," etc. etc. To this was appended an account of the Succession Controversy, with a scornful description of "el pretensor don Antonio."

Though the license is dated Lisbon, 17 Oct: 1581, no edition of that year is in the B.M., only a version with an undated title page, and on the final page a printer's device, and "*Por Manuel de Lyra. M.D. LXXIII:*" (B.M. 81.C.19.)

² "*A Treatise Paraenetical.*" 1598. p. 133. Particulars of Authorship, under date.

was signed for the conquest of Portugal, a fortnight before Antonio's election as King.

But although King Philip rode into Lisbon in all his pride and magnificence, and the nobility did him homage and took the oath of fealty to his little son Prince Diego, there were Portuguese still bold enough to protest:

"Doctor Frier Hector Pinto, Provinciaall of the order of S. Ierome in Portugall, and ordinarie professor of the holie Scriptures in the Vniversity of Coimbre," imprisoned by order of King Philip, was advised to "recant that which he had publikely said and preached: and to declare that his said Majestie was lawfull heire of the said realme of Portugal." To these "persuasions" he answered, "That which I have said, I have said: and true it is that Philip hath not anie right in the succession of this Crowne: but invading and intruding upon the same, . . . without staying till the cause were lawfully heard and decided . . . therefore for my part I do not acknowledge him for my king, but rather for a tyrant and an usurper."

This, he was warned, was "a verie daungerous thing for him to maintaine," in that he would be taken away into Castile, "bound hand and foot, and fettered in iron: and there will they make you languish in miserie . . ." without hope "ever to see Portugall againe."

Whereon he replied that it would be "an extreme grieve" to end his days out of his "deare cuntry; and that (which worse is) in Castile"; but even were he to be taken "into the realme of Castile, yet shall not Castile ever enter within me."

He "persisted in this fidelitie"; and on his death ensuing, a rumour arose that King Philip had caused him to be poisoned: also that "the like misadventure happened to Don Lamenie Prior General of the Channons Regulars of Saint Augustine . . . of Coimbre."

This is part of an enlargement upon a general statement by one of King Philip's foes, himself a Spaniard and a Catholic, than when any ecclesiastic, no matter how pious and learned, dared cross "his Majestie that is so Catholike," he was as ruthless as if his opponent had been a Jew or a Protestant.¹

Whereas the Philip of Spain of modern English history is a "mediocre" dull "bigot," he was to his enemies the "Leviathan" seeking power at all costs and in every place; and to his admirers the most pious as well as the strongest Monarch in Christendom.

A now common notion that English Protestant aversion to Spain arose entirely from prejudice against the "old faith" and sympathy with the Northern

¹ The "Translatours" addition to "*A Treatise Paraenetical, That is to say: An Exhortation. . . . Dedicated to the Kings, Princes, Potentates and Commonweales of Christendome: and particularly to the most Christian King*" (Henry IV of France) "*By a Pilgrim Spaniard. . . . Translated out of the Castilian tongue into French. . . . And now Englished. London . . . 1598.*" p. 112. (Dedicated by the printer William Ponsonby "To the Right Worthy of all honor Maister Fvlke Grevil, Gentleman of her Maiesties most Honorable Priuie chamber.")

Pinto was author of "*Imagem da Vida Christam Ordenada per dialogos como membros de sua composiçam. . . . Compostos per. F. Hector Pinto frade Ieronimo. E por elle acrescentados com muita diligencia, 1567:*" (Colophon "*Impressos em Euora em casa de andre de Burgos, caualleiro da casa de Cardeal Ifante, e impressor da universidade de Euora: os tres de Ianeiro, 1569.*")

See "*Early Portuguese Books 1489-1600 In the Library of His Majesty the King of Portugal*" (*Livros Antigos Portuguezes*, etc.). Maggs Bros., London, 1932, Vol. II, pp. 796-801. H.M. King Manuel, while not believing that Pinto was poisoned by order of King Philip, says "If he earned himself a distinguished name in letters, he also deserves the respect of all Portuguese for the noble way he tried to defend his country's independence."

Netherlanders, leaves out of the reckoning the memory of Philip as King of England, and his later dealings in Portugal. The Catholic Portuguese who refused to elect a foreign Sovereign were styled by him "rebels" equally with the Protestant Northern Dutch, his hereditary subjects, when they cast off their allegiance.

Believing himself the lawful and Heaven-sent King of Portugal, his rigorous measures against recalcitrant Portuguese, and classing of his cousin the elected King among "other his rebels," followed logically from the premisses. Nevertheless, that the Spaniards under Don Pedro de Valdez were defeated in 1581 in their efforts to capture Terceira, encouraged King Antonio to believe that, holding the Islands, he might yet recover the mainland. According to the Spaniard already quoted, the Terceirean victory was the more surprising in that these Islanders who repelled Don Pedro were not professional soldiers, "but mechanical persons, handicraftsmen, and labourers; and amongst them there were not ten Gentlemen,"—most of these being employed by the Governor in the city "for the defence and government thereof."¹

The Governor, "Scipio de Figueredo de Vasconcellos, a Gentleman whose valour and fidelity is well known,"² is described as having "defended himself in plain field with less than four hundred Portugals against more than a thousand Castillians" many of whom were of "the flower of Castile."

The expedient of using the wild cattle to charge the foe, as already noted, is alleged by this narrator to have resulted in the death of eight hundred and seventy-five Spaniards during a conflict lasting from "four hours after morning until four in the night."

"The famous Conestagio³ doth recount this historie otherwise, but falsely; howbeit that he confesseth that there were slaine sixe hundred Castilians, and thirtie Portugals. But I have heard what passed in this encounter of many Gentlemen Spaniards, my countrymen, who were present at it, . . . There died one of the nephews of the Duke de Alva, and one of the nephews of the Marquis de Santa Cruce, and a nephew of . . . Don Pedro de Valdes . . . Being allured with the late sacke of the suburbs of Lisbon . . . they had embarked themselves for this service as cheerefully as if they had bin going to a wedding."⁴

Such triumph of untrained troops over experienced soldiers, and of peasants over noblemen, was regarded as almost miraculous; and is explicable only by the panic caused by the unexpected onslaught of the wild cattle. But when the same device was repeated on a later occasion, the Spaniards were prepared, and it failed. For the time being, it raised seemingly rational hopes; and will bring us soon to Burghley's unpublished "*Considerations*," drawn up in August 1581, in regard to the Azores, and what might there and thence be compassed, if war could be carried out on a large enough scale. This long MS all in Burghley's own hand was not known to Corbett, whose chapter on Drake's return in 1580 from his voyage of circumnavigation opens with a fanciful description of how the Lord Treasurer

¹ "*A Treatise Paraenetical*," 1598. p. 62-64.

² *Ib* :

³ "*Istoria*." 1585.

⁴ "*A Treatise Paraenetical*." pp. 63-64.

"feared the fatal consequences of the pirate's success." But "pirate" was Mendoza's epithet; not Burghley's. And the real Burghley, who anticipated previously that Philip II would "get the Crown of Portingale," had endeavoured to bring about united action of France and England to frustrate His Catholic Majesty's intention. It had required all the subtlety of Mendoza, and his skilful sowing of distrust between the Sovereigns of France and England, to prevent materialisation of Burghley's plans.

In Corbett's chapter entitled "*Knighthood*" in "*Drake and the Tudor Navy*" the author's references to politics, both at home and abroad, abound in scorn for Burghley. And though Corbett says truly "that during Drake's absence the situation in Europe had changed entirely," his summary of the change reveals confusion:

"In 1580 . . . Sebastian the last of the Avis, the royal line of Portugal, had died without a legitimate male heir. Dom Antonio, Prior of Crato, a natural son of a younger brother of John III, Sebastian's grandfather, claimed the throne; Philip II in right of his wife, the daughter of John III, asserted a prior title, and had in readiness an overwhelming argument to back it. In one short campaign Dom Antonio was driven into exile by the Duke of Alba, and the whole of Portugal and its vast oceanic trade and possessions fell into the hands of Spain."²

But Sebastian was not "the last" of "the royal line of Portugal," nor did he "die" in 1580, but was killed in '78; nor was he "without a legitimate male heir." The legitimate birth of his uncle and successor King Henry the Cardinal was never questioned. Philip II in 1580 had not claimed the Portuguese Crown "in right of his wife": his then-wife being his niece Anna of Austria. His first wife Maria of Portugal and her son Don Carlos had long been dead. So in 1579 and '80 King Philip's claim was through his Portuguese mother, the Empress Isabella, daughter of King Emanuel.

Philip II certainly had "*an overwhelming argument*" in the person of the Duke of Alba at the head of a Royal army; but "when Drake came home," in 1580, King Antonio, though recently defeated at Alcántara, had not yet been "driven into exile by the Duke of Alba." For many months he was to be kept in concealment by the people of Portugal.

The importance of the Duke's victory on August the 25th it would hardly be possible to overrate; but Corbett is mistaken in asserting that Drake in 1580 found "the whole" of the "vast oceanic trade and possessions" of Portugal fallen into the hands of Spain. This is to forget that eight out of the nine islands of the Azores refused to accept Spanish sovereignty; and that the Azores not only were still Portuguese in 1580, but that in '81 Don Pedro de Valdez, Vice-Admiral of Spain—after Drake came home—had been beaten back with severe loss when he strove to capture Terceira, the principal Island.

For lack of Burghley's statements in 1581 as to "*King Antonio . . . who hath a*

¹ "*Drake and the Tudor Navy*," (1898). Vol. II. p. 325. ² Op. cit. Vol. I. p. 345.

just war against the King of Spain,"¹ and by taking our own State Papers not from the MS. but from Calendars which omit Dom Antonio's Royal title, Corbett failed to discover that Antonio was much more than a mere "claimant." After the 24th of June, 1580, he was "*the sacred Majesty of Portugal*": the phrase is Drake's.²

As the alleged irregularities and "piracies" of Sir Francis Drake have become a theme for dissertations in serious works bearing the imprint of University presses, it is necessary to draw attention to the ensuing matter. In the "*Political History of England*," Burghley is represented as looking acrimoniously upon the greatest of Elizabethan seamen, and crossing him whenever possible. This idea will collapse entirely, now that Burghley is called up to answer his critics for himself, which in 1585 he offered to do "in anie honest companie": adding "P.S. *I will answer them in anie companie, good or badde.*"

His challenge was not accepted. But the more his private papers are scrutinised, the more we shall see upon what firm ground he stood. That the Queen, under Mendoza's influence, reversed some of his decisions, was no fault of his. When we have reached the end of his forty years of office we shall then be able to assess what he was worth to Queen and Country. Meanwhile it is necessary to pay attention to a hitherto overlooked MS, docketed by him "20 Aug: 1581 *Merchants advise for ye Isle of Azores.*"

Those who drew up this memorandum were uncertain what at the moment might be the condition of the Islands. But they hoped their ships would be allowed by the Queen to "*go forwards, in consideration of the great charges the parties have been at.*" Supposing Terceira remained in possession of King Antonio's forces, "all means possible" should be used to try and "bring the trade of the East thither." If Terceira were lost, they suggest substitution of an African port. No hostilities need be committed upon the King of Spain's subjects; and the ships could depart openly; the Spanish Ambassador being notified that Her Majesty "intendeth not" to fall out with the King of Spain; but that as she has no treaty with Spain in relation to Portugal, and "her highness is not yet sufficiently able to judge to whom the right of that Kingdom belongeth," she has been "contented that some of her said subjects should repair thither . . ." with orders not to fight against "the King of Spain or any of his," but only to "pass quickly" into the places where their business may be.

Further particulars follow: the Merchants concluding that much must depend upon what news might arrive from the Court of France:⁴

¹ Burghley's Holog: Lansdowne MS. 102-104.

² To K. Antonio, from Cascaes, 21 May, 1589. To be published under date.

³ Unpublished Lansdowne MS. 31.83.

⁴ "her Majesty shall have some advertisement from Mr. Secretary touching the French King(s) meaning to enter into league, and of Monsieur's enterprise for the relief of Cambray. And thereupon may her Majesty either suffer them to go forward or revoke them as (to) her Highness shall seem right. And perhaps by the decyphering of the Spanish l(ett)re some other matter will appear, whereupon further advise be taken."

Were it not for Burghley's dated endorsement "Merchants advice" etc. and a commentary in his hand, we might mistake these commercial projects for the measure of what the Queen had decided to do for the King of Portugal. But Burghley's memo in the margin in reply to the proviso not to commit "action of hostility," is pungent:

"As the Pope hired soldiers and ships in Spain to invade hir Ma^{ties} realm of Ireland, being (illegible) bonded to ye league, so a fortiere may her Ma^{ty} suffer Dom Antonio to hire men and shippes for a place w^{ch} is not in the league; and without breache of ye league."

The day after reading the Merchants' Advice, Burghley drew up "*A discourse of ye voyadge for ye Isle of Azores.*" This, all in his own hand, with his interlineations and corrections, has lain in oblivion for over 350 years. It is headed "*Articles to be considered . . . the voyage of S^t Francis Drake to the (Islands) w^{ch} the shippes to serve Don Antonio King of Portugal.*"

"*First it seemeth convenient that seeing the VI August the Terceira was in the possession of the said King, it is no offence to any Treaty or league with the King of Spain to permit any of her Majesty's subjects to serve the said King Antonio to maintain him in possession thereof; for that her Majesty is not bound to take knowledge of any other right that Kings have but as their possession yieldeth knowledge.*"

(There is no question as to the validity of Antonio's right and title; so the present English habit of classing him as a "pretended King" could never have arisen had Burghley's papers been consulted).

"*Secondly there is no Treaty or League betwixt the Crown of England and the Crown of Spain for the Kingdom of Portugal, nor for any Isles or Countries possessed by Portingale. So as it is no offence (to any league²) in any subjects of Her Majesty to do any service in or upon any the territories, Isles, or the Indies possessed heretofore by Portingals.*"

Then, with a wider margin to emphasise the matter, Burghley sums up:

"Hereupon, for any matter of league, *her Majesty may permit Sir Francis Drake to serve the King Antonio, to maintain that [which] he possesseth, or to recover any things taken from him whereof he was as a King possessed.*"

"The second question is what is convenient or expedient for her Majesty to do in this cause, and what may be contrariwise inconvenient.

¹ Holog: draft, Unpublished Lansdowne 102.104. endorsed by L^d. B. "21 August Co(n)sid(erations) of ye entrp(ri)se for ye Azores Islands." The clear copy made by his secretary (31.81.) is dated the "23 August." Spelling modernised.

These articles deal with large strategic issues, such as the author of "*Drake and the Tudor Navy*" in 1898 questioned if any Elizabethan understood. This idea that Elizabethans acted on blind instinct arose from Froude's assertion that it was "a great unrest" which prompted their enterprises, the persons mainly concerned being supposed by him scarcely to have known the reasons for their own doings: a notion the more strange in that the aims and objects of the great men were specified lucidly by themselves.

² Interlineated in holog: MS. 102.104.

For the first, it is profitable and convenient that the Islands of Azores and other territories of Portugal were rather in the possession of Don Antonio than in the K. of Spain's, for many over apparent causes.

For the second these difficulties are to be remembered:

First difficulty: First if the French King will not plainly deal (with) Don Ant(onio) as her Majesty should do, the peril might be too great for her Majesty to provoke the K of Spain. And also *without the help of the French King, her Majesty's aid (except it be very great and very Royal) cannot suffice to procure restitution to King Antonio of the Kingdom of Portugal, which must be the end of his actions: Or else to invade the Isles, or to keep possession of some part and not of all, will be but a perpetual war and charge, which ought to be considered in the beginning:*¹

Whereupon the French King's mind, with good assurance, is to be plainly understood before any great action be enterprised by her Majesty's subjects to offend the K of Spain by seeking to invade any portion of the Portugals territories being in the K of Spain's possession: but to maintain the possession of King Antonio in any thing held for him seemeth reasonable, and may in justice be maintained: but how the King of Spain will interpret the actions, against her Majesty, will rest in him.

(Second) Difficulty. For a second difficulty it may be said that this voyage may give cause to the King of Spain to arrest the Queens subjects, their goods and ships with his power.

(first question) Whether it be better to stay the merchants fleet thither this year, wherein by conference with the merchants may be understood what damage shall ensue to her Majesty for her Customs, and to her Realm and subjects.

(2) question. Or whether in respect of the money in the Queens Majestys hands² it may be thought the K of Spain will not attempt the arrest.

(3). Or whether our merchants cannot by little and little recover what they have need of, without any conveying into the Kings dominions any great number of Ships, mariners, or goods, to the power of the Kings arrest."

"Questions presently" arising upon the preparations.

1. Whether the voyage shall proceed before the Queen be assured that the French King will join with her Majesty for maintenance of the action in case the King of Spain shall offer any violence for the same to the Queen's subjects as by arrest, or by invasion of any of her countries or by giving support to Scotland to offend her?

It was from the beginning concluded, No.

2. What manner of assurance shall the Queen require or shall admit to be sufficient to warrant the voyage to be attempted?

It is reason to have either the French King's letter, or the writing of such as he appointeth to confer with Mr. Walsingham to deliver the like.

3. What shall be done with these great preparations presently?

1. Either they must continue as they do, which is at about XXth the day, and more by the uncertainty of Mr. Outhred's unknown charge at Hampton.⁴

2. Or else there must be some diminution of men.

3. Or else 3 Ships and a Bark might be presently sent to the Isle to do service there, whereto Drake and Hawkins assent; and though thereby great service may ensue, and in this case the rest of the ships may be reduced to a smaller charge, and yet remain in readiness upon knowledge from France, the K. Antonio will not assent hereto as to bear any charges thereof.

4. Or else the whole preparation to be sold, the victual to the merchants trading voyage, the munition etc. reserved for her Majesty."

¹ Notice this especially.

² Presumably what had been brought by Drake and demanded by Mendoza.

³ Immediately. ⁴ Southampton.

To which last Lord Burghley adds in the margin¹

"Or lastly the whole to proceed as they are in readiness, so as it may be accorded how the charge shall be borne at their coming thither.

For which purpose Mr. Drake and Hawkins say that it was meant afore Mr. Secretary went that supposing the charge be in this sort:

VMI² d(elivere)d by the Queen's Majesty to Mr. Secretary to be accounted the money of King Antonio.

IJM¹ⁱ to be Mr. Secretaries.

The rest according³ to VJ or VIJM¹ⁱ to belong to Drake, Hawkins and other venturers.

Upon the supposition

This would have that one half that should be won from the K of Spain of his Fleet or his Isles should be answered to the King⁴

An other	1 q(uarte)r for tonnage of the ships
half to be	after V ^s the ton.
divided	1 q(uarte)r to the whole company.
And the half	
allowed to	1 part to the K himself
the King to	1 part to Mr. Secretary and to Mr. Drake
be divided.	and the other Adventurers.

But herein in my opinion the Q(ueen's) Majesty for her five thousand pounds should⁵ be forgotten, for it were not reason but that her Majesty should have either payment of her five thousand pounds worth of the merchandise of the Isles that should come hither, or else to have a portion as Mr. Secretary and Mr. Drake and others have.

(Whereto Mr. Drake and Hawkyns agreed.)⁶

"Item: it is convenient that the five thousand pounds should be accounted for in the name of Mr. Secretary, for that her Majesty at the lending thereof would not have it otherwise accounted, and yet Mr. Secretary to render to her Majesty that (which) should be allowed to him for it.

"What Sir Francis Drake shall do if the French King shall join in this action.

"He may by Commission from King Antonio justly do any service against any that will impeach King Antonio's possession in the Terceira or in any other Isles. Secondly, he may attempt upon the Madeira or upon any other Island that did belong to Don Antonio as King of Portugal. These services he may do without breach of league with the King of Spain.

Objection. But by these only actions neither shall King Antonio be so profited as shall tend to bring him to possession of Portugal or the East Indes. Neither is it likely that by these two actions the charges will be discharged of the preparations.

Answer. It is true.

"Therefore of necessity it followeth that he must attend to take anything he can from the King of Spain, as his treasure, the Islands of Canarie, or any Island in Nova Spania, or in Peru.

"Whereof followeth that though he shall do this by King Antonio's Commission, who hath a just war against the King of Spain, yet if the K. of Spain shall take this action as maintained by her Majesty, then shall it be at his will, as he shall find himself able, to avenge it upon her Majesty by arresting and taking of all her people, ships and mariners being in his countries or coming within his power.

¹ Lansdowne 102.104. ² Five thousand pounds.

³ MS. 31.81. but 102.104 has "amounting."

⁴ Of Portugal.

⁵ Should not.

⁶ 102.104. These words only in first draft.

"He may give new support to Ireland, and relief to the King of Scots to be an evil neighbour."¹

These objections are because if the King of France declines, or delays to co-operate, the whole burden would be left upon England. The main point, to be "*considered of in the beginning*," is that although, in the peculiar circumstances of King Philip's forcible annexation of Portugal, the Queen can rightly send her subjects to war on behalf of King Antonio, and Drake could capture Madeira or serve at the Islands of Azores without breaking "*anie league*,"—no treaty existing with England by which the King of Spain is recognised as ruler of Portugal,—nevertheless the expediency of provoking Spain to war would depend not only upon France but upon whether the Queen's aid to Dom Antonio would be sufficiently "*great and Roiall*."

Occasional assistance would not suffice to procure restitution of "*K. Antonio to the Kingdom of Portugal*"; and a small war might be more prolonged than a great war, and so in the end more costly.

This last is the moral which Burghley's modern critics imagine him never to have learnt; but no man defines it more clearly than he in 1581, a period at which—despite the invasion of Ireland in 1580—he is now supposed to have believed in King Philip's peaceful intentions.²

Burghley's "*Considerations*" end in terms from which we infer that he feared the Queen would not undertake such a "*verie great*" enterprise that year.

"If the voyage proceed not, The King Antonio ought to have his Jewel in good reason, for he shall have nothing for his Jewel."
(A diamond which he had given in charge to Leicester as a pledge).

"The preparations would be viewed and (ap)prised, and sold and distributed.

"The loss to be borne. The King might upon his Jewel or upon some less Jewel, or upon his own bond, have sold to him the four ships which he desireth, and the munitions also, as shall be thought meet to be spared."

So ends this MS, the long ignoring of which has hitherto prevented comprehension of Burghley's attitude towards Drake. It should henceforth be manifest that if the mutinous Doughty had been "*Cecil's spy*" with orders to cross and frustrate the voyage of 1577-80, and if Drake by executing Doughty had

¹ "King Antonio . . . who hath a just war," etc. (Lansdowne MS. 102.104.)

In some spurious "*Instructions to his Sonne*" printed in Lord Burghley's name in the 17th century, but held up by Martin Hume in "*The Great Lord Burghley*" as typical of Burghley's mind and feelings, he is represented as denying that there could be any such thing as a just war, and asserting that a soldier is no more to be regarded in peace time than a chimney in summer. But in real life "*a just war*" was one of Burghley's favourite phrases; and no one Minister did more to try and keep the manhood of the nation in a state of readiness for war,—thereby to discourage intending invaders.

² In "*Two English Queens and Philip*," 1908, p. 371, as to the events of 1580-81, Hume refers to "*Cecil who always advocated a conciliatory course with Spain*," etc. As "*Cecil*" had then been a peer for 10 years, and as his own papers show him as a most consistent adversary of Spain, it is time to understand that Martin Hume's statements as to "*Cecil's*" policy are based on delusions derived from 19th century English histories.

deprived the Lord High Treasurer of a valued instrument, it would have been out of the question for the same Lord Treasurer soon afterwards to select Drake as prospective Commander, when he was hoping that a war of aggression against King Philip would become practicable: not only as a retort to the invasion of Ireland, but to restore "the balance of Power" and aid the Portuguese to regain the Empire of Portugal, the East Indies, and other dependencies.

From Paris on the 3rd of August our Ambassador Sir Henry Cobham wrote Burghley a long report of all that he observed or heard, including even such particulars as that the Queen Mother had bought "the best and fairest Spanish horse in France" to present to her son "Monseigneur" (the Duke of Anjou): to whom "this day or yesterday Sir Francis (Walsingham) had his first access."

As for Dom Antonio's attempt towards his own restoration,

"The King hath sent for Monsieur Strozso from beside Bourdeaux, where he is at Bourg, in young Lansac's House; and they two do prepare some Ships to repair towards the Island d'Assores. There is an opinion conceived the King would have him to be Admirall of France, so as thereby Le Valet, one of his Minions, might become Coronel-Major of the French Footmen, which office Strozso now enjoyeth. . . .¹ It is understood here how the Spanish King doth send to the sea about twenty Ships for to conduct in Safety the Indian Fleet, and so to see if he can therewithall assure the Islands."²

Of "Strozso," Philip Strozzi, a cousin of the Queen Mother but singularly unlike her, we shall hear much. Though he had been a foe of England in his early youth, serving with his father Marshal Strozzi under Francis Duke of Guise at the taking of Calais, a time was approaching when English soldiers afloat were to fight under his command.

On the 9th of August Cobham relates to Burghley,

"I have been advertised by the Counts of Vymioso and de Torres Vedras that the King at their last audience on Saturday the fifth of this instant not only assured them of his good disposition . . . for their desired aid for the enterprise of the Azores; but likewise that he purposed to send for me, that he might show me his affection in . . . these Affairs."

(Francis of Portugal, Count of Vimioso, we will remember as the one whom King Antonio had nominated Lord High Constable. The Count of Torres Vedras, Emmanuel de Silva, had been the only peer Antonio created. Both were fated to die prematurely as the price of their fidelity to the losing side).

On the afternoon of the 6th August King Henry III had invited Queen Elizabeth's Ambassador into his presence:

"his Majesty did will me to advertise the Queen that he, *hearing tell she was inclined to succour Dom Antonio with aid of Ships, did think this manner of dealing would be profitable as well for France as for England,*" in that "it should be a ready mean to impair the increasing Greatness of the Spanish King: and that he had for his part some months past

¹ Colonel General of the Foot (as successor to François de Coligny, Sieur d'Andelot).

² Orig: *State Papers*, ed: Murdin, pp. 350-351.

sent Captain Escalyn with men unto the Island of Tarserys" (Terceira) "and now he did send from Burdeaux three or four other Ships . . ."

Having been informed that the Indian Fleet would be soon on the way to Spain, "he desired that the Queen of England would order those of her ships appointed for this service" to "depart" immediately.

Cobham, though touching upon Her Majesty's displeasure against "*the Spanish Usurpation of Portugal*," and the "*Sanctuary*" she had given to Don Antonio, could not make promises.

In reply to King Henry's request "that the English ships might with the first commoditie depart," because he considered the enterprise "beneficial to both the Realms of England and France," Cobham requested the King to "let his mind be known," what order he wished "taken for the Commanding of those Fleets of England and France, and to what Ends they were to be employed": for Queen Elizabeth must know his exact intentions "for the better Proceeding in the enterprise."

The King gave no reply beyond that "at the return of his Mother" he would confer with her.

Cobham was not reassured. He had been informed that the Queen Mother absented herself in order to dissuade the Duke d'Anjou from his intended suit to Queen Elizabeth; and that she not only was trying to prevent his "proceeding to hazard his Person and Friends in the Action of relieving of Cambray, but also hath propounded to his Highness *the Offer of one of King Philip's daughters, with the Continuance of the Spanish Amitie, with large benefits besides . . .*"

Cobham hoped that, no matter what Queen Catherine might say, Monsieur's "loyall princely Nature" would be capable of judging how little the Spanish offers should be "had in estimation." An intercepted letter is enclosed, directed from the Spanish agent Tassis to King Philip: which should be "a means to discover to her Majesty the dealing and meaning of the Spanish King with this King."

At the end of August, Cobham had "long speech" with the Queen Mother "about the Portugal Causes." He repeats what he had said before:

" . . . I do understand by her that the King will attempt nothing by way of Concurrencing with her Majesty against Spayne without the Marriage:" which marriage she "earnestly" recommended; and "renewed her former Request touching the support to be given to D^r Antonio, letting me understand that the four Shippes were departed from Burdeaux with 600 men at the least . . ."

"I am presently given to understand that all further proceeding shall be stayed till her Majesty's full resolution to the marriage be known . . ."

¹ Cobham supposes the cipher is the same as that by which "Phillips my Lord Ambassadors man did dissyphre me a letter the last year in the Spanish tongue." "Your Lordships most assured and humble to command Henry Cobham." Endorsed "Sir Henry Cobham to my Lord 9 Aug. 1581." Orig. *State Papers*, ed: Murdin, pp. 351-353. Several of these letters at Hatfield supplement Cobham's letters in P.R.O., S.P. Foreign, Portugal and France.

² Printed "Duke" by Murdin. p. 360: most likely a wrongly expanded D for Don.

The Queen's resolution was precisely the matter upon which no man could be certain. And to this day it is not possible to decide whether she seriously meant to give her hand to "Monsieur"; or whether she merely considered it politic to affect an intention to marry, until she obtained what she wanted from France.

It had been primarily due to the cleverness of Mendoza that the Azores enterprise from England was checked at the last moment. Even to the "flagges etc, with the Armes of Portugal," the fleet had been ready.¹

The names of the Lord Treasurer and the Earl of Leicester are in the margin beside the statement that

"By the Queen's Majesty's order it is resolved,

That all the men that are in wages or any charge in any of the Ships, Barks and Pinaces provided to have passed to the Portingall Islands shall presently² be discharged and put out of pay.

That all munition and furniture for the ships be also sold"

Particulars follow as to who shall "joyne with Sir Fr. Drake knight, John Hawkins, Mr Mills Mr Secretares servant" to arrange for disposing of the ships, victuals, munition and "Ordonance," some of which last the Queen might purchase for her store if "the prices may be found reasonable."

There are "*Nota desperat cases*" of money claimed. The whole is signed by "*Fra: Drake John Hawkyns Fra: Mylles.*"

As Burghley, Leicester, and Walsingham were all highly favourable to the cause of Portugal, the collapse of the plan would be difficult to understand, were it not for Mendoza's letters to King Philip, describing his own machinations to upset with the Queen the influence of such Councillors as he saw to be most resolute against Spain. This frustration of the Azores project now reveals the reason why in September 1581 Walsingham, from Paris, sent the Queen his indignant protest against her parsimony:

*"If this sparing and improvident course be holden on still, there is no one that serveth in the place of a Counsellor, that either weigheth his own credit, or carrieth that sound affection to your Majesty that he ought to do, that would not wish himself rather in the farthest part of Ethiopia than to enjoy the fairest place in England. . ."*³

Though this was first published in 1655, it has not hitherto been realised

¹ Unpublished Lansdowne MS. 31.83. Orig: "The resolution for y^e discharges of ye ships etc. for y^e Islands voyage Portingale": dated and endorsed 29 August 1581.

² Immediately.

³ In Hatfield Cal: II. No. 1044, p. 427-8 is printed Walsingham's draft of this, endorsed "*12 September 1581.*" It has *palace* instead of *place*. But by the reference to a Counsellor, "place" would seem to be the correct reading; and presumably Sir Dudley Digges copied his version in "*The Compleat Ambassador*" from the letter as actually sent to the Queen.

why Walsingham in 1581 was so specially exasperated with his Sovereign's economies.¹

The distrust worked up by Mendoza between France and England was one of the main reasons Burghley's plan was strangled; for if King Henry III would have acted promptly, Queen Elizabeth would have been the less afraid of risks. But her delays about her marriage neutralised the efforts of her Ambassador; and that the French King was only half-hearted in regard to Portugal was Walsingham's complaint. He wrote to Burghley in September that although it was "apparent to all the world" that the hindrance to King Antonio's intended enterprise the previous month had been primarily due to French delays, Vimioso was still "*carried away with a vain hope that the King here is greatly disposed to assist his Majestie.*" Walsingham prayed that Vimioso's confidence in the French might not "in the end" lead to disaster.²

Burghley had noticed that the French Ambassador in London spoke of "*Don Antonio*,"—not "*King Antonio*"; wherefore he feared that the French assistance would be given with some other motive than that of re-establishing Antonio as an independent Monarch. So he bade Walsingham refer to Queen Elizabeth's zeal in the cause of *King Don Antonio*, with emphasis upon the Royal title.

"*The Explanation*" of King Antonio's "Right" (issued in 1585) treats all these matters with discreet reticence: merely saying that when the caravel sent to the Azores, with news of his safe arrival, returned to England—to tell of the repulse of Don Pedro de Valdez from Terceira, and give assurance of the steady loyalty of the Tercereans,—

"King Anthonie was there still, preparing an Armie wherewith he purposed to meete the fleete which was to come that yere to Spaine and Portugall from the east and west Indies. But forasmuch as it was after known to be then too late to execute th'enterprise, it remained in suspense, without anything effected that yere . . . Wherefore King Anthonie departed out of England."³

That it was "then too late to execute the enterprise," was because the Islands were unsafe for navigation in autumn and winter. Mendoza had only to create delays which would prevent the ships sailing in August, to be sure the venture would be deferred until the following spring.

¹ That he and Burghley and Leicester, but especially Burghley, were considering an enterprise to the Islands (of Azores) with Drake in command in 1581 can now be proved beyond controversy. But even without Burghley's MSS, now first published, the main fact might long ago have been suspected, from remarks of Burghley to Walsingham printed in "*The Compleat Ambassador or two Treatises of the Intended Marriage of Qu: Elizabeth . . . Comprised in Letters of Negotiation of Sir Francis Walsingham. . . . Together with the Answers of the Lord Burleigh, the Earl of Leicester, Sir Tho: Smith, and others.*"

Wherein, as in a clear Mirror, may be seen the faces of the two Courts of England and France . . . with many remarkable passages of State, not mentioned in any History, Faithfully collected by the truly Honourable Sir Dudley Digges Knight, late Master of the Rolls.

London: Printed by Tho: Newcomb, for Gabriel Bedell and Thomas Collins, and are to be sold at their Shop at the Middle-Temple Gate in Fleet-street, 1655."

² "*The Compleat Ambassador*," ed: Sir Dudley Digges, 1655, p. 434.

³ Op. cit. p. 39.

King Philip was gratified by the skill with which Mendoza, from the moment of Dom Antonio's landing, had impeded all plans for the English liberation of Portugal. But he expressed scorn for Queen Elizabeth that she was thus easily influenced.¹ Acknowledging his Ambassador's letters of the 7th and 10th of September, (received on the "18th") the "Most Catholique King" highly commends him for sending "minute intelligence" of the "changeable way" the Queen and Council behave to Dom Antonio: "first promising him ships and then refusing them."

"As he was on the point of leaving, I doubt not you will advise me as to the road he was taking, what ships he had, and how he was treated on his departure.

Let me know if he still keeps up a correspondence with England

"With regard to the 2000 ducats sent to you for the purpose you are aware of, the plan you have adopted was a good one."

(This "plan" was for bribery of some of the Queen's servants).²

"*Let me know if he still keeps up a correspondence with England.*" From the word "*if*" we might infer King Philip to have hoped that Queen Elizabeth had withdrawn her promises of help. But clever as Mendoza was, he did not know everything. A letter to Queen Elizabeth which we can now read, he certainly had not seen. Dated from Dieppe on the 3rd of October, it is the earliest to be found from King Antonio to Her Majesty after he made her personal acquaintance.³

His manner by no means gives the impression that he held her responsible for the obstructions which had arisen to frustrate the sailing of the Navy raised for his service. And he is hopeful yet of success. On his recent landing in France, he tells her, he found not only "the Constable" (meaning Francis Count of Vimioso) still

¹ Hume, "*Two English Queens and Philip*," 1908, p. 356, stated that the Spaniards recognised "Elizabeth . . . in diplomacy" as "more than a match for the cast-iron methods of their master" (in 1579-81). On the contrary, Mendoza prided himself he could always outwit her; as is shown in Mendoza's own letters in the Calendars Hume had edited.

² The editor of Cal. S.P.S. III adds that this sum was "to bribe Sir James Crofts the Controller, and a member of the Queen's Council"; but does not in his footnote give authority for the statement. Crofts was an adversary of Leicester, a form of enmity usually denoting Spanish leanings.

³ Holog: Hatfield MS 98. 176. (Now first reproduced, ante.) The orig: not having any year after the date, the editor of the Calendar (Vol. XIII, p. 383) has placed it among papers of "1588?" But this date is impossible. On the 3 Oct: 1588 King Antonio could not have written from Dieppe as he was in England. (Vide his own unpublished MSS, and also the secret reports to King Philip by traitors from London; Cal: S.P. Spanish.) Secondly, in this letter of 3 Oct: he refers to Philip Strozzi (*felipi strozzi*) as resolved to follow his fortunes. By October 1588 the famous Strozzi had been dead over six years. The only October in which King Antonio and Strozzi conferred together was 1581. Some of the chief letters of Sir Henry Cobham from France as to the intention of Strozzi to serve King Antonio are also at Hatfield. The Calendars having different editors, whose work has necessarily extended over a long period of years, the student needs to find for himself, in the 14 printed volumes, and in Murrin's earlier folio vol: of Burghley's MSS (1759), matter relevant to his purpose, not forgetting a Hatfield volume of Addenda Calendar. In relation to King Antonio, the editors have not noticed Burghley's giving him the Royal title; and have supposed him to be a mere "claimant."

resolute to follow his fortunes, but also Philip Strozzi and M. de Sansolesmne; who brought him promises of service from many French gentlemen.¹ "On behalf of the Most Christian King and his Mother, I was offered all I could desire."

He reserves his decision as to his mode of procedure until he can know what Queen Elizabeth wishes: hoping and believing that she will be his guide, patron and "molinará" in an enterprise worthy of her greatness.²

With expressions of unalterable devotion to herself, and apologies for his imperfect way of writing, he prays God long to preserve the Queen's life and prosper her estate; and, "*humiliame(n)te bascia li piedi de la maesta vostra*" signs himself, not as in official letters "The King" (*Rey*), but "*il marinaro de E. R.*" ("the seaman of Elizabeth Regina").

This last was a reminiscence of how he had disguised himself as a sailor when escaping from Vianna the previous autumn: since when he had wandered for months through Portugal in humble disguises.

In the art of statesmanship, a wise selection of subordinates is important. But what constitutes wisdom of choice, or its opposite, is sometimes discovered too late. The ancient saying that one traitor within a fortress is of more value to the enemy than a thousand soldiers outside, is in this case peculiarly applicable. Wherefore it will be necessary to pay heed to Dr. Lopez, already commended by Topclyffe as "honest" and "zealous." That the "honesty" of this doctor was of the school of Iago, in a play not then on the stage, we shall see later, in circumstances more extraordinary than any dramatist could have invented. Meanwhile "*De la Cort in Richiamonth 9 di ottobre 1581*" a letter from him to King Antonio abounded in expressions of solicitude and fervour.

"I find myself greatly obliged to your Majesty for the singular courtesy by which you have deigned to write to me with your own hand:⁴ another great favour which has been a special consolation to me . . . as it shows the good will as well as the health and safety of your Majesty: in which God grant your very perfect Majesty may continue for many years, He being the guide and conductor of your person and all your affairs . . . for your greater safety and pleasure.

¹ "Trovai il Conestable et felice estroci et Santa Solema resolutissimi di sequire la mia fortuna: et de la parte di molti Signori frăcesi . . . la mesma oferta."

That he does not explain who Philip Strozzi is, was because in 1581 the renown of the French branch of the house of Strozzi was such that information was superfluous.

² "*Molinara*." To find Dom Antonio, ex-Prior of Crato indulging in Euphuism may be unexpected, but the word is clearly "molinará" (not "monitara"). See facsimile ante.

Readers of Sir Walter Scott's "*The Monastery*" will remember the Southron gallant who uses this Italian word on every possible occasion: "Fairerest Molinará. . . I will so celebrate thy wit and beauty that the Bakers Nymph of Raphael d'Urbino shall seem but a Gypsy in comparison. . . ." (ch: 28). "Fair and generous Molinará" (Ib); "lovely Molinará" (ch: 29); "kind Molinará," "my ingenious Molinará," etc. (Ib). Though Raphael's "Baker's Nymph" seems to have been a myth invented long after Raphael's death, (vide Julia Cartwright's "*Raphael*," p. 162) the fashionable use of the word *molinará*, not as meaning miller's daughter but as a synonym for "goddess" or "adored one" need not be doubted, now that we find it in this hitherto unpublished letter of the elected King of Portugal to the Queen of England.

³ Now first translated from unpublished Cotton MS. Nero Br, No. 118. f. 126. Italian: endorsed in English "9 Oct: 1581. Copy to the K. of Portugal."

⁴ This letter cannot be found.

"Since the departure of your Majesty the best news I have to inform your Majesty is that I have found the Queen in good health, with the same kind affection and disposition towards you and your affairs that she showed when you left her; and very desirous to hear of the happiness of your success: and to this end she has written to Ambassador Chobam to exert himself in every way to advance the affairs of your Majesty: and on my part I hope to employ such little ability as I have, which may be useful to such a Prince."

With repeated assurances of "good will and great readiness to serve your Majesty," the doctor with "much joy" looks forward to keeping Dom Antonio's trust and favour "in all that I shall and can do." Promising to report himself to "your faithful agent who is not at all idle in the affairs of your Majesty" he concludes by praying for King Antonio's "life, prosperity, health, and happy return to this Island."

This Portuguese refugee was basking in the sunshine of the Queen's approval; and a fortnight later she appointed him one of her physicians, granting him for life an annuity of fifty pounds.¹ He thereupon became an English subject: a circumstance Her Majesty had ultimately very particular reason to regret.²

¹ Date and terms of appointment hitherto unknown. Patent will be published later.

² The reader must again be reminded that modern references to Dr. Lopez are misleading, in that his letters to King Antonio and the Earl of Leicester (and others) have been left out of the reckoning by all commentators on his case: and only a fraction of the relevant and necessary material hitherto examined. Elaborate proofs of his treachery, discovered by the present writer, will appear in later volumes.

APPENDIX A.

"TO DO YOUR QUEEN AND COUNTRY GOOD." 1580.

The year that Drake came home, there was published in London a small octavo with the Arcadian title of "*A Posie of Gilloflowers, eche differing from other in colour and odour, yet all sweete.*"¹

It is hardly in such miscellany that we should expect to find a song "*For Souldiers*" so spirited that it would have suited the crisis of 1588. Whether written as an exhortation to our first contingent embarking for the Low Countries in 1572, subsequent to the dismissal of the Spanish Ambassador Despes from London, or whether it was inspired by the expectation of a great war to follow swiftly upon the Spanish and Italian landing in Ireland in September 1580, it is sufficiently remarkable. (The opening lines in which our countrymen are apostrophised as descendants of Brutus, refer, it need hardly be said, not to the assassin of Caesar but to the King whom the Elizabethans believed to have colonised England, after the fall of Troy²).

"Ye buds of Brutus' land,
 courageous youths, now play your parts.
 Unto your tackle stand:
 Abide the brunt, with valiant harts:
 For newes is carried to and fro
 that we must forth to warfare goe:
 Men muster now in every place,
 and souldiers are pressed forth apace.
 Faynt not; spend blood,
 to do your Queen and Countrey good.
 Fayre words, good pay,
 will make men cast all care away.
 .
 .
 .
 Serve God. Stand stout.
 Bold courage brings this gear about.
 Fear not: forth run.
 Faynt hart fair Lady never won.

¹ "By Humphrey Gifford, Gent. Imprinted at London for Iohn Perrin, and are to be solde at his shop in Pauls Churchyard, at the signe of the Angell." (B.M. No. 239.g.33.) Sm: 8vo. 78 leaves numbered only on one side. Extremely rare: the Folliot copy was sold at Sotheby's in 1930 for £560 to Messrs. Quarich. Except "*For Souldiers*" (included in Norman Ault's "*Elizabethan Lyrics from Original Texts*," 1925, pp. 78-80), there is little of outstanding value in the volume. But Grosart in 1870 reprinted it privately in his "*Miscellanies*"; and another reprint is now announced (1933).

² This Trojan Monarchy of ancient Britain was a favourite theme. Subsequently Richard Harvey (brother of Gabriel Harvey) dedicated to "The Lord Robert Deuoreux, Earle of Essex, of her Maiesties priuie Counsell, Knight of the Princely Order of the Garter," "*Philadelphus, or A Defence of Brutes, and the Brutans History. Written by R.H. Imprinted at London by Iohn Wolfe. 1593.*" (B.M. 292 f. 44.) And an early 17th century MS of the Arms of the Nobility of England (Thorpe's *Catalogue*, 380, No. 325, p. 42), allots Arms to "Brutus the sonne of Silvius Posthumous, coming out of Italie with the Troians," and discovering "this island, A^o of the world 2855." See also *Catalogue of "Exposición internacional de Barcelona. El Arte en España,"* Barcelona, 1929, item 1621, p. 620, "Tapiz llamado 'de las Naves'; fabricación quizá de Tournai, de hacia mediados del siglo xv. Representa la expedición del legendario Bruto desde Grecia a Bretaña, antes de colonizar en Inglaterra . . . Catedral de Zaragoza."

Ye curious carpet Knights that spend
 the time in sport and play,
 Abroad and see new sights; your Countrey's cause
 calls you away;
 Do not to make your ladies game
 bring blemish to your worthy name.
 Away to field and win renown;
 with courage beat your enemies downe.
 Stout hearts gain praise,
 when dastards saile in Slanders' seas.

Unto it boldly let us stand.
 God will give right the upper hand.
 Our cause is good, we need not doubt;
 In sign of courage give a shout.
 March forth; be strong . . .
 Strive with these foes with all your might,
 So shall you fight a worthy fight.
 That conquest doth deserve most praise
 where Vice do yield to Vertues wayes.
 Beat down foul sin;
 a worthy crowne then shall ye win.
 If we live well,
 In Heaven with Christ our souls shall dwell."

This martial tone so early as 1580 will seem less surprising if we note that on the 23rd December 1578 (the year when Barnaby Riche had issued his "*Allarme to England*,") Geoffrey Gates dedicated to Lord Burghley's son-in-law the Earl of Oxford, "*The Defence of Militarie Profession. Wherein is eloquently shewed the due commendation of Martiall prowessse, and plainly proved how necessary the exercise of Armes is for this our age. . .*"¹

Gates had done more than write. He had been a follower in the field of Colonel John Norris (not "Sir John" until April 1586). In 1581 a dialogue between Geoffrey Gates and William Blandy, "Souldiers," was published in London: "*The Castle, or picture of pollicy, shewing forth most liuely, the face, body and partes of a commonwealthe; the duety, quality, profession of a perfect and absolute Souldier, the martiall feates encounters and skirmishes lately done by our English nation under the conduct of the most famous Gentleman M. Iohn Norris Generall of the Army of the States of Friesland. . .*"²

The Castle was dedicated "*To the Noble and vertuous Gentleman M. Philipp Sidney*," for though Sidney's personal experience of war had as yet been brief—under Walter Earl of Essex in Ireland,—he was already as noted a patron of soldiers as of scholars. And even while entertaining his sister Mary Countess of Pembroke at Wilton with "his Arcadian romanticks," he knew that any moment it might be needful to go forth and combat his Royal godfather "the Leviathan of Spain."

¹ "Imprinted at London by Henry Middleton, for John Harrison. 1579." B.L. quarto.

² "At London Printed by Iohn Daye, dwelling ouer Aldersgate. Cum privilegio Reginae Majestatis." Black letter Quarto. B.M. G.10373. In 1576 Blandy had translated Bishop Osorio's "*De Nobilitate*" and dedicated it to the Earl of Leicester. II. 4. 1. ante.

APPENDIX B.

"THE KEY TO ALL THE NAVIGATION OF SPAIN."

(Notes on the History of the Azores).

"By his presence he achieved so much that we may say that by his means the conservation of this Island is in great part due to England. . . ."

Father Simon de Varro to Queen Elizabeth: from Terceira, 14 Oct: 1581, (on the service of Captain Henry Richards.) II. 5. 1. ante.

The nine Isles, Santa Maria, São Miguel, Terceira, São Jorge, Pico, Fayal, Graciosa, Flores and Corvo, are spread out in an irregular line of four hundred geographical miles, running W.N.W. to E.S.E., between latitudes $36^{\circ} 59'$ and $39^{\circ} 44'$ north, and longitudes $25^{\circ} 10'$ and $31^{\circ} 7'$ west of Greenwich. St. Michael's is about 700 miles west of the coast of Portugal, and 1,147 miles from the Lizard. Flores the most western is 1,680 miles from the coast of Newfoundland. Extra to the nine islands there are two groups of rocks, called the Greater and the Lesser Formigas.¹

The discovery and colonisation of the Azores was due solely to Portuguese initiative; and especially to the persistence of the half-English Prince Henry "the Navigator," son of John the Great by his Queen, Philippa, daughter of "old John of Gaunt, time-honoured Lancaster."

Prince Henry's brother Pedro, with a suite of only twelve persons, set out on his travels in 1416 (the year after the battle of Agincourt), and visited Constantinople, Venice, Palestine, Hungary, Denmark; and last of all England, where his cousin King Henry VI made him a Knight of the Garter.

After twelve years he returned to Portugal, bringing back a Venetian MS of the travels of Marco Polo: of which in 1502 he published a Portuguese translation, illustrated with maps of the world, reputed to have been drawn by Marco Polo. From these maps Henry "the Navigator" may have been stimulated to the discoveries of Porto Santo in 1418 and Madeira in 1420; but both had previously figured in a map of 1351 as "*Isola de Leguame*" and "*Isole Deserte*"; and some of the Azores also were marked on that map; though whether their site was given at a venture or from actual knowledge Prince Henry could not find out. In 1431 he sent forth a fleet under Gonzalo Velho Cabral. When the expedition set sail from Villa de Sagres (Cape St. Vincent) he bade the Captain bear due west "toward the setting sun" until he came to an island.

On the tenth day, Cabral reached the group of rocks he named the Formigas; but although the island subsequently called St. Michael is only distant therefrom some 33 nautical miles, and another island was but 20 miles away, he could see no trace of land; so returned to Portugal. Prince Henry was not discouraged: and the next year, 1432, he provided Cabral with a larger fleet.

On the 15th of August, the Festival of the Assumption, the explorers found and landed upon an island: uninhabited, and thickly wooded. In honour of the day they baptised it Santa Maria. The first biographer of Prince Henry states that its position "*concordava com os seus antigos*

¹ W. F. Walker, F.R.G.S., "*The Azores*," (1886) p. 45. The larger Formigas were discovered in 1431 by Gonzalo Velho Cabral; as also was the other group which he called the Lesser Formigas. These last from 1788 onwards have been called Dollabarets after Captain P. Dollabarets. "During the fierce storms . . . not only the Dollabarets but the Formigas are buried in cataracts of foam. . . . It seems certain they have been the scene of frequent fatal wrecks" from which there have not been any survivors.

mappas": but does not particularise with which antique maps it tallies; possibly those brought from Venice by Dom Pedro.¹

When the Prince had conferred on Cabral the lordship of the new territory, about 27,000 (English) acres, the first step was to send a ship with cattle and other domestic animals. Some three years later, settlers from Portugal built their town; and subsequently a shipful of Flemings came, equipped by Prince Henry's only sister, the Infanta Isabel, wife of Philip III, Duke of Burgundy and Count of Flanders.²

The discovery of another island followed: christened São Miguel because found on the 29th of September, St. Michael and All Angels Day. In May 1444, Cabral founded a settlement, consisting of some of his own servants and of African slaves. But when on the 29th of September he returned with more colonists, the havoc wrought in the interval by an earthquake had altered the configuration of the land almost out of recognition. Nevertheless he refused to take the new colonists back to Portugal; and Villa Franca (the free town) was built under his auspices.

For 78 years there were no earthquakes of any consequence. By 1522 the inhabitants numbered 5000. That year, however, the "*deluvio de terra*" began again. It was accompanied by a tidal wave; and of the 5000 persons in Villa Franca all perished except seventy. Those that died swiftly were the least unfortunate; for of the survivors rescued from beneath the ruins some had been stricken dumb and others were mad from terror. The only one unconcerned was a little girl aged three, who was found playing with fragments of the debris, after both her parents had been buried alive.

For over a year the excavations were continued, so that the bodies of the victims might be interred with the rites of the Church.³ And extraordinary as it seems, the new town was erected on the place where the old one had been.

Scarcely were the houses habitable, before a plague swept across the island, killing both masters and slaves. In spite of many negroes then perishing, the coloured population eight years later outnumbered the white. Some of the Portuguese priests then said that the pestilence and other calamities had been drawn upon them by the presence of too many mulattoes and Arabs. Their remedy was a cruel massacre of the slaves. This blood-sacrifice did not produce the desired result; for in 1538 there ensued a submarine eruption, and in 1563, during June, July and August, another series of earthquakes.⁴

Though on the one hand such disasters, and the annual vehemence of the winter storms, were productive of horror, there was a persistent legend of an "*Undiscovered Island*" of magical peace and beauty; which had been marked on a map drawn at Weimar in 1424; also in Beccaria's map of 1435; and on Bianco's map of 1436. It was shown in 1455 and 1476 on maps by Bartolomeo Pareto and Andrea Benincassa; and reappeared on the globes of Martin Behaim, one of the discoverers of the Congo River.⁵

If the later idea of Prospero's island in Shakespeare's "*Tempest*" was suggested by the Azorean legend, such a derivation would be reasonable; for even the practical Spaniards sent an expedition with orders to discover and annex that elusive tenth Island. This search was made in 1591, the same year that Sir Richard Grenville fought his last fight, one ship against fifty-three, off Flores.

The quest for the Undiscovered Island was resumed at intervals; and even after the Portuguese in 1640 regained the Islands, the tradition continued to flourish. It lasted from the fifteenth century to the eighteenth; till in 1770 the Governor of the Azores not only forbade further expeditions, but prohibited any more talk about an Island which he officially pronounced to be fabulous.

¹ Three out of the nine Azores had been marked on a chart made by a Majorcan hydrographer as early as 1375. "*Insula de Brezi*" and "*Insula de Ventura*" were the names he had given to islands we now know as Terceira and S. Jorge. Pico and Fayal he rolled into one and called "*Columbis*." Map inscribed "*Gullmus Solerij civis Maioricarum me fecit anno Nat Domini MCCCCLXXXV*." Described in Walker's *Azores*, p. 18.

² For her portrait, see II. 4. 1. ante. ³ Walker's "*Azores*," pp. 53-54.

⁴ Op. cit. pp. 60-67. ⁵ Ib.

PART II.

“Particularly the Power of Spain.”

CHAPTER 5.

“OUR REALM SHALL BE HIS SANCTUARY.”

SECTION 3.

“Friendly to him and hostile to me.”

(*King Philip's protest against Queen Elizabeth's welcome to Don Antonio, 1581*).

“ . . . there is no treaty or League betwixt the Crown of England and the Crown of Spain for the Kingdom of Portugal, nor for any Isles . . . possessed by Portingale . . . Hereupon . . . her Majesty may permit Sir Francis Drake to serve the King Antonio, to maintain that (which) he possesseth, or to recover any things taken from him whereof he was as a King possessed.”

Lord Burghley's hitherto unknown “*Articles to be considered. . . . the Voyage of Sr Francis Drake to serve Don Antonio King of Portugal.*”
21 Aug. 1581. First published II. 5. 2. ante.

“ . . . hearing that Don Antonio has not only had free access to England, but has been received by your Majesty otherwise than I had hoped, and finding all factors around your Majesty friendly to him and hostile to me . . . I beg . . . your Majesty will take steps immediately to have Don Antonio handed over to me. . . .

If your Serenity will not grant this request . . . know then for whatsoever destination in Our Dominions Don Antonio may depart from your Kingdom, with hostile mind towards us . . . with whatsoever aids to warfare . . . I shall comprehend war to have been declared upon me by your Majesty . . . ”

Philip King of Spain to Queen Elizabeth.
Lisbon, 23 Aug: 1581. (Orig: S.P. Spain, 1. 73).

“She again replied that she had been the first offended . . .

After I had taken my leave and was two paces away from her, I heard her say, . . . ‘Would to God each one had his own and was at peace.’ ”

Don Bernardino de Mendoza to King Philip II.
20 (Oct: 1581). Paris Arch: K. 1447. 93.

KING PHILIP II:

From the original by Pantojo de la Cruz:

now in the Prado, Madrid.

(Photograph : Moreno).

This picture is not unfamiliar in modern England, having been reproduced, on a small scale, to illustrate events of 1596-98, under the name of "Philip of Spain in old age."

But according to the authorities at the Prado, it represents King Philip when not more than fifty-five, and it was not painted later than 1582.

A portrait of Philip II in actual old age, showing signs of weariness and declining health, will be reproduced in the present work in the section treating of this King's last years.



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(*King Philip's protest against Queen Elizabeth's welcome to Dom Antonio, 1581*).

ON the 26th July, 1581, the States General of the United Provinces issued a Declaration recapitulating their reasons for thinking themselves justified in “disallowing” the authority of the King of Spain. It is now the fashion to refer to their “republican” temper. No such theory appears in their own words. Against Monarchy they made no complaint; rather they praised their late ruler the Emperor “Charles V of glorious memory”; and acclaimed Princes as “constituted by God.” Their argument was that as King Philip had failed to defend their ancient privileges and customs, he was no longer a “true Prince” and faithful shepherd, but an oppressor. Having striven in vain to “soften” his “tyrannical proceedings,” they were driven to remonstrance: especially objecting to being governed by Spaniards instead of Dutch. Above all they had protested against “*the Spanish Inquisition which has been always as dreadful and detested in these Provinces as the worst of slavery*”; insomuch as the late Emperor Charles “having once before proposed it to these States, . . . did desist,” thereby showing his “great affection for his subjects.” But King Philip, (in 1565) after lulling them by “fair words,” had refused to act on the remonstrances of the “principal Lords” and particular towns; and had forced upon them instead the decrees of the Council of Trent, “*which in many articles are destructive of the privileges of the country.*”

Until then, his Dutch subjects had always borne him good will. It was when he sought “not only to tyrannise over their persons and estates, but also over their consciences,” that some of the “*chief nobility, in compassion of the poor people*” made a petition (in 1566) that it would please His Majesty to modify the “rigorous Inquisition,” especially to abolish “capital punishment for matters of religion.”

When these nobles went as Ambassadors to Spain, the King refused to see them. All who had been concerned in the remonstrance were declared "rebels and guilty of high treason," and to be punished with death and confiscation of their estates; and the King "did soon after imprison and put to death" the Lords Ambassador "and confiscated their estates, contrary to the law of nations." It was this which had driven so many of all ranks into rebellion.

This Declaration of 1581 repeats the former protest of the Prince of Orange (1568) against the Governor Generalship of the Netherlands having been given to the Duke of Alba, "*a stranger and no way related to the royal family.*"¹ Though at the time the Duke had deliberately drawn on himself the full brunt of the indignation which otherwise would have been concentrated on the King,² by 1581 it had been realised where the responsibility rested. Hence this renunciation of allegiance.

King Philip's letters to Queen Elizabeth should be read with a lively recollection of these circumstances: and of the belief, on England's part, that France should make use of this further opportunity; so that Queen Elizabeth, William of Orange, and "the King of Portingale," could severally and jointly trouble the pride and power of Spain.

At this time King Philip had been sending Mendoza three alternative letters to Queen Elizabeth, demanding her surrender of "Don Antonio," in various gradations of affability or menace: leaving it to the Ambassador which to use. Mendoza selected the letter dated 14th of August, which, however, he did not hand to Her Majesty until the 20th of October. Hitherto unknown to English readers, we will now take it from the original.³ Rendered from Latin into the vulgar tongue it runs thus:

"Philip by the grace of God King of Spain, the Two Sicilies, Jerusalem, &c.; Archduke of Austria, Duke of Burgundy, Brabant, &c., Count of Hapsburg, Count of Flanders and Tyrol, &c., &c., to the most Serene Princess The Lady Elizabeth, Queen of England, France, Ireland, our most beloved Sister and Kinswoman, health and every blessing.

"Most serene Queen, Our most beloved Sister and kinswoman:

"The Treaties which have been made between Our Ancestors, both mine and those of your Serenity, demonstrated thus not only their mutual good will at the time, but also showed as it were the way of hereditary love for their descendants justly to tread; and so they took sufficient and excellent counsel providently for the future safety, tranquillity, peace and security of their respective Kingdoms."

¹ Declaration. Reprinted Lord Somers' *Tracts*, 1809. Vol. I. pp. 325-326.

² II. i. i. ante.

³ Signed "*Philippus.*" Countersigned "Jo: Idiaq" (Juan Idiaquez). Its whereabouts seem not to have been known to the editor of the *Cal: S.P. Spanish* (Martin Hume) in which Mendoza's description of his audience was printed, 1896: nor to the editor of the *Cal: S.P. Foreign*, which includes King Philip's later letter referring to this his previous communication as "full of love and confidence" This letter was sought in vain among Hatfield and Lansdowne MSS, but is found at last (Cotton MSS, C VII. f. 142) by the aid of the Visconde de la Figanère's "*Catalogo dos Manuscritos Portuguezes . . . Do Museum Britannico,*" (1853) (B.M. Circle 87a) which includes also MSS in other tongues bearing on Portuguese affairs.

(From Philip II, the words "peace" and "tranquillity" were often used when he was meditating their opposites).

"By reason of that kindly condition of affairs above noticed, since I learn that Don Antonio has fled to and arrived in your Serenity's Kingdom I address your Serenity, beseeching you, . . . both by the strength of the Treaties alluded to, and by the argument of our present friendship, that *you should take measures either to have Don Antonio handed over into the keeping of our servants immediately; or at least, within the month specified by treaty in similar cases, you should entirely interdict your Serenity's realms to him, and likewise to all the rest of our rebels who follow that same rebel: no assistance being given on any pretext either in your own name or by the hands of deputies.*

"If your Serenity shall do this, in the spirit of justice and order, you will render me so indebted to you that I promise you will never regret this kindness conferred upon me: as your Serenity will learn in more detail from Bernadino Mendoza our orator, in whom you may have as complete confidence in all things which he may set forth in my name, as though I were myself present.

"May God, Best and Greatest, keep your Serenity safe. Given at Lisbon, this 14th August, 1581.

Your Serenity's good Brother and Kinsman,

PHILIP."

King Philip was aware that even assuming the Queen might think it expedient to accept him as "successor" to the Crown of Portugal, *if she held to the letter of previous English treaties with that Kingdom there was not in any of them any clause by which she was bound to surrender to the rulers of Portugal such fugitives as might seek refuge in England.*

But for her to have taken a stand upon the Portuguese treaties would have appeared like admitting King Philip as the legal inheritor of that realm; so we shall find Burghley representing her as refusing to discuss with the King of Spain any Portuguese matter whatsoever: in that the treaties between his and her parents, which he had himself invoked, contained no reference to the Portuguese Empire: wherefore King Philip could not lawfully claim any right to dictate to the Queen of England on matters Portuguese. Furthermore, King Antonio, never having taken any oath of allegiance to Spain, could not "in common reason" come under the designation of a rebel.¹

Whereas it was King Philip's method to be exceedingly polite when his case was not logically perfect, Don Bernardino de Mendoza had discovered that the way to agitate and disconcert Queen Elizabeth was to bully her. That he performed in the most overbearing fashion his errand of delivering the letter his own description shows.

She was then at Richmond Palace, and when Mendoza was shown in, he found her seated "under a canopy" attended only by two of her Councillors, the Lord High Admiral (Edward Earl of Lincoln) and the Lord Chamberlain (her cousin Lord Hunsdon).² She received the Ambassador coldly, but asked for his

¹ Hatfield MSS. Lord Burghley's instructions, cit. ante p. 84. Also Cotton MS. Vesp. C VII, f. 412. (Unpublished).

² "Lord Chamberlain" is the phrase. If "Lord Great Chamberlain" it would have been the Earl of Oxford.

master's communication; which she read, and upon which he says she commented "with much hectoring vociferation" to the effect that if she had helped Dom Antonio, the Spanish fleets "would not be where they are now, and perhaps Portugal would not be so quiet." "She said that your Majesty referred her to me, . . . and asked me what I had to say?"

Mendoza, who was scornful of Queen Elizabeth when she was gentle or complimentary, but resentful when she showed any spirit, proceeds thus with his story:

"Seeing her rudeness, I replied that as to the fleets" it was easier to "talk than to do; *as your Majesty's fleets were all so well prepared that no matter how large and powerful were those that might go against them, the assailants would return well trounced.*"

"With regard to Don Antonio, I said that not only had she helped him with munitions, troops, arms and money," but this had been done "so publicly that all could see it; and in addition to her welcome (and) hospitality to Don Antonio, whom she had dubbed '*King*' in England, the ships he had brought here had sailed down the river with arms and munitions from the Tower, and had actually passed her own windows at Greenwich covered with pennants of the arms of Portugal."

To this, the obvious retort would have been that not Queen Elizabeth but the three Estates of Portugal had "dubbed" Dom Antonio King, and that England received him accordingly. Mendoza seems to have given her no time to answer, but poured out a succession of accusations, culminating in the assertion that she could not have done more against Spain "if she had openly declared war." (This is hardly consistent with his contention at the beginning that even if she had sent her fleets to Portugal they would have been powerless to prevail. That it was the Spanish invasion of Ireland which had kept those fleets in the Narrow Seas the previous autumn he persistently ignored.) Although Mendoza complains to his master of the "terrible insolence" of Queen Elizabeth's reply, it may appear polite compared with his language to her.

"*With respect to Don Antonio, she answered that she had helped him and would still do so; and as for the other things she neither knew nor understood anything about them . . . as I saw her evil intent, I replied that I had been here for more than three years and a half, and had been constantly telling her about these things,*"—Drake's enterprise and such like—and as she alleged she had not heard of them "it would be necessary to see whether Cannons would not make her hear them better."

She told Mendoza that he "need not think to threaten and frighten her," and that if he so attempted he should be put "into a place where I could not say a word. This she said without any passion . . . speaking very low. . . ."

Mendoza conjectured she had been "instructed what to say." She ordered him in future to communicate his business not to her but to her Council, as "*she had no Ambassador in Spain.*"

This conversation was out of earshot of Lincoln and Hunsdon; but the Queen

next called them up, and repeated to them the threat about the cannons, adding that it was useless to try to alarm her.

"I smiled to hear her relate this with so much fury . . ." writes Mendoza; "and replied that I would not waste time on that point, as I well knew that Monarchs were never afraid of private individuals; and above all she, who was a Lady, *and so beautiful that even lions would crouch before her. She is so vain and flighty that her anger was at once soothed.* . ."

Nevertheless she reminded him how the previous Spanish Ambassador had been dismissed by her, for endeavouring to raise rebellions among her people. She also accused Mendoza of plotting the death of King Antonio. Protesting that he had been a soldier accustomed to slay in fair fight, he added that he "was not desirous of doing Don Antonio so great a favour as to shorten a life the folly of which would be its own greatest punishment. . ."

Though this speech had no influence at the time, our later English historians have echoed Mendoza's tone and manner, without investigating the circumstances. Scoffing at Queen Elizabeth's aid to Dom Antonio—without allowing the elected King of Portugal to speak for himself,—merely means that it has been easier to skim the printed letters of Mendoza in the English translation of the Spanish State Papers, issued in 1896, than to seek and bring together the large variety of manuscripts in Latin, Italian, Portuguese, Spanish, and French, from which the story can be adequately unfolded across a period of fifteen years.

While recognising that it had been the Duke of Alba's duty to obey the orders of his Sovereign, and to conquer Portugal, and that Mendoza's detestation of King Antonio was perfectly natural, no English critic should imagine that Queen Elizabeth can be fairly estimated through opinions entertained towards her by Spaniards who intended to unseat her. The Great Duke's principles towards the heretic Queen are sufficiently demonstrated in a statue of himself slaying the hydra, of which Her Majesty appears as one of the three heads;¹ and Don Bernadino's animus is evident in all of his letters. The wonder is not that Queen Elizabeth at last expelled Mendoza from England, but that this did not happen sooner.

On the occasion of presenting King Philip's letter, the lengthy discussion ended by Mendoza's demand that Drake's spoils should be returned; otherwise the King of Spain would "order the seizure of all English goods" in his dominions. "*She again replied that she had been the first offended, and should be the first to receive satisfaction.*"

We have seen how, earlier in the conversation she had commanded him to do business in future not with her but with her Council. But Mendoza, on leaving her presence, endeavoured to make this appear as his own choice, so that the English courtiers might infer it was he who "refused to have audience again."

¹ Vide picture of this statue in the present Duke of Berwick and Alba's "*estudio de la persona de Don Fernando Alvarez de Toledo, III Duque de Alba.*" Madrid, 1919. (Facing p. 76.)

"After I had taken my leave, and was two paces away from her, I heard her say with a great sigh *"Would to God that each one had his own and was at peace."*"

Before King Philip in Lisbon had time to hear the result of his letter of remonstrance of the 14th of August, he addressed another to "*Seren^{mae} Principi Do^e Elizabeth Angliae Franciae et Hiberniae Reginae, sorori et consanguineae nostrae Char^{mae}*." Dated from Lisbon ("*Lissabonae*") 23rd of August, 1581, it is a masterpiece of injured innocence. But Burghley knew "the Leviathan of Spain," and, holding ample proofs of his hostile intentions, could measure his expressions of devotion to peace at their real value. In the Latin customary between Princes, His Majesty begins:

"Philippus Dei Gratia Hispaniarum, Utriusque Siciliae Hierusalem etcetera Rex: Archidux Austriae, Dux Burgundiae Brabantiae et Mediolani, Comes Habsburgi, Flandriae et Tirolis et(cetera)." He opens with reference to his previous communication, "full of love and confidence" and hopes that complete satisfaction will be given him by his dear sister, in that "nothing more agreeable" can befall him than to have further experience of her reciprocal affection.

*"But meantime, hearing that Don Antonio has not only had free access to England, but has been received by your Majesty otherwise than I had hoped,—and also that a fleet is being fitted out for him, and he being aided with men, arms, provisions and money: finding all factors around your Majesty friendly to him and hostile to me, I cannot but expostulate."*³

Assuring her that his original "good will" is not yet extinguished, though severely wounded, he demands that she shall cease countenancing his enemies.

"I beg therefore, as I have done before, that Your Majesty will take steps immediately to have Don Antonio handed over to me. If your Majesty will accede to this request no man shall surpass me in gratitude. If not, I must at least demand that he, with other rebels, shall be expelled from your Dominions with the least possible delay."

She is admonished that the public peace and her relationship to King Philip,—and the loyal observance of treaties between their respective realms,—make such an action on her part obligatory.⁴ In reading this last sentence Queen

¹ "*Volesse a Iddio che ognuno il suo, e fosse in pace.*" Paris Arch: K. 1447.93. Cal: S.P. S. III. pp. 202-3.

² from Orig: $\frac{3}{4}$ sheet. S.P. Spain. I. 73. Not holograph. Signed by the King, and by "*Jo. Idiaquez*" (Don Juan Idiaques, of whom we shall hear again). Endorsed "*23 August 1581. To hir Matie from ye K of Spayne.*"

Cal: S.P. For: 1581-82, (No. 314) p. 229 gives a slightly abbreviated version printed in modern English, omitting ceremonious forms and titles, etc. (but without asterisks).

³ "*Interim vero cum Don Antonio non solum liberum aditum in Anglia patuisse sciam, sed a Serenitate Vestra aliter quam sperabam exceptum, tum et eidem classem instrui, ipsum viris, armis, com meatibus, atque pecunia iuvari, sibi que amica omnia apud Serenitatem vestram mihi hostilia experiri, facere nullo modo potui nisi cum Serenitate vestra de his omnibus expostularem.*"

⁴ "*Debet id Sertas Vestra et publicae quieti et paternitati nostrae, et regnorum nostrorum conjunctioni, et foederum incorruptae observantiae.*"

Elizabeth cannot but have recalled her dismissal of the Spanish Ambassador from London in December 1571, in consequence of King Philip's secret project to purchase Hawkins and contrive the invasion of England.¹

The art of ignoring what is awkward to remember is an established convention of diplomacy: and the King continued,

"If your Majesty will not grant this request, and it is again your pleasure to abuse Our often-injured patience, *know then that for whatsoever destination in Our Dominions Don Antonio may depart from your kingdom, with hostile mind towards Us and towards Our subjects,—with whatsoever aids to warfare, and on no matter what pretext supplied,—I shall comprehend war to have been declared upon me by your Majesty, though most undeservedly.*"

By "Our Dominions" King Philip meant inclusively Portugal,—and the Azores (which he had not yet been able to subjugate). The phrase covered likewise Brazil and the East Indies, also Ceuta, and Tangier, and other parts of the Portuguese Empire to which he had announced himself "lineal heir."

He asserts that in the event of the Queen of England taking upon herself to molest him, it must be clear to the world that he on his part never failed in loyalty, nor in desire for preservation of amity. And finally, if or when "*peace so often shaken by your Majesty is broken at last, I shall not lack force to meet the consequences. . .*"

For all else he refers her to his Ambassador.²

If in reading King Philip's two letters we had no other matter to enlighten us than a map of Queen Elizabeth's small kingdom contrasted with King Philip's world-wide Empire, we might suppose that England would perforce have withdrawn support from the fugitive Portuguese; instead of which we shall find Burghley throughout the next fourteen years holding unwaveringly to his original contention that as the existing treaties of England with Spain had never included Portugal, Queen Elizabeth was free to pursue what policy she pleased in that connection.

That Dom Antonio's prospects were viewed favourably by Englishmen appears from many indications: not least a letter of Sir Thomas Leighton to Leicester from "Guernsey this the 20th August 1581":

"I most humbly thank your good Lordship for my very good sport which I received by your Lordship's order . . . in the New Forest, where I was for your Lordship's sake very honourably used and saw a very goodly game: And now I thank God arrived here in my little

¹ II. i. 6. ante.

² "*De his omnibus et (si quae erunt) reliquis meo nomine Bernardino a Mendoza disserenti integram fidem habebit Serenitas vestra. Quam Deus Opt. Max. seruet incolumem.*"

Dat. Lissabonae die 23 Augusti MDLXXXJ.

Sertis vestrae bonus frater et consanguineus."

In the Calendar this last paragraph is abbreviated to "For the rest credit Bernardino de Mendoza. Lisbon, 23 Aug. Signed *Philippus*, and below *I. Idiaquez*. Add. End^d. Lat. $\frac{2}{3}$ sheet." Cal: S.P.F. 1581-2. No. 314.

government where I rest greatly at your Lordship's devotion, and do humbly beseech you to *favour the disposition of King Don Anthony his coming hither, with the traffic of his subjects, the which would bring a great benefut both to me and these Isles: which good, if we may receive by your Lordship's goodness, ye are not like to find us unthankful.*"¹

In France Dom Antonio continued making such steady efforts to raise troops that our Ambassador Sir Henry Cobham thought it necessary, "for the better satisfaction of her Majesty," to visit him and learn his intentions direct. After the "ordinary compliments" had been uttered, Dom Antonio told Cobham "that he was well satisfied with her Majesty's good demonstrations; but otherwise he lamented to me the evil expenses of above 30,000 crowns . . . employed in the preparation of a Navy which was not suffered in the end to do him service." But he doubted not that "otherwise the English nation" would stand by the Portuguese.

Learning that he had sent to England "for his diamond," Cobham then understood that the French King had given him commissions "to gather men of war; . . . he meant, as he said to me, for to levy 7000 at his own expenses, or 7500, which he intendeth shall be commanded only by Monsieur Strozso and the young Count of Brissac. The King giveth him license to embark when he thinketh good;" and to take up ships for transport. Moreover King Henry had given him 8 cannons, with other pieces of artillery; "also munition and powder, suffering him for his money to make any provisions for the enterprise. Lastly the King hath written to Mareschall Matignon to assist D. Antonio in all his preparations" as if it had been for his Most Christian Majesty's own service.

More remarkable still, the Queen Mother "promiseth to pay 3000 souldiers, and disburseth . . . at this instant 15,000 Cro(wns) . . ."²

With sufficient means thus in hand, Dom Antonio expected to levy 3000 German mercenaries, and "to embarke 200 French horsemen." But Cobham doubted if he would be able to raise so many.

Actually Dom Antonio was to have English men and ships among the forces embarking under Philip Strozzi the next summer for the Azores. And the events ensuing will show how much wiser Queen Elizabeth would have been to let Drake sail, when Burghley and Walsingham so advised, in August 1581: instead of giving the King of Spain another eleven months for further preparations. Not Philip of Spain but Elizabeth of England was the "procrastinator." But her delays on this occasion were mainly due to the skilled machinations of the Spanish Ambassador, Don Bernardino de Mendoza.

¹ "To the right honourable my very good Lord the erle of Leicester." Spelling modernised from copy in the Bailiff's Room, Guernsey, Hist: MSS. Vol. IV; supplied by Miss Carey of Mesnil Carye, Guernsey.

Leighton asks for "a goshawk or a 'tersoll'" (tiercel) "to kill my pheasants whereof I have innumerable store here." "If it please your Lordship to deliver a hawk to my wife she will send her to me." He also asks for a stag and a couple of tame hinds.

² "From Parys the 22 of Nov. Yr honors humble to command Henry Cobham." S.P. France. VI. 64.

NOTE: "THE JEWELL SO GREAT AND ROIALL." (1581).

When Sir Henry Cobham wrote from Paris, 22nd November, 1581, of hearing that King Antonio had "sent for his diamant" the reference was to the same "Jewell so great and roiall" to which numerous allusions have been in print since the 17th century in "*Cabala*," and "*Scrinia Ceciliana*."

Lord Burghley's unpublished letter to the Queen on the subject is not dated: but seems to apply to the circumstances directly prior to the abandonment of the great expedition to the Azores. In view of the change of plans, Burghley in his "*Considerations*" of August 23rd had noted that unless King Antonio is to be well aided, his diamond should be given back to him. The ensuing letter therefore may be conjecturally dated July:

"My Lord of Leicester coming to me, moved me in your Majesty's name to know my opinion for the Great Diamond now in gage in his custody, for the money which certain merchants of London lent to Don Antonio for the which the merchants do daily call for payment. And surely in my opinion, *considering the value of the jewel is so great and royal*, and that there is also due to your Majesty about three thousand pounds¹ for the which you have but a bond in writing, *I think your Majesty might by taking the Jewel into your hands both provide safely for your own money, and of your princely goodness relieve the merchants: who for their loyal duty to your Majesty and for no other cause, did lend the same*: and so your Majesty might have a better gage than you have for many great sums due to you. And though I like not of lending your money, finding the repayments so slow, yet by this act your Majesty hath in possession [the wherewithal] to pay yourself, in such sort as when you deliver ready money for bullion to lie in store.

"Thus I am bold to scribble to your Majesty for my Lord of Leicester so told me that I should do.

Your Majesty's most humble subj(ect)

private bed(es)man

W. BURGHLEY."²

¹ iij^m.l.

² Spelling modernised supra from holog: Cotton MS. Nero B.1. f. 246.

The abbreviated words at the end are not easy to read. Presumably he was suffering from gout; for he adds in the margin "My evill legg maketh my wryting—yt was allweiss nought—now worse than nought."

In this private and informal communication to the Sovereign the refugee is called merely "Don Antonio." But in all Burghley's references to him when addressing any one of lesser rank, or for official purposes, he is "Don Antonio King of Portyngale."



Memorial print of Father Edmund Campion, S.J. By J. M. Lerch.

(Line, $5\frac{1}{4}$ by $3\frac{1}{2}$).

(B.M. No. 1863. 2. 14. 485.)

There exists a print by J. Neefs (line, $10\frac{1}{2}$ x $6\frac{5}{8}$). Standing, with cord round neck, and knife in breast. Inscribed "P. Edmondus Campianus vande Societeyt Jesu ghehanghen ende gheverieren deelt voor het ghelghof binnen London." A poor copy was issued in 1819, published in "A Collection of Portraits to illustrate Granger's Biographical History of England," Vol. I.

The B.M. also possesses a 17th century anonymous print; standing, with nimbus; holding palm and flaming heart.

Inscribed "Defecit caro mea et cor meum: Deus cordis mei et pars mea, Deus, in aeternum, Psal. lxxii": and "B. Edmund Campianus, societe Jesu, martyrio affectus. Londini, An. MDLXXX" (wrong year). This last bears scant resemblance to the other three, and is more symbolic than actual.

APPENDIX A.

"PRO FIDE": FATHER EDMUND CAMPION, S.J. 1580-1581.¹

While the Catholic Dom Antonio was looking to the Protestant Queen of England for assistance against Spain, and Queen Elizabeth's marriage with a "Popish" French Prince was being discussed both by enemies and friends, the invasion of Ireland by "the Pope's men" had inevitably resulted in an increase of severity against English Catholics. In the Parliament of 1580-81, it was considered anew not only how to defend the Queen from foreign foes but from such of her own subjects as obeyed literally the Bull of Pope Pius V dispensing them from their allegiance to Elizabeth the "pretended Queen." Among significant events of 1581 ("An. Reg. 23") was the trial, on 18th July, of "Everard Hance, alias Duckett, a seminarie priest," who maintained that "*England was subject to the Pope in ecclesiastical causes, and that the Pope hath now the same authoritie here in England that he had an hundred years past, and which he now hath at Rome, . . .*" for which the prisoner was "condemned to be drawne, hanged, and quartered; and was executed accordingly. . . ."²

As under the 1st Statute, 1st Elizabeth, (1558-9) all foreign jurisdiction was forbidden in England, the Pope's abolition of Queen Elizabeth's authority (1569-70) had been intended as an effectual counterblast: instead of which, as King Philip foresaw, it failed of its main purpose, and put English Catholics in a terrible dilemma.

During the visit of Queen Elizabeth's French suitor, though a citizen of London (Thomas Butcher) was sentenced to whipping and banishment for defacing the statue of the Virgin Mary on Cheapside Cross,³ Catholics were languishing in prison, or making from scaffolds their final orations to the people, while the executioner stood waiting to seal their testimonies with their blood. Of those who, "*come rack, come rope,*" strove for the "conversion of England," Father Edmund Campion of the Society of Jesus was especially ardent. Of an eager and gracious disposition, his charm appears not only through praises from his brethren, who might from *esprit de corps* be tempted to over-estimate his influence. His adversaries

¹ The facts ensuing are not new to Catholics; but the case for the Crown—as given by Holinshed, 1587, ed: 1808: Vol. IV, pp. 447-532,—seems not to have been studied hitherto in conjunction with the privately printed Publications of the Catholic Records Society. For the loan of these last, and permission to quote from them, thanks are due to Mr. R. Cecil Wilton, B.A., Secretary to the Society. Of special interest are "*Certain Notes of Memory concerning the first entrance of y^e fathers y^e Soc. of Jesus into England . . .*," being Fr. Parsons' Mem: III, in C.R.S. *Miscellanea*, Vol. II (1906). See especially pp. 195, 198, 200. In Vol. IV, lb, 1907, see (with translation) "*Punti della Missione d'Inghilterra L'anno 1581. Copiato dall' originale dettato e in parte scritto dal P. Personio,*" Stoneyhurst MS. Collectanea P.; Ed: Rev. J. H. Pollen, S.J. Sec: 14-17, pp. 15-17. And Vol. V (1908) "*Unpublished Documents relating to the English Martyrs, Vol. I, 1584-1604. Collected and edited by John Hungerford Pollen, S.J.,*" espec: pp. 27, 44, 60, 113, 115, 160, 205. And C.R.S. *Miscell*: Vol. I (1905) pp. 111-112, references to "Fr. Parsons and Fr. Campion coming into England"; and how Fr. Parsons, having met "in France or Spain an Englishman called Mr. Robert Heighinson who had been in rebellion with the northern earls," got this man to help him to draw up "*a pedigree of all the Competitors to the Crown of England.*" This pedigree (found elsewhere) will be reproduced in facsimile in a later volume of "*Elizabethan England.*"

² 31 July. Holinshed, IV, p. 446. Also C. R. S. *Miscell*: IV, p. 19.

³ Holinshed, IV, p. 446.

also refer to him as of "prompt and ingenious wit," having won "a marvellous goodlie report" for "great wisdom and learning." Rumour in 1581 alleged that "his like was not to be found either for life, learning, or anie other qualitie that might beautifie a man."¹ We may remember his meeting with Philip Sidney in Bohemia. Campion was still at Prague when summoned in 1580 to Rome. It was afterwards said that a premonition of his fate moved a Spanish priest, "confessor to the Emperor," to go to "*F. Campians chamber door*" and write above it "*Campionus Martyr, whereof all men did wonder. . .*"² But the Penal Laws of England being what they then were, it needed no gift of prophecy to foretell that if a Jesuit were discovered going into Queen Elizabeth's dominions, his survival was unlikely. Therefore, when he arrived at Rome in Holy Week, and thence went to "Cardinal Boromeus" (Saint Charles Borromeo) at Milan, the danger and solemnity of the "enterprise for England," in which he and Father Parsons, S.J. were associated, must have been vividly felt by both. Travelling via Turin to Geneva, they were curious to see "Theodorus Beza y^e successor of John Calvin." He and his wife welcomed them cordially, being "very glad" to meet Englishmen. But when a dispute arose as to theology, Beza was startled that "a servant in buckram" joined in the controversy, speaking "so good Latin" as to be incongruous with his station. This "Patrick," in attendance on Father Parsons, was Campion in disguise.

After visiting Rheims, they embarked from Calais; Campion transformed into "a merchant" and Parsons figuring as "a captain returned from the low-countries." In that guise they landed at Dover, and most daringly went up to London "in ye tilt-boat" (query vlieboat) "*by night amongst the Queen's musicians returned from Kent.*"³

The "northern parts" being the most Catholic, Father Campion made Lancaster his centre of activities; and if he had there remained, he might have escaped detection. But he was anxious to find a printer for his book "*Decem Rationes reddite Academicis*": no easy matter, as it had to be published in secret; when the fate of the author and printer of the "*Gaping Gulf*" was still vivid in many men's minds. Campion sent the book to London to Father Parsons; who found the margins so loaded with quotations that he considered successful printing only possible under Campion's own superintendence.⁴ From London the private press was moved to "the house of a widow named Stonor, which stood in the middle of a wood twenty miles from London."⁵ This business carried out, he took the road into Norfolk; little suspecting that the "bookseller's servant," who had bound the volumes, had put the Privy Council on his track. Campion had not long been gone when Stonor Lodge was searched; and then Justices of the Peace in Norfolk were ordered to look for him. He might have escaped to the north, had he not been called back to Lyford Grange to preach anew to converts from Oxford. Twice the house was searched, and the Queen's officers departed. But before Campion and his associates could get away, one Eliot, a relapsed Catholic, turned informer; and on the third search they were discovered. As it was against the law for any Jesuit to come into England, Campion can have had scant hope of life; but when taken away under a "strong guard of soldiers" he showed his patience and "contentment to suffer," even when

¹ Holinshed, IV. p. 443.

² Fr. Parsons' Memoirs. C. R. S. *Miscell.*: Vol. II. p. 195.

³ Fr. Parsons' Mem.: C. R. S. *Miscell.*: II. pp. 195, 198, 200.

⁴ The title is given with slight variations. In "*Domesticall Difficulties*," C. R. S. II. p. 182, it is described by Father Parsons how "nere to Henley upon Thames in the house of Lady Stonor" Campion "came out of Lancashire to print his booke, in Latin, called *Decem rationes ad Academicos*." See E.E., Bibliog.: Note, p. 140.

⁵ Fr. P. C. R. S. IV. pp. 15-17. And see "*The Month*," July 1889, and Jan'y, 1905.

brought into London to the Tower with an inscription over him "*Campion the Seditious Jesuit.*"¹

Father Parsons (presumably still disguised as a Captain from the Netherlands) remained in safety; and contrived to send a messenger to the Ambassador of the Duc d'Alençon at the Court, asking that the Duke should intercede with Queen Elizabeth for the Catholic prisoners. But he was told that the Duke's coming to England was "*not to treat of religious matters but of matrimony.*" (The English Catholics afterwards cited it as a judgment on the Duke that the match did not materialise.) "On the one hand, . . . banquets, balls, masquerades" with the French visitors; on the other, the interrogation and torture of priests in the Tower: the prisoners feeling it hard that the French showed no concern for their sad plight.²

Campion's courage and constancy under torture, and his steady refusal to incriminate others, were in the spirit of an age when masculinity and valour were synonymous, not only among men of action like the seamen and gunners of Captain John Hawkins, but in sensitive and contemplative scholars whose sustained endurance also came of deep conviction.

Arraigned at Westminster, 20th of November, the indictment was that the accused, having forgotten their "love and dutie" to England,

"forsooke their native countrie to live beyond the seas, under the Pope's obedience, as at Rome, Rheimes," and elsewhere.³ Also that the Pope "having with other princes practised the *death and deprivation*" of Queen Elizabeth, and subversion of her throne, they, the prisoners, having vowed allegiance to the Pope, were "*sent over with intent to seduce the hearts of hir Majesties loving subjects, and to conspire and practise hir grace's death.* . . ."

They denied the latter charge; whereon Pope Pius's Bull was recited to them, with its consequences upon England and Ireland. To which Campion protested, "*Let not other men's offences be laid to our charge. . . . Some of us were but novices here in the universities, and were altogether ignorant of these matters.*"³ In face of all accusations, he maintained that he and his fellows came into England only "*for the saving of souls, which meere love and conscience compelled us to do.* . . ."⁴

" . . . We, which enter into that Blessed societie of the Iesuites, . . . vowing ourselves to chastetic and sinceritic of conscience, [swear] to obeie our superiours, and to be readie to go whither they shall appoint us. If they send us to the Indies, . . . we are bound by conscience to go. . . . [But] shall it be said we come [to England] for the destruction of the prince and countrie. . . . ?"⁵

The judges considered it could hardly be said otherwise, when the "prince" was Elizabeth, and the pronouncement from Rome had been that she was not the lawful ruler. When Campion, paradoxically, protested that he regarded her as his Sovereign, it was answered that by the laws of his Order he was compelled to act against her, as the Pope commanded. Also

¹ Fr. P. Mem: C. R. S. IV. pp. 19, 23. According to Dom Bede Camm, Stonor Lodge was searched 15 July; Campion arrested at Lyford Grange, 17th July; and imprisoned in the Tower 22 July. ("*English Martyrs*," II., p. 338.) There is no date to the P.R.O. list of "The Names of Certayne Papists and the Places where they are committed," S. P. Dom: Eliz: cxlix, 83, in which "Edmond Campion" is one of many.

² C. R. S. Vol. IV. p. 25.

³ Father Parsons calls these accusations *frivole e impertinenti*, C.R.S. Vol. IV. pp. 32-33. But he is not explicit enough as to the graver charges ensuing.

⁴ Holinshed. p. 448.

⁵ Ib. p. 451.

that Her Majesty's Council were aware of a recent plot for taking her life, of which they held "manifest proofs."

The same sentence of death for High Treason was passed upon the Jesuit and his associates as in Queen Mary's day had been pronounced upon many laymen for rebellion against the Spanish marriage: namely, to be hanged, cut down alive, and mutilated while still conscious; then their heads cut off, and their bodies quartered, "to be disposed according to her majesties pleasure; and the Lord God to receive their souls to his mercie."

Campion and two seminary priests with him were taken back from Westminster to the Tower by boat. The next day, seven others were tried; and all except one condemned.

On the 1st December, Campion and the two other priests were brought on hurdles from the Tower to the place of execution (Tyburn); and were permitted to speak to the people. Several of the Privy Council were present, and a "sufficient companie" and guard. Holinshed relates that after "a phrase or two in Latine," Campion said in English, "I am here brought as a Spectacle before the face of God, of angelles, and of men. . . . to die as becommeth a true Christian and Catholike man. As for the treasons that have been laid to my charge, . . . I am altogether innocent."

One of the Councillors objected that the charges were proved or Campion would not be about to suffer: whereon he answered, "Well my Lord, I am a Catholic man, a priest, . . . and if you esteem my religion treason, then of force I must grant [it] unto you:" but not otherwise.¹ He again protested his loyalty to Queen Elizabeth as his "lawful Princess." There was next read aloud to him a recapitulation of the Catholic intention for "*invasion by foreign enemies and by raising of inward war within the realm.*"²

Campion then said his Pater Noster in Latin; and when asked by a Protestant preacher to express penitence, he answered, "You and I are not of one religion." But he again expressed loyalty to the Queen, and "desired that she might long live and reign over us." To many of his hearers, this seemed most audacious, considering the Pope's fiat to the contrary.³ But Lord Howard of Effingham, the Queen's near kinsman, was so touched and convinced that he altered the order to the executioner; and the sentence was so far mitigated that Father Campion was not mutilated living, but "hanged till he was dead."⁴ The same mercy was extended to the others. Howard is said (by Father Parsons) to have told the Queen how the condemned men "prayed God for your Majesty, . . . and protested under pain of eternal perdition . . . that they had never conspired against the commonwealth or against your Majesty."⁵

¹ Holinshed, p. 456. As given in Louise Imogen Guiney's "*Blessed Edmund Campion*," based on Richard Simpson's "*Edmund Campion, Jesuit Protomartyr of England*," the words are,

" . . . if our religion do make us traitors we are worthy to be condemned; but otherwise we are and have been as true subjects as ever the Queen had. In condemning us you condemn all your ancestors, all the ancient priests, Bishops and Kings: all that was once the glory of England, the Island of Saints, and the most devoted child of the See of Peter."

(Actually England even in Catholic days had often been on ill terms with the Pope).

"To be condemned with these old lights, not of England only, but of the world, by their degenerate descendents, is both gladness and glory to us."

² Holinshed, in extenso, IV, pp. 457-459. "An Advertisement . . . for Truth."

³ Holinshed, p. 456, states that Campion possessed a "facultie" from Pope Gregory XIII. confirming the Bull of Pius V: and quotes it, p. 522: "*Facultates concessae pp. Roberto Personio et Edmondo Campiano, pro Anglia. Die 14 Aprilis, 1580.*" Whether Father Parsons showed it to Father Campion we cannot tell; but for another confirmation from Rome, see App. B. pp. 141-144.

⁴ Holinshed only states the latter fact. It is Father Parsons who describes the "nobleman Charles Howard" [i.e. L^d Howard of Effingham] as being responsible. C.R.S. IV., pp. 45-46.

⁵ *Ibid.*

Father Parsons wrote of Campion's death as having "smitten the Catholics" more heavily than any previous loss. "Nevertheless the wonderful fruit that has since ensued has not only taken away their grief" but enabled them to "abound with joy in all our tribulation."¹ The Spanish Ambassador also was of opinion that the fate of Campion and his associates would not deter other Catholics from obedience to the Pope, but incite them to a daring emulation.² A concealed printer dared to issue a "*True Report of the death and martyrdom of M. Campion*"³; and the Recorder of London, 14th April, 1582, wrote to Lord Burghley complaining of "a book cast abroad in commending of Campion and of his fellows."⁴ In our own day a Catholic essayist wrote of Campion that he was "no remote mystic," but

"a man of his age . . .⁵ in his kinship with his place and time, his peculiar gentleness, his scholarship lightly worn, his magic influence, his fearless deed and flawless word, he was a great Elizabethan. . . ."

The word "Elizabethan" is more usually applied to Queen Elizabeth's supporters than to her adversaries: and if Campion had not been ranked at Rome among the latter he would not have been beatified by Pope Leo XIII (9th of December, 1886). But certainly he was "a man of his age" in his combination of faith, scholarship, eloquence and unhesitating self-sacrifice; and Queen Elizabeth's "historiographer,"⁶ even while accusing him of "fantastical conjectures," "subtletie" and "sophistrie," adds that though the "learned" Protestants "loathed" his Order and intentions, they "*yet loved the man.*"

¹ To Fr. Agazario. 1 March, 1581-2. Ib: pp. 41-47.

² See Cal. S.P. Spanish, Vol. III, for numerous references of Mendoza to the Catholics.

³ B.M. 1370. a. 80.

⁴ Lansdowne MS. 35. n. 26. In Louise Imogen Guiney's (unpublished) "*Recusant Poets, a Catholic Anthology*" are verses in memory of Campion and his companions, by Richard Stanihurst, Francis Tregian, Nicholas Rosarrock, Richard Verstegan, and others.

There is a long contemporary tribute to Campion printed with other Catholic memorials in "*Black-Letter Ballads. Old English Ballads, 1553-1625. Chiefly from Manuscripts. Edited by Hyder E. Rollins, Ph.D.*" Cambridge University Press, 1920.

⁵ "*Blessed Edmund Campion*," by Louise Imogen Guiney. London, 1908. Dedicated "*Campiani Fratibus e Provincia Angliae Societatis Jesu tribus opusculum suum grato affectu Scriptor.*" 2nd ed: 1914.

⁶ Holinshed IV, p. 457.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE ON TRACTS FOR AND AGAINST FATHER CAMPION.

Among Lord Burghley's books, preserved at Hatfield House, is a discourse dedicated to him by "the most learned heretic," as Cardinal Bellarmine called William Whitaker, of Trinity College, Cambridge: viz.: "*Responsionis ad decem illas rationes, quibus fretus E. Campianus certamen Ecclesiae Anglicanae ministris obtulit in causa fidei, Defensio contra confutationem Joan. Duraei (Scoti) Presb. Jesuitae: auctore Gul. Whitakero. Henricus Middletonus: Londini. 1583.*"

This was first published in 1581, "*Ad Rationes decem,*" &c. Thomas Vautrollier, London, (B.M. 1020, c. 23); then at Antwerp, 1582, "*E. C. Jesuitae,*" &c. (B.M. 860, f. 5), and is a reply to

"*Rationes decem, quibus fretus certamen Anglicanae Ecclesiae ministris obtulit in causa fidei Edmundus Campianus,*" secretly printed in a lodge near Stonor Park.¹ An answer was dedicated to the Earl of Leicester as Chancellor of Oxford, by Laurence Humphrey:—

"*Jesuitismi pars prima: sive de praxi Romanae Curiae contra respublicas et principes &c. &c. Londini, Hen. Middletonus, 1582.*" (B.M. G. 11701).

In 1582 Father Drury published, "*Confutatio responsionis Gulielmi Whitakeri,*" &c., which was reprinted 1585.

Whitaker retorted with "*Responsiones ad Decem Rationes,*" &c., 1583. And Humphrey then continued a 2nd part of his previous discourse, calling it, "*Puritano-Papismi seu doctrinae Jesuiticae aliquot rationibus ab Edm. Campiano comprehensae et a Joanni Duraeo defensae confutatio, et ex eisdem fundamentis reformatae nostrae religionis assertio,*" Londini, 1584.

Such living writers as now call Burghley and Leicester "Puritans" are unaware that those two peers were in their day the chief lay pillars of the Established Church, which the Puritans were eager to pull down. Nothing could be less reasonable than to liken, as some 16th century controversialists did, the Puritans to the Jesuits. The Jesuits, founded by Ignatius Loyola on the model of a military company, were exponents of Spanish discipline and obedience; but the terms "Puritan" and "Libertine" were frequently used by English Churchmen as synonymous:² and if the ghosts of Leicester and Burghley could return to earth they might well be astonished at the present confusion between Protestants who denied the authority of the Church of Rome, and "Puritans" who repudiated the authority of the Church of England, and claimed to be a law unto themselves. The only resemblance between English "Papists" and English "Puritans" in the Elizabethan era was that neither of them accepted Queen Elizabeth as "Defender of the Faith." The Catholics refused because their ancient traditions forbade, and the "Puritans" because they were in many cases opposed to Monarchy and Episcopacy, and were the forerunners of a degree of license and lawlessness which in the next century was to behead the Archbishop and then the King, on the excuse that both were secretly "Popish,"—a charge not borne out by the scaffold speeches of both when suffering for offences not committed.³

¹ First ed: not in B.M. (title taken from Whitaker's reply). In Campion's Collected Works (*Opuscula omnia*), B.M. 1089, c. 30, it is called "*Rationes decem academicis reddite*" (sic), &c. B.M. 830, b. 9, is ed: of 1583, "*Epistolae duae, Rationes oblatae certaminis redditae Academicis Angliae,*" &c.

² See especially John Fielde to L^d. Leicester in 1580; dedicating to him "*A Notable Treatise of the Church . . . principall questions . . . moved in our time,*" etc., from "*Traicts de l'Eglise*" of Philippe de Mornay, Sieur du Plessis, who came to England with introduction from Walsingham when he was Ambassador in France. Plessis became the intimate friend of Philip Sidney; and published the above work in London in 1578, in French; and in 1579 in Latin, "*Tractatus de Ecclesia*"; the original being dedicated to Henry, King of Navarre, Prince and Sovereign Lord of Béarn, "Peer and chief Prince of the Blood Royal of France."

³ The Theological History of the controversies from the tracts of both sides has yet to be written. If we think Queen Elizabeth unduly severe to dissenters, she and her Council understood better than their commentators what the Puritans aimed at accomplishing if permitted,—namely the overthrow of all constituted authority, and the substitution of their own government; and what the Jesuits were endeavouring to accomplish can be seen from the Bull of Pope Pius V.

APPENDIX B.

"ARMS AGAINST THE QUEEN": THE CONSPIRACY OF 1580-81.

In saying that after Campion *pro Fide* suffered the final penalty, "*the Government sent forth publication after publication in lame defence of its action*," a modern essayist omits the titles of those publications: probably because they are now so rare that few of the disputants consult them. But "lame" is hardly the fitting epithet; for it was not an age of halting excuses or gentle evasions, but of bold and challenging affirmations; and the official "*Aduertisment and Defence of Truth against hir backbiters*," as reprinted by Holinshed, is based upon reference to the pronouncement of the Vatican, as the clearest way to define the situation.¹ Protesting that the "secret favourers" of Campion affirm that nothing was intended except "by exhorting and teaching . . . to move the people to change their religion," the Queen's defenders refer to the "*bull of the last pope Pius . . . that her maiestie by the said pope's excommunication was not the lawful queene . . . nor that subjects were bound to obedience of her lawes . . . but that they were all free and discharged of their obedience . . . and that 'they ought to take armes against hir maiestie, as in the late rebellion in the north, . . . and as now also latelie was notoriously attempted in Ireland, by stirring up the people in the pope's name and under his standard to an open generall rebellion.*"

The Bull of 1569-70 (as repeated in the broadside declaration,) we have already studied.² The point now is whether in 1580-81 it was still regarded as operative by the successor of Pope Pius.

It is sometimes to-day considered necessary to the defence of English 16th century Catholics to postulate that the plots against Queen Elizabeth were inventions of Burghley and Walsingham, "seeing through blood-red spectacles," as an excuse for persecution. But any such fallacy is dispelled by the words of those who felt obliged to obey the Pope's pronouncements.

Even supposing that Father Campion's eloquent denials of personal animus against the Protestant Queen are to be accepted as the literal expression of his feelings, a different aspect of the case appears in a letter of the Nuncio in Madrid to the Secretary of State in Rome, just when a combined force of Spaniards and Italians was invading the County Kerry.

The Nuncio, Sega, Bishop of Ripatransone (afterwards of Piacenza) wrote then to the Cardinal of Como (Tolomeo Galli), 14th of November, 1580, in terms which amply prove the existence of an assassination plot.³ Naming only one man concerned in it (and that one not Father Campion), the Nuncio refrained from hazarding on paper the titles of the Island "noblemen" who proposed to slay Queen Elizabeth. Nor are we to this day certain who they were. But the decoded cypher of the Nuncio is otherwise in no way equivocal:

"Among the other things which this Dr. Humphrey Ely tells me,⁴ he told one *with*

¹ *Chronicles* (1587) ed: 1808. Vol. IV., pp. 457-459.

² Facsimile, with translation, II. i. 3, ante.

³ *Ex Archivio Secreto Vaticano. Nunciatura Hispaniae, xxx, f: 541. Cifre del Nuntio di Spagna.* Recently in a Protestant periodical this letter was given from Stevenson's transcripts 19/77, in P.R.O., as if a new discovery: the editor not being aware that in 1905 the correspondence had been printed in Italian by Arnold Oscar Meyer, "*England und die Katholische Kirche unter Elisabeth*" and again in Italian in the notes to the authorised version (with Imprimatur), "*England and the Catholic Church under Elizabeth*," trans: by Rev. J. R. McKee, Cong. Orat. London, 1916. Since then repeated in Pastor's (Austrian) "*History of the Popes*," (Kegan, Paul, &c.), 1930, Vol. XIX, p. 441.

⁴ "*Tra le altre cose che mi dice questo dottore Umfrido Elei.*" &c.

great secrecy in the name of certain noblemen of the island of the same Jesuit father; and that is that *these noblemen were resolved to attempt the death of the Queen by their own hand*,¹ if only they could be assured at least by word (and they would put their faith in this, either if he wrote or if he answered them personally, as he offers to do), that His Holiness assured them that they would not fall into sin; seeing that there would be danger for their own lives in attempting anything so grave and hazardous.

"I answered him that in view of the words of the sentence of Pius V. of blessed memory, it would seem that those referred to could be assured, since, in particular, these words admit of all vassals taking up arms against the Queen, without censure. Nevertheless I should not fail to submit the point, in order to know better as regards this particular case *what it is that His Holiness enjoins*; adding that should the Pope not desire to make any declaration in anticipation, I could at least assure them that to the subsequent survivors His Holiness would give all the absolutions and declarations that might be necessary, and as an additional safeguard would grant them *individually* to the said survivors; adding that "*nocuit quandoque deferre paratis*."² Moreover if this affair has passed into the knowledge of two or more, it is not a matter to be kept suspended; on account of the danger of discovery it should be understood how to take advantage [soon] of the opportunity and of the occasion. And I am occupied in persuading him that at his return to England there should be no assurance as to his writing what is concerted with his friends; indicating to him that if by chance his letters were intercepted, since they have no cypher but use vernacular, it might be a case of long imprisonment and tortures for those who by mischance fell into the hands of the Queen.

"Meanwhile we shall meet to-morrow, he and I, to consider a little more the particular case with the words of the sentence in our hands, and whether, well understanding the danger which threatens him on returning to England, he should nevertheless decide to go back, before writing that he has come to a decision, as I shall duly inform you, as to what is being done. And he advises your Illustriousness *that these noblemen desire neither Brief nor Bull from His Holiness but only nudum verbum*, which signified to me by Your Illustriousness by your cypher will be sufficient;³ and when he leaves, I will arrange a cypher with him and the means of getting letters to him safely, if I have not gone too far: feeling sure, even so, that if the absolution of His Holiness is necessary, I beg your Illustriousness to ask for it for me, for certainly in this matter *zelus domus Domini comedit me*."

An eminent English Catholic antiquarian is under the impression that no answer exists, and that the approval of the Cardinal cannot be assumed. There is not any reply now to be found in the Record Office among Stevenson's transcripts;⁴ but neither Meyer in 1905 ("*England und die Katholische Kirche*"), nor Pastor in the History of the Popes, 1930, made any secret of the confirmation sent by Cardinal Galli: 12th December, 1580:

"Non è da dubitare che tenendo quella rea femina d'Inghilterra occupati a la Christianità due regni si nobili, et essendoi causa di tanto danno a la fede cattolica e de la perdita di tanti milioni d'anime, ciascuno che le levasse dal mondo col fine debito del servizio di Dio non solo non peccaria, ma anco meritaria, massime stante la sententia contra di lei di Pio V. di s^{ta} m^a."⁵

¹ "Con molto secreto in nome di alcuni nobili de la isola de li medesimi padri Gesuiti et è che li sodetti nobili si resolveriano di tentare di ammazzar la Regina di mano propria."

² "Tolle moram: semper nocuit deferre paratis" (from Lucan).

³ "... non si desidera ne Breve ne Bolla da questi cavalieri sed nudum verbum, il quale significato a me da V.S. Ill^{ma} per sua cifra bastara." &c.

⁴ Information from Mr. J. Vacey Lyle of the P.R.O.

⁵ Pastor, vol. xix, p. 441, quoting Meyer. Both give it in Italian only, with very brief reference in text.

This may be Englished as follows:

"There is no doubt that seeing that this guilty woman of England holds in occupation two so noble Kingdoms of Christendom, and is there the cause of such ruin to the Catholic faith and the loss of so many millions of souls . . .," anyone who "would make an end of her would not commit a sinful but rather a meritorious act, especially in view of the sentence against her by Pius V. . ."

This is the answer to a recent assumption that Queen Elizabeth's Penal Laws arose from mere bigotry, without political necessity. However "*meritorious*" her removal might appear from the standpoint of her foreign opponents and their English adherents, Sovereigns in the 16th century did not meekly acquiesce in their own overthrow. The numerous designs against her life worked out the opposite way to what their promoters intended, and after each unsuccessful attempt to dislodge her from her throne her popularity became enhanced with all who had refused to accept the Pope's authority.¹

¹ In the Memoirs of Father Parsons, S.J. (C.R.S. *Miscell.*: II, p. 199), the following reference (which has escaped notice) plainly shows the conspirator "noblemen" as Irish and not English:—"At this very time, Dr. Sanders being in Spain, was moved by *certain Irish lords, and by ye Pope's Nuncio Monsign^r Sega*, afterwards Card^l, to go into Ireland w^t them, which he yielding unto, and y^t matter after having met with ill successe, made ye whole case of ye priests that were sent on a mission to England more odious." Compare the official "Advertisement of Truth" (Holinshead, IV, p. 457), as to "the purpose to deprive hir majestie of hir life, crowne, and dignitie; . . . as latelie hath beene notoriouslie attempted . . . by Doctor Sanders . . . and by other English and Irish Jesuits and traitors," &c.

As to the Nuncio's request for personal reassurance that he had rightly encouraged the nobleman, the Cardinal replied "With regard to you, in case that you have fallen into any irregularity, His Holiness sends you his holy benediction."

"*Quanto poi a V.S. in caso che lei fosse incorsa in alchuna irregolarità, N.S. le dà la sua santa benedizione.*" (Pastor, op. cit., p. 442). On p. 440, note 1, Pastor adds, "In the opinion of the Pope, the English Queen had forfeited her Crown by heresy long before the issuing of the Bull," &c. It is upon "the Bull of Pius V." that Cardinal Galli in 1580, and Pastor in 1930, took their stand. Pastor's remarks ensuing are representative:—

"Since the Queen was deposed . . . it seemed a legitimate conclusion . . . that it was 'lawful to take up arms against her,' and that it was permissible to raise an armed rebellion . . . after the manner of that of Northumberland, of 1569 . . . the doubt only referred to . . . whether . . . it would be lawful to lay hands on the Queen herself, or whether the sacred person of the Sovereign must in any case be respected. In the view of the Nuncio, as well as of the Secretary of State, the permission to take up arms . . . also included the other right of using them if necessary against the person of the unlawful Sovereign. If the Nuncio and the Secretary of State approved of the killing of Elizabeth, this was in conformity with the principles of law then in force."

[The English in general did not accept any such "principles" or "law." In vol. v. "*Eliz. England*," we will see a facsimile of the manifesto in which Englishmen in 1585 answered on behalf of the Sovereign.]

"Gregory too," (continues Pastor,) "whom the Secretary of State undoubtedly consulted, concurred in this view. Gregory . . . expressly condemned as unlawful an attempt on the life of Henry III [of France] . . . the case of Elizabeth was substantially different. She had been expressly excommunicated and deposed."

[Actually, both the Emperor Charles V. and King Philip had been under excommunication. They did the same as Queen Elizabeth, viz.: prohibited circulation of the Papal Declaration, and punished for high treason any subject who smuggled it into their dominions.]

". . . Gregory XIII. as a logical canonist found all the less reason for departing from the principles then in force, in that he deemed Elizabeth to be incorrigible. . . . The Nuncio urged Ely to hurry on the execution of the plan . . . But the latter only got as far as Rheims on his return journey to the English nobles, and no more was heard of the projected insurrection."

Pastor in adding the word "*English*" had not thought of the noblemen being Irish.

By "the principles then in force," Pastor means the Bull of Pius V., confirmed by Gregory XIII.

The English student of history, whether Catholic or Protestant, should carry that Bull in mind, from 1569-70 up to the death of Queen Elizabeth in 1603. Many now current attempts to estimate "the policy of Elizabeth" without quoting the Bull, or looking at the printed Declaration, necessarily fail to elucidate the events. An eminent ecclesiastical antiquary in 1919 was of opinion that Queen Elizabeth imprisoned and executed Catholics only out of theological animus, without any substantial pretext. Protestant historians, on the other hand, often refer to the Vatican approval of the conspiracies as if no man had ever plotted the death of a Sovereign except with a Papal Bull in his hand! To which the obvious retort is that when Charles I. in 1648-9 was "tried" by a mock "Court of Justice" and condemned to be beheaded, there was not a single Roman Catholic among the "Judges," and certainly Cromwell was not acting for the Pope! It is sometimes alleged that Cromwell resorted to this "extreme measure" to prevent England being allied with the Pope. But King Charles repeatedly declared that he had lost his crown because he refused to countenance the destruction of the Established Church; and until the mid 19th Century he was commemorated by the Church of England as a martyr.¹

Excuses have been made for the crime of regicide by politicians of many grades of opinion. But there is this distinction between the 16th Century Catholic conspirators who failed, and the 17th Century rebels who were successful. *The Papal anathema against Queen Elizabeth was not based on repudiation of the sanctity of Monarchy as such, but on refusal to accept Elizabeth as legitimately born, or as the rightful ruler of England.* No such excuse could be made by the regicides who butchered Charles I. Incidentally certain modern English historians who condemn Catholic plots against Queen Elizabeth but applaud Cromwell for overthrowing King Charles, are in an illogical position. If it is "absolutism" they dislike, Elizabeth was far more autocratic than any Stuart. The manner in which she was kept on her throne for 44½ years, despite conspiracies within and without,—the peculiar destiny by which every attempt against her only served to fix the crown more securely on her head,—may be seen from different aspects; but no useful purpose can be served by substituting polite euphemisms for the unequivocal denunciations uttered officially by her open adversaries from Rome.

¹ See "*A Form of Common Prayer, To be used yearly upon the xxx-day of January, being the day of the Martyrdom of K. Charles the first.*" Ordered by Charles II "to be used . . . in all Cathedral and Collegiate Churches and Chappels, in all Chappels of Colleges and Halls within both Our Universities, and of Our Colledges of Eaton (sic) and Winchester, and in all Parish-Churches and Chappels within our Kingdom of England, Dominion of Wales, and town of Berwick-upon-Tweed."

"A BRIEF DISCOVERSE OF ROYALL MONARCHIE." 1581.

The year of Father Campion's tragedy, there was dedicated to Queen Elizabeth (as "*Stella, Sole, Honor & Gloria della nazione Inghilese.*") "*A Briefe Discourse of Royall Monarchie, as of the best common weale: Wherein the subject may beholde the Sacred Maiestie of the Princes most Royall Estate. Written by Charles Merbury Gentleman in duetiful Reuerence of her Maiesties most Princely Highnesse. Whereunto is added by the same Gen. a Collection of Italian Prouerbes, In benefite of such as are studious of that language. Imprinted at London by Thomas Vautrollier dwelling in the Blackfrieries, by Ludgate, 1581.*"¹

The writer of the discourse had been aided in his studies of history and life by Henry Unton, whom we will see in 1586 knighted on the field of battle in the Netherlands, and subsequently Ambassador to France. The "perfect shape of the best and most happy state of government" is to be found in hereditary Monarchy. A good Monarch he likens to the "gladsome Sunne." The overshadowing of a Crown is as the obscuring of the Sun by clouds and vapours:

" . . . if the Princes power be in any point impaired, . . . the subjecte straight doth feele the smarte, and want thereof. The Travailler is less esteemed abroad: the Courtier lesse regarded at home: the Marchante less privileged in a farre countrey: the Noble man less honoured in his owne. . . . *The prosperous estate of the subjectes is derived from the prosperitie of the Prince: their honour from his honour.* . . . So long as the Romane Empire flourished, . . . a Senator of Rome was thought anie kinges companion: a Citizen, or souldier of Rome might have travailed over all the worlde without paying one pennie of taxe or towl. And since the Dignitie of th'Empire was translated into Germany, the Germanes also in most places have like privileges. . . .

"So the Spagniard, because his Prince is of great Power, . . . chalengeth also many Preheminences . . . he will sit uppermost at the table wheresoever he commeth: and though he have neither money in his purse, nor good cloathes on his backe, yet because his maister is kinge of Spaine, he wilbe Signor Di Castilia. . . . I do not remember that I have seene any Spagniard (and yet I have seen a great many both at Milan, Naples, Messina, Syracuse, Malta) ever to exercise out of his country any manual occupation." He is to be found in the Gallies as "a souldier," or in the Cities in some occupation for his mind. But "the Fleminge because his countrey seemeth of late yeares to be overshadowed, . . . he, as a man halfe in disgrace, liveth abroad with less reputation. . . .

"Wherefore it is no small comferte unto an English Gentleman, finding him selfe in a farre countrey, when he may boldly shew his face . . . unto any forren Nation: sit side by side with the proudest Spagniard: cheeke by cheeke with the stoutest Germane: set foote to foote with the forwardest Frenchma[n]: knowing that his most Royall Prince (her Maiesties highnesse) is no whit subject or inferiour to any of theirs;" and may consider

¹ Quarto, 31 pp. and Prelims. In the collection of Mr. John Grant, 31 George IV. Bridge, Edinburgh. The Italian proverbs have a separate title page: "*Proverbi vulgari, raccolti in diversi luoghi d'Italia, et la maggior parte dalle proprie bocche de gl'Italiani stessi. Per Carlo Merbury Gentil'huomo Inghilese. Il quale ne fa presente di cosi fatta sua industria a gl'amici, & patroni suoi honorati, della lingua Italiana studiosi.*" pp. 1-31. Dedic: "*A I Nobili, et Illustri Signori di Corte, et altri gentil'huomini,*" etc. When in 1584 Giordano Bruno came to the Court, introduced by the French Ambassador, he found nearly all the Courtiers able to discuss literature and the arts with him in his own language.

herself superior to some: "as maister Dee hath very learnedly of late . . . shewed vnto her Maiestie, that she may justly call her selfe Lady and Emperes of all the Northe Ilandes."¹

It does not suffice for a Sovereign to be obeyed at home: "*He must also be well-estemed of strangers abroad: not onely beloued of his freindes, but honoured of his neighbours, and feared of his enemies.*" He must not be "under the shadow of another," nor pay any annual pension "as some great Princes of Christendome have unto the greate Turke . . ." and as Louis XI of France paid to Henry VII of England "to have peace with him, and with our Nation."

Royal prerogatives relate to allowing or disallowing matters of law, proclaiming of war and concluding of peace; choosing or refusing Magistrates; coining and rating money; erecting fortresses, granting "Pardons, Licences, Liberties, and Privileges." Subjects who have good Sovereigns should "reverence them with all humilitie: Serve, and obeye them with all Loyaltie: heare and speake of them with all honour." This being realised by us as the rule, the language used about Queen Elizabeth by her champions, and about King Philip by his Ministers, will be better understood; not as mere servile flattery, but as the sign and symbol of the credit of their respective nations.

Commonweals are good and just which advance "the publicke profit." But the "corruptions and declinations into the which the good common weales doe fall" are when a multitude of "the baser sort" attain and abuse authority "at their owne foolish fancie," without "order or discretion." This "confused" kind of government, called in Greek "*Democratia*," is apt to be "choked with bribes" and "corrupted with covetousness." Judging from ancient history, this "*Democratia*" "envieth the riche, and malliceth the mightie, . . . is ignorant of all thinges: and yet she thinketh to know everything." She keeps the state in a miserable condition as on "a tempestuous sea tossed with boysterous windes, in every place and at every season."

Not much better is an Oligarchy, if it be composed of a few who are oppressive and self-seeking; but a good Aristocracy has no other aim than "vertue and honestie":

"They refuse no travail, or paines for the benefit of such as are committed unto their charge: they love and cherish the poore people, . . . defending them also from being injured." They strive to train inferiors as they would their own children, affectionately, "under a continual discipline of vertue, and good education."

But a harsh "Oligarchie" has none of these merits. Moreover, between a good King and a tyrant there is an absolute antithesis:

"The one is courteous, merciful, endewed with all vertue; the other is haughtie, and cruell." "The good Kinge loveth his people and is beloved of them againe;" but the Tyrant abhors "all that have any valor or vertue in them."

The best system, repeats Merbury, is an inherited kingdom, where the Sovereign's aim is the "glory of God," and the "prosperous and happy estate of his subjects: Examples whereof, though in these days there seeme to be many, . . . yet we need not seeke any farther than our owne native cuntry for a most lively and perfect paterne of the same."

¹ In the ensuing volumes many examples will be seen of the independent tone taken by Englishmen abroad. Even as prisoners in Spain, or of the Grand Turk, the words "*I am an Englishman*" would be spoken with as much pride and dignity by a supercargo of a merchant vessel, or a common mariner, as by an accredited Ambassador from Queen Elizabeth. The humblest Englishman then felt himself custodian of the national honour.

PART II.

“Particularly the Power of Spain.”

CHAPTER 5.

“OUR REALM SHALL BE HIS SANCTUARY.”

SECTION 4.

“Loth to Depart.”

(*Queen Elizabeth's French Suitor, 1581-1582*).

“I find her Majestie in words more inclined to the marriage than at your departure. But how long this inclination will continue, I know not.”

Lord Burghley to Sir Francis Walsingham.

17th Aug: (1581). “*The Compleat Ambassador*.” (1655). p. 390.

“The departure was mournful . . . she loth to let him go, and he as loth to depart . . . Monsieur promiseth to return in March . . .”

To the Earl of Shrewsbury from “your Lordship's loving and most obedient son Francis Talbot.”

12 Feb: 1581-2. Talbot MS F. f. 398.

“I grieve, and dare not show my Discontent ;
I love, and yet am forc'd to seem to hate.”

“Sonetto” erroneously attributed to “*Eliz: Regina*.” Tanner MS. 76. 94.

“ . . . my beautiful goddess,
whom I adore with all my heart.”

Francis, Duke of Alençon and Anjou to Queen Elizabeth. 1583.
(French original, Hatfield MSS, Cat. III, No. 7).



Contemporary print of François de Valois, Duc D'Alençon, brother of the King of France: Now first reproduced from "*Divers[ar]um gentium armatura equestris*."


Ubi fere Europae Asiae et Africae equitandi ratio propria expressa est. Abraham Bruynus Excudi."

Undated; but prior to 1578. Plate 22. (B.M. No. 554. b. 3).

When King Charles IX died in 1574, he was succeeded by his brother Henry, King of Poland, who in 1572 as Duke of Alençon and Anjou, had been considered as a possible husband for Queen Elizabeth; until the Massacre at Paris in August that year broke in upon the negotiations.

On the succession of Henry to the Crown as Henry III, the third and youngest brother, Francis Hercules, became Duke of Alençon and Anjou, and heir presumptive.

This is "Monsieur," whose matrimonial alliance with the Queen of England was under discussion in 1578-9.



Title-page of the Rheims "New Testament," 1582. (7 $\frac{3}{4}$ by 4 $\frac{7}{16}$ inches).

Formerly in the library of The Earl Spencer at Althorpe; now in The John Rylands Library, Manchester.

This work of a group of Catholic scholars abroad, of whom Dr. William Allen was inspirer, was criticised in England, as not being direct from the Greek. In 1589 there was issued through the "Printer to the Queenes most excellent Maestie" a commentary by William Fulke D.D.: "The Text of the New Testament of Iesvs Christ, translated out of the vulgar Latine by the Papists" &c. (see under date).

For Bibliographical Note on all Dr. Allen's chief publications, see later under 1587: in which year the Pope, at the request of King Philip II, made Allen "Cardinal of England," in expectation of the approaching Spanish conquest of this country.

PART II.

“Particularly the Power of Spain.”

CHAPTER 5.

“OUR REALM SHALL BE HIS SANCTUARY.”

SECTION 4.

“Goth to Depart.”

(Queen Elizabeth's French Suitor, 1581-1582).

IN the tangle of intrigue and counter intrigue at the French Court, especially in regard to the Queen Mother,—to whom elaborate duplicity was no effort,—it is not always possible to be sure what to take at face value and what to class as deceit. So far back as 1571-2 Walsingham had recognised her as the ruling influence, and had warned Lord Leicester that no arrangements made with the King were of any avail unless “Q. Mother” concurred. Our Ambassadors found it exceedingly difficult to read her intentions. Sometimes they thought she genuinely desired the marriage of her son the Duke of Anjou with Queen Elizabeth; but otherwhiles inferred that she maintained the negotiations only to cause temporary uneasiness to Spain, and therefore gain advantages from King Philip as the price of secretly impeding the alliance she ostensibly advocated.

In 1581 Burghley, Cobham, and Walsingham were more inclined to believe in the good faith of the Duke than in that of his mother or brother. To-day he is usually depicted as worthless, idle, debauched, and grotesquely ugly; and the English Councillors are rebuked for endeavouring to push their Sovereign into the arms of so contemptible a creature. While it would be unreasonable to expect a son of Catherine de Medici to be a model of manly frankness, “Monsieur” appears at least to have been superior to his brothers Charles IX and Henry III.

His exceeding unpopularity with our own masses, and the antagonism which John Stubbe felt towards him as a future King Consort of England, are comprehensible. But having seen through their eyes, it is our task to see also through the eyes of several Ministers of State personally acquainted with him. That Sir Henry Sidney and Sir Francis Knollys would not be reconciled to the alliance on any terms whatsoever, that Leicester agreed to it only under the influence of Burghley; that Sussex, Walsingham, and Smith all advocated the

match,—in short that there were able and loyal statesmen both for and against it,—should prevent any one from supposing the whole truth can be told in an epigram. The political circumstances were not the mere background to personal relations, but were oftener the reasons for and causes of those now misunderstood relations. Hence the futility of mere “scandal about Queen Elizabeth.”

Before continuing the story of England's concern in King Antonio's “warres with Philip King of Castile for the recovery of his kingdom,” we must see the effect of the rumoured approaching marriage of the Queen of England with Francis Duke of Alençon and Anjou; and how King Philip's affairs were progressing. Though he had added to the Spanish Empire, Portugal, Brazil, the East Indies, Madeira, and parts of Africa, he had not yet conquered the Azores, “*the key to all the navigation of Spain.*” Also he was still having trouble in the Netherlands. As one of his partisans expressed it,¹

“The State of Flaunders ministered matter of consideration, for although the Prince of Orange had long enjoyed the greatest part of those provinces,” yet King Philip hoped “*especially now upon the conquest of Portugall*, that his people would be advised and that one day he should reclaime them; but this hope soon failed, for that Frauncis de Valois Duke of Alancon, brother to the most Christian King Henry the Thirde, being entred with his armes into Flanders, and having succoured them that were in Cambrey, he forced the Prince of Parma Capitaine general (being at the siege thereof) to retire. . . .”

(a fact not sufficiently remembered in England to-day, where it is the custom to think of the Duc d'Alençon as utterly incapable, and King Philip's Governor of the Netherlands, Alexander of Parma, as unbrokenly triumphant). In the Duke's letter to Her Majesty after his victory, he tells her of the capture of several Spanish standards which he would hasten to place at her feet, were he not given to understand that she hesitates to declare herself openly against Spain.² To her “*belle jartière*” which she gave him as a talisman he ascribes his good fortune.

Returning to the “*Istoria*” published in 1585, we see Spain in 1581 unpleasantly surprised that Cambray had been captured by the Duke of Alençon and Anjou; and King Philip exceedingly offended that the French gave a welcome to

“Anthony Prior of Crato coming out of England, (he) being embraced by the Queen Mother of Fraunce and visited by the whole Courte.”

News reached the Spaniards likewise of a “practise” they also disapproved: namely, “that the saide Duke of Alancon should marrie with Elizabeth Queene of England, and for that he had passed and repassed above once into that Iland, it was given out that the marriage was secretly co(n)cluded. . . .” But “men of the greatest judgement beleaved that her Majestie of England was not married to the saide Duke, because she had refused so manie great Kings and Princes in former times and had lived with the reputation of a most chaste and vertuous Princesse:”

which latter remark shows that the scandals spread on the Continent by disaffected Englishmen by no means met with universal credence. Her Majesty's frequent refusals to marry won for the “most renowned Virgin Queen” a unique reputation.

¹ “*Istoria*” etc. 1585; “*Historie of the Vniting*” etc. 1600. Book 8. p. 265 et seq.

² 4 Sep: (1581). Orig: French 4 pp. Hatfield MS. Abstract in Cal: II. (1888). No. 1037. p. 424.

We shall find compliments to her "chastity" coming from unexpected places and persons; even from the Grand Vizier of the Sultan of Turkey. But on the 28th of February 1580, Mendoza had written from London to King Philip that the French Ambassador had "pressed the Queen greatly" to answer whether she would marry the Duc d'Alençon or not; and after many evasions on her part, had threatened that if Her Majesty did not intend to marry, the Duke would have to publish her letters, to show that he had not come to England out of mere "flightiness" but on the assurances she gave him. She answered she was amazed that it could be proposed to treat any lady in this fashion, much less a Queen.

Mendoza then reports a private conversation she had alone with Burghley and the Archbishop of York. (How if she was alone with them, Mendoza procured the particulars he did not explain). To the Archbishop, she complained that she was between Scylla and Charybdis; for her French suitor had agreed to her terms and now was wishing to know when he could be married: "If I do not marry him, I do not know whether he will remain friendly with me; and if I do, I shall not be able to govern the country with the freedom and security I have hitherto enjoyed. What shall I do?"

The Archbishop answered that whatsoever she decided, they would all be pleased. She then consulted Burghley. He replied that as the Duke had agreed to all her conditions, if she married him no harm would come to England; and that if she did not intend to marry, she ought to notify the fact at once to His Royal Highness. The Queen retorted that the rest of the Council thought it better he should be kept in correspondence.¹

A rooted idea now in connection with "the Courtships of Queen Elizabeth" is that Burghley, while pressing the French marriage, was harassed by a perpetual adversary in the person of Leicester, who played a "lover's" part to the Queen in order to frustrate the Lord Treasurer's projects.

The persistent repetition of this legend is the less excusable, as the main parts of Burghley's holograph memoranda on the transactions have been in print since 1759; and would long since have completely upset the favourite fiction, if historians were systematic in taking Elizabethan negotiations from those mainly concerned; instead of too often from gossip and hearsay, and from libels miscalled "contemporary evidence." *The first necessity for "evidence" is that the witness should know the facts; otherwise how can he reveal them?* Burghley is best able to inform us who opposed him as to the French match, and who supported him. He left a series of notes on the views of all the chief personages at the Court. Leicester had not at first liked the Valois match; but, recording on the 6th of October, 1579, how Sir Henry Sidney utterly refused to allow that any considerations whatsoever could justify it, Burghley added that "the Erle of Leicester," in reply to his representations, had admitted that "*Councillors may*

¹ Cal: S. P. Spanish. III. p. 11.

change their opinions upon new Cause . . .” and that “*New Reasons moveth him to change.*”¹

One of the new reasons was the anticipation of King Philip's increased power “*if he should get the crown of Portingale.*” From that time onward, Leicester endeavoured to see the marriage project with Burghley's eyes.

Among strange stories which have arisen in relation to Burghley's intentions, one of the most peculiar was issued in 1925:² namely that the Queen thought of “*abandoning the Duc d'Alençon altogether and coming to terms with Spain: a suggestion which seems to have emanated from Burghley, and to have received the support of the conservative elements in the Council, but which Leicester, Hatton, and Walsingham all violently opposed. That project was dropped.*”

No references are given for any of this; and as Lord Burghley was the originator of the French match, and from first to last disbelieved in Spanish blandishments, the statement is the more untenable. To attempt to describe an absolute Monarchy in terms of modern party politics is courting failure; especially when the Lord Treasurer's intimate friends and chief supporters “Leicester, Hatton and Walsingham” are transformed into a “violent” opposition. To pursue all the fallacies which have grown up around the situation would carry us far from the point. More to the purpose is it to attend to what was said and written by Her Majesty's trusty servants at the time.

On the 31st of August 1581, from Paris, Sir Henry Cobham had predicted to Burghley, when sending a messenger to report to him the state of the Duke of Anjou's camp, “If this young Prince continue in the course he hath begun, there are few or none in our Days that promiseth greater things than he doth.” Praising him for taking infinite pains, Cobham adds that his patience is “admirable,” he having “to deal with Persons of so strange and unquiet Humours.” And at the French Court

“It offendeth the better sort here to see so much treasure spent in preparation for Masks and other Vanities, and this poor Prince forced, unless he were otherwise relieved, to give over an Enterprise many ways profitable for that Crown.

“This day I had long speech with the Queen Mother, both about the Portugall Causes,” as also the delays in regard to the English treaty. “*For the first I understand by her that the King will attempt nothing by way of concurrency with her Majesty against Spayne without the marriage . . .*” without which the Queen Mother declared there could be “no sound friendship.” She also renewed “her former request touching the ships to be given unto Duke Antonio, letting me understand that the four ships were departed from Bordeaux with 600 men at the least . . .”

Cobham regrets that his own Sovereign complains he does not send her enough

¹ *State Papers*, ed: Murdin (1759) pp. 333 and 335. And see (p. 319 et seq.) Articles “by the Lord Treasurer the Erles of Sussex and Leicester, and Mr. Vice Chamberlain” (Hatton) in Burghley's hand, followed by arguments and considerations.

² By C. Read, “*Mr. Secretary Walsingham and the Policy of Queen Elizabeth*,” Oxford, 1925, Vol. II. p. 99.

³ sic. Possibly Murdin's expansion of D for Dom.

news; but he hears "so great Uncertainties," that if he and "the Ambassador Resident" were to send all the rumours, "*we should revoke in one Day what we wryte the other.*" The main point is that nothing further will be done in France about Portugal "till her Majesty's full Resolution to the Marriage be known."

(Her Majesty's "resolution" was precisely what none of those around her could divine).

From Paris on the 3rd of September, 1581, Walsingham wrote to Burghley that "the affection the Nobility here do bear to Monsieur" appeared in "*his late Army, compounded of voluntaries, . . . principally of Noblemen and Gentlemen.*" But this very fact had "greatly increased the King's jealousy towards him," and so had hindered the support which otherwise His Majesty might have given.²

The King, however, did not obstruct the English marriage negotiations; and, in the last week of October, Leicester from the Court was informing the Earl Marshal (Shrewsbury) that he was hard-worked in preparing for the arrival of the French Commissioners who "are now landed, and will be here on Tuesday next. . . The Prince Dauphin, the Marshal de Cossé, Monseigneur Lansac, Monsieur Caruges, Monseigneur le Mothe, Secretary Pinart, President Bosiney" and "Du Vray." "The whole train belonging to these is 400 and odd."³ Having disembarked on the last day of October,⁴ they were taken up the Thames to Richmond Palace where they arrived on the 2nd of November. On the 17th "The Q. Majesty came by water to Westminster from Richmond,"⁵ with Monsieur himself, for the magnificent tournament which was held every year on that day, the anniversary of her Accession.

To speculate as to what Queen Elizabeth secretly thought is waste of time. But it is useful to get rid of false ideas of what she said and did. In a 17th century hand, in the Bodleian Library is the copy of a so-called "*Sonetto*" signed "*Eliz. Regina*":⁶

"I grieve, and dare not show my Discontent,
I love, and yet am forc'd to seem to hate;
I do, yet dare not say I ever meant,
I seem stark mute, but inwardly do prate:
I am, and not; I freeze, and yet am burn'd
Since from my Self another Self I turn'd.

¹ *State Papers*, ed: Murdin. pp. 359-360.

² "*The Compleat Ambassador*," 1655. p. 428.

³ Howard MSS. Lodge's "*Illustrations*" (1838) Vol. II. p. 198. With note that the above mentioned were the Prince of Dauphiny (Prince of Conti); Artus de Cossé, Sieur de Gonner and Marshal of France, "a furious Papist" (Lodge's remark); Louis de Lusignan de St. Gelais, Sieur de Lansac; Tanneguy le Venneur de Carrouge; Bertrand Salignac de la Mothe Fénelon; Claud Pinart (a Secretary to King Henry III); Barnabus Brisson, President of the Parlm^t of Paris; Jacques Vray or "Viraye," Secretary of the Treasury to the Duke of Anjou.

⁴ Ld. B.'s Notes. Hatfield MSS. 333. Cal: XIII. p. 202.

⁵ Ib: p. 203.

⁶ Tanner MS. 76.94; and Ashmole 6969.781. p. 142, where it is given as composed "upon Mount Zeurs departure." Accepted as genuine in notes to "*Petrarch translated*," &c. 1808, p. 241. Petrarch's translator believed it to be an echo of the sonnet of Petrarch beginning *Pace non trovo, e non ho da far guerra*: a comparison too complimentary to the English verses.

My Care is like my Shadow in the Sun,
 Follows me flying, flies when I pursue it,
 Stands and lies by me, doth what I have done;
 His too familiar Care doth make me rue it.
 No means I find to ridd him from my Breast,
 Till by the End of things it be suppress.
 Come gentle Passion slide into my Mind,
 For I am soft, and made of melting Snow,
 Or be more cruel Love, and be so kind;
 Let me or float or sink, be high or low;
 Or let me Love wth some more sweet Content,
 Or Die, and so forget what Love ere meant."

No matter what Her Majesty may have written—and she was addicted to composing verses,—whoever attributed these lines to her had little considered the circumstances of her reception of the Duke of Anjou.

Far from her being "*forced to seem to hate*," a show of cordiality on her part was essential to the maintenance of diplomatic relations. As we shall find King Henry III in 1584 alleging that the Queen of England was the personage who had best loved his brother, even if this be a politic exaggeration it disposes of the fallacy that she made a display of "hate" to her suitor, thereby provoking him to an outburst of impassioned anger.

The usual rendering of those events is a revival of Camden's story of a quarrel between the Queen and Monsieur: culminating in his casting away her ring "in a fury, with bitter invocations against the lightness of women and the inconstancy of Islanders." But if any such explosion had taken place at the Court, the Queen would not have accompanied the Prince afterwards to Canterbury on his departure, nor have aided him with large sums of money. As Monsieur's later letters to his "beautiful Goddess" show no sign of "fury," and as Camden's rendering of the reign of Queen Elizabeth was not attempted until the time of James I, we should seek information from men who were at the Court and acquainted both with Her Majesty and Monsieur.

The frequent reappearances of the "fury" tale to-day are the less reasonable in that towards the end of the 18th century Edmund Lodge, Norroy, though usually otherwise most credulous of Camden's gossip, pointed out that his circumstantial narrative in this case is discredited by the absence of reference to any such episode in the intimate letters of personages living in the Court: such as Francis, Lord Talbot, who habitually sent his father the Earl of Shrewsbury, minute reports of all happenings and rumours, and of the Queen's varying moods.¹ Why Camden's allegations have been accepted as to the Queen's breaking off the match the morning after she had given Monsieur a betrothal ring is not easy to understand; *for the negotiations were not broken off*.

¹ "Lord Talbot could not have remained ignorant of such a rupture," says Lodge, "while Camden (even) if it had really happened, would probably have remained ignorant of it." "*Illustrations*" etc. 2nd ed: Vol. II. p. 204. Nevertheless, in a note in the same vol. p. 61, Lodge forgets this and refers to "the accurate Camden."

"Monsieur has taken shipping into Flanders," writes Lord Talbot, "and minds to land at Flushing, where the States meet him; and thence he will go to Antwerp.

"There are gone over with him my Lord of Leicester, my Lord Hunsdon, my Lord Charles Howard, my Lord Thomas Howard, my Lord Windsor, my Lord Sheffield, my Lord Willoughby, and a number of young gentlemen besides.

"As soon as he is at Antwerp, all the Englishmen return, which it is thought will be about a fortnight hence . . .

"The departure was mournful betwixt her Highness and Monsieur; *she loth to let him go, and he as loth to depart*. Her Majesty, on her return, will be long in no place in which she lodged as she went; neither will she come to Whitehall, because the places shall not give cause of remembrance to her of him with whom she so unwillingly parted."

Far from denouncing "the lightness of women and the inconstancy of Islanders," (as alleged by Camden, circa 1615), "*Monsieur promised his return in March*; but how his causes in the Low Countries will permit him is uncertain."¹

On the 1st March, 1582, the Spanish Ambassador reported to King Philip that when the Duke d'Alençon left, Her Majesty bade him write "*to my wife the Queen of England*"; and that his letters were "*full of love and his desolation at being away from her*."² "*But it is all nonsense*," adds Mendoza.

These epistles are still extant; the Duke signing "*in esterne vostre humble et tres affectionne esclave Francoys le Constant*,"³ and she beginning hers "*Mon trescher*." And with them are preserved the effusive outpourings of his Gentleman of the Chamber, Monsieur Simier, to Her Majesty. Likewise Simier's key to a cipher, in which the reigning Kings each have three alternative designations. Henry III of France is Jupiter, Mars, and Mercury; "*Le Roy d'Espagne: La ronse: Saturne: Vulcan:*" Queen Elizabeth is the Sun, the pearl, the diamond. Vicomte de Turenne is "*le lyon*," Marshal de Biron the fox; and Marshal de Montmorency the falcon. "*Le conte Subces [Sussex]: Le conte de Lestre: Le grand tresoryor: [Burghley] Mr Haston [Hatton]*" have signs against their names, but no symbolical appellation.⁴

It has so often been described how Simier was the Queen's "monkey" and the Duke of Anjou her "frog" that we will deal instead with the large political

¹ Talbot MS. F. f. 398. Lodge's Illustra: 1838. Vol. II. pp. 203-204.

Editing "*The Complete Works of John Lyly*," Vol. II. p. 366, R. W. Bond remarks of *Sapho and Phao* that "the distress and perplexities of Phao, and his departure from Sicily at the call of other "destinies, are quite in keeping with the facts of Alençon's courtship; nor need the marked ugliness "of the Duke disqualify him for the part." But as Queen Elizabeth, though hostile to handsome women, had a preference for handsome men, we may suspect that "marked ugliness" would have been a serious drawback.

As John Lyly was the protégé (some said the "fiddlestick") of Edward de Vere, Earl of Oxford, a favourer of the Valois match, *Sapho and Phao* is one of the dramas discussed in Captain B. M. Ward's "*The Seventeenth Earl of Oxford*" (Murray, 1928).

² Cal: S.P.S. 3, p. 299.

³ Hatfield Cal: II. (1888). p. 477.

⁴ Full list in Hatfield MS. Cal. II. p. 448.

concerns which the Queen's vacillations impeded.¹ Not only were the marriage negotiations not broken off in 1581 or '82, but in 1583 the Duke's addresses to "*vostre belle Majesté*" were still to be phrased in the approved fashion of a professed lover who is also a Frenchman:² "*brulant de l'ardent desire que j'aure de me voir entre les bras de ma belle déesse que j'adore de tout mon Coeur.*"³

The point is not whether he meant any such thing, but that his modes of expression in this as on other occasions, are strikingly divergent from the manners and language attributed to him by Camden writing in the reign of the first Stuart King of Great Britain.

At the time when if we were to credit Camden the French Prince was quivering with rage, and spurning the Queen who had scorned him, Lord Talbot who was in attendance upon her, concludes his description of Monsieur (as "loth to depart") by relating how "Her Highness went no further but (to) Canterbury; Monsieur took shipping at Sandwich. . ."⁴

Among the "number of young gentlemen" who attended upon him, was Philip Sidney; presumably invited to join the train of his uncle Leicester.

Leicester and Hunsdon did not remain long absent. Secretary Walsingham sent them the Queen's condolences on the heavy "charges" they incurred while visiting the new Court, and authorised them to "return as soone as in yo^r owne wisdomes it shall seeme meete . . ."⁵

That Leicester, impelled by jealousy against Burghley, opposed Burghley's policy in general and the French match in particular, is given out so often and in such positive fashion that few readers suspect the main source of it: namely a libel entitled "*Leycester's Commonwealth*," (1641,) wherein a "Gentleman" is represented as saying,

¹ In Hatfield Cal: Vol. II. 1888, these negotiations for the Queen's marriage, with her frequent changes of mood, her evasions and circumlocutions, and the Duke's protestations loom large: many of these letters being given in extenso in the original French. But the editor did not realise the importance of the Portugal business. "Don Antonio" appears but once in the index (in relation to the battle of Alcacer) though oftener in the text. The Portugal items are abstracted so briefly as to be cryptic; some are coupled with conjectured dates which show they have not been compared with matter in the same collection which would have elucidated them.

² Hatfield Cal. III (1889) No. 6. p. 2. ³ Ib: No. 7.

⁴ "From Sion this 12 of February. Your Lordships loving and most obedient son
Francis Talbot."

Talbot MS F. f. 398. Lodge's *Illustr.* 2nd ed: 1838. Vol. II. pp. 203-205. No year, and no editorial note for date. But see *Journal of Sir Francis Walsingham*. (Camden Miscell. O.S. Vol. VI.) under February 1581 (2):

"Thursday 1. The Court removed to Rochester. Monsieur departed.
Friday I went to Rochester.
Saturday 3. Hir Majesty removed to Sittingbourne.
Monday 5. Hir Majesty removed to Cantorbury.
Tewsdays 13. Hir Majesty came back to Faversham."

⁵ Unpublished Dudley MSS of The Marquess of Bath. K.G. Vol. II. ff. 222-223. Addressed (f. 223^b) "To the right honorable my verie good ll the Earl of Leycester and the L. Hunsdon." Signed by Walsingham.

"... it was thought most certainly throughout the Realm that hee would have taken armes soone after, if the marriage of her Majesty with Monsieur had gone forward. The thing in Cambridge and in all the Countrey as I rode was in every man's mouth."¹

This was a flagrant lie, for circulation in France in 1584; when the anonymous libeller with equal untruthfulness asserted that "this noble match" was approved by all the Protestants in England. As we have not only John Stubbe's pamphlet but Lord Burghley's notes on the dislike of the people to the project, it is misguided when modern writers echo the 1584 legend that Leicester was the only opposer of the national benefits the marriage would have conferred:

"Of which," continues the libeller, "this Tyrant for his own private lucre (fearing lest hereby his ambition might be restrained and his treachery revealed) hath bereaved the Realme, and done what in him lieth beside to alienate for ever and make our mortall enemy this great prince, who sought the love of her Majesty, . . . putting twice his own person to jeopardy of the Sea, and to the perill of his malicious envions here in England . . ."

After holding up Leicester's "*deepe, dangerous, and desperate practizes, in using . . . the time and state for his own purpose,*" with "*continuall thwartings of the match,*" Leicester is alleged to have thereby "*done more hurt to his Commonwealth than if he had murdered many thousands of her subjects or betrayed whole armies to a professed enemy.*"²

This libel of 1584 has been reprinted many times, from 1641 to 1904 when it was commended to the public, not as a curiosity of mendacity, with notes tabulating the documents by which the farrago of falsehood can be exposed as such, but under title of the "*History of Queen Elizabeth . . . and the Earl of Leicester,*" praised by its editor as throwing "considerable light" upon the politics of that age. The "animosity of the Government" against this publication was made subject for rebuke, in a most misleading Introduction, which has caused many students to take seriously the string of accusations against Leicester, which Sir Philip Sidney is said by the same editor to have been unable to answer, except as to the pedigree of the Dudleys.

To the libel—with the answer—we will come in chronological place. It is mentioned now so that readers may see the absurdity of its pretence that Leicester "drove away" the "brother and heire" of Henry King of France "*by protesting and swearing that himselfe was contracted unto her Majesty . . .*"

As in 1581-2, Leicester not only was chosen by the Queen as the chief nobleman to escort her suitor to Antwerp, but as he had then been married for three and a half years to the Queen's cousin Lettice, widow of Walter Earl of Essex, that he neither could nor did swear to Monsieur he was "himselfe" contracted "unto her Majesty" a moment's reflection should have shown!

¹ p. 27. reprint, 1904.

² *Ib*: p. 33.

³ p. 33.

(As the correspondence of the Duke of Anjou and Queen Elizabeth has been available in print for over 40 years, it is the more deplorable that it was not consulted by the editor who in 1904 foisted the 1584-1641 libel again upon the public in the name of History). After the Duke's assertion that he is "not a mercenary soldier" but loves the Queen for her "beauties, virtues and perfections," he protests that even those who are most envious of him must admit that in fighting against the King of Spain he is combating an enemy who bears Queen Elizabeth, "in his secret thoughts, as much ill will as he does those who make open war upon him."¹

The warning was more true than the Duke knew. We have seen how the Spanish Ambassador when received in England in 1578, after the long spell of suspended diplomatic relations, set to work at once to undermine the negotiations for a matrimonial alliance between England and France. And after the Spanish conquest of Portugal in 1580, it was more than a matter of marriage. The immediate question in 1580-83 was the help to be given to King Antonio by an allied English and French fleet and army, to restore him to the Empire from which his cousin the King of Spain had displaced him. As expressed by King Philip's defender in the "*Istoria*" already quoted,

"the Catholique King complained to the most Christian King that he had received the Prior his rebell into Fraunce." He objected also to "the succours given to Cambrey, and *blamed the marriage with England*, labouring to divert it all he could . . . The King of Fraunce, as they said, made answer . . . that as for the marriage, he left it to the Duke, who was thereunto inclined, with all the Nobilitie of Fraunce . . . That the Prior had been received by the Queene Mother, who being Queen (as she beleaved) of the realme had receeved him as her vassal":

(The reference is to Queen Catherine's fantastic claim to the Crown of Portugal, to which Dom Antonio had not the least intention of yielding.)

King Henry is then alleged to have informed King Philip "that he had opposed himself to his brother, touching the succours of Cambrey," but that his "admonitions" had been of no effect. Philip II, who would not have allowed his own relations to act independently, concluded that neither would any other Sovereign; so he held the King of France responsible for the policy carried out in the person of the Duke; who certainly could not have proposed marriage with Queen Elizabeth or taken an army to Cambray without his brother's approval.

The writer of the "*Istoria*" admits that the Queen of England at this juncture "*knowing the Pope's intention against her, having seen the proof thereof in the affaires of Ireland*"—a delicate euphemism for the recent invasion—"sought to secure her selfe," and so desired to this end the increased amity of the French.

"The saide Alancon being returned againe into England, being alreadie agreed with the Prince of Orange . . . he passed from thence to Antwerpe," where

¹ Dated from Bruges, 1 Aug: no year. A 5 pp. letter, set in Hatfield Cal: Vol. II. p. 510 conjecturally in 1582.

"he was received . . . with great joy; and the XIX day of Februarie, in the yeere of our Lord 1582 they did swear him Duke of Brabant."¹

In May 1582 King Antonio at Tours was allowed to proclaim in print the sympathy of "our dear brother the Duke of Brabant:"² a fact which has been overlooked.

In July the Duke left England just before the Spanish fleet sailed for the Azores to encounter the French forces gathered on King Antonio's behalf, with Englishmen amongst them.³

This was the enterprise which Queen Elizabeth, after promising her support, would only aid underhand. The need of her French suitor for money at this juncture was one of the causes of her economy where King Antonio was concerned. While the uncertainty whether she would or would not marry drove Walsingham almost to despair, Burghley in his private notes set down that the Duke had received from Her Majesty £35,000.

The situation puzzled the Spaniards: both as to Queen Elizabeth's intentions, and William of Orange's delegation to the French King's brother of the power they expected him to keep solely for himself. As asserted three years later,

"it seemed strange that the Prince of Orange, in a manner absolute Lord of those countries, which he had so long defended, would upon the end of the work spoile himself of the state and give it to a stranger."

Some conjectured that the Prince had acted from necessity, "to seeke some one that should aid him against the Catholique King, who having now recovered the realm of Portugall" ("recovered" is a peculiar term for what Spain had never before possessed), "should bee able with greater ease to molest those countries."⁴

¹Among Lord Burghley's books now at Hatfield House is a pamphlet inscribed on the title page "for my very (good Lord) ye L high (Treasurer) of England," called "*L'Entree magnifique de Monseigneur Francoys Filz de France, Frere unique du Roy, par la Grace de Dieu Duc de Lothier, de Brabant, d'Anjou, d'Alencon, etc. Comte de Flandres etc. Faicte en sa Metropolitaine et fameuse Ville de Gant.*" Dated "XX^{me} d'Aust, Anno 1582. (Printers device of a flying eagle with aureole of the sun) a *Gand Chez Corneille de Rekenare, demourant au Pigeon blanc pres le Belfort, avec Jehan Van den Screene*" (the rest is torn away by the binders who have cut into the text, and cut away part of the inscription on the title page.) The "Sommaire du Privilege" is dated "a Anvers le xxviii^{me} d'Avril 1582.

Souffigne.

N. D. Sille."

Lord Burghley (or the giver of the book) has underlined in the text, Alost, Dendremond, Hulst, Ypres, Axeles; "Les Princes d'Orange et d'Espinoy" and others who received the Duke. Also the handing over to the Duke of the "baston de Justice" and "les clefs de la Ville."

This tract has escaped notice. It is bound as No. xiii in a Miscell: of "*Tract: Gall: Ital: Hispan: 7819.*"

² See p. 180.

³ 7 July, 1582, "The D of Anjou departed from Canterbury to Sandwyche: 10th he landed at Flushing.

Aug. 7 The Prevvy Seale directed to Chequer to delyver Mr. Somners the Somme of 20,000*£* Sterling, to be caryed to Mons D. Anjou.

12 Du Bex, a Servant of Mons Duke of Anjou received by Delyvry of John Somners 50,000 Crowns at 6*s* the Crown or 15,000*£* Sterling."

State Papers. ed: Murdin. 1759. p. 781.

⁴ *Historie of the Vniting, etc.* Book 8, p. 268.

Whatever the reasons, Prince Francis Hercules of Valois, Duke of Anjou and Alençon, was received with acclamation; all the nobility of the Provinces coming in state to welcome him. It was soon after this that

"there happened . . . in Flaunders a matter of admiration" (that is, of wonder) " . . . For the Prince of Orange being in Antwerpe, quiet, and in the greatest fortune that he was ever, was shot in his house, rising from his table, in the midst of all his servants, with a pistoll by John Scaurigni, a young man, a Biscaine, mooved thereunto by zeale of religion. . . ."¹

Thus it was expressed in 1585; but let us see how nearly this "young man," moved by the sort of "zeale of religion" which prompts assassination, accomplished his object. Royal and noble personages were then most accessible; and it is significant both of the courtesy and fearlessness of rulers that the attempted assassin gained his opportunity by presenting a petition. As Prince William took the paper into his hand, and bent his head to read it, his treacherous petitioner drew out a pistol and shot him in the face with two balls, which pierced both cheeks. The Prince fainted: and those around him believed he was killed. But he soon recovered consciousness; and his first words were a command to spare the life of his assailant. But the assassin had already been slain.²

The people imagined that the murderer had been "set on" by the Duke of Anjou. And though the Prince wrote with his own hand, and ordered to be publicly proclaimed, his expression of confidence in the Duke, and his conviction that the French had nothing to do with the attack, this suspicion was not entirely dispelled. So says Don Juan Alvarez de Colmenar.³ But whereas the Duke of Anjou could have no motive for the crime, there were manifest reasons for Spanish hatred of the Prince of Orange, as appear from private remarks of Mendoza to King Philip.

Though in 1582 the wound inflicted was not mortal, it was so shatteringly painful and the Prince's sufferings were so acute that Mendoza did not relinquish the hope that the adversary of Spain would never recover.

On the 1st of April (1582), after telling King Philip that the Lord Treasurer was "earnestly pressing the Queen" to declare who she meant to choose for heir to the throne, he added as to the attempted murder of the Prince of Orange, "It is impossible to exaggerate the grief which the affair causes to the Queen and her Ministers. They are so sad and disheartened that on the day the news came it was the same as if she had lost the Crown and they were all ruined." There follow particulars of the Prince's torment from his wound; and then of a slight improvement; and the Queen's message to him "that she will never fail to assist him against his enemies and try to avenge his injury." She sent reassurances also to "Monsieur" as to her intention to marry him.⁴

On the 4th of April, Mendoza wrote that news had come of the death of the Prince of Orange. "I will report instantly if it be confirmed . . . it may be taken

¹ Op. cit. ante. p. 269.

² "*Annales d'Espagne et de Portugal*." Vol. II. pp. 129-130. ³ Op. cit. ante.

⁴ Cal: S.P.S. III. pp. 328-9.

now as certain he will die; and we may give infinite thanks to God for having been pleased to visit with such a punishment so abominable a heretic and rebel."¹

On the 9th Mendoza writes of the Prince "that he had lost so much blood as to be almost dead. . . God was pleased to delay the end in order to punish him with more terrible sufferings than they say were ever undergone by man. From the time he was wounded until the end his pain hourly increased . . ."²

But it was not "the end"; for it had not "pleased God" to allow the assassin to succeed. The victim was to recover almost miraculously; though again, on the 11th of April, Mendoza again reported him as dead.³ In the same letter Mendoza describes the martyrdom of a Catholic priest condemned with Father Campion, S.J. (but he did not add that the condemnation was by statute law, and therefore a very different matter from the attempted murder of the Prince of Orange). The same day Mendoza reported that the Prince was still alive: "The doctors even express surprise that he should have survived the day, but say that it is humanly impossible that he can last much longer. . ." Again Mendoza asserts, "It may be looked upon as a judgment of God that his sufferings are thus prolonged, as they say again that the pain is terrible."

Previously on the 1st April (in a letter to the King in which he had referred to his secret negotiations with Lord Henry Howard), Mendoza related that Lord Leicester

"while supping the other night with his sisters, sisters-in-law and many kinsfolk, said openly that I had caused [the Prince of] Orange to be shot, and that the man who shot him had been seen leaving my house a month ago. *He said that under the cloak of reticence I was weaving the most pernicious plots that ever a minister had done; and he would therefore endeavour . . . to get the Queen to expel me.* He went so far in the matter, that out of sheer pity for me his sister-in-law the Countess of Warwick said that she had always noticed that I had acted with great modesty at Court."⁴

The reasons why Mendoza and his Sovereign abhorred the head of the house of Nassau are numerous and comprehensible. When in 1581 William "the Silent" had defended himself against King Philip's "*Bannum et Edictum*,"⁵ his answer had not merely been an explanation of his own position, but an attack upon the character of Philip.⁶ Being particularly provoked by the Spanish King's criticism of his marriage with Madame de Téligny, widow of one of the Saint Bartholomew victims and daughter of Coligny-Chastillon the most illustrious of them all, the Prince carried the war into the enemy's camp.

"Hee then, that hath married his Niece, dare reproach unto me my marriage," though he had "cruelly murdered his owne wife, the daughter and sister of the Kings of Fraunce

¹ Ib. p. 329. ² Ib. p. 334. ³ Ib. p. 335.

⁴ Cal: S.P.S. 3, p. 325.

⁵ 15 March, 1580 (1).

⁶ "*The Apologie or Defence of the Most Noble Prince William by the grace of God Prince of Orange, Countie of Nassau . . . against the Proclamation and Edict published by the King by which he prosecuted the saide Lorde Prince. Presented to my Lords the Estates generall of the lowe Countrie. At Delft, 1581.*" Published in French and "all other languages."

(as I understand they have in Fraunce informations and instructions concerning that matter); yea, his lawfull wife, the mother of two daughters, the true heires of Spaine . . . But, you will say, he had a dispensation for it. From whom? From the Pope of Rome, which is a god on earth . . . ”

(Hardly anyone believes that Philip II “murdered” his third wife Isabel of Valois. Of his four Queens she was the one he most esteemed; and his affection for her daughters can be amply demonstrated.)

Enumeration of the alleged crimes of King Philip is followed by Prince William’s general denouncement of the pedigree of his adversaries:

“ . . . all the worlde believeth . . . that the greatest parte of the Spanyardes, and especially those that counte them selves Noblemen, are of the blood of the Moors and Jews,” which last “solde, for readie money downe,” the “life of our Saviour. . . .”

The language of the Prince of Orange, though in retort to the Spanish King’s equally violent thunders, was such as no Sovereign of King Philip’s temperament would have forgiven. But despite the torturing nature of the wound the assassin had inflicted, the Prince appears to have believed that no bullet, sword, nor poison could kill him until his hour had come. He was proportionately magnanimous. “My Lord of Aldegonde,” he wrote to one of his chief Councillors,¹

“I hear that to-morrow the two prisoners, his complices that shot at me, shall be executed. For my own part, I do willingly forgive them whatsoever they may have offended against me. And if peradventure they have deserved some sore and sharp punishment, yet be a meane to my Lords the magistrates not to suffer them to abide in any great torment: But rather, if they have so deserved, to content themselves with some speedy death.

“Hereupon I bid you goodnight.

“Your very good friend to do you service

WILLIAM OF NASSAU.”

¹ “His Excellencies Letter, written with his owne hande.” (undated). Lord Somers’s *Tracts*, (ed: 1809) Vol. I. p. 404.

PART II.

“Particularly the Power of Spain.”

CHAPTER 5.

“OUR REALM SHALL BE HIS SANCTUARY.”

SECTION 5.

“The Sea-Fight at the Islands.”

(1582).

“Behold the issue of the sea-fight at the Ilands, which possibly is one of the greatest that ever happened within the bounds of the Ocean.”

“The Historie of the Vniting of the Kingdome of Portugall to the Crowne of Castill.”

Translated 1600, from “*Istoria Dell’ unione*,” etc, etc. Genoa, 1585.

“ . . . in the vanguard of the French marched the generall shippe with Strozzi . . . accompanied with three English ships, followed with all the rest of the fleete . . . ”

Ib: p. 228.

“Her said Majesty gave me leave for the ships which wish to go and serve the King my master which will be given to him secretly. (Sa dicte Mate macorda songe pour les nauires qui vouldront aler seruir le Roy mon maistre lequel luy cera donne secretement).”

Custodio Leytam to Secretary Walsingham. Orig: S. P. France. VII. 134.

“ . . . his most christian Maiesty had permitted Monsieur de Stroce, the Count de Brissac and other Lords and Gentlemen, to go with an army by sea to give aide and succour to Don Anthony the true and rightful K of the Realmes of Portugall, who had bin elected king according to the customs of the Portugals, by al the cities and townes of the sayd Realme . . . ”

“A Treatise Paraenetical. . . . Wherein is shewed . . . the right way to resist the violence of the Castilian king now Englished. London. . . . 1598.” p. 2.

DON ALVARO DE BAZAN, 1st MARQUÉS DE SANTA CRUZ:

from the only existing portrait. Artist unknown.

Photograph, Moreno.

Though the first Marqués de Santa Cruz is said to have been painted by Titian, no such picture is in possession of the present Marqués, nor can any record of its existence be discovered.

Born at Granada, 12th December, 1526, Santa Cruz was fifty-seven at the time of his victory at St. Michael's.

The picture now reproduced—from the original in Madrid in possession of the present Marqués,—may have been painted shortly after Santa Cruz was commissioned to command the Navy during the war for the conquest of Portugal 1580-83; or in 1584 when he was appointed Captain-General of the Ocean Sea. (For his Commission of 1584 now first published and translated, see Vol. V, under date).





(a) *PHILIP STROZZI: SEIGNEUR D'ESPERNAY, &c.*

From a sketch ascribed to Dumoustier.

Labelled "*Portrait d'homme*" in Musée de Bayonne, "*Collection Doucet des Archives photographiques*," No. 2456 (D. 2426).

Never, so far as can be ascertained, reproduced in any English historical work; but included by P. G. J. Niel in "*Portraits des Personnages Français les plus Illustres du XVIème siècle, Reproduits en fac-simile, sur les originaux dessinés aux crayons de couleur par divers artistes contemporains.* &c. Paris, 1856, Vol. II. *Deuxième série.* No notation; 15th plate: "*N. Rémond Impr Rue des Noyers 65 Paris.*" (B.M. 747. c. 16).

Niel (p. 4) though questioning the attribution to Dumoustier, adds "*c'est d'après le crayon que nous reproduisons . . . que Thomas de Leu a exécuté, en petit, une gravure aussi charmante, aussi fidèle qu'il en fut jamais. . .*"

De Leu's engraving was inscribed "*Philippe de Strossy, cheva. des ordres du roy, colon. de l'infant. de Fran.*"

Niel quotes from this a quatrain printed underneath:

"Le peintre ingénieux en Strosse au vif icy,
La candeur et valeur au vif a peint aussi
Comme voir on le peut et mieus et davantage.
Au reste : ce craion n'estant que le visage."

There is at Versailles a portrait of Philip Strozzi, possibly by Clouet, an engraving of which was reproduced by Gavard in "*Supplément aux Galeries Historiques de l'ersailles*," Tome V. (Plate 39; but no notation in the book).

Two years after Strozzi's death, a crude print of him appeared in "*Portraits et Vies des Hommes Illustres Grecs, Latins, et Payens, Recueilles de Leur Tableaux diueres, Medalles antiques et Modernes. Par Andre Thevet Angoumoisyn Premier Cosmographe du Roy. A Paris Par la veuve J. Keruert Et Guillaume Chaudiere Rue St. Jacques 1584.*" Second Tome, p. 479. (B.M. 134. f. 14). This is a profile three-quarters figure, holding in the left hand the Cross of the Royal Order of St. Michael. Despite the imposing title-page, the print of Strozzi is so ill-drawn and roughly executed as hardly to deserve the name of a portrait.

(b) *THE STROZZI ARMS: National Museum, Florence.*

(Photograph: Alinari, 32819).

Reverse of a medal of "*Phillippus Strozo*"; who died a prisoner, 1538, three years before the birth of his grandson Philip Strozzi.



Page from the RIME OF PETRARCH,
which, with the CANZONI of DANTE, were illuminated "during the lifetime of
Petrarch or immediately after his death,"
for Lorenzo son of Carlo degli Strozzi.
Now first reproduced, from the original
in the John Rylands Library, Manchester.

(Size $9\frac{9}{16} \times 6\frac{7}{16}$ inches).

Notice the Strozzi arms. This family, for many generations, whether settled in Italy or France, extensively patronised literature and all the arts.

A poet, praising the Queen Mother of France (Catherine de Medici) as having "*fait chercher les livres les plus vieux, Hebreux, grecs, et latins traduits et à traduire,*" did not mention how Her Majesty acquired those belonging to her kinsman Peter Strozzi, father of Philip Strozzi. In "*Book-binding in France,*" W. J. Fletcher (when Assistant Keeper of Printed Books, British Museum), 1894, pp. 17-18, thus translates the story:—

"This famous Captain—Brantôme is speaking of the celebrated Marshal Strozzi who was killed at the siege of Thionville in 1558,—'was a great lover of letters, and possessed a very choice library. . . . The Marshal often visited and read his books which principally came to him from Cardinal Ridolphi, by purchase on the death of that ecclesiastic. They were so rare and choice that they were valued at more than 15,000 crowns. But when Strozzi was killed the Queen-Mother took possession of the library, promising to recompense his son, and to pay for it some day. He never received a sou, and I well remember his telling me how sore he felt about it.'"



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...sospiri ond'io nudrui al core
n sul mio primo giovenile amore
A uanterra in parte altr'uom da quel ch'io sono.
D el uano stile in ch'io piango et ragiono
F ra leuare speranze el uan dolore
O ue sia chi per priuoa intenda amore
S pero trouar pietà nò de peccato.
Ma ben ueggio or sì come al popo'l tuoto
F auola fui gran tempo onte souente
D i me medesimo meco mi uergoglio.
E t del mio uaneggiar ragognai fructo
E l pentersi el conoscer ueramente
E le quanto piace al mio to e h'ar lo segno -



THE SEA FIGHT AT THE ISLANDS.

26 July, 1582.

*From the fresco in the Sala de Batallas; Escorial Palace, Madrid:
by Nicholas Grunello (a Genoese): painted in 1590:
valued on 7th Feb., 1591, by Hernando de Avila, "pintor del Rey N. Señor."*

(Photograph: Llado, Madrid).


(For large reproduction, see Portfolio, No. 7).

This defeat of the French fleet under Philip Strozzi by the Marqués de Santa Cruz, near St. Michael's (Azores), has been little understood in modern England, where the painting will be as unfamiliar as the matter now brought together in the text.

Particulars evolved now from MSS are from Strozzi's General Order, hitherto overlooked; and from the unpublished Spanish relation, "*Lo sucedido al Armada de Su Mg^d de que es Capitan General el Marqués de Santa Cruz en la batalla que dio a la Armada de Francia que la traia Don Antonio en las Yslas de los Açores*" (*Archivo de Simancas. Leg: 431 de Estado*): and other materials equally new to critics of these operations.

In the Spanish narrative, written afloat before and after the victory, nothing is said of the secretly lent English ships, which were flying the French flag: the writer presumably not having distinguished them.

Three years later, a reference to the English ships in the battle of St. Michael's came into print, "*Istoria dell' Unione*," etc. Genoa, 1585. This was never contradicted.



PART II.

“Particularly the Power of Spain.”

CHAPTER 5.

“OUR REALM SHALL BE HIS SANCTUARY.”

SECTION 5.

“The Sea-Fight at the Islands.”

(*The battle of St Michaels in the Azores. 1582*).

THOUGH “the sea-fight at the Islands” was characterised in 1585 by a partisan of Spain as “*possibly one of the greatest that ever happened within the bounds of the Ocean*,”—and though descriptions in Latin, French, Spanish, Italian, and ultimately in English, were circulated so extensively that hardly any man who could read could then remain ignorant of the particulars as put forward by the defenders of the Spanish annexation of Portugal,—few battles are less remembered in England to-day. The author of “*Drake and the Tudor Navy*” did not mention it in his summary of the relations of England, Spain, and Portugal. Yet as some of Queen Elizabeth’s ships served therein, and as it was partly by pressure from Lord Burghley upon the King of France and the Queen Mother, through our Ambassador Sir Henry Cobham, and by loans from London merchants, that King Antonio was enabled to go to sea in the summer of 1582, it behoves us to put back the suppressed circumstances into the place they actually occupied.¹

Considering how King Philip the previous August had informed his “dearest sister” that any help given by her to “Don Antonio” would be regarded as a declaration of war upon Spain, all the more should we notice a statement from enemy sources that “*three English ships*” were recognised in the fight near St. Michael’s.

As Dom Antonio’s army sailed not from Plymouth but from Belleisle in French ships, the lack of reference to English ships in his service in our own State Papers Domestic for 1582 is natural. “State Papers France” becomes the most likely source of information. Among matter forwarded by Sir Henry Cobham in September of that year to Secretary Walsingham is a long French *Discours*, on

¹ The ensuing is the first systematic attempt by an English historian to bring together and weigh the evidence.

the events of June and July. It answers our question by relating how a bark was sent ahead to Terceira to give "advertisement" of the coming of King Antonio's forces and summon "*the Sieur du Landrau and the English Captains who had ships there*": whereon the Captain of the bark brought back intelligence that the Sieur de Landrau and the English with their ships were already at sea.¹ We shall come to the particulars later; but the matter is here anticipated to prevent any assumption that the English ships were "mythical."

As it is in a letter to Walsingham that one of King Antonio's agents refers to Queen Elizabeth's verbal permission for ships to serve his master "*secretly*,"² let us look among Walsingham's memoranda: not such as in the ordinary routine were drawn up by clerks, but MSS in his own hand. These include "*A Note of the Shipps to be lent unto Q. Mo*" (Queen Mother of France). Undated, it is preserved among papers of 1581-2. Its confidential nature may be deduced from even the endorsement being by Walsingham himself.³

A recent assumption that if Englishmen were in the battle of the Azores they were only merchant adventurers, and that Dom Antonio did not in 1582 receive aid from any ships of the Royal Navy, is dispelled by Walsingham's list, in which four of the Queen's ships, recognisable by their names, make a group by themselves.

"A Note of the Shipps to be lent vnto Q. Mo.

350	The Marye Rose	700
300	The Bonaventure	700
250	The Dreadnawght	500
250	The swyft svre	400

The subject shippes

London

The Gallyon	300
The Royal Marchant	350
The Saloman	220
The Anne Parnell	200
The fortune ⁴	200

The west

Plymouthe

The Saloman	300
-----------------------	-----

Dartemouthe

Barke Chepeley ⁵	200
---------------------------------------	-----

Hull

The prymerose	200
-------------------------	-----

newcastel

The Elysabethe	200
--------------------------	-----

The Ihon Bonaventure	260
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On the back is added "The Almayne."

¹ S.P. France, VIII. 51. ² S.P. France, VIII. 134.

³ Endorsed "*A Note of the Shippes to be sent unto Q. M.*" (S.P. Portugal, I. 73). Pencil noted on the back by editor of Calender, "Probably beginning of 1582. Should be France" etc: viz. S.P. France; but as the ships were for King Antonio, the MS. has rightly been kept in its place in S.P. Portugal.

⁴ Cal: (S.P. Fr: 1581-2; No. 529), omits the Fortune; but in the MS she is not crossed out, only smudged. ⁵ Or Shapeley.

Previously the petition to Queen Elizabeth delivered by King Antonio's envoy had been for "twelve ships" with men and munitions.¹ These are fourteen.

This squadron, if the extra figures beside the Royal ships stand for soldiers, would bring the French fleet and troops up to the numbers alleged by the author of the 1585 "*Istoria*," which at first glance seemed an over-estimate, King Antonio's "*Explanation*" only mentioning "seven and fiftie shippes of warre as well greate as small," embarking from Belleisle. If, however, these 57 from France were joined at the Islands by 14 (or with "The Almayne" 15) from England, the "*Istoria*" figures, both for fleet and troops, would be accounted for. But let us consult "*The Booke of the whole Navy and XXXII Merchant Ships*" compiled three years later for Hawkins, 27th of December 1585.² It gives "the names of all the Queenes Majesties ships with their tonnage, and the number of mariners gunners and soldiers"; and these include

Tonnage			men
500	<i>The Mary Rose</i>	Mariners	170
		Gunners	50
		Soldiers	100
360	<i>The Dreadnought</i>	Mariners	136
		Gunners	24
		Soldiers	60
330	<i>The Swiftsure</i>	Mariners	130
		Gunners	20
		Soldiers	50

(There is no "*Bonaventure*" in this list; but in Lord Burghley's hand "*Elix. Bonaventure*" is added³).

The figures for "*the Shippes to be lent unto Q Mo*" (1581-2) do not tally with those set down for the same ships by Hawkins. Must we therefore conclude that the extra figures on Walsingham's list beside the Queen's ships do not denote tonnage but troops? And if so, what is the meaning of "700" on the other side of *The Marye Rose* and *The Bonaventure*, and 500 and 400 respectively beside *The Dreadnawght* and *The Swyftsire*?

Although the Elizabethan tonnage figures vary also elsewhere, there nevertheless were Rules for measuring tonnage and manning ships:⁴

¹ II. 4. 9, ante.

² Enclosure in S.P.D. Eliz.: CLXXXV. 33., Hawkins to L^d Burghley. *The Spanish War* (1898) Navy Records. p. 270-271.

³ In a supplementary list (1b:) "*Merchant Ships meet to join with her Majesty's Navy*," Dec: 1585, we see

(Tons)	300	<i>The Edward Bonaventure</i>	160 (men)
	200	<i>The Saloman of London</i>	120 "

But the merchant ship in Walsingham's list is not the *Edward* but the *John Bonaventure* 260 tons. *The Saloman* on his memo is 220 tons, which is near enough to the above, in an age when tonnage was often only approximately reckoned.

⁴ S.P.D.E. CLII. 19; *The Spanish War 1585-1587*. (1898) ed: Corbett, pp. 263-265.

"By the proportion of breadth, depth and length of any ship or vessel to judge what burden she may be in merchants goods and how much dead weight of ton or tonnage" etc., etc.:—

"For service in warlike manner the ship is to be rated by her tonnage in dead weight, and to allow for every 5 tons 3 men, That is to say for a ship of 500 tons.

Soldiers	100	
Gunners	28	Amounteth 300 men."
Mariners	172	

In Merchant Voyages the habit is to "allow for every 5 tons one man . . for a ship of 500 tons burden 75 men

Mariners	69	
Gunners	06	Amounteth 75 men."

The last is to be varied by one man to every 4 or 6 tons according to the "special purpose." But this does not elucidate Walsingham's double set of figures flanking the Royal Ships; so to estimate the number of men lent seems impossible. As the undated list is not of ships that had been lent but ships "*to be lent* to Queen Mo(ther)" we cannot be sure that they were all engaged in the fight on the 26th of July. But as the French MS sent through Sir Henry Cobham so undeniably shows "*English ships*" waiting at Terceira to join Strozzi, they presumably are those "*other ships*" to which King Antonio's printed "*Explanation*" alludes only in general terms. Their presence is of peculiar importance to us to-day: for if we follow closely the particulars of the battle, we will find the hitherto "unknown precedent" for the tactics of Drake in the fight against the great Armada in 1588.

Drake's interest in the affairs of the "Portuguese Pretender" is always treated by his modern biographers as if it had begun and ended in 1589; and hitherto no historian has been aware that it was Drake whom Burghley had selected for command of the "great and roiall war" in which in 1581 Queen Elizabeth would have allowed England to become engaged, had it not been for the skill of King Philip's Ambassador, Don Bernardino de Mendoza, in working upon her to disregard the advice of her chief Counsellors.

As a Spanish Ambassador, after seven years interregnum had been resident again in London for the past three years, Queen Elizabeth could not openly contribute to King Antonio's fleet, without dismissing the Ambassador: which Burghley was not yet ready for her to do. But as the occupation by Don Bernardino de Mendoza of a house in Seething Lane had not prevented King Philip's troops from invading Ireland in the name of the Pope in 1580, we have the less need to apologise for Her Majesty that her ships and Captains fought the Spaniards on St Anne's Day 1582 in the name of the King of France.

Mendoza knew more than Queen Elizabeth supposed. On the 19th of February he wrote from London to King Philip about the intended expedition, and added,

"Diogo Botello has fitted out a ship here of 140 tons, called the *Julian*, to go to Terceira. She will sail in a week, and take 80 sakers of cast iron,¹ and 40 mignons, . . . which are

¹ Pieces weighing 1,400 lbs, and throwing a shot of 5½ lbs.

big pieces, four-pounders, with a hundred balls for each piece, two bronze cannon of 50 hundredweight, and 150 hundredweight of powder, with 30 sailors *All the above munitions were brought to the Tower by night, they having been sold to Diogo Botello by Walsingham, in his own name, as if they did not belong to the Queen, who certainly does not like giving things away.*"¹

On the 1st March, Mendoza informed the King that Antonio's ships were only small craft; and on the 6th he continued, "Although *I am doing my utmost to hinder the success of Don Antonio's designs, and to detain his ships, Walsingham and Leicester counterchecked me on every point.*"²

And on the 19th, "*I have men there, putting . . . further obstacles in the way of their leaving; but Leicester and Walsingham, with their private letters, upset all the arrangements I can make with the Council.*"³

On the 1st of April his news was that "Diogo Botello has left Plymouth with Don Antonio's ships. Until my man comes back I do not know whether all have sailed; as Leicester and Walsingham, after sending the first order, despatched another, enabling him to take the *White Bear* as well."⁴

On the 3rd April Mendoza was able to report,

"My man has come from Plymouth, and tells me that Don Antonio's ships left there on the 18th. There were two of them, and one private vessel, of 100, 120, and 140 tons respectively. They do not carry more than 150 persons of all sorts, a very poor array . . . Leicester's fly-boat, which had been with them, and the *White Bear*, have remained on the English coast to plunder, and they tell me that the *White Bear* has already captured a ship . . . Leicester and Walsingham managed to countermine all my obstacles, which nevertheless delayed the ships here for months, and have resulted in their sailing in such poor case, and short handed."

On the 12th April Mendoza wrote to King Philip,

"They report that Manuel de Silva arrived on the 24th of February at Terceira in a French ship accompanied by not more than 50 men in all. He took with him 6 men of the Order of Christ . . . [and] bore ample power from Don Antonio both in lay and ecclesiastical affairs, as no doubt during his stay in England he has caught the trick of making himself Pope. They received him with a canopy and procession, as if he were a King, in consequence of his claim that he came as the King's Lieutenant. He bore the title of Count de Torres Vedras, and had a large revenue from Portugal. Four days after he arrived, he beheaded Juan de Betancourt, who died serenely . . . defending the cause of God and your Majesty. . . ."⁵

The following month King Antonio from France bade Philip Sidney "write to me often, and preserve me in your friendship."

"My affairs (praised be God) go on extremely well. The Fleet is ready to sail, fully manned and well equipped; and I do expect to receive a considerable quantity of stores or ammunitions by the ships from Flanders, in order to equip a second Expedition."

He expressed his intention of embarking himself with six or seven thousand men,

¹ Cal: S.P.S. Vol. III. pp. 297-8. ² lb: p. 313.

³ Cal: S.P.S. III. p. 319. ⁴ lb: p. 326. ⁵ Cal: S.P.S. p. 337.

and "three or four friends who are willing to risk the same fate with me." He hoped Sidney also might join the expedition.

"I have received good news from Portugal, both in regard to the natives as well as the Spaniards: the former wishing my presence, and the latter desiring to return to their own country. The King of France assists me sufficiently, his Mother still better; the States of Flanders very well. . .

I remain in health. God grant you the same, according to my wishes.
Tours, the third of May 1582.

Your greatest friend

THE KING."¹

From Paris on the 27th of June 1582 Sir Henry Cobham informed Sir Francis Walsingham that "Custodio Leitam is appointed by Don Antonio to repair into England to inform her Majesty of his proceeding, and so to pass into Flanders to hasten away the ships which are prepared there for these causes."²

On the 3rd of July Cobham from Paris writes further to Secretary Walsingham:

"This bearer, M. de Leytam, a Portuguese, comes to me as I am ready to go on horseback . . . I find it doubtful if Don Antonio will resolve to land in Portugal unless he is offered good occasion to employ his forces to good purpose; otherwise I learn that he will rather seek to seize on the isles of Madeira, and St. Michael, and . . . the Indian fleet."

Walsingham however is referred for particulars to "M. de Leytam" "sent to her Majesty on his King's affairs."³

Leytam soon afterwards writes to Walsingham from London that the Queen had given him permission to speak to her⁴ "last Tuesday"; but being pressed to catch the tide she had not time to hear what he had been charged by the King his master to say; so she arranged that he should see her "to-day or to-morrow." Meanwhile she bade him consult her Principal Secretary, as knowing her mind. And again, "*de Londres ce 18^e Juillet 1582,*" Leytam wrote "*A Monsieur, Monsieur de Walsingan, premier secretaire de la Ser^{me} Reyne dangleterra*"⁵:

"Sir, I came away without the letter which I await from her Serene Majesty in response to that which I brought her from the King my master: without which I cannot write to him. I beg you therefore to do me the favour to send it to me by the Captain Prinn;⁶ her Majesty promised to write it when I took my leave of her."

¹ Collins, "*Letters & Memorials*," 1746, Vol. I. p. 294. Translated from the original, at Penshurst. Headed by Collins "The King of Portugal to Sir Philip Sidney." (Not Sir Philip till 1583). *Tours* misprinted *Tunis*. Collins also translates as "Illustrious Nephew Philip Sidney," what should be "*cousin*": courtesy term used by Royal personages to peers; though not as a rule to untitled gentlemen, however nobly born. Sidney, however, was a Baron in France, which King Antonio, writing from France, may have taken into consideration. The date is misprinted 1581, in May of which year D. Antonio was not at Tours but concealed in Portugal.

² Cal: S.P. For: 1582. p. 113. ³ Cal: S.P. For: 1582. No. 136.

⁴ 12 July, 1582. Cal: S.P.F. 158. No. 153.

⁵ Holog: S.P. France VII. 134. French. (Calendared: but now re-examined from original).

⁶ Or Perim.

The Queen also had reassured him "*as to the ships*" which were to "*go and serve the King my master, which will be given to him secretly.*"¹

A later reference by Sir Henry Cobham on the 27th of August to "*the new supply of ships and men*" which the Queen Mother purposed to send to King Antonio,² makes it appear likely that the other ships mentioned by Sir Henry two months before, as already "*prepared for these causes,*"³ were identical with the English ships we shall encounter at the Azores.⁴

Turning from secret correspondence to matter first printed only three years after the battle, we see even from a source entirely antagonistic to Dom Antonio how nearly he was the winner in 1582. This "*Istoria*" 1585, translated ultimately as "*The Historie of the Vniting of the Kingdom of Portugall to the Crowne of Castill,*" was composed in effort to reconcile Europe to the forcible subjugation of a people who had refused to elect the King of Spain their Sovereign; they giving their hearts to a native-born ruler, even though a price was set on his head, and all intercourse with him was forbidden by the conqueror. Whether the writer of the "*Istoria*" was the Count of Portalegre under a pseudonym, as appears likely, or some other Portuguese person of quality, also purchased and rewarded, that he well understood the niceties of "warfare and the State" is manifest throughout, from the extreme skill with which he arranges facts to suit his argument. Yet he every now and then admits the fidelity (he calls it "obstinacy") of Dom Antonio's friends.

His treatment of events, from 1578 up to 1583 when he writes "Finis" to the story, is as graphic as if they had unfolded before his eyes, as in some instances seems to have been the case. A man of the world, knowing the persons of whom he wrote, and those to whom he wrote, intending to be read in all the Courts of Europe, he described the war so cleverly that it would have been difficult on the other side to raise up an author to surpass him.

That his book was published neither in Spanish nor Portuguese, but in Italian, and printed not in Madrid but in Genoa and Venice, may have given it the

¹ Sixteenth century Portuguese French (often with scant punctuation and no accents) is not easy to read. ". . . Sa dite Ma^{te} ma corda conge pour les nauires que voudront aler servir le Roy mon maistre, leque luy sera donne secretement. Il y a long temps qui set presente le nauire que le dict capitaine vour dira. Je vous suplie, mons^r luy vouloier octroier conge en la forme que bon Vous semblera pour setenir secret suiuant la volonte de sa Maj^{te} et nestant la present a autrefois. Je vous supplie seulement de metenir pour vre humble seruiteur estant for mary de nauoir ce bien que vous Dire adieu ceque Je fais presente, auquel Je prie Monsieur vous donner tresheureuse et longue vie de Londres ce 18^e Juillet 1582 vostre tres humble et obeissant seruiteur Custodio leytam."

² Cal: S.P.F. 1582. No. 287.

³ 27 June, p. 172, ante.

⁴ The French fleet left Belleisle on the 16 June; and arrived at the Islands on the 15 July. King Antonio then learnt that the "English with their ships" were already at sea with the Sr de Landrau. Yet Custodio Leytam's third letter is dated three days later (July 18). The reasonable inference from this, and Sir Henry Cobham's references to ships and new ships—and from Don Bernardino de Mendoza's relations of how he had worked underhand to cause delays—(Cal: S.P.S. III. 1896) is that there were a succession of English ships lent. How many of them were in the battle is still not certain.

semblance of an independent tribute to King Philip.¹ But whereas nearly all cultured men throughout Europe could read Italian, which was the language commonly used for the diplomatic correspondence of Portugal with England and France (with occasional deviations into Latin), the number of Englishmen familiar with Spanish outside the Court was not then so large as during the later years of Queen Elizabeth's reign; and considerably fewer were conversant with "the Portingale tongue."²

In the same year that the "*Istoria dell' unione del Regno di Portugallo alla Corona de Castiglia*" first appeared in Genoa, and treated the English with politeness due from a high-bred if antagonistic pen, simultaneously in King Philip's principality of Naples there was issued with license "*Flores Calvinistici*," one of the most ferocious attacks upon the Queen of England, her ancestors and her ministers, which had ever issued even from a continental press.³ This, though dedicated to the Prince of Parma and composed in Latin, was an ebullition of malice so crude as to defeat its own ends, except among persons already determined to think the worst of Queen Elizabeth. But the "*Istoria*" is witty, elegant, vivid, and dramatic: the method being to reach different minds in different ways.

Whereas the "*Istoria*" is a subtle work of genius, "*The Explanation*" issued for "Anthonie King of Portugal" in the same year 1585, is as devoid of picturesque detail as of eloquence. For the wars we will draw upon both sources, supplementing them from MSS.

As expressed in the "*Istoria*," King Philip, in the spring of 1582, "still in Portugal, sought to give contentment to the Portugals," promoting some to offices of State "to the great grieve of the Castilians who said that this realm with more

¹ "*Dell' unione del Regno di Portugallo alla corona di Castiglia, istoria del Sig. Jeronimo de Franchi Conestaggio*" (queried in B.M. cat: as João de Silva, Count Portalegre). Genoa. 1585. (4^{to}); B.M. 1060. c. 2.

1589. 2nd ed: Genoa, 4^{to}, 2 copies. Nos. 1060. c.3. and 281. c.22.

1592. 3rd ed: Venice. 8^{vo}. 2 copies. B.M. 1323. a.2. and 281. b.31.

1642. (8^{vo}). Venice and Verona, 13.2.3. a.2. (with MS. notes).

French translations: (with Imperial Arms and Emperor's license).

1596. "*L'unione du royaume de Portugal a la couronne de Castille. Contenant les dernieres guerres des Portugals, et changement de son empire. Prise de l'italien du Sieur Hieromo de Franchi Conestaggio. . . par T. Nardin.*" Besancon. 8^{vo}, B.M. 1195. a.5.

1600. (Arras. 8^{vo}). 1195. a.7.

1600 London. "*Historie of the Vniting*," etc., etc. B.M. 593. c.7. (with MS. notes).

& Catalogued under Conestaggio. G.

1680. (Paris (12^{mo})). 281. c.15.

In Latin:

1602. "*De Portugalliae conjunctione cum regno Castellae, Historia Hieronymi Conestaggii divisa in decem libros, et ex Italico sermone in Latinum conversa.*" Francofurte. 8^{vo}. B.M. 1195. a.8.

1603. A.593.i.5.

² That Burghley was among the latter few is an inference suggested by one of Dom Antonio's holograph letters to the "*grao tresoriero d'inglaterra et de Counsellis priuados de sua mag^{te}*" being in Portuguese. Unpublished Lansdowne MS. 37.67: endorsed "28 Dec: 1582. The K of Portugal to my L."

³ Particulars and title page under date (1585).

right appertained unto Philip, seeing he had inherited it, bought it, and conquered it."

Nevertheless the Portuguese, "by nature uneasie to content," would not "suffer the Castilians to be superiors," which "troubled" King Philip, who had hoped for "a quiet enjoying of that realm."

Having appointed his nephew, the Cardinal Archduke Albert of Austria, Viceroy over these "insolent" Portuguese who were so "obstinate" as to resent losing their national independence, the "most Catholique King" proceeded to consider how he should deal with the Azoreans who still had not become "obedient" to him. As rendered laconically from Dom Antonio's "*Explanation*,"²

"The King of Castile" feeling it necessary to subdue the islands of the Azores, especially Terceira, "*that hee might thereby better assure his navigation from the East and West Indies*," had determined in 1581 "to prepare a great and puissant Armye by sea for the year following, 1582. Upon notice whereof King Anthonie gave advertisement presently" (immediately) "to the queene-mother" of France.

The "sea-army" Her Majesty helped him to gather, under Philip Strozzi and the Comte de Brissac, was not so large as Dom Antonio had hoped: but there were also the English ships and troops to meet him at Terceira.

If we went by the "*Istoria*," we would suppose King Philip only to have moved in 1582 after he learnt of preparations in France and England. But the reason he had not attempted any great enterprise since Don Pedro de Valdez had been repelled the previous autumn by the Tercerians was not "*for that he was a friend to peace*" (as his champion alleges), but that navigation near the Azores was impossible in winter, and excessively difficult even in early spring: the tempests being a more effectual defence against invasion during the stormy months than all the fortifications the islanders could build. The "chiefe monethes" there "for raine and storme are Januarie, Februarie, March and Aprill; and also the moneth of September is commonly very stormy"; likewise October and November.³ The four summer months, May, June, July and August, were the only safe time for enterprise in that direction; and accordingly when the voyage season came again with the calmer weather, hearing that "in Fraunce, Flaunders and England" ships were being armed, intended for Portugal, King Philip

"sent the Marquesse of Ste Croix to Seville to arme all the great ships he could, and to prepare some galleies. In Biscaie he commanded eighteen Biscaine ships to be furnished, to make their randevous in Andelouzie, where they prepared their galleies and built a goodly number of great boats to land their soldiers.

"He wrote into Italy to the Viceroy of Naples, and to the Governour of Millaine, that either of them should levy 6000 Italian foote: He gave order in Germany to bring downe 1000 Germanes under colour to send these two nations to Flaunders."

¹ "*Hist. of the Vniting*," etc. p. 270. ² pp. 39-40.

³ Linschoten, *Descrip. of the Azores*. 1592. "*Purchas his Pilgrims*," 1626: reprint 1907. Vol. XVIII. p. 364.

The narrator (with a touch of Portuguese feeling against his Spanish masters), deploras that the Castilians being "slow by nature in the execution of their business" the preparations were not completed "before the X of July in the yeere 1582." King Philip is represented as rebuking his Admiral-General for the delay.

Meanwhile "the French armie" embarked with Dom Antonio and his followers, "being in number about three score and ten saile, and seven thousand foote, whereof Philip Strozzi and Monsieur de Brisack were Commanders." Thus the English version of the "*Istoria*"; but according to King Antonio's "*Explanation*" the part of the fleet which sailed from Belleisle was not seventy but "seven and fitye shippes of warre, as well great as small."

His land forces are set by the "*Istoria*" at "four or five" thousand soldiers, with about six hundred French gentlemen and some couple of hundred Portuguese, who "stood assured that their armies should both spoile the Indian fleet, sack the Island of St Michael," and overcome the Spanish forces.²

There was no intention to sack St. Michael's; only to expel such Spaniards as King Philip had established there. But as Antonio had many adherents in Portugal, the French certainly hoped to go there afterwards and "to arme the unarmed Portugals; for which cause they carried great quantitie of arms." Many "noblemen and gentlemen imbarked with the Armie, both for that the French are easie to moove, as also heerein to please the Queene Mother":³—the words "*for that the French are easie to moove*" being an attempt to minimise the political importance of the support of France to the elected King of Portugal, upon whose head Spain had set a price equivalent to £20,000.

Animadverting scornfully on the confidence of the French, the same narrator (Count of Portalegre?) admits that "In the Court of Spain" the feeling was neither so unanimous "nor so joyfull" as in King Antonio's force; and that "the Portugalls, being now as contrarie in their humours to the Castilians as they had been ever," were looking forward to the discomfiture of their rulers. But those who were known to favour the exiled King were "kept under"; large garrisons of Spaniards being detained in Portugal to prevent a rising.

Some lookers on, of both nationalities, thought the Marqués de Santa Cruz had no light task ahead: especially as his German mercenaries were "little acquainted with the sea."

It was about this time that there came into circulation an illicit pamphlet under the misleading title of "*Apologie ou Deffense de Monsieur Antoine Roy de Portugal, contre Philippes Roy d'Espagne, usurpateur dudict Royaume de Portugal etc. Ensemble les tyrannies et cruauitez qu'il exerce iournellement sur ses propres subiects. Traduit d'Espagnol en Francois. MDLXXXII.*"

¹ Estimated afterwards by the Spaniards at "over 60" including small vessels. Simancas MS. 431. infra.

² *Hist. of the Vniting.* p. 40. ³ *Ib.*

¹ (12^{mo}) B.M. 114. h. 54. pp. 1-20.

This, which sounds as if it were a personal manifesto of King Antonio like the famous "*Apologia*" of the Prince of Orange, or like his own later "*Explanation*," is no such thing. "*Escrit a Seville ce 8 de Juillet 1582*," it is merely a letter from some unknown defender of the ancient right of the Portuguese to elect their own ruler. Their good judgment is eulogised for having chosen "*Monsieur Antoine*," "*. . . filz de l'Infant Loys*," a Prince of the royal line which had continued in Portugal "four hundred years." Being without name of printer or place of printing, the anonymous opinions are of scant evidential value, except as an example of what was being surreptitiously produced during the same summer that the upshot of the sea-fight at the Islands was still further to increase the power of King Philip, of whom the pamphleteer alleged that even his own Ecclesiastics "*crient contre luy, voyant sa tyrannie et cruauté*." References to Spanish methods of making war upon England "*pour le Royaume d'Irlande*," and on the conflicting interests of Spain and France, lead up to an expressed hope that the enemies of King Philip will combine and avenge themselves; especially "*les invincibles Anglois*," who resent the "*ruses et tromperies*" of Spain, and are "*d'un courage incroyable . . .*" And the Portuguese hater of King Philip contrasts his overbearing methods with "*la Chrestienté, la vertu, le benignté*" and other royal attributes of Antonio "elected of all the people."

During this month of July 1582, Antonio was foiled of victory only after the fortune of war had seemed to veer to his side. Had the Marqués de Santa Cruz been a few degrees less resolute in repairing an initial disadvantage, and had there not been traitors among the French, the outcome of the sea fight at the Islands might have answered Dom Antonio's hopes.

Much seemed to depend upon whether his fleet and army or those of King Philip reached the Azores first. If the Marqués de Santa Cruz could land his forces before King Antonio's arrival, he might with his army of Spaniards, Italians, Germans and some "Portingales," make himself master before the French could reach the scene of action. Or if he could intercept Antonio on the "wide sea" he might defeat the French before they could come within sight of their projected base of operations. Of this fact Antonio was vividly conscious; so his preparations were pressed forward. According to a French contemporary version of the story,

¹ pp. 4-5. This is taking it back through both dynasties.

² "Nous n'avons jamais veu Roy plus hay ne plus mal volu que le Roy d'Espagne" (p. 12). He is accused of sharp dealing with the merchants (p. 12), and of being overbearing to his nobles: "Il leur oste leurs propre biens, comme un Connestable," etc. (p. 13). He "ne semble pas estre Roy Catholique mais . . . voleur." Comments upon the circumstances which enabled him to acquire Portugal (p. 8) are followed by remarks as to the past achievements of the Portuguese being greater than anything done by the Castilians (p. 9). ³ pp. 17-18.

⁴ This printed letter of 8 July 1582, if read uncritically, might bolster up the now prevalent fallacy that Spain was "crumbling to decay." But if we contrast with the allegations of this anonymous pen, as to "la miserable Castile" and the unpopularity of the King, the series of actual triumphs won for him by his noblemen and martialists, the deduction will be that he was exceedingly well served. To identify the writer of the "*Apologie*" seems impossible; but his unauthorised use of King Antonio's name for the title of his booklet indicates more zeal than discretion.

it was "on the 16th of June, 1582" that there set sail from Belleisle the "Army of the Sea raised for the affairs of the kingdom of Portugal," whereof "*le Serenissime Dom Anthonye Roy de Portugal*" was Commander-in-Chief; the Generals under him being respectively the Sieur "D'estrosse" (Strozzi) and the Comte de Brissac.¹

Strozzi, then forty-one years of age, had begun his active career when he was seventeen, at the siege of Calais. During the interval of twenty-four years he had served with conspicuous ability in a succession of campaigns against the Huguenots. It was a strange "whirligig of Time" which was to place English ships and Protestant Captains under the great-grand-nephew of Pope Leo X.

Philip Strozzi, Seigneur d'Espenay, brilliant scion of a famous Catholic house, was of near kin to the Queen Mother Catherine,—his grandmother, a sister of Duke Lorenzo de Medici, having been Her Majesty's aunt. His grandfather, Philip Strozzi "*Il du nom*," described as "*de son temps le plus illustre citoyen de Florence et le plus renommé gentilhomme de toute l'Italie*,"² had sons whose names are interwoven with the history of France. The elder, Peter, was naturalised as a Frenchman in 1543; and in 1548 as "General of the Galleys" he had escorted the infant Queen of Scots from Dumbarton to the country of her betrothed husband, Francis, heir to the throne of France.³ Councillor and Chamberlain to the King, Knight of the Royal Orders, and Marshal of France, he was created Seigneur of Belleville-en-Beaujolais, and of Espenay, as the reward for many services.

In 1557-8 after the English loss of Calais and Guisnes, it was he who exacted so heavy a ransom from Lord Grey of Wilton that Wilton had to be sold to pay it.

Strozzi and his brother Léon, Knight of St John of Jerusalem (also one-time General of the Galleys of France,) were so renowned for energy and ability that much was expected from Philip the son of Peter. Though born in Venice he had no personal memory of Italy; for as a baby of one year old he had been brought to France in 1542 to be educated with the Dauphin.

Living under the influence of a father and uncle who were renowned both by sea and land, and himself having served in the army from his teens, Philip Strozzi when appointed Colonel-General of the French Infantry, subsequent to the death of Francois de Coligny-Chastillon, Sieur d'Andelot, had been able to fill that post with distinction, even coming after so eminent a Commander.

¹ S.P. France VIII. 51. (Contemporary MS. described). In Cal: S.P. Foreign for 1582, No. 353, pp. 344-351, an epitome of this is given, which would be taken for a complete translation unless compared with the original French MS. The Calendar version begins "On June 16, 1582, the French 'army by sea' raised for the affairs of the Kingdom of Portugal, set sail from Belleisle; wherein, according to the intention of the King of France, the general command was held by Don Antonio." But the words of the original are that "*le Serenissime Don Antonye Roy de Portugal*" commanded. The Calendars, by omitting Antonio's royal title (without asterisks to denote the omissions) prop up the "standard" error that the King of Portugal was a mere pretender: instead of a King "anointed and crowned" as Sir Christopher Hatton emphasised to the House of Commons.

² Père Anselm, "*Histoire Généalogique*" 1733." Vol. VII. p. 207. Particulars as to his descendants p. 931; and Vol. VIII. p. 218.

³ Charles de La Roncière, "*Histoire de la Marine Française*." Paris, 1899-1920. Vol. III. pp. 436-437. See Strozzi's portrait, Prologue, sec. XV.

Though his desire for experience at sea had been crossed, he was widely known for "*son gout pour les choses de mer.*" Expeditions equipped and sent out by him were themes for discourse long after his death.¹

That he was primarily a soldier, did not appear any drawback when he was appointed "Lieutenant General of the Army by Sea"; for it was an age when persons of quality were expected to act as Admirals or Generals as the occasion might require; or as both at once.

We might think that this expedition would either have been prepared with as much secrecy as possible, or that the outside world would have been allowed to suppose the forces destined for some other service; so that an effort could be made to take the Spaniards by surprise, whether in Portugal or elsewhere. But, as if he had been living in the Middle Ages, when it was not etiquette for a Sovereign to open or renew hostilities without a public challenge, Dom Antonio, on the 15th of May 1582, had printed in French a manifesto (of which the Spanish Ambassador, must have sent King Philip a copy): "*Sommaire déclaration des iustes causes et raisons qui ont meu et meuuent le treshault . . . Prince Anthoine Roy de Portugal . . . de faire et de continuer la guerre . . par mer que par terre, au Roy de Castile, etc.*"²

Translated at once into Dutch it was published at Antwerp as "*Cause of the War in Spain. Short Explanation of the just causes and reasons which moved his Serene Highness the mighty Prince Don Anthonio King of Portugal and the Algarves, &c., to go to war on Land and Sea against the King of Spain and Castille, and against all who help him in whatsoever way.*"³

This opens with the ancient titles of the Kings of Portugal, which read ironically now, but had certainly been conferred upon Antonio by the popular voice

¹ According to De Torsay's "*Vie, mort et Tombeau du haut et puissant Seigneur Philippe de Strozzi*," Paris, 1608, he gathered at Brouaye in 1572 "*un grand nombre de vaisseaux et de forces pour entreprendre une lointaine expedition*" by sea; but by order of the King those ships and troops were diverted to the siege of La Rochelle. That Strozzi was responsible for "*un grand nombre de voyages d'exploration*" is stated in general terms; and a particular story is told of his sending a vessel of 30 tons to reconnoitre Nombre de Dios; which little ship returned with large booty. Strozzi "*porta au roi des plaques d'or de Nombre de Dios, et lui conseilla d'establir un empire coloniale qui ferait la richesse de la France.*" The Queen Mother is represented as encouraging this dream; her desire to gain part of the ancient Empire of Portugal for France being the reason given for her support of "Don Antoine" from whom she meant to exact colonial concessions.

² 4to, 10 pages. No name of printer. Not in B.M.; but in Royal Library at the Hague, Catalogue of Pamphlets, No. 582.

³ "Printed from the French at Tours in Touraine, Anno 1582."

"*Oorsake van't Oorloch in Spaengien. Corte verclaringhe van de rechtveerdighe Oorsaeken ende redenen, de welcke den Doorluchtigen ende machtigen Prince Don Anthonie Coninck vā Portugael vā Algarbes &c. besweecht hebben ende beweghen d'Oorloghe te voeren en te volherden sowel ter Zee als te lande teghen den Coninck van Spaengien Castilien ende teghen alle deghene die hem hulpe oft bystant doen oft doē sultē in wat manieren dat sonde moghē wesen. Ut den francoyseken ghedruckt te Tours in Toureynen. Anno 1582.*" (B.M. 106.c.4.) small 4to, black letter. About 1,500 words. 7 pp.

Begins "Don Anthonie by der Gratien Goots Conic van Portugael"; and ends "factorij in de stadt van Antwerpen. Ghedeaen te Toeurs den XV Dach van May, int Jaer MDCXXXII."

in 1580: ". . . by the Grace of God King of Portugal, the Algarbes, of the Sea of Africa; Lord of Guinea, and of the Conquests, Navigation, and Commerce of Ethiopia, of Arabia, Persia and the Indies," &c.

Setting forth, "to all whom it may concern," that he is "*the only grandson of King Emanuel by male descent*," he recapitulates his right and title. Heaven having already brought him safely through "storm and tempest,"—and the previous year at Terceira having beaten back the Spanish armies, he was "hoping that by God's help" he was now on the eve of an "entire victory."

He refers to the Duke of Brabant and Anjou as "our good brother," and to the States General of the United Provinces in such terms that we infer this Declaration must have been issued with their knowledge and approval as well as that of the King of France.


It is likely that warning may have reached France and the Netherlands that King Philip was conversant of all the preparations; and that—calculating on the Declaration as only informing him of what he already knew,—King Henry III of France and the Prince of Orange preferred for this manifesto to be circulated in print to remind the world that their support was given to one they accepted as a lawful Monarch. (The Declaration and its terms is important; because, when subsequently the Spanish Admiral sentenced the French participants in Strozzi's expedition as "pirates" breaking the peace, his own officers were to protest that there was "war and no peace," and that the French foes were as lawfully commissioned as themselves).

In the middle of June when the forces raised for the King of Portugal set sail from Belleisle, "*Led(it) S^r Roy*" embarked in the flagship ("*dans le navire de Monsieur d'estrosse Admiral d'icelle*");² and Antonio's eldest son, Dom Emmanuel, aged fourteen, accompanied them.

The start was discouraging; for although June was the time usually most favourable to maritime ventures, wind and weather turned hostile. But some hundred leagues from the Islands³ the French captured a small caraval bound for Lisbon from Madeira and St. Michael's, carrying Spanish letters. St. Michael's was the only one of the nine Azores which had submitted to Spain. According to the intercepted letters, the Governor was dying, and the people still hankering after Dom Antonio. Therefore, though the former intention had been to go first to Terceira,⁴ it was decided in the light of this news to make instead for St. Michael's. A barque was sent to Terceira to explain the change of plans, and summon "*the Sieur du Landreau, and the English Captains who had ships there*," to come and join the main fleet. The barque brought back news that Landreau and the English were already at sea.⁵

¹ A. ij. ² S.P.F. VIII. 51. ³ "Approchant a Cent lieues desdits Isles." ⁴ "laceryers."

⁵ ". . . envoyer une barque d'avis a la ceryers" (Terceira) "pour y donner advisement de l'armee et y faire venir joindre le s^r du Landreau et les Capp^{ns} Angloys qui y avoient leurs Navires, laquelle barque rapporta que les S^r du Landreau et Angloys estoient en mer avec leurs vaisseaulx." (S.P.F. VIII. f.1.)



The Islands of Azores: "Acores Insulae":
 From corner of large Atlantic chart made for Lord Burghley.
 Undated but most likely circa 1581.

First published II. 5. (2), ante and No. 6 in Portfolio.

Prior to the battle of St. Michael's, 26 July 1582, the English ships and Captains were waiting in readiness at Terceira; and on the 14th July, or early 15th, joined the French "Army by Sea" which then arrived from Belleisle commanded by King Antonio, with Philip Strozzi, the Comte de Brissac and the Marquis de Sansolesmne under his orders.

Some disparity in the shapes and proportions of the various Islands will be noticed if this chart is compared with that of the Azores made by Captain A. T. E. Vidal, R.N. in 1843 and 1844. (Admiralty Charts No. 1950). But it does not follow that the Elizabethan cartographer was wrong: for changes in the conformation of the islands were among the results of the terrible series of volcanic eruptions. Wherefore it is not possible that a chart drawn circa 1581 should conform precisely to the chart made in the mid-19th century (reissued 1873 and 1913, No. 1854).

The "Acores Insulae" from Burghley's MS. collection is chosen to accompany Strozzi's last fight, in preference to Edward Wright's chart printed 1599, or even to Boazio's of 1597 for three reasons:

First, because it may have been used by Burghley and Leicester, when despatching the English ships in 1582; or even the previous year when formulating with Drake and Hawkins the "great and roiall" Azorean project first disclosed ante II, 5, 2, under date.

Second, that it is unique, and has been hitherto unknown.

Third, because the later and more graphic "Trve Description of all the iles of Acores by the Late perfect view and Carefull labor of the Right Honorable the Earle of Essex . . . 1597" shows the movements of the fleet which Essex commanded; and so would be premature.

On arrival at St. Michael's, on the 15th of July¹ Strozzi and Brissac "*et autres Capp(tai)nes de terre et de mer*" went in small vessels to examine the coast and select the best places for the fleet to anchor. On the 16th they landed some "*douze ou quinze cent hommes*"; but with difficulty and loss, because the seas were high, in spite of the summer weather.²

Added to the hostile elements, there were soldiers of the King of Spain to oppose the landing. But the French acquitted themselves so briskly,—capturing the colours of three Spanish Companies,—that the foes retired to their fort. Next day (17th of July) there was a sortie by the garrison, who, to the number of "six or seven hundred," behaved with considerable spirit, but were driven back by the French; the Spaniards losing many men and throwing down their arms on the field.³ The Governor of the fort and two of the principal officers were killed.⁴ On the French side many suffered from sword wounds, of which, however, only one officer died.⁵

King Antonio then took up his quarters at Laguna.⁶ Various persons came in with white flags; and on the morrow there arrived in camp on behalf of the inhabitants of the city an envoy requesting audience of Strozzi, to assure him how willing they were to "receive their Prince and employ themselves in his service." They reported the Spanish garrison in the fort as not above 1,200. Whereon it was decided to camp nearer the city: arranging to keep strong guard in case of attempts from the fort. The Spaniards sallied out several times, but were repelled with heavier loss to themselves than to the French.

The same day King Antonio, in the midst of his army, received officers and inhabitants who "from all parts of the island" came to make submission, bringing him "*en signe d'obeyssance toutes les bandures avec offre des clefs*"; and expressing gratitude to him for coming in person. They made him many promises of devotion, being confident of favourable treatment at his hands.⁷

But the fort was so strong that there was no hope of reducing it without artillery; so the next move was to land guns from the ships. While this was in process, a pinnace was taken by the French near Villa Franca, bringing a Captain from the Marqués de Santa Cruz to inform the Spanish garrison of his intended

¹ "Le () de Juillet," the date is left blank; but the 15th is given in Simancas MS. 431.

² "la descente estoit fort fascheuse, la mer estant haulte, de sorte que la plus grande partie des bataulx qui portoient les hommes furent rompue et perdue a la coste sur la Roche." (Ib.)

³ "perdirent beaucoup d'hommes, plusieurs armes quittees sur le champ." (S.P.F. VIII. 51.)

⁴ Ib:

⁵ Information given to the Marqués de Santa Cruz a week later was that Don Antonio on the 16th had landed "up to 3000 men"; and that Don Lorenzo Noguera had met him with 4 Companies of Spanish Infantry, and a Company of Basque Harquebusiers; and the odds of numbers had been such that the Spaniards were repulsed, losing 20 Castilians, 12 Basques, and Noguera himself mortally wounded. Unpublished Simancas MS. 431.

⁶ Villa de Laguna is marked on Teisera's "*Insula St. Michaelis*" in printed map of "*Açores Insulæ*," 1584.

⁷ S.P.F. VIII. 51

approach. The letters intercepted included one from King Philip ordering the Marqués to make for St. Michael's, join his army to the troops already in the island, and there await the arrival of 17 (or 19) large ships and 12 galleys which were being sent from Seville. When this fleet and his own had effected their junction he was to give battle to Antonio's Navy.¹

The version received by Lord Burghley via Paris afterwards was

"Monzr de Strosso having at his arrival at the Isles of Assore, taken that of St. Michell (being one of the chiefest and held by the Spaniards), having vanquished at his Landinge all the ennemies, . . . except between nyne hundreth and a Thousand soldiours the w^{ch} retired themselves within the fort," Strozzi "*having also taken foure greate shippes of the eleven w^{ch} the kinge of Spaine had sent thither before wth seven or eight hundreth men*" to reinforce his garrison, "the residue of the said shippes being abandoned and broken on the shore," Strozzi "had intelligence howe the spanishe armie² cam forward; which was the occasion he left the enterprise of forcing the fort, . . ."³

As to relative numbers of the fleets, the Italian "*Istoria*" is vague on the Spanish side: the Marqués de Santa Cruz being depicted as commanded by King Philip in the spring to "arme all the great ships he could, and to prepare some galleis," eighteen "Biscaine galleis," and "a goodly number of boats" for landing. The fleet of the French is given at "three score and ten." What is not mentioned is that of the few French "greate shippes" the largest were between 700 and 800 tons; the most part being smaller vessels, and some only victuallers and transports.

According to the French estimate, as the Spanish fleet became visible it was reckoned to consist of 34 or 35 ships (tonnage not specified), 7 or 8 being "great galleons" of 500 to 700 tons; others of 300, 400 and 200 tons respectively, and more ships to the number of 20.⁴

On sailing from Lisbon on the 10th of July the Spanish officer who recorded "*Lo sucedido al Armada de Su Mgd*" gave the figures at "28 ships and 5 small pinnaces."⁵ With these, Santa Cruz had received order to sail, "without waiting for

¹ S.P. France, VIII. 51. In the unpublished Spanish narrative (Simancas, 431 de Estado) a Spanish officer (unnamed) relates that on Sunday 22 July the fleet under the Marqués anchored at Villa Franca in St. Michael's. The previous day the Marqués had sent ahead of the fleet two small vessels under Captain Aguirre with a letter enumerating the 5,500 Spanish soldiers he had afloat, with 1,800 from Flanders, and 200 "gentlemen and private persons. The writer refers to the other fleet in "Cadiz" describing it as: "19 large ships, 2 galleons, 2 pinnaces and 12 galleys, with a further 5,000 Foot," including five more Companies from Flanders. Not until Santa Cruz asked for news of the French fleet, which he intended to "seek" did he hear of the capture of Captain Aguirre with his letters.

² and fleet.

³ Unpublished Lansdowne MS. 100.5. "A copy of that which passed . . . as well by the advertisements w^{ch} the Kinge of Spaine hath sent unto his ambassador resident here in France as of mon^s Fournicon Secretarie to Mon^s Strosso . . ."

⁴ No punctuation here; the last few words are "Autres de quatre trois et deux cent tonneaux et plus en nombres de vingt." (S.P. France. VIII. 51).

⁵ Simancas MS. 431. The report sent to Ld. Burghley specifies "XXVIII shippes" of war, two of which were galleons and six "verie greate." Lansdowne MS. 100.5.

the 19 ships, 12 galleys, and 2 pinnaces which were fitting out and making ready in Andalusia."¹

In that the orders from King Philip were that Santa Cruz was to effect a junction with the second fleet and then give battle, Strozzi's best hope of victory was by drawing Santa Cruz to fight before the fleets could combine.

Let us now join the Spanish forces, and see events from aboard the flagship San Martin.² Having been driven out of his course by adverse weather from the 10th to 13th July, Santa Cruz was not aware of the movements of his adversary. On Saturday the 21st when he came in sight of St. Michael's, he did not know that Dom Antonio, already in possession, was watching his approach and had decided to try his fortune by sea before the Spaniards could land.

The next day, Sunday 22nd, King Philip's fleet anchored before Villa Franca, "a town of 500 houses. . . The previous day the Marqués had despatched ahead of the fleet two pinnaces under Captain Aguirre," and "warned Aguirre to have great care" if he saw any of the enemy's fleet "not to go alongside any ship nor suffer any to approach the pinnaces," but to get ashore quickly and deliver the letters to the Governor of Villa Franca.

". . . Now when the Marqués arrived with his fleet at Villa Franca, one of the caravels that had been left in Lisbon to bring the horses, came with news to the flagship that the previous day three of the ships from Lisbon had reached Villa Franca, and gone to sea again.³ Also that a caravel with them, carrying officers' horses, had been captured. The bringer of the tidings had narrowly escaped after being chased by a French ship. On hearing all this, the Marqués sent a few private persons to get information in the island and at Villa Franca; *but they were not allowed to land*; being fired upon with harquebuses." Though a priest told them that the island was for King Philip, and that there was no news of the enemy, they learnt from the master of one of Aguirre's two pinnaces

¹ "con 28 naos 5 pataxes pequeños por tener orden de su m^{gd} de partir con esta armata sin esperar a las 19 naos, 2 galeones, 12 galeres y 2 patajes que se aprestaron y puiseron en orden en el Andalusia," &c. Unpublished Simancas MS. 431; (confirming S.P. France VIII. 51). From Lisbon word was sent to England that the Spanish fleet which had sailed thence for the Azores consisted of 30 great ships, 20 caravells, and 10 great barges; and that it was to be reinforced at Cape St. Vincent for forty sail more, coming from San Lucar. Dr. Hector Nunes to Lord Burghley, from London, 9 Aug: 1582. 1 p. Hatfield MSS. Cal. III. p. 513 (No. 1185 Abstract).

² Ensuing details from unpublished Simancas MS. 431 de Estado, "*Lo sucedido al Armada de Su Mg^d de que es Capitan General el Marqués de Santa Cruz en la batalla que dio a la Armada de Francia que la traia Don Antonio en las yslas de los Açores.*" Apparently written by a military officer, not by a seaman.

There does not appear to be at Simancas any letter of Santa Cruz himself to King Philip; but in writing to the Secretary Antonio de Ereso, after the battle, Santa Cruz refers him to a *Relacion* which most likely was the MS. now to be quoted. It is judged at Simancas that No. 431 is not the original but a contemporary copy. It appears to be the most reliable authority for the figures on the Spanish side.

³ These ships seem identical with those captured by the French.

that "a French ship and boats from the land had taken Captain Aguirre with his pinnace," (in which were the Marqués's letters).¹

"*The Marqués [then] understood that the island had rebelled*"; and he sent for Don Lope de Figueroa, who commanded the Army, to "discuss a sudden landing at Villa Franca to obtain water." He chose selected officers to reconnoitre; but then "the look-out men in the top of the flag-galleon began to descry sail near Punta Delgada" (the principal town and fortress on the island).²

"As it seemed to the Marqués this might be the enemy's fleet," he abandoned his intention to land at Villa Franca, and set his course towards Punta Delgada." "Then more sail hove in sight, until it became clear that this must be Don Antonio's fleet . . ."

Santa Cruz at once conferred with Don Pedro de Toledo.³ A Council of War was called, to consider whether to fight or temporise. But Strozzi, by getting to the scene of action first, had not left the Spaniards much choice. As related, three years after, in the "*Istoria*,"

"The Castillian armie had no place of retreat, to return backe they could not without great danger, to get the wind of the French there was no means; for with their lighter shippes and easier to turne with the wind, they might chase, flie, fight, and retire, . . . at their pleasure. So the Spanish Captaines framing

¹ As to whether Captain Aguirre's vessel should be rendered *pinnace* or *bark*,—or (as in the "*Historie of the Uniting*," 1600,) "*caravel*,"—in Elizabethan English the Spanish *pataxe*, *pataje*, becomes *patache* (Hatfield MSS. Cal: vi. 61), a term which remained in use up to 1748: Anson's Voyage, "a patache of 20 guns." Whereas Corbett "*Drake and the Tudor Navy*" (1898) translated *pataxe* sometimes as *bark*, sometimes as *rowing frigate*, sometimes *pinnace*, and occasionally *tender* (I, 204, 189, II, 214, &c.), the word *pinnace* will be used in the present work, though neither *pinnace* or *patache* are absolutely definite terms.

John Drake deposed before the Inquisition that Captain Francis Drake's fleet for the circumnavigation expedition was "quatro navios y un *pataxe pequeño* de diez y siete toneladas"; and we read "que se dixo llamar Juan Draque y ser Capitan de un *Patáx*. . . ." "Y el *Pataxe* venia sin gente de Guerra y el *pataxe* traia algunos Bases." "*The Family and Heirs of Sir Francis Drake*," II, 363, 343. "Bases," p. 383, are defined as breach-loading pieces of secondary armament.

² "*Don Lope de Figueroa Maestre de Campo general del exercito . . . lengua en Villafranca, . . . los de la gavia del galeon capitana empezaron a descubrir navios a la parte de Punta Delgada.*"

³ "*El Maestre de Campo general.*" No exact modern equivalent to this in English. Don Pedro seems to have performed duties analogous to those of an Elizabethan Marshal of the Army, who did the work now executed by the Chief of the General Staff. Don Pedro de Toledo y Osorio was only son of Don Garcia de Toledo who had relieved Malta in 1565. His mother was D. Vittoria Colonna. His sister Doña Maria de Toledo was wife of Don Fadrique, eldest son of the Great Duke of Alba. He is described in the "*Historia General del Mundo*," 1612, as "*a Captain worthy of eternal fame*," having served Philip II with great valour on every possible occasion, especially in the wars of Flanders and Portugal and the Islands." He succeeded his father as 5th Marqués of Villa Franca, 2nd Duke of Fernandina, and Prince of Montalban. Having been Captain-General of the Squadron of the Galleys of Naples under Philip II, he was Philip III's Captain General of the armies in the State of Milan, 1618: and in the later wars as in the earlier he displayed "*the great valour he had inherited from his ancestors*." He was twice married: (1) to Dona Elvira de Mendoza: (2) to his cousin the Duchess of Terranova, but by her he had not any children. "*Noticias de la Gran Casa de los Marqueses de Villafranca*," etc. Naples, 1676. (His son, the 5th Marqués, commanded an expedition to the Barbary Coast in 1586, and was Admiral of Naples in or before 1595).

their opinions according to the necessitie” declared it would be best to give battle.¹

Ordering “ the battle flag to be hoisted ” and a piece of artillery to be fired as a signal, the Marqués selected two Captains to go through the whole fleet with his orders. “ The ships and galleons were to form one front, the galleon St. Matthew on the right of the flagship [Saint Martin] and the other great ship on the left.”²

The martial officers in the flagship, including some Portuguese and Milanese, were drafted to their respective stations, with harquebusiers and musketeers; the decks were cleared for action; gunners with handspikes were told off to each piece of great artillery on the lower and upper decks, each gunner having six “ assistants.” Seventeen cannons and culverins were planted on the lower deck; and seventeen “ large and small pieces ” ranged on the upper deck. A Captain was appointed to take charge of the powder. A skiff was lowered for carrying orders, to wait astern of the flag-galleon; and four small craft (*pataches*) were ordered to remain astern of the St. Martin for the same purpose. Elaborate preparations were made in case fire should break out.³

“ Twenty basketsful of hand stones ” were ordered “ to be taken from the ballast, and ten sacksful hoisted to the mast tops, the rest being divided between the forecastle and sterncastle. All pikes, javalines and spontoons in the galleon were to be brought on deck, . . . ” And “ Captains Merolin and Rodrigo de Vargas, being seafaring men and having great experience, were bidden to attend to the Artillery, and also intervene ” elsewhere when required.

With “ great readiness and good will ” all these preparations were completed, relates the Spanish officer: and “ to the shrill note of the fifes and the beating of drums our fleet set out, with colours flying, to attack the enemy, who came on with the same purpose in good order.”

But neither side could carry out this intention, for the wind suddenly dropped, keeping the foes apart; and separating some of the Spanish ships from their own consorts.

Obliged to remain out at sea for lack of wind, Santa Cruz had no further news of what was happening in the island, until “ at the fourth hour of the night ” a Basque shipmaster in a pinnace brought him this note ensuing:—

“ The fleet of Don Antonio consists of 58 sail, 28 large and the rest small, and carries aboard 6000 Frenchmen. If our fleet is not strong enough to fight the enemy, it can anchor under this fortress which is for the King our Lord. And *your Excellency must be aware of the great risk entailed if the battle were to be lost.* Don Juan de Castillo.”

¹ “ *Hist: of the Vniting,* ” etc. p. 285. Confirmed in Simancas MS. 431. Important to note these details, as they completely upset a recent criticism upon this battle, answered, App: A.

² “ *la horden de vatalla que fue de una frente de las naos y galeones poniendo a los lados de la Capitana al derecho al galeon Sant Mateo en que ban el maestre de campo general y el veedor general y al siniestra la nao en que va el maestro de campo general don Francisco de Vouadella,* ” etc. Simancas MS. 431.

³ Described in detail. Marginal note in another hand “ All this to be rewritten and abridged ” (*Todo esto se reforme y acorte*).

(This was the fortress which had formerly resisted Antonio when he summoned it to yield on the 16th).

Santa Cruz sent the shipmaster back with a cheerful letter announcing that he commanded a powerful fleet, and trusted that with God's help he would give battle the next day and defeat the enemy. Meanwhile Castillo was admonished to be "content" that his services would be reported and rewarded.

"The following day, Monday the 23rd," relates the Spanish officer, "the two fleets were again ranged in battle formation"; the French fleet "having the wind and sun in its favour, bore down upon ours in three squadrons. This manoeuvre it repeated thrice during the day, but did not carry out the attack. Towards evening, as the Spanish fleet was coming on a seaward course, the French detached ten ships, to take it in the rear that night from the side of the island. But the wind having died down, they were unable to make headway; and on Tuesday the 24th they turned back and rejoined their fleet. On the wind being in their favour they twice came on, . . . but each time withdrew landwards without having pushed home the attack."¹

The Spaniards, despite their vigilance, were unaware that Strozzi and Brissac together in a small boat came close to them at night to reconnoitre.² As the story soon afterwards reached France and England through Dom Antonio's men, when "Santa Cruz was seen to arrive in the roade of the Isle of St. Michell," and "some of our shippes" went "out to meet his squadrons," "prevoking them the space of foure or five days," it was "presumed" the Spaniards were not then anxious to fight, but were waiting for the Andalusian fleet. In the Spanish narrative, written (though not dated) day by day, we should examine with special care the portions marginally noted in another hand "*Leave out the whole of this chapter.*"³ It reveals that the position of Santa Cruz was not enviable:

" . . . Out of the 10 transports of our fleet, two, carrying Germans, are missing; it seems they returned to Spain, being afraid of the enemy fleet; for the same fear was observed in some of the transports that remained. Nor did the three ships which left Lisbon after the fleet had sailed, catch up with it. *So the Marqués is left with only 25 ships, including the two galleons.*

"The fleets sail in sight of each other. It looks as if the enemy is trying to gain some advantage or seeking an opportunity to destroy our fleet. . . . *his superiority in ships is very great.*

"*The Marqués contents himself with keeping them engaged so that they shall not take the fleets from India and New Spain; for he has no ships that could sail against theirs, as all the vessels of the enemy are great sailers. Thus he is longing for the arrival of the galleys and ships from Andalusia; as with them are coming two galleons which are good sailers.*

"There have been three days of calm, in which the 12 galleys would have done much had they been here; but *still greater results would have been achieved if the people of Villa Franca had informed the Marqués that the enemy fleet was at Punta Delgada*, the crews ashore, and the castle (held) for His Majesty: for they could have gone and attacked the

¹ Simancas MS. 431. The French *Discours*, S.P.F. VIII. 51, passes from 19th July to "*Le Mardi 24 jour de juillet.*"

² "*au soir Messieurs destroce et de brissac dans ung bateau Reconnoistre de fort pres larmee de lennemy.*" S.P. France VIII. 51.

³ "*Saltar est capitulo todo.*"

fleet at anchor; and the Spaniards holding the Castle could have killed many men as they withdrew to their ships."¹

It was too late to repine; but Santa Cruz was pleased "to see the spirit animating his men, . . . each in his appointed place, defiant of the enemy's guns and eager to come to close quarters . . . Great and powerful is the French fleet, but it seems that the prestige and reputation of His Majesty's fleet is greater."²

The ancient axiom in warfare "*Never do what the enemy wants,*" was remembered by Strozzi. Understanding that Santa Cruz was trying to delay the battle, it was the more urgent for King Antonio's fleet to attack as soon as the wind permitted. Strozzi's entire Council of War agreed as to the urgency of immediate action; and (as related to Lord Burghley) it was commanded that "*foure of oure shippes were . . . to chardge and assaile eche of them one of the greate vessells of the ennemie:* so as everie one of them understood what they had to do."³

The Order of Battle was set down in writing, and signed first by Strozzi, then by the Comte de Brissac, and all "the principall Capitaines."⁴

"The xxvj of Julie . . . Monz^r de Strosso went in the morning from shipp to shipp, to exhort everie one to do theire best endeavours, shewing unto them howe the occasion w^{oh} they had so longe desired was come, to fight with the spanish armie."⁵

There was excellent hope of success in the encounter, and a good prospect of intercepting the Spanish fleets from Peru; and so returning to France "with much honour and riches." The words of Strozzi drew forth assurances from his officers that they had come from France "to no other intent" than "to follow him (as they said)."

He answered that he would lead the onset, relying upon their vigorous and *united support*"; and "so soone as he was re-entered into the shipp which he had chosen to fight in, he went towards the ennemy with a marvailous resolution . . ."

Let us now look at "*The Explanation of the true and lawful Right . . . of Anthonie . . . King of Portugall, concerning his warres against Philip, king of Castile, . . . for the recoverie of his Kingdom,*" as Englished in October 1585:

" . . . the six and twentieth of Julye the Lorde Strossi having sette his armie in order, determind himself first of all to aborde th'ennemie: and therefore Comming out of a greate and mightie ship of seven hundred tonnes which served for th' admirall of his armye, he shipped himselfe with the Constable, and many

¹ Observe all this closely; for it completely upsets the criticisms launched against Strozzi in 1927 in England. Answered App: A.

² The words, "What may further befall the two fleets that lie in sight of each other will be duly notified," are marginally annotated "*This also to be struck out*": and we see the narrative was not a retrospective summary, but written day by day.

³ Lansdowne MS. 100. 5 (unpublished). Based on news brought to Paris by the Secretary to whom Strozzi dictated the Order.

⁴ Ib. Important to notice this.

⁵ The word "armie" is used throughout where we would say "fleet."

gentlemen as well Frenchmen as Portugalls in another shippe of smaller burthen which sailed well."

"The Constable" was Francis, Count of Vimioso, who had fought at Alcacer, and whose father had been killed in that disastrous battle. Vimioso, created by Dom Antonio Lord High Constable of Portugal, was hoping soon to exercise the office in something more than name. A brilliant scion of a famous family, he was disdainful of gold and eager for honour; and his virtues were his doom.

The previous autumn, Walsingham from Paris had deplored to Burghley the tendency of Vimioso to put blind faith in French promises; which our Principal Secretary had prayed might not lure King Antonio to his overthrow.¹ Walsingham's apprehensions were soon to be justified; but in the opening phases of the battle Strozzi had the advantage. For the first three hours, victory was with the French. Throughout the fourth hour the issue hung in the balance. During the fifth, the fortune of war was entirely changed.

The sequence of events we must see from the one side and the other in turn. On the 24th July the calm continued. Both fleets discharged "vollies of great shot" but could not seriously injure each other, in that the wind prevented their being able to get to close enough range. The 25th, the feast of St. James, passed in the same inconclusive fashion; and it was not until the 26th, St. Anne's Day, that the wind arose.

At daybreak Strozzi put his ships in order of battle; and by noon he and Comte de Brissac had begun the attack, "*accompanied with three English ships, followed with all the rest of the fleet.*"

The happenings of several hours are compressed in King Antonio's *Explanation* into a few lines: Strozzi "having overcome and sonken certen of th' ennemies shippes he set so fiercelye uppon the . . . vice-admirall conducted by Don Lopes de Figueroa that he slewe about sixe hundred spanyardes therein and had it rendered to him."

This was the *Saint Matthew*. The name we should remember, as we will hear of her again.⁴ According to the "*Istoria*," her misfortune was that she got under the lee of Strozzi's ship; and, not being able to use her sails, was tormented with such a "stream" of "fire and shot" that her case seemed desperate. But her Captain "being a man of great valour, accompanied with expert soldiers" put up a gallant defence, even after he was assailed by four ships at once.

By this time all the fighting was at very close range, artillery on both sides playing a large part. The principal conflict as yet had been between this galleon *Saint Matthew* (Don Lope de Figueroa) and Admiral-General Philip Strozzi.

¹ "*The Compleat Ambassador*," 1655. p. 434.

² "*Hist: of the Vniting*," etc. p. 228. This is not to say that only three English ships were in the fleet, but that three were recognised as English.

³ *Op. cit.* p. 4.

⁴ In 1596: her capture by the Earl of Essex.

The noise and concussion of the artillery were such that in the *Saint Matthew* a Spanish priest, Chaplain to the Marshal of the Army, died without a wound, simply of shock.¹ "Much wild fire" was "cast by the French"; and Strozzi, boarding the *Saint Matthew*, took and burnt her sails and tackling, threw her anchors overboard; and was in the act of accepting the surrender of Figueroa, when the cup of victory was dashed from his lips: he being "at the very same instant . . . so furiously assailed by the marquis of saint Crosse himselfe (coming in a very great and strong ship called the galeon saint Martin)," that he who had appeared the master of the situation was soon to be brought to a plight worse than that whereto he had reduced Figueroa in the *Saint Matthew*.

It was then that Strozzi's Vice-Admiral "the Lorde of Sansolemne," with his whole squadron, and "the lorde of Fumei, capitaine of five shippes," instead of coming to his rescue, remained callously watching a tremendous bombardment concentrated upon him.

Following Santa Cruz in the *Saint Martin* came many "other ships"; until Strozzi was "compassed round," and so battered with artillery that after keeping up the contest for "aboute an houre" longer, his ship, being "shot through in divers places, began to sinke visibly."²

All this time his Vice-Admiral, Sansolemne, held aloof. At the juncture when an uninjured squadron coming into the fight should have restored the advantage to the French, there is no excuse for Sansolemne, that he, with the other traitor, Fumei, kept out of the conflict. When after about an hour they saw that Strozzi's ship was riddled with shot, they "retyred with twentie shippes" to Terceira.

Far other was the conduct of General the Comte de Brissac. While Strozzi was fighting his last fight, Brissac had made a brave defence against three Spanish ships, until his own, "much torne and broken," could no longer be kept afloat. He and others then took to the boats, and managed to get to "the next French ship" just as his own ship sank.³

There he continued the contest. Not until he was severely wounded, and his position hopeless from "the losse of many of his men, and his shippes in evil plight," did he think of retiring; and not then until he saw "that *he laboured in vaine . . . not seconded by others*."⁴

Upon his memory no slur of dishonour rests. As to the others who, unwounded and in their full strength, deliberately forsook their Admiral-General, we shall hear more later.

"The fight had continued five hours, when as the French seeing their General yeelded, their Admirall lost, two others sunke, and many broken with

¹ "Historie of the Vniting," etc. p. 292.

² Louis de Mayerne Turquet: "*The Generall Historie of Spaine*," first written in 1583, published 1586. English version. London, 1612. Lib. 30. p. 1223.

³ Ib: p. 1223.

⁴ *Explanation*, 1585. p. 41.

artillerie, they began to flie; *but the Marquis by reason of the night pursued them not, fearing for that they were better sailors he should not [be able to] board them.*"¹

Another interpretation is that as the twenty ships under Sansoleme had been "corrupted by King Philip," it was not necessary to chase them."²

The officers of the squadron which forsook Strozzi at the crucial moment, proceeded, on arrival in France, to account for their own flight by throwing the blame on him. Knowing him to be severely wounded, and in the hands of the enemy, with the Conde de Vimioso also prisoner, and being aware that Dom Antonio did not intend an immediate return but was planning to re-capture Madeira, they had a clear stage upon which to tell their story. Without too blatant expression of hostility towards their late Commander, it was not difficult to paint him as unpopular in the fleet and army. The Captain of his "great ship" is depicted as resenting Strozzi's transference of his Flag to a smaller vessel before the fight,—absurdly calling this the "forsaking of many honest men."

The news of the defeat on July 26th reached France about the 20th of August; but not till the 26th of September did Queen Elizabeth's Ambassador, Sir Henry Cobham, when writing to Sir Francis Walsingham from Paris, send him

"the discourse of the action and battle on the sea happened between the Spaniards and the French, the which when you have used I beseech you it may be returned to me, for to serve for mine owne use and remembrance."³

As to the last phase of the battle, the discourse correctly stated that the Marqués de Santa Cruz came in "*frais et bon de voile*," attacking "*ledit sieur destrosse . . . saisit pardessous de vent*," and

"gave him such a volley of cannon and harquebus-fire that the greater number of those who had been left alive were killed. And thus the Lord Strozzi was captured and carried away; and up to the present we do not know if he is dead or living." They said then, however, that he was "wounded with harquebussades."

"Neither do we know for certain if the Lord Constable is alive or dead."⁴

¹ *History of the Uniting*, etc. p. 292. ² *Ib.*

³ Orig: S.P. France VIII. 50. It was not returned.

It is S.P.F. VIII. No. 51, enclosed in No. 50. There is no heading. The MS begins with the departure of the Fleet: "*Le Sesieme de Juing 1580 feist voyle et partit de Belle Isle l'armee de mer Francoyse leuee pour les affaires du Royne de Portugal . . .*" When transcribed in a small compact modern hand from the original, it covers 16 folio pages averaging 340 words to a page. There is an endorsement in Portuguese "*Enformação de batallia que armada de fra(n)ca tene co a de Castella*," from which the inference is that it was given by the writer to King Antonio's agent in Paris to hand to the English Ambassador according to the usual procedure. It has now been closely studied from the original French.

⁴ (S.P.F. VIII. 51.) "*. . . luy donna tell vollée de Canon et harquebuzades que la plupart de ce qui estoit Reste vivant fust tué et ainsi fus prise et enleve ledit sieur destrosse: et Jusques au Jourdhuy ne savons sil est mort ou vif. Bien dict on alors quil fust blessé de harquebuzades. Non plus scavons nous au certain de la vie ou mort dudit sieur Connestable.*"

The writer was not in a position to know; having been one of those who remained passively watching the "*vollée de Canon et harquebuzades*." We will learn more from Spaniards: but let us see first how the runaway ends the story:

"Quelques aultres tiroient aussi quelques Coups de Canon et harquebuzades passant la meslée. Mais tout y a que de quarante sept ou quarante huit voiles qui estoit en (l')armée les Sieur strosses et de brissac dont est vray que la meilleure partie estoit de petit port. Il ne sen trouve plus de huict ou neuf qui ayent faict debuir de Combatre: *Chose qui monstre assez quil y en avoit de peu affectionez.*"

Thus the narrator abruptly ends.

In a naval battle the point is not whether the officers of any squadron are personally well-affected to the Admiral; the business of all squadrons is to obey orders to combine and defeat the foe. After a general attack is arranged and the Order signed in Council, when the Vice-Admiral's squadron and other ships watch the fight as if in no way concerned, *and are permitted by the victorious enemy thus to stand inactive*, this speaks for itself. Had Sansolemne not been a traitor, it would have been natural for him to lead his twenty ships to reinforce Strozzi in the last hour of the battle. To remain idle, and allow Strozzi to be bombarded till his ship was sinking, and then for Sansolemne to depart with a whole squadron, *no man pursuing*, is a form of "tactics" which should not be glossed over. But seldom has any Commander in a losing battle kept up a more gallant defence than Philip Strozzi; and it was not until, "sore wounded with a musket shot above the knee," he was unable any longer to lead and hearten the broken remnant of his men, that he surrendered, and was carried to the victor's flagship the *Saint Martin*.

As the story was afterwards told, when the winners "past with him from one vessel to the other," a Spanish or German common soldier thrust the wounded and defenceless Admiral through the body with his sword; and "in this estate" Strozzi "was laid before the Marqués de Santa Cruz; who made no account of him," but "turned his head to the other side"; whereon Strozzi was cast "into the sea yet breathing."

The Spanish official "*Relacion*" is tantalisingly brief as to "*Felipe estroc gran Marichal del rrey de francia y su Capitan general del armada y exercito*": his end being dismissed in two lines: *he "was taken prisoner wounded by a harquebus shot, and later as they brought him to the Marqués he died."*

Two years later a semi-official French publication "*Les Portraits et les Vies des Hommes Illustres*" described Strozzi's valour as "indomitable"; he only having surrendered "after the greater number of the French who had followed him were broken and put to flight." (Nothing is said about the Squadron which did not "follow him" but ran away.)

According to the French narrator, Strozzi's harquebus wound was not mortal.

¹ *Gen: Hist: of Spaine* (1586), 1612. p. 1223 E.

² "*prendiose herido de un arcabucazo y luego como la traxeron al marqués murio.*" *Simancas, Estado*, 431. f. 4.

The deadly blow was given "*de sang froid*" by "*un coup d'espée*" after his capitulation. But the author of "*Des Hommes Illustres*" who also received particulars of the battle from "*Seigneurs et Capitaines*" who fought in it, only makes it "*après la mort du Seigneur Strossi*" that "*l'Espagnol pour tombeau lui donna la mer.*"¹

Those who fled to France were in no case to describe the death of Strozzi: *having departed while he was still alive*; and those who stayed with him never came back to France.

The belief that he perished not fairly but by a wound given in cold blood remained current among the French and Portuguese till the end of the next century.² But as Lord Burghley via Paris was informed that Santa Cruz had testified strongly to Strozzi's "valor and resolution"³ it appears the less probable that Santa Cruz would have behaved in the manner alleged: although (as we shall see) he certainly treated Strozzi's officers in a fashion his own Staff considered contrary to the rules of *buena guerra*. The only prisoner to whom he was gracious was Francis Count of Vimioso, alleged to have been "embraced by the Marqués as if he had been his kinsman"; but "being wounded unto the death," he "lived only two days."⁴

We may infer Vimioso to have known nothing of a "Confession" afterwards circulated in his name, representing him as divulging the plans of Dom Antonio and the King of France, and urging "the Kynges Maigesty of Spain" to prevent the "great harme" likely to be done by "Dom Antony." There is a statement as to "secret intelligence" received by Antonio from "the most partes of portingall" that the people meant to rise in his favour as soon as he could come to them "with souldyers and navey."⁵

¹ "*Les Portraits et Vies des Hommes Illustres, Grecq, Latin, et Payens . . . antiques et Modernes. Par André Thevet Angoumoisyn: A Paris . . . 1584. Tome II. p. 479.*" With a rough woodcut of Strozzi.

² In 1696 the circumstances were related thus by Madame de Saintonge, a grand-niece of Cyprian de Figueiredo who from 1578 to 1582 had been Governor of the Azores: "*(l'Amiral Strossy) se defendant long-tems, mais avec des forces trop inégales pour n'y pas succomber . . . blessé et fait prisonnier, on le porta dans le Gallion du Marquis de Saint Croix, ou il receut encore un coup d'espée qu'un Soldat lui donne par dessous le Pont de corde . . . et la cruauté du Marquis de Saint Croix alla si loin qu'il fit jeter dans la mer l'Amiral Strossy avant qu'il fut expiré . . .*" "*Hist: de Dom Antoine, Roy de Portugal,*" etc. B.M. 611.b.30. pp. 83-84.

³ Unpublished Lansdowne MS. 100. 5.

⁴ "*Istoria.*" 1585 ("*Hist: of the Vniting,*" etc. 1600). According to unpublished Spanish *Relacion* (Simancas MS. 431). "The Count of Vimioso who styled himself Constable of Portugal," was "taken prisoner wounded by a harquebus shot and a sword-thrust, and died on the flagship the day after the battle." ("*Prendiose herido de arcabucços y una estocada; murio en la Capitana otro dia despues de la vatalla.*")

⁵ "*The Declaracyon and Confessyon made by the Earell of Vemyoso 2 owers beffore he dyead by the persuation of his Father*" (Father Confessor) "*Sir Frawncis maldontho of the order of the graye Frieres.*" No date. Unpublished Lansdowne MS. 53. 35. f.75. Though the battle of the Islands was fought in 1582, someone has added a pencil note "1587." In the copy in the Venetian Archives (Cal: S.P.V. 1581-91, No. 106) also headed as a Confession made two hours before Vimioso's death, it is dated "27 July 1582." But the battle was fought on St. Anne's Day, which was the 26th: and Vimioso lived two days longer. He therefore died on the 28th.

This attempt to make it seem as if King Antonio's Lord High Constable and dearest friend had betrayed him, was sent to Venice.¹ It is noteworthy that the "*Istoria*" printed at Genoa and Venice says nothing of any alleged Declaration or Confession; but with reluctant admiration admitted "Francis of Portugall Count of Vimioso" to have been "*more honorable than any of those who have followed Anthonie unto this day*"; adding that he was "young indeed, with good parts, both of bodie and minde," and "by nature amiable"; but "*obstinate*." Hardly the way it would be possible to describe a man who when taken prisoner had accommodated his captors by betraying to them the projects by which his native Monarch hoped to achieve restoration.²

The "*Istoria*" animadverts on Vimioso's "childish vanitie"; meaning his daring in 1580 to forfeit his all, rather than grudge the sacrifice of his possessions and the loss of personal and domestic happiness in a cause that he esteemed as sacred. When subsequently he embarked with Strozzi, this was the more courageous as he, being one of the exceptions to King Philip's Amnesty, was certain, if captured, that a rebel's death would be his portion. So the adversary's rebuke of his "obstinacy" is the best tribute to his constancy.

The more the "*Declaracyon and Confessyon*" is examined, the less relation it bears to Vimioso; especially as the writer thereof makes him speak "*with some of them w^{ch} hade fleade away from his shippes*": which he could not have done, for he remained with Strozzi to the last.

As Vimioso fought against Santa Cruz until mortally wounded, we need say no more as to the incongruity of putting his name at the head of a "*Declaracyon*" of zeal for the "maigesty" of Spain and for the frustration by the "Lorde Markous" (Marqués) of the plans of Antonio, for whom he laid down his life.

Though for the Count of Vimioso and for Dom Antonio there could be no

¹ But by whom is not clear: for Cal: S.P. Venetian, 1581-91, No. 106, merely describes it as enclosed "In the despatch of September 3rd," not explaining from whom and where was the despatch; which is not given. So far as can be judged from abstract in the Calendar, the "Confession" is the same as that in Lansdowne MS. 53. 35.

² "Declaringe also that the same navy was prepared for to watche for the shippes of Calycouthe" (Calcutta) "And also to spoyle the shippes of novey Spain . . . and afterwards to take the possession of the Iell of Sant Michel for to kepe the Ieland wth the reaste of the Ielles of assores And also the Iell of Tasseran" (Terceira) "w^{ch} Dom Antonye hathe alredey"

"That the King and Queen of Frawnce are determineade to bringe out of Flanders 30 great holkes and in them 4000 germaines And that the xxxth holkes shall be veary well appoynted and well manead, and he shall shippe in them out of Fraunce 3 or 4 thoussan soldyers. over and above more than 6000 w^{ch} came in these shippes. So thear shall be in all better than 14 thousan menn of warr.

"*That particular men of England did promesse him*" (D. Antonio) *to helpe him wth 40 shippes* Declaread also that his desir was wth all the Foresayd Navey and Menn to goo to Portingall Beinge demaundead by the Lorde Markous whear he did purpose to lande the men he did answer that in the Ielles of Bayona, and by Laingous" And so on. The question about landing is one to which the Marqués, if he had put it to the dying Count of Vimioso, would never have received an answer. The MS reads like an actual confession of some obscure Portuguese, made in order to save his own worthless life by propitiating "the kinges maigesty" of Spain. The fathering of the effusion upon Vimioso may have been an afterthought subsequent to his death. It is totally different from anything he would have said in life.

³ Translation, 1600. p. 291.

illusion as to what their lot would be if captured, the French officers stood in a different position. By no stretch of casuistry could they, the subjects of Henry III of France, be reckoned as Philip II's "rebels." So when they gave up their swords on the decks of the sinking flagship, they expected to be put to ransom. Any Spaniard who had taken prisoner a personage of rank thought himself fortunate; ransoms being proportionate to the quality of the prisoner. Most of the officers would have known the old anecdote of how the French champion Bertrand du Guesclin, on being told that he was worth thirteen lesser men, promptly volunteered to remain prisoner and give his own ransom for the freedom of thirteen poor French soldiers. Many had been the courtesies of prisoners on the one side and the other in the mediaeval wars, as Froissart delightedly described. That to reckon with Spain in 1582 was a different matter, these Frenchmen learnt too late.¹

Cruelties in the sack of a captured city were permitted by the laws of war, provided the city had refused fair offers of capitulation. But in battle by sea or land any officer who voluntarily gave up his sword, believed himself entitled to be free of insult and guaranteed against injury. All he lost was his liberty; and that only until he could be ransomed.

(If every Englishman will look at what follows, as if he were himself one of those Frenchmen who after hard fighting against heavy odds surrendered when their leader was disabled, and if every Englishwoman will picture her husband, brother, or lover in such circumstances, we may get our nation even to-day to understand what their ancestors felt in 1587 on hearing that Santa Cruz was the Admiral selected by King Philip to conduct the invasion of England).

Having landed his wounded at Villa Franca, Santa Cruz disembarked to receive the submission of the inhabitants. He ordered a scaffold to be erected in the market place: wherefrom "with a loud voice was read the sentence of the Marqués." The "most Christian King," he said, "at peace with the most Catholic King," had sent "adventurers" with "Anthony Prior of Crato," in hope both to capture his Catholic Majesty's fleet, which he "expected from the Indies and the Newfoundlands, and to spoile the Islands." But the French "had been broken and overcome"; and he held as his prisoners "*eight and twentie noblemen, and two and fiftie gentlemen, and manie other marriners and souldiers.*"²

¹ The scene ensuing concerns ourselves; for it is the explanation of what Sir Richard Grenville must have had in memory, when nine years later, after fighting off Flores in the Azores for a day and a night, he wished his master-gunner to sink his ship, and fall into the hands of God rather than into the hands of the Spaniards.

² "*Istoria*," 1585; "*Historie of the Vniting*," 1600. Numbers borne out by unpublished Simancas MS. 431. After 12 names of "principal persons, those who were taken prisoners and died, and those who fled" (*Las personas principales que venian en la Armada francesa y las que en ella se prendieron y murieron y los que se huieron*), come the names of 28 "lords of towns and castles taken alive with the fleet and now prisoners": and of 52 "gentlemen prisoners who are not lords of towns or castles" (*Los cavalleros prisioneros que no son señores de villas ni castillos*). The names are so "espanolated" as not to be easy to identify: "Fricto," "Coblal," "Torga," for example. The same MS. reports 313 of the lower ranks, seamen and soldiers, also prisoners (*Mas ay prisioneros marineros y soldadas trecientos y treze*). The list of names of noblemen and gentlemen must have been drawn up immediately after they surrendered.

Whether according to orders previously received from the King, or on his own responsibility, Santa Cruz resolved to strike terror into the Islanders, and also try to deter the French from giving further assistance to Don Antonio. Denouncing his captives as "enemies to the quiet and publike good, disturbers of the trafficke, and favourers of his Majesty's "rebels,"—the "rebels," be it remembered, were defending their own King and country against a foreign power,—he condemned them as "pirates," and commanded the Auditor General of the Army to have them immediately executed: the persons of quality to be beheaded, the others hanged. This he declared would be "convenient both for the service of God and of the two Kings."

The irony of professing to serve the King of France by executing his subjects was manifest; and even the "*Istoria*" of 1585, though defending King Philip's policy at every turn, admits that

"This sentence seemed cruell to all such as heard it, and chiefly unto the Spanish soldiers; both for that they feared the like might happen unto them another day" [by way of reprisal]; as also that they "*did not wish to lose the profit which many expected by the ransome of the saide prisoners.*" And some by "*their own good inclination*" were so shocked that they dared to remonstrate, saying most truly "*that there was no firme and inviolable peace betwixt the Catholic King and most Christian, but warre*"; and that the prisoners they had taken were "*neither pirats nor theeves but valiant soldiers.*"

"*That there was no peace, they proved it by the warres of Flaunders, more hot than ever, . . . and that they were no pirats they proved by the letters patents they had from the King, under which the ships and soldiers were enrolled.* Besides the number and qualitie of these men were such as it appeared clearly" they would not have attempted the war "of themselves, if the King [of France] had not sent them."

Some of "the principall soldiers" of Spain (who had not protested against the fury of the sack of Antwerp in 1576, nor would have hesitated to repeat it), were so dismayed at the prospect of this slaying in cold blood of opponents they knew to be as good officers and as lawfully commissioned as themselves, that they went in a deputation to the Marqués "to make intercession for the lives of their enemies": saying that it did blemish the honour of arms to condemn "valiant souldiers" to be beheaded and hanged: "whereupon they made many requests unto the General, seeking to divert him from that cruel resolution. But he was immovable."¹

"I order . . . the said Lords and gentlemen to be put to death, . . . in public, in sight of this fleet and army, on the scaffold built for the purpose in the market square of Villa Franca. . . And the remaining sailors and soldiers, . . . who are over seventeen years old, to be hanged, some from the yard-arms of the ships,

¹ "*Gen: Hist: of Spaine*" (1586), 1612. p. 1224.

and others on gallows in the town . . . those of under seventeen years to suffer such punishment as I shall decide. . ."¹

"The same day," as afterwards related, to the horror and "pittie" of all spectators, these gentlemen of France "were beheaded upon the scaffold; and the mariners and soldiers hanged in divers places": the dismay of the beholders being the greater because they knew the victims were not only brave warriors "*but Catholique and devout Christians.*"²

The chronicler passes quickly to the results of Strozzi's defeat and death: and the ensuing paragraph reveals anew how reasonable were King Antonio's hopes, and how near he had been in July 1582 to the fulfilment thereof.

"Behold the issue of the sea fight at the Ilands, which possibly is one of the greatest that ever happened within the bounds of the Ocean . . . for besides that not onely the Realme of Portugall by this victorie remained settled" (i.e. subject to King Philip) "but also all Spaine" (was freed from apprehension):

*"if the contrarie had fallen out, all had been full of confusion, for that the French, pursuing their victorie, might with these forces, their good fortune, the presence of Anthony, and the inclination of the people, have renewed the war in Portugal itself."*³

¹ " . . . porque asi conuiene al servicio de Dios," proceeded the Marqués, "*La qual dicha horden se executo en las personas de los dichos señores y caualleros, soldados y marineros el dicho día . . .*" (1st August, 1582). Simancas MS. 431.

² "*Istoria,*" 1585; "*Hist: of the Vniting*" (1600). p. 295. ³ pp. 292-293.

PART II.

“Particularly the Power of Spain.”

CHAPTER 5.

“OUR REALM SHALL BE HIS SANCTUARY.”

SECTION 5.

“The Sea-Fight at the Islands.”

APPENDIX A.

“OF GREAT VALOUR”:

THE LAST FIGHT OF ADMIRAL-GENERAL PHILIP STROZZI,
26TH JULY, 1582.

Recent assertions answered from contemporary sources.

“The marquis” (de Santa Cruz) “hath given great testimonie of Monsr Strosso his vallor and resolution by his l(ett)res written unto the Kinge of Spaine, protesting that he and those which did accompany” him “had slaine 350 Spaniards and hurt 500; and that if half of the French arriving had done the like endeavour, he should have been in daunger to be overcome himself.”

“A copy of that w^{ch} passed in Mons St(r)ozzos defeat, and of his valerous manner of supporting himself.”

Unpublished Lansdowne (Burghley) MS. 100. 5.

Anon: “That which I could gather . . . aswell by the advertisements the King of Spaine hath sent unto his ambassador resident here in France as Mons^r Fournicon secretarie to Mons^r Strosso deceased, who arrived the XVJ of September. . . .” (1582).

“His Majesty . . . conceived great sorrowe . . . for the deathes of the lordes Strossi and the Constable, both lordes of great valor; and took it in very evill parte that Sansolemne and Fumei had so miserablye forsaken them in the battayle.”

“The Explanation . . . of the Right and Title of . . . Anthony . . . King of Portugall concerning his warres against Philip, king of Castile, for the recoverie of his Kingdom . . . 1585.” p. 41.

NOTE ON SPANISH CASUALTIES
IN THE BATTLE OF ST. MICHAELS. 26 JULY, 1582.

(Unpublished Simancas MS. Leg: 431 de Estado).

Considering the crucial nature of this conflict, and the vigorous fighting,—also the use of heavy artillery which considerably damaged the ships,—what must impress us is the relatively small loss in men: only 553 wounded and 224 killed, as reckoned “in his Majesty’s fleet on the day of the battle.” How many of the 553 injured men afterwards died of wounds we do not know. But even had none of the wounded recovered, that such a victory as that of the Marqués de Santa Cruz could have been won for Spain at a total cost of less than 780 men appears astonishing:

“Wounded		Killed
70	In the galleon San Martin, flagship	15
74	In the galleon San Mateo	40
	There are a few others with burns from Greek fire, and some slightly wounded.	
52	In the ship Maria de Guipuzcoa	45
28	„ „ „ San Vicente	27
17	„ „ „ Santa Maria de Yciar	5
5	„ „ „ Buena Ventura	6
27	„ „ „ Juana	13
17	„ „ „ Catalina	13
24	„ „ „ of Oquendo	17
16	„ „ „ San Antonio dc(l) Buen Viaje	15
13	„ „ „ Misericordia	6
13	„ „ „ Nuestra Señora de la Pena de Francia	2
7	„ „ „ San Miguel	
190	In the other ships of the fleet	20
<hr/> 553		<hr/> 224

Thus in His Majesty’s fleet there were five hundred and fifty wounded and two hundred and twenty-four killed.

In all seven hundred and seventy seven 777.”

APPENDIX A.

“OF GREAT VALOUR”: THE LAST FIGHT OF ADMIRAL-GENERAL
PHILIP STROZZI, 26th JULY, 1582.

Recent assertions answered from contemporary sources.

The description of this fight, in which Dom Antonio—by the special wish both of his subjects and his allies—did not take part in person, is exceedingly brief in “*The Explanation*” of his “*Right and Title*” as issued in 1585. But though the language is of studied moderation, one of the few expressions of dismay is in connection with the conduct of “the Lorde of Sansolemne and the lorde of Fumei captaine of five shippes,” who “when they saw the lord Strossi over come retyred with twentie shippes to King Anthony into th’ isle of Tercera. His Majestie uppon notice of th’ ill successe of the battayle, conceived great sorrowe (as he had good cause) and that most specially for the deathes of the lordes Strossi and the Constable,¹ *both lordes of great valor; and tooke it in verye evill parte that Sansolemne and Fumei had so miserablie forsaken them in the battayle.*”

Sansolemne and Fumei “shortly after, by his majesties lycence retyred into Fraunce,” leaving in Tercera “aboute two thousand and five hundred french souldiers for the defence of the King’s person” in case the foe should attack.

“But the Marquis of Sainte Crosse having loste in the battayle aboute two thousand of his best souldiers² durst attempte no further againste th’ island of Tercera, but onely stayed for the fleete whiche came out of the East and West Indyes; and when they were joyned with him he took them under his conduction, and so retired presently towarde Spayne with all his armye.”³

The re-capture of one out of the nine Islands, (and that one not the capital), did not end the contest. That despite the Spanish victory at sea, the Azores except St. Michael’s remained in King Antonio’s possession, and he in safety at Angra in Terceira, was due to the French fleet having sailed from Belleisle in good time to forestall Santa Cruz, and frustrate the project for the Spanish conquest of all the Islands.

Strozzi in 1582 certainly prevented King Philip’s Admiral from making Spain master of the Azores; and even in the 1585 *Istoria* it is admitted that Strozzi gave the Spaniards several hours’ fierce fighting before they captured him.

We have seen how the Spanish victory came about: namely that just as King Philip’s Vice-Admiral de Figueroa was in act of surrendering to Strozzi, the Marqués de Santa

¹ Francis, Count of Vimioso.

² Error. See list of losses opposite.

³ pp. 41-42.

Cruz succeeded in cutting his way through to the rescue of Figueroa who had only seventy men left alive in his great ship.

That instead of coming up to fight Santa Cruz, the squadron of Sansoleme and Fumei stayed idle and watched the bombardment of Strozzi's ship, until she was shot through and through, and Strozzi and Vimioso severely wounded, and that Sansoleme and Fumei then led away twenty uninjured ships to Terceira, at the very time when it was still open to them to have made an effort to redeem the day, should not be forgotten.

Seldom has any brave Commander been more ill-fated than Strozzi; and against his reputation there is nothing that any just man will wish to say. That his last fight was not lost by any faltering of his own is as clear as the noonday, from the enemy's narrative.

Let us, however, observe how the case is treated in a recent English work, claiming "proportion" and "perspective":¹

"A Spanish fleet under the Marques of Santa Cruz" followed "a large armament led by Philip Strozzi"; and "he" (Santa Cruz) "*brought Strozzi to action and annihilated his expedition. Strozzi showed no tactical skill. With only a part of his force in hand he closed with the superior Spanish fleet and was killed with most of his men in a battle of the old mediaeval type.*"

Not one word about his courage; but a scornful finale as to "*Strozzi's suicidal proceedings.*"

The lack of footnote references gives the impression that the author of this paragraph, Mr. James A. Williamson, must have trusted to memory when composing it. No numbers are vouchsafed for the forces on either side; and the matter is so phrased that the reader supposes Santa Cruz to have "brought Strozzi to action" against Strozzi's will: whereas we have seen how Strozzi was at the Islands first, in readiness to give battle; and how Dom Antonio was master of St. Michael's before the Spanish sails loomed on the skyline. It is an advocate for King Philip who in 1585 did not deny that though a Council of War was held by the Spaniards on arrival, to discuss whether to give battle or to delay, this was a mere matter of form, in that Strozzi by getting first to the scene of action had left them little option.

Mr. Williamson, not stating how long the battle lasted, appears to believe that as soon as Santa Cruz "brought Strozzi to action"—he should have expressed it the other way about,—the Spaniard "annihilated" Strozzi's "expedition." But on the Spanish showing, the Marqués de Santa Cruz did not come into action in person until his Vice Admiral was surrendering to Strozzi. Moreover Santa Cruz cannot be said to have "annihilated" the "expedition" when twenty uninjured ships *deserted*. As it was thought at the time that Spain must have purchased that squadron before it left France, we can recognise that to buy and to "*annihilate*" are not synonymous terms.

Mr. Williamson's assertion that "*Strozzi showed no tactical skill*" because he engaged "*with only a part of his force*" is doubly erroneous: for Strozzi did not engage "*with only a part of his force in hand.*" He ordered a general engagement;² and, with

¹ "Sir John Hawkins *The Time and the Man.*" Oxford University Press, 1927. p. 399.

² S.P. France VIII. 51. and Lansdowne 100. 5.

Brissac, he began the attack "accompanied with three English ships" and "*followed with all the rest of the fleet.*"¹

It was three or four hours afterwards that his Vice Admiral's squadron, which should have supported him, stayed idly looking on while the enemy "compassed him round": the squadron then deliberately running away, and not being either attacked or pursued.

Mr. Williamson therefore is mistaken in his statement that "*suicidal proceedings*" and lack of "*tactical skill*" were the cause of Strozzi being "*killed with most of his men in a battle of the old mediaeval type.*"

As the Spaniards who vanquished Strozzi did not censure his tactics, but regarded their own victory as sufficiently hard-won, we need not labour this point further.

Mr. Williamson also forgets that far from Strozzi being "killed with most of his men" in the battle, he was slain (or died) afterwards; and eighty of his "Noblemen and Gentlemen" were beheaded in Villa Franca, to the horror even of the Spanish officers.

What Mr. Williamson can mean by "*a battle of the old mediaeval type*" it is not possible to explain; for in all detailed contemporary accounts of this fight, whether in French, Spanish, Italian, Portuguese, or English, a main feature is the artillery. Considering that both sides prided themselves on their gunnery, and that the Spaniards less than eleven years before had beaten the Turks, hitherto the master gunners of the world, Mr. Williamson's description of the operations as "*old mediaeval*" is unfortunate: the battle of St. Michael's being regarded in its day as an example of the latest methods in warfare.

Mr. Williamson gives no clue to the source of his contempt for Strozzi. It can hardly be derived from the discourse we have quoted, of a French officer who fled in haste; for even that writer, manifestly antagonistic to the leader he had deserted, fully describes Strozzi's initial success in St. Michael's;² whereas Mr. Williamson in representing Strozzi as overtaken, and "brought to action" at sea, ignores his preliminary victory by land.

A fragmentary account of the "*sanglatante bataille navale des Acores,*" given by Torsay in "*La Vie, Mort et tombeau du haut et puissant Seigneur Philippe de Strozzi,*" Paris 1608, was reprinted in "*Archives Curieuses,*"³ . . . and later by Charles de la Roncière in "*Histoire de la Marine Française,*" Vol. IV. Possibly this, though not mentioned, may be the source of Mr. Williamson's phrase as to the Marqués de Santa Cruz having "*annihilated*" Strozzi's "expedition": "*ruina notre expedition*" says Torsay. But if so, Williamson has overlooked the explanation in the same narrative: "*la trahison de . . . Joseph Doineau, Marquis de Sainte-Souline, qui, achete par l'ennemi, se retira sans tirer un coup de canon*" (taking his squadron with him).

"*La Vie, Mort et tombeau*" printed 26 years after the events, requires to be

¹ *Hist. of the Vniting*, etc. p. 228.

² S.P. France VIII. 51.

³ 1^{re} Ser: t. 8.

compared with manuscripts of 1582, representing both sides of the combat. If these be examined with the care and precision obligatory when the honour of a famous leader is at stake, Williamson's criticism collapses utterly.

The errors must now be tracked to their source. The offender is Sir Arthur Gorges; who in his old age sat down to vent on the memories of his betters an envious hatred he had concealed while any lived who would have rebuked and contradicted him. In relation to English exploits at the Islands in 1591 and 1597, writing in or after 1621, he carried his pretended examination of Azorean history back to 1582; and proceeded so to mangle the last fight of Strozzi that no less than fourteen misstatements deface one paragraph.

The malevolence of Gorges is so palpable that the most elementary caution should have warned Mr. Williamson to distrust these retrospective rantings. But a "school" has arisen which in over-anxiety to "avoid hero-worship" goes to the opposite extreme, and accords to calumniators a blind credence.

The diatribes of Gorges being the most likely source of Mr. Williamson's infelicitous phrase, "*Strozzi's suicidal proceedings*," all similar mistakes should be prevented in future if we take Gorges's allegations in a separate Appendix,¹ and compare them with the facts: an operation never hitherto performed.

An Elizabethan "lover of learning and of Chivalry" objected to those who from their "soft chairs at home" used to "play fast and loose" with men "that venture their lives abroad": such theorists constituting themselves "*judges of danger which they fear, and honour which they understand not.*"² And now the number of pens which treat of naval and military concerns without first learning to understand the same is enormously increased.

Before denying the "*tactical skill*" of such experienced fighters as Philip Strozzi, intending historians would be well advised first to make sure that they possess the facts on which to base their observations: and also that they themselves, by sympathetic study, have acquired at least a rudimentary comprehension of "martial causes" and of the "regimen of the sea."

¹ App: B. "*That which is false.*"

² Sir Fulke Greville, Lord Brook, "*Life of the Renowned Sir Philip Sidney.*"

APPENDIX B.

"THAT . . . WHICH IS FALSE": SIR ARTHUR GORGES'S
DESCRIPTION OF ADMIRAL STROZZI'S LAST FIGHT.


"To Lie is to affirm that to be true which is false."

Philip Sidney (rebuking careless historians):

"Defence of Poesie," circa 1580.

As it has not been realised in modern England that some of our own ships, flying the French flag, took part in the "Seafight at the Islands," under command of Philip Strozzi, the name of Strozzi has been a matter of indifference to English writers.¹ Injustice is done to the memory of a valiant leader; while his retrospective slanderer Sir Arthur

¹ The Antecedents of Philip Strozzi, *Seigneur d'Espernay, Admiral-General of the French Fleet and Army raised for the service of Dom Antonio, King of Portugal, 1582.*
Now first Tabulated from information in Père Anselm's *Histoire Généalogique*, etc. 1733. Vol. VII, pp. 207 and 931 and Vol. VIII. p. 218.)



PHILIP STROZZI

Born at Venice, April 1541. Taken to France 1542 to be educated with the Dauphin. First experience of war at the siege of Calais, aged 17. Naturalised as a Frenchman, 1558. Fought in Scotland against English forces; and in France on the Catholic side throughout the Civil Wars. Commanded 3 regiments at the battle of St. Denis, and was specially conspicuous at the battle of Moncontour 1569, and the siege of La Rochelle 1578. Appointed Colonel-General of the Foot (after the death of François de Coligny-Chastillon, *Sieur d'Andelot*). Admiral-General of the Fleet and Army raised for the restoration of King Antonio. Successful in the land operations; and for the first four hours in the battle by sea; but severely wounded during the fifth hour. Deserted by his Vice-Admiral (*Sansoleme*) with 20 ships. Defeated and captured by the Marqués de Santa Cruz. Died of wounds 26 July, 1582: aged 41. Unmarried.

Gorges, writing some forty years after the event, has been echoed without any attempt to check his statements from despatches of 1582, whether on the one side or the other.

In 1591-2 Spenser had eulogised "Master Arthur Gorges" as come of a family "of great antiquitie in this Realm" and "of unspotted loyaltie to their Prince and Countrey"; and had praised him also as "a lover of learning and vertue."¹ This was while Gorges was yet unembittered. But as the years advanced, and there did not accrue to him any particular renown, and he was *not* one of the few "Voluntary Gentlemen" selected for knighthood by his Admiral-General the Earl of Essex in the Islands Voyage of 1597, he developed a grudge against certain of his countrymen, and others, who had attained high and deserved honours for conspicuous gallantry.

Queen Elizabeth's reign came to an end, and still this gentleman was only "Master Arthur Gorges." Another eighteen years went by, and at last in 1621 he was one of over sixty knights whom King James I dubbed "on the carpet," within eleven months, one of them, the next to Gorges, being Peter Vanlore the money lender.²

The modern notion that because in 1597 Gorges was one of the Captains in the Islands Voyage he was therefore a "naval expert," and that his so-called "*Marine and Martiall Discourses . . . according to the Occurrences*" are a mirror of facts, has arisen from taking him at his own valuation. Actually Gorges was not a naval "authority"; and comparatively few of the Captains of the Queen's ships were seamen. The designation "Captain" in such expeditions as that of 1597 enterprise was applied to the military officer in command of whatever troops were carried abroad. "Sea-Captains" and Captains were different persons. And though a few names of men who were primarily mariners, most notably Hawkins, Drake and Frobisher, had been previously numbered in song and story among the "gallant Capteynes," yet when we come to examine the careers of Captains in the ships of the Royal Navy in famous actions, we shall be surprised to find how many were soldiers, not professing knowledge of "marine causes."

Most of these soldiers at sea, being gifted with honesty and good sense, were capable of estimating justly the maritime as well as military services of others. But two of the least intelligent and most arrogant of Elizabethan military officers have been mistaken by landsmen of later date for naval geniuses revealing the mysteries of their "profession."

Their power to deceive has extended far and wide, one of the most fertile sources of

¹ Spenser's tribute, dated "London this first of Januarie, 1591" (2) prefaces "*Daphnida. An Elegie. Upon the death of the noble and vertuous Douglas Howard, daughter and heire of Henry Lord Howard Viscount Byndon, and wife of Arthur Gorges, Esquire. Dedicated to the Right honorable the Ladie Helena Marquesse of Northampton.* By Ed. Sp. At London. Printed for William Ponsonby. 1596."

² A.D. 1621. "At Theobalds, 18 September: Sr Arthur Gorges.
"At Whitehall, 5 November: Sr Peter Vanlore."

Full list for that year in "*A Book of Knights*," p. 179. Compiled from Lansdowne, Cottonian, Harleian MSS, and other sources specified in Preface, by Walter C. Metcalfe, F.S.A., 1885.

The transactions of Peter Vanlore during the latter part of the reign of Queen Elizabeth, and of King James, have been now (1928) studied by the present writer, from unpublished accounts in a private collection, and will be described in Books V and VI.

Knighthood had certainly changed its nature since the days of Queen Elizabeth when it was still esteemed an exalted honour. For mournful remarks upon how King James lavished titles so indiscriminately that they lost their meaning and prestige, see Sir Edward Walker, Garter King at Arms and Secretary of State for War to Charles I; "*Historical Discourses*," 1705. (Written circa 1650.)

error being "*A large Relation of the . . . Islands Voyage*" (commanded by the Earl of Essex, Admiral-General, 1597,) "*written by Sir Arthur Gorges, Knight, collected in the Queens ship called the Wast Spite, wherein he was their Captain; with Marine and Martiall Discourses added according to the Occurrences.*"¹

The Discourses, harking backwards to Plantagenet days and to ancient Rome, were very little "according to the Occurrences." They were according to the personal prejudice of Gorges. Storing up his venom until the famous Elizabethans were dead, and a younger generation had arisen which was too ignorant to detect divergencies from truth, he discharged his spleen upon the name of Sir Richard Grenville, and then carried his temperamental antagonism to the heroical nine years further back:²

"We had also fresh in our memories, a Sea experiment . . . very like . . . Sir Richard Greenfield, in the like rash attempt of Peter de Strosse, Admiral of a French Fleet against a mightie Spanish Navy, commanded by the Marquesse of Santa Cruce, at these Islands":

What follows should be carefully read; because though fourteen errors are heaped into one paragraph, nobody until now has been sufficiently critical to compare these assertions, penned late in the days of James I, with the circumstances of Strozzi's battle, defeat and death, as testified when it took place, in the 23rd year of the reign of Elizabeth.

" . . . this Strosse," says Gorges, "out of a wilful bravery, contrary to the better advice of all his Captaines and Masters, having already landed many brave troupes of Frenchmen in the Islands as assistant to Don Anthonio, named King of Portugal, upon the first view would needs lay the Marquesse and the Spanish Fleet aboard, being composed of mightie huge Galleons, and the French but slender nimble Ships. By which unequall match and foolish daring, he was beaten downe right, all his Navie destroyed (saving the Count Brysack, and a few others of better judgment that would not follow his vaine course) and himselfe being taken prisoner was alive most despitefully torne and drawn asunder with two Ships.

"Thus lost he himselfe, and his honour, brought many gallant Gentlemen and Souldiers to a butcherly execution, and utterly thrust Don Anthonio from the possession of the Isles of Azores, and confounded all those brave troops which he a little before placed in them."³

This typical specimen of Gorges' matter and manner we will take point by point, answering each of the fallacies in turn.

(1) " . . . a Sea experiment . . . very like . . . Sir Richard Greenfield" (Grenville).

The case of Strozzi was not "very like" that of Grenville. Except that both were brave men, and both fought against Spain, their circumstances were conspicuously different.

¹ First printed in "*Hakluytus Posthumous or Purchase his Pilgrims*" (1625-6). Reprint MacLehose's *Purchas*, &c., 1907. Vol. XX.

² As the documentary references for Strozzi's last battle are fully given ante in "The Sea Fight at the Islands," it is not necessary to repeat them in the answers to Gorges, every one of the statements now recapitulated in brief being already proven in detail, II. 5. 5.

³ p. 106.

Strozzi was Admiral-General of a large Navy; Grenville Vice-Admiral of a small squadron. Grenville's Admiral and Commander decided against meeting the expected Spanish force, which was greatly superior in strength. But Strozzi's best hope of success was to fight before the Marqués de Santa Cruz could be reinforced by the second fleet from Seville.

For the English off Flores, in 1591, to retire was expedient. For the French under Strozzi at St. Michael's in 1582 the necessity was to fight as promptly as the enemy could be brought to action.

When Strozzi left Belleisle he had some 57 ships; but his forces were augmented at the Island to about 70. As to the Spanish total, if we exclude the barges, and remember the caravels can hardly be reckoned as fighting ships, the odds of numbers were with Strozzi.

Grenville in the *Revenge* found himself separated from his squadron and confronted by an Armada of 53 sail. His being unable to get away with the rest of the fleet was because he stayed to re-embark his sick. Strozzi had no sick; and *he had re-embarked his Army from St. Michael's before the enemy came in sight.*

Strozzi's last battle in 1582 was when the Azores were yet resisting Spain, and the elected King of Portugal was being welcomed in Terceira the capital.

Grenville in 1591 was caught in a locality under Spanish rule; the Islands having been secured to Spain finally in 1583.

The resolve of England never to surrender to the forces of the vast Spanish Empire was a determination both symbolised by and incarnate in Grenville; who calculated what a rebuff it would be to Spanish pride that he chose rather to die fighting than to capitulate. To get away was out of the question; for he had lost the wind; so there were only two alternatives; and for the honour of England he chose that of defiance.

Strozzi, of Italian birth, a naturalised Frenchman, was commanding men alien to him in blood; and was serving another alien, the elected King of Portugal. Bravely as he carried himself, his case is in no way "very like" that of Grenville, whose exploit remains unique.

Grenville fought for a day and a night, and refused to surrender. He was carried at last on board the enemy "Admiral," in a dying condition; his crew having capitulated in defiance of his orders.

Before the fight began, Grenville had been separated from his consorts. But Strozzi was deserted by all except "8 or 9" out of his fleet *long subsequent to his entrance into action.* He fought for some six hours or more, till his ship was sinking, and he was disabled by wounds. Whereon he surrendered; expecting to be held to ransom.

Grenville did not voluntarily surrender; yet he was honourably treated. He died of wounds received in the action. Strozzi is alleged to have been slain in cold blood; but even if he died of injuries previously received, his officers, who had surrendered with him, were beheaded at Villa Franca. Grenville's refusal to surrender at Flores in 1591 may have been inspired by remembrance of what had befallen Strozzi and over 80 "noblemen and gentlemen" after the battle of St. Michael's.

Grenville's case we will examine further when we come to 1591. But having realised the inapplicability of Gorges's attempted comparison, take now the particulars.

(2) It was not "*Peter de Strosse*" who was Admiral of the French Fleet in 1582; for the sufficient reason that Peter Strozzi had been dead 23 years.

(3) Strozzi's decision to give battle was not "*contrary to the better advice of all his Captains and Masters.*"

The Council of War unanimously approved it; and the "principal Captains" not only signed the order for the attack, but were loud in protestation that they had left France for no other purpose but to follow Strozzi. His leading the onset in person was not "rash" wilfulness, as Gorges alleged. It had been settled in Council. Moreover it was then usual for Commanders to lead, and be exposed to the greatest hazards accordingly. (In naval actions even now it is upon the flagships that the principal fire is concentrated.)

(4) Strozzi had "*alreadie landed many brave troupes . . . in the Islands.*" He had done more than land troops. He had gained St. Michael's, the only one of the Azores held by Spain. Subsequently, as we have seen, he re-embarked most of his men, because, after capturing a Spanish ship and learning from intercepted letters that the Marqués de Santa Cruz was ordered to await the arrival of the fleet from Seville,—and was expecting also another fleet from Peru,—the necessity was manifest to fight as soon as possible. The suppression of this main fact is characteristic of Gorges.

(5) "*Don Anthonio named King of Portugal.*"

Not merely "named" but elected, "crowned and anointed" King. His "Right and Title" had been repeatedly asserted by Queen Elizabeth, and published in print in English; but Gorges's use of the word "named" (instead of "*elected*" or "*native*") has fed the modern fallacy that King Antonio's royalty was a chimera; the words of Lord Burghley "Don Antonio King of Portugal who hath a just war against the King of Spain." having lain buried.¹

(6) That Strozzi "*upon the first view*" laid "*the Marquesse and the Spanish Fleet aboard*" is not the case; for we have seen how the wind made it impossible to get immediately within range, and how the preliminary manoeuvres of the two fleets, in sight of each other but unable to come to close action, lasted for several days: a fact Gorges also suppressed, because it would have invalidated his attribution of headlong rashness to Strozzi.

(7) Gorges states the "Spanish Fleet" to have been "*composed of mightie huge Galleons.*" There appear to have been some eight "huge Galleons," two of which, the *St. Matthew* and the *Saint Martin*, Gorges might have remembered by name; as Lord Essex captured them at Cadiz in 1596 and had them in his fleet in 1597 in the expedition to the Azores in which Gorges was one of the Captains.

(8) That Strozzi had only "slender" ships is not the case. But he deliberately transferred his flag from a great to a small ship, so that he could move about more swiftly: and his orders were that four of his nimble ships should attack each of the enemy great

¹ "*Considerations*" in Ld. B.'s hand. Aug: 1581. (II. 5 (2) ante.)

ships. From a "slender ship" he boarded one of the two galleons, the *St. Matthew*, Vice-Admiral; and was in act of receiving the Vice-Admiral's surrender, when the Marqués de Santa Cruz, who had waited aloof in the *St. Martin*, suddenly directed an attack upon him.

(9) It was not by haste in laying the Marqués "aboard," "upon the first view,"—for he did no such thing,—nor was it by "*unequall match and foolish daring*" at the start that Strozzi was "*beaten downe right*." It was the deliberate failure of the traitor, squadron to carry out his orders which turned his victory to defeat during the final hour.

(10) Gorges (whose peculiar notion of "marine and martiall" honour we shall have occasion to examine again,) transfers the credit from those who were faithful to those who were false. In this inversion he also confounds the loyal and disloyal, and commends the "*Count Brysack*" for the part actually played by the Marquis de Sansolemne, whose name is suppressed.

"*Brysack*" in Gorges's story is one of the "few" who refused to follow Strozzi's "vain course." None of the officers verbally refused; they all assented in Council with apparent fervour. Then some did the opposite to what they had undertaken. Nor were they "few" who deserted; but sufficient in number for their standing out of the fight to enable Santa Cruz the more effectually to come in as victor.

That Brissac fought till his ship was sinking, and then transferred himself to another ship, and did not retire until severely wounded, when the flight of San Solemne had made the situation hopeless, we have seen. But the manner in which Gorges befouls the honour of "*Brysack*" by attaching his name to the vile behaviour of Sansolemne,—thus sheltering Sansolemne, and blackening Brissac while appearing to commend him,—is one of many examples of how a crooked mind can pervert facts.

(11) In the words "*himselfe being taken prisoner*" and "*alive most despitefully torne and drawn asunder with two ships*" Gorges is alluding to the story of Strozzi being slain after capitulation. But Gorges transfers the shame from the slaughterer to the slaughtered—saying, "*Thus lost he himselfe and his honour*."

As Strozzi fought to the utmost of human endurance, and only surrendered when too disabled to keep on his feet, Strozzi's honour in the battle of the Islands should henceforth be secure against misunderstanding.

(12) For Strozzi "*brought many gallant Gentlemen and Souldiers to a butcherly execution*," Gorges should have written that the Marqués de Santa Cruz, after Strozzi was dead, caused Strozzi's officers and men—who had surrendered—to be executed. Strozzi only "brought" them in so far as they had crossed the seas under his command. None of those Frenchmen who at Villa Franca perished on scaffolds could when leaving Belleisle have foreseen such a sequel to an honest battle; for though Count Vimioso and other Portuguese, who had King Philip's price on their heads, knew they would be executed as "rebels" if captured, the French officers gave up their swords in expectation of receiving the usual terms accorded to prisoners of war. The peculiar notions of Sir Arthur Gorges are manifest by his transference not only of the guilt of Sansolemne to the shoulders of Brissac, but his changing of the responsibility for the Villa Franca

executions from the account of Santa Cruz to Strozzi, who was dead before the scaffolds were erected.

(13) To state that Strozzi by his "wilful" rashness "*utterly thrust Don Anthonio from the possession of the Isles of Azores, and* (14) *confounded all those brave troops which he a little before had placed in them,*" is another typical inversion. The most part of such "brave troops" as remained in the Azores after the battle were not confounded; nor were they of Strozzi's placing. They had been quartered at Terceira before the French fleet reached the Islands.

Some forty years or more having elapsed since 1582, before Gorges composed his Discourses, it would not have been indiscreet had he mentioned that some of those troops in Terceira were English. The soldiers placed by Strozzi in St. Michael's (as we have seen), except a small force, had all been re-embarked. Many were wafted to France in the defaulting squadron of Sansolemnne.

Far from Dom Antonio being "*utterly thrust out*" by Strozzi "*from the possession of the Isles,*" he was received in triumph with great rejoicing at Terceira, the capital of all the Azores, while Strozzi was defending his cause near St. Michael's. To Strozzi he owed it that he was enabled still to hold eight out of the nine Islands.

After the sea-fight, Santa Cruz, though victorious, did not attempt to carry on the contest by attacking Terceira. The battering that Strozzi's artillery had given to the galleon *Saint Matthew*, and other of the Spanish "great ships," necessitated a return to Spain before anything further was attempted.

Antonio was therefore left unmolested in possession of Terceira; for which, and for the other Islands, (Gracioso, Fayall, St. George, Corvo, Flores, Pico, etc.) he appointed a new Governor, who remained in command until a year later; when he too was betrayed; and executed.

If any reader is disposed to argue that as Gorges was not present at the battle of the Islands he might naturally be ill-informed, the answer is, first, that even if his memory had become dim in his old age, a cloudy mind is no excuse for inventing slander. Second, that in regard to other operations in which he did actually take part, his criticisms are equally misleading; for as to actions wherein he served he had the added motive of self-glorification.

As a report of Strozzi's "*valourous defending*" of himself was put into English in the autumn of 1582 under the auspices of Lord Burghley, and in 1585 the facts were printed in English in the official "*Explanation*" of King Antonio,—clearly describing how Vice Admiral Sansolemnne and his squadron stood out of the battle, and so caused Strozzi to be brought to a tragic death,—it is unlikely that the 14 inversions in Sir Arthur Gorges's narrative arose from ignorance.

As Gorges's distortions extend to nearly every matter he touched with a pen, a new edition of his retrospective *Discourses* is in preparation, (by the present writer) wherein the text is interleaved with copious extracts from (and precise references to) MSS. showing the genuine history of the "occurrences" he mangled. The same process will ultimately be applied to the "*Naval Tracts*" of Gorges's rival in unscrupulousness, Sir William

Monson. The many false ideas which have arisen from uncritical republication of Gorges' and Monson's blendings of quarter truths with whole lies should then at last be powerless to delude. As yet, in no case have the editors been sufficiently acquainted with the times, persons, and circumstances, or with the science of war, to be aware how much calumny they were recirculating.

Where Strozzi is concerned, enough MSS from which to have learnt essentials of the battle are in our Public Record Office and British Museum, open to the veriest novice. The truth might have been found long before now; were it not for our defective system, which "standardises" repetitions of adverse charges against Naval and Military Commanders, without enquiry whether such allegations stand on any solid basis.¹

Until Gorges and Monson are comprehended to have been peculiarly spiteful,—and unable to value, much less convey, the great actions of the Elizabethan era,—the world will continue to be misled by these writers, who not only "*affirm that to be true which is false*" but also suppress facts essential to the proper understanding of "occurrences" regarding which "hereafter ages" have been their dupes.

The case of Philip Strozzi has been explained now for three reasons:

First: Because as the slanders came from an English pen, it is fitting that another English pen should make atonement.

Second: That as some of our own "ships and Captains" were in the vanguard with Strozzi, Strozzi's reputation should no longer be a matter of indifference to us.

Thirdly: That the analysis of this paragraph, with its fourteen errors, will serve students as a warning no longer to be led astray by Gorges: and the tardy but conclusive answers to his distortions will exemplify the ancient axiom that "Truth is great and shall prevail,"—even after many hundred years.

¹ Raleigh in his old age, in "*The Historie of the World*," fell into the same mistake as Gorges:

"To clap ships together, without consideration, belongs rather to a mad man, than to a man of warre: for by such ignorant braverie was Peter Strozzi lost at the Azores, when he fought against the Marquesse of Santa Cruz."

As this occurs in "*A Discourse of Sea-fights in general and of the Advantage of swift ships*," the condemnation is the more infelicitous; for Strozzi was a great advocate of the use of swift and nimble ships; and few General Orders show more careful "consideration" than his of 1582. Six years later our own countrymen in 1588 were to adopt Strozzi's tactics: with this difference of fortune: that Strozzi, whose plans were technically perfect, was betrayed by his Vice-Admiral, but in 1588 Howard of Effingham's Vice-Admiral was to be Sir Francis Drake.

In the Clarendon Press "*Sir Walter Raleigh*" Selections, ed: G. E. Hadow, 1917, Raleigh's error is repeated (p. 100), with an editorial note (p. 205), "*Peter Strozzi was a member of the famous Florentine House which greatly distinguished itself in arms in the sixteenth century.*"

But *sic transit gloria mundi*, when an editor fails to notice the confounding of Philip Strozzi with Peter Strozzi; and when it is also forgotten that though of Florentine ancestry, Peter and Philip Strozzi "distinguished themselves" as naturalised Frenchmen: Peter Strozzi having been the officer who held Lord Grey of Wilton prisoner after our loss of Guisnes in 1557-8. (See ante. Prologue, sec. 15 for picture of Peter Strozzi.)

APPENDIX C.

"THE PRESTIGE AND REPUTATION OF HIS MAJESTY'S FLEET":

*Unpublished particulars of the Spanish victory, 26 July, 1582.
From "Le Sucedido al Armada," etc.: (Simancas MS. 431 de Estado).*

Further extracts from the Spanish official report, drawn up during the operations (and finished before the execution of the French prisoners), will complete for naval students the picture of a battle the details and lesson of which will be new to all English readers.¹

"Great and powerful is the French fleet, but it seems that the prestige and reputation of His Majesty's fleet is of more avail. . . .

"On the 26th the enemy fleet again came in search of the Spanish fleet, in good order and with the wind in his favour. The Marqués put his ships into close formation, though the galleon San Mateo was left a little behind²: which grieved him greatly, as he feared the enemy ships might lie alongside of her before assistance could come, as indeed occurred. Two galleons, the flagship of the Commander-in-Chief, and one of his Admirals, came to attack her, against whom she put up a stout defence; whilst two other ships which had borne down upon her, after firing several rounds of artillery and some harquebus shots at her, passed on. At the same time two other French ships came up against the flag-galleon and started to fight her; whereupon she poured into them two broadsides from her guns and volleys from her harquebuses and one of them was seen to be much damaged³ and like to sink. So they withdrew, having fired many rounds of artillery and harquebus volleys at the flagship; some of their gunfire finding its mark, and they likewise coming under a heavy gunfire and a hail of harquebus shots from Don Francisco de Vouadilla's ship, which was near our flagship.⁴

"At this time the French flagship and Admiral's ship were still fighting with the galleon San Mateo, where a valorous defence and offence was conducted by the *maestre de campo general del exercito* Don Lope de Figueroa with the Inspector-General and the other gentlemen,⁵ and the Infantry, which valiantly discharged upon the adversaries a heavy fire of guns, harquebuses and muskets.

"Now when the Marqués saw that the whole French fleet was attacking the Spanish ships by their sterns and noticed the straits in which the galleon San Mateo found herself with the two French ships, he made the flagship tack in the direction of the enemy ships,⁶ and Don Cristobal de Eraso and the other ships of the fleet did the same. And whereas the ships of Miguel de Oquendo, Villaviciosa, and another Biscayan vessel were in the rear, they

¹ Punctuation modernised. In the original a full stop is rare.

² *el marqués hizo poner y juntar las naos de la suia aunque el galeon Sant Mateo se quedo vn poco atras, &c.*

³ *muy maltratada.*

⁴ *que estaua cerca de la capitana.*

⁵ *el veedor general y los demas caualleros.*

⁶ *hizo virar el galeon Capitana la vuelta de los enemigos.*

were then the foremost, and the first to reach and attack the Admiral's ship that was fighting the galleon San Mateo. The next to come up was the vessel in which was Miguel de Avenesa, who fought the French flagship like a good Captain; as also did the soldiers with him: which was the reason why the Marqués could not then bring his ship alongside the French flagship, for this other vessel was between them,¹ so he passed on. Meanwhile the Admiral's ship was being fought by the three vessels that had engaged her while she was fighting the San Mateo, whence she was still receiving many rounds of gunfire and harquebus shots; one of these vessels was Villaviciosa's, which had attacked her at the bow, and whilst they were fighting the French with great spirit, Captain Villaviciosa was killed, . . . and there were many more killed and wounded in the vessel. Oquendo's ship engaged her by the stern,² and they boarded her, starting to sack her and taking four prisoners and the flags.

"Whilst our other Spanish vessels were engaged in battle with the enemy ships, two more French ships came to the aid of their flagship and put 300 fresh men into her, whereupon she withdrew from the San Mateo and from (attacking) Miguel de Avenesa's ship. By this time the Marqués had already turned again upon the enemy, subjecting him to a heavy cannonade:³ the two flagships then came together, bow to bow, grappling, and both parties fighting bravely and hurling at each other round after round of gunfire and volleys of harquebus shot, musketry and stones for the space of an hour before the enemy surrendered. Here over 300 Frenchmen were slain, the gentlemen and soldiers holding the fore and stern castles distinguishing themselves by their valour, as also did Captains Agustin de Herrera and Gamboa and their lieutenants.

"The Marqués of Santa Cruz, as the General in command,⁴ went about, . . . cheering the men, giving orders for the attacks on the enemy, and providing for whatever required to be done.

"The artillery on the upper and lower decks produced great effect⁵ under the good direction of the Captains in charge, who swiftly saw what was required and put it in execution.

"From the tops⁶ the musketeers fired and the topmen hurled many stones. Captains Merolin and Rodrigo de Vargas went with great spirit from one to another, and to the guns, so that nothing was lacking.

"The battle was carried on between the other ships with the exchange of heavy volleys of harquebus shots and broadsides of artillery,⁷ and Don Cristobal de Heraso subjected the ships of the enemy fleet to a great cannonade; the Frenchmen by this time having the worst of it, so that after the battle had lasted 5 hours the enemy ships fled in great disorder, vanquished and shattered.⁸ Don Antonio had withdrawn the night before in a *patache* with another ship.

"Some ships sank and others were left abandoned, their French crews having been slaughtered and some having gone aboard other vessels. And as none could be taken in tow nor followed by our ships, the Marqués ordered such vessels to be burnt and scuttled as could be. . . .

"The caravel which the enemy had taken with the horses was recovered. It is reckoned that in the French Flagship 400 men were slain, for, with her original complement, and the

¹ *por estar en medio esta nao.*

² *Oquendo la tenia investida por popa.*

³ *sobre los enemigos tirandoles muchos cañonazos.*

⁴ *como general andaua.*

⁵ *El artilleria de la cubierta alta y baxa traxia mucho efeto.*

⁶ *gauias.*

⁷ *grandes cargas de arcabuzos y cañonazos.*

⁸ *desbaratadas y destrocadas.*

reinforcement put aboard, the number that fought in her is estimated at over 700; and in the Admiral's ship that they left waterlogged, which got away from the 3 ships attacking her, of the Frenchmen that left the other ships it is known that over 200 men died; and of the complement of one of the sinking vessels 300 soldiers were drowned, only their Captain escaping.

"Many Frenchmen in the other vessels were slain, especially in one compelled to surrender by two Biscayan vessels. As in one of these a number of Basques had been slain, they put all the Frenchmen to death. On this reckoning it appears that the dead, so far as now known, are 1,200 Frenchmen, in addition to the wounded, of whom there are many, and those who were killed and wounded in the ships that fled. Many vessels would have been won if the ships of the fleet had had enough sailors to take them in tow. But, not being able to do this, they had to let them go; . . .

"In some ships were many killed and wounded, and those of our fleet were also badly damaged so that the Flag-Galleon had great difficulty in towing the French Flagship."

There follows a list of the enemy casualties, beginning with Strozzi (*Felipe extroce gran marechal*), and the other principal personages; then the lesser noblemen and officers taken prisoners. The list was drawn up before Santa Cruz had announced his intention not to allow the captives to be ransomed, but to treat them as pirates. His own losses were only 777; 550 wounded and 224 killed:¹ figures which seem incredible after the description of the close range fighting, but which rest on the authority of an official report not hitherto known to English critics of this battle.

¹ Ante. p. 200.

PART II.

“Particularly the Power of Spain.”

CHAPTER 5.

“OUR REALM SHALL BE HIS SANCTUARY.”

SECTION 6.

“The present unhappy end to a
favourable beginning.”

(*Aftermath of the fight at the Azores. 1582*).

“ . . . we let you witt that . . . when the said Agent shall repayre with a note of such peices of Ordnance and quantitie of munition . . . you do further take ordre with . . . officers of our ports . . . that he or such as shall have the chardg . . . be suffred to convey and cary the said ordnance and munition away at their pleasure : which we would have you to do, as if it were don of yourself and not by o(u)r commandment.”

Queen Elizabeth to her Lord Treasurer. Unpublished Warrant endorsed by Lord Burghley, “ 9 August 1582. *Hir Maties Lrès Licensing ye Agentes of K. Antonio to transport certain munition.*” Hatfield MS. 12.46.

“ . . . the King my master has done what her Majesty counselled in coming to this island . . . as it is of permanent importance to this kingdom and to the whole world that the King of Castille be not allowed to become master, . . . I am confident that your Excellency will . . . help my master as he deserves.”

Diogo Botelho to the Earl of Leicester: from Terceira, 8 Sep: 1582. Now first translated.

From unpublished original, Cotton Nero B.I. f. 221.

“ I send this gentleman . . . to the Serene Queen of England, . . . assuring myself that she will not fail to give me every assistance, seeing the good will she has always shown, and the present unhappy end to a favourable beginning.”

King Antonio, to “ Ill^{mo} Signor Conte Borley, Tezoriero maggior dela Ser^{mo} Regina d’Inghilterra.

Endorsed “ X^o Sep^r 1582. *K. Antonio to my L.*”

Unpublished Lansdowne MS. 35.62. f. 180.

“ I assured him ” (Antonio) “ there was none in the world that had more compassion of his Estate and desyred greatlier his comphorte ” (than Queen Elizabeth).

Sir Henry Cobham, to “ Sy^r Frances Walsingham. . . . “ From Paris the last of December 1582.”

S.P. France VIII. 126.

NOTE ON THE COINS OF KING ANTONIO.

In the 1585 "*Istoria*," in the defamatory account of how the "Prior of Crato" ruled the Islands, emphasis is laid upon adulteration of the coinage.¹ The gold coins are alleged to have been rated at twenty-five royals while weighing only eight, and his "testoons of silver" and even copper coins debased in proportion. But as all such as were found in St. Michael's in 1582 (and in 1583 in Terceira and the other Islands) were taken and destroyed by the conquerors, and as there are not any specimens now extant in England, we cannot weigh and test them. Presumably those described in the "*Istoria*," 1585, were the coins which had been minted in France early in 1582, at the Royal Mint.

"Claimants" and "pretenders" give medals to their friends; but pretenders cannot circulate coins for payment of troops: which King Antonio could and did do, not only in 1582 but after. One of his coins, inscribed "Antonivs D.G. Rex Port. et Algarbie," dated 1582, was engraved in "*Sylloge Numismatum Elegantiorum Quae Diuersi Imp: Reges, Principes, Comites, Republicae Diuersas ob causas ab Anno 1500 ad Anno usq 1600 . . . Opera ao Studio Iacobi Luckii . . . Cum Gratia et priuelegio Sacrae Caesareae Majestatis: Agentinae . . . 1620.*" (p. 287).

Though this work, containing King Philip's St. Quentin medal, was published 20 years before the deliverance of Portugal from the "Spanish Captivity," the compiler dared to set Dom Antonio's "iconicus" in its place among coins of Kings. And although in 1580-95 Antonio's right to the Royal title had been denied by Spain,—and, excepting only ex-Secretary of State Antonio Pérez, all Spaniards referred to him as "the Prior of Crato" or the "*Pretensor*,"—Jacob Luck, twenty-five years after Dom Antonio's death, estimated his position correctly, even in this work licensed by the Emperor: "*Nummus iconicus cunco castrensi Antonii I electi Regis Lusitaniae: suscepta infelici contra Philippum Hispaniarum et Lusitaniae regem expeditione, cusus anno Christi 1582.*"

("A portrait coin with the military coin of Antonio I, elected King of Portugal, struck during the disastrous expedition against Philip King of [all the] Spains and of Portugal; A.D. 1582.")

In 1903 an illustrated monograph was issued at Amsterdam, (Johannes Muller) by L. M. Rollin Conquerque, Docteur en Droit, "*Fondation Pilaer. La Monnaie du Roi Antoine de Portugal à Gorichem (Gorcum) 1583-1591.*"

King Antonio's appeal to the States to have his coins struck in their territory followed upon restrictions regarding money minted for him in France.²

Of the coins reproduced only one shows the King's head: "*Testao de Don Antonio I, frappé in 1584: (Argent. Cabinet de Leyde),*" described as modelled on "*Franc de Roi Henri III, frappé en 1576, Argent (Cab: de la Haye).*" The King of France wears a ruff; the King of Portugal a high lace collar: otherwise there is no marked difference; wherefore this coin cannot be called a portrait.

As no "Pretender" has ever been authorised by other Sovereigns or States to employ the official Mints for striking new coins to be circulated in allied countries, the existence of such coins will speak for itself now that the fact—not hitherto noted by English historians—can be set in its due place in the story of our country's "relation to all foreign Princes."

¹ "*Hist: of the Vniting*," (1600). p. 297.

² pp. 23 and 17.

MONUMENT IN THE VATICAN TO POPE GREGORY XIII.

(Photograph: Alinari. Rome. No. 26452).

Ugo Buoncompagno was educated in Civil Law, and acted as a Judge of the Court of Trade in Bologna. But after being employed at the Council of Trent by Pope Paul III and Pope Paul IV, he was ordained priest under Paul IV.

After the death of Pius V, March 1571-2, Buoncompagno, Cardinal of St. Sixtus, was elected to the Papacy as Gregory XIII: 13 May, 1572.

His apparent encouragement to Dom Antonio in the matter of succession to the Crown of Portugal was not followed by any active aid.

In 1582 the Pope reformed the Calendar; and from the 15th of October onwards we must bear in mind the difference between the English and Gregorian Calendars. In the *Istoria*, 1585, *Historie of the Vniting* etc., 1600, p. 302, the change is thus described:

" . . . in this yeere of our Lorde 1582 they did reckon ten daies less than in others: for by the Pope's decree all Christian Princes obeying the Romish see, gave commandement to cut off ten daies in the moneth of October, so as for the fift day they should generallie write 15th which was done to fit the times to the meanes and principall aspects wherein the heavens were, when as our Redeemer Iesus Christ suffered, that they might celebrate Easter, and the other feastes upon their proper daies . . . the true course of the sunne . . . being certaine minutes of an hower lesse than the time . . . it seemed that in the course of so manie yeares so small a difference had mounted unto ten daies. . . ."

The alteration by the Pope was to make the time "conformable to the past."

As Queen Elizabeth refused to change her methods, and all our English *official* documents continued to be dated *stilo antiquo*, sometimes called *stilo nostro* (our style) and not by the Continental *stilo novo*, modern misreadings of "*stilo nostro*" as "*stilo novo*" have led to confusion (examples later).

In many private letters there is no indication which style is being used. Care is needed in testing dates; for if the ten days difference in time is forgotten, specially in relation to negotiations with foreign countries, serious mistakes may ensue.



PART II.

“Particularly the Power of Spain.”

CHAPTER 5.

“OUR REALM SHALL BE HIS SANCTUARY.”

SECTION 6.

“The present unhappy end to a favourable beginning.”

(Aftermath of the fight at the Azores. 1582).

WE have noticed that it was on the 9th of August, 1582, in London, that Dr. Hector Nunes transmitted to Lord Burghley news received from Lisbon of the sailing of the Spanish fleet for the Islands; described as thirty great ships, twenty caravells and ten barges.¹ On the same day Burghley in his own hand docketed an order “9 August 1582. *Hir Ma^{ties} Lres Licensing ye Agents of K. Antonio to transport certain munition.*”

This “By the Queen,”—addressed “To our right trusty . . . the Lorde Burghley,”—should no longer be overlooked. In the script of a clerk, it nevertheless bears signs of Her Majesty’s ruffled temper. Though professing to “gratifie” Dom Antonio, she does not give him his title: though his royal rank is emphasised in all her official letters to foreign potentates and was never omitted from her letters to himself. Her tone of granting a concession, for which at the end she throws the responsibility on to Burghley, makes it likely that this warrant was drawn up in response to a request of the Lord Treasurer for her written authorisation of matters verbally settled some while before.

ELIZABETH R.

“Right trusty and welbeloved Counselor we grete you well. Whereas the Agent of don Antonio hath made earnest request unto us for Lisence to transport out of this our Realme for the use and service of his said Mr² certain peices of ordnance and munition alledging a promise to have been made thereof to the said don Antonio: We lett you wytt that mynding to gratifie him herein our will and pleasure is that when the said Agent shall repayre with a note of such peices of Ordnance and quantitie of munition as he shall have provided here, you do forthwth take ordre with the Customers and other our officers of our port where the same shall be laden that he or such person as shall have the chardg herein be suffred to convey and cary the said ordnance and munition away

¹ Hatfield MS. Cal. III. p. 513.

² M(aste)r.

at ther pleasure: *which we would have you to do, as if it were don of yourself and not by o^r commandment.*

"And thes our Lres shalbe your sufficient warrant and dischardge in this behalf.

"Given under our Signet at the mano^r of Nonesuch the nyynth day of August 1582 in the XXIIII yere of our Reign."¹

The accompanying list of war material to be embarked at Southampton "In the ships named franceys and fortune" is signed "Antonio Dancique."² It includes

48 hundred of powder. 45 pieces of iron ordnance.

30 light corselets. 12 corselets of proof.

60 pikes. 80 halberds.

100 calivers with their "furniture." 100 "muraons."

5 ton shot: "crosbar," chain, and round. 12 "dromes"³ (drums).

When or where these reached King Antonio we have no means of knowing. There is no mention of his having received them when on the 10th of September from Terceira he wrote to Burghley and Walsingham announcing his ill success. But it seems likely that they were ultimately used for the garrisons in the Azores, or possibly during the attempted expedition to Madeira in October.

For us it is a secondary question for what locality the 45 guns, the powder and shot, the corselets, halberts, pikes, calivers, and drums were destined. The point is that the Queen allowed Dom Antonio's agent to choose what ordnance, arms, and munition he required, and that the Lord Treasurer, depicted by "Modern History" as morbidly pacific, was the Privy Councillor selected to facilitate the transport, in time of peace.

Though the warrant of August 1582 was calendared in 1888,—ten years before the publication of Corbett's "*Drake and the Tudor Navy*,"—that the entry was so brief, and Burghley's name in this connection not mentioned by the editor, may help to account for the oblivion in which the circumstances have remained.

The MS. now printed serves two purposes: First to show how the Queen persisted in her intention that her aid should be "underhand"; whereas Burghley had wished her to make it open and formidable if she would consent to the French marriage. Secondly the MS. will remind us of what is forgotten by the many current writers for whom Drake is a buccaneer going forth against the will of the Privy Council; but suddenly transformed in 1588 from a "gallant pirate" into Her Majesty's Vice-Admiral and Second-in-Command against the Great Armada.

In real life, had "*El Draque*" desired to cross Lord Burghley he would have

¹Now first published from orig: Hatfield MS 12. 46,7. Calendared Vol. II (1888) p. 514, No. 1188, as "1582 Aug. 9. Warrant for the Agent of Don Antonio to transport certain pieces of ordnance and munition. Manor of Nonsuch, 9 August 1582. Sign manual. 1 Sheet." Nothing in Cal: to indicate that it is to Lord Burghley; or was endorsed by him; or that the export of these materials was to be "as if it were don of yourself." One reason this important item has been so long overlooked may be that it not only is so curtailed in Cal: but is not included in the index.

²There are numerous Antonios among the King's followers, but in a subsequent list of his Household no surname resembling "Dancique" (which is what the signature looks like). The *Francis* may possibly be the same vessel of that name which Drake took with him in 1595 on his final expedition. The reference to the "franceys and fortune" is in yet another hand.

³Cal: II. p. 514.

found it extraordinarily difficult. To go to sea surreptitiously with armed ships would have been to risk a premature end on the gallows: even supposing he could have achieved the initial feat of bluffing the port officials; who were chosen for their vigilance and astuteness, and would have been heavily punished if negligent.

As no merchant craft ever went to sea unarmed, but as passes were required and the arms and munitions were licensed in accord with the "lawful occasions" of the vessels, no subject of Queen Elizabeth could get out to sea without many and complex formalities.

If we look into the dealings of our seamen, from Hawkins and Drake down to Captain Clarke and Botolph Holder, we must realise that under an absolute Monarchy, of which Burghley was the "Nestor" and the "Atlas," many seemingly independent adventures were parts of one and the same struggle.

Far from Burghley being coldly aloof from these proceedings, he will oftener be found expediting the arrangements. The diplomatist who skilfully impeded progress, by the cleverness of his spies, and the influence he acquired over the Queen, was the Spanish Ambassador. Over and over again (as he reported in detail to King Philip), by working upon the Queen's feelings he was able to put obstacles in the way of her Privy Council, and delay the intended assistance to Portugal.

Both at the Courts of England and France, King Philip's Ambassadors were busy sowing doubt and distrust. And though they could not prevent the reception of King Antonio by Henry III and Queen Elizabeth in 1581, or entirely frustrate the aid offered him in '82, their utmost ingenuity was employed in delaying that assistance.

In England Mendoza, though sometimes breaking forth (in what Burghley termed "his hot manner") into open altercation with Her Majesty's ministers, was nevertheless cool-headed enough to see that he could prevail little in his efforts to cajole, goad, or alarm, Burghley, Leicester, Walsingham, or Hatton. The personage whom he prided himself upon being able to manage was the Queen. But his labours were not easily performed; and in 1582 his letters palpitate with exasperation:

"My sight is very bad," he wrote to King Philip, "but I will willingly employ what is left of it, and my life, in serving your Majesty, since you deign to command me to stay in this place, my only regret being that besides being blind, I shall not be of so much use to your Majesty as another would; since my ill luck will have it that *these people continue as uncontrollable as ever. They are sending a greater number of Englishmen to Flanders again, and the Queen openly gives passports to the Captains.* On the night of the 12th she sent to Alençon¹ four boat-loads of broad angels, 20,000*l.*, which money was taken in a ship in which were four of the best Captains and four of the best pilots in England. They are helping forward more furiously than ever the arming of ships for Brazil and the Moluccas, whilst *they cry out at the top of their voices that they are free to undertake such expeditions. . . .*"²

¹ Francis, Duke of Alençon and Anjou.

² London 14 Aug: 1582. Cal: S.P.S. Vol 3. p. 397.

In private Burghley had deplored to Walsingham the Queen's coldness in the cause of Portugal; but he considered what could be said, both to the French and to King Antonio, to prevent blame falling upon Her Majesty. Dom Antonio never realised that the Queen was at fault. Up to the last he believed in her sympathy. It is from the bringing together of her own ministers' secret lamentations to each other, and Mendoza's half jubilatory half scornful letters upon his own success in managing the "vain and flighty woman," that we see over and over again how her overbearing temper was combined with a dislike of being pinned down to decisive measures.

To promise; to postpone; to give with one hand and take away with the other; to make concessions, delaying them until too late; to mistake duplicity for wisdom, and to believe that whatsoever might be her own "Will and Pleasure" must necessarily be the acme of statecraft,—thus Mendoza depicts her. Certainly King Antonio, the object of her professed benevolence, was also to some extent the sacrifice to her limitations.

When we come to weigh what Drake achieved in open war, in 1585, '86, '87 and '88, it will be plain that the advantages would have been more speedy if the Queen had allowed Burghley's "*great and royal war*" to have begun in 1581, as a retort to the invasion of Ireland. But Burghley in vain adjured her then that a small war, inadequate to restore Antonio, would last longer and be more costly than a great war.¹

The capricious Muse of History has made Burghley responsible for the dilatory methods to which he especially objected; and he, one of the most far-seeing war Ministers in the whole course of our national life, has been held up to posterity as an embodiment of peace at any price.

It had been on the 20th of August that news of Strozzi's defeat was first sent from Paris to Secretary Walsingham:

*"the rout of Don Antonio's fleet has been reported here; . . . it is related by M. de Brissac's men, and there are doubts as to whether there was a failure of loyalty . . . they say that Strozzi is dead in captivity, and Don Antonio at Terceira, and so they say 'God help them' . . ."*²

Our Ambassador, Cobham, writing the next day, clinging to a hope that Strozzi might have survived, could not make sure of what had happened. Of Nepeville, the Captain of the ship in which the Comte de Brissac returned, he remarks: "*he speaks as one who fled away.*" On the same date, 21st of August, Cobham reported later "advertisement," namely that Strozzi had defeated the Spaniards; and that Brissac had brought into port three Spanish ships; that seven ships were sunk: but that Strozzi's fate was still uncertain.⁴

A week later Cobham, from Paris, told Secretary Walsingham that there was "an Irish footman of my Lord of Leicester's gone towards England, who returned

¹ "Considerations," II. 5. (2), ante. ² Tommas Sassetti: Cal: S.P. For: 1582. No. 265.

³ S.P. France VIII. 22. Calendared No. 266. 1 page.

⁴ Cal: No. 268. (On the authority of Messrs. Pinart and De Lansac.)

in Count Brissac's ship, from whom you may understand such particulars as he saw during the Count's stay in the fight beside St. Michael's"¹ (meaning by "footman" foot soldier; thus making it likely that the secret volunteers had been equipped at Leicester's expense).

On the 4th of September Cobham still could forward no more than rumours.² On the 1st, a letter to Walsingham dated from Turin is so worded as to show anew how slowly the truth travelled:

"As to the King of Portugal's defeat, we have the same news as you, and of the same date" (consequent on Brissac's arrival in Normandy). "*But we hear that the Queen Mother has advices to the contrary* on the 22nd ultimo; and in fact from intercepted letters from the Prince and the Duchess of Parma's agents, written at Lisbon on August 8 from the Cardinal, and others at Madrid on the 15th, we see that *the King of Spain was much taken aback at the loss of the island of St. Michael's.*"

(This presumably refers to Dom Antonio having been received as King in St. Michael's before the Marqués of Santa Cruz with his fleet had come in sight):

"also that the two fleets had fought on July 23 and 24,³ and they did not know on which side the victory lay; inasmuch that the King was become as white as ashes . . . And we have a ship . . . which says the same . . . Only the fleet from Lisbon was in the action, that from Seville having doubled Cape St. Vincent on July 27th only. It consists of 30 to 40 vessels":

("it" being the Seville fleet, for which Santa Cruz had been ordered to wait; but Strozzi caused him to fight before it could arrive).

Because of the recent English misrendering of Strozzi's defeat, in which he was represented first as "brought to action" by Santa Cruz, and then blamed for "suicidal proceedings," (all those "proceedings" being misunderstood by the critic,) we must pay attention to the news as it came in to Lord Burghley a few weeks after the events.⁵

That when Strozzi leading the onset, was followed by Brissac and others, "the residue" of the French fleet *omitted to do their duty*, so that even the ships which

¹ Ib: No. 287.

² Cal: S.P. Foreign 1582. No. 30.

³ The chief and final encounter was on 26th. ⁴ Answered, II. 5. 5., App: A. ante.

⁵ The P.R.O. Vol. of News Letters from English agents in Spain and Portugal (S.P. 101) was searched in vain (in 1928) for any description of the battle, but as English participation was "secret" the omission is less surprising.

In the Calendar of State Papers, Spanish, (Simancas) 1580-86, Vol. III (1896) are many references by Don Bernardino de Mendoza in London to the affairs of "Don Antonio." But the editor, Martin Hume, taking King Antonio at Mendoza's angry valuation (and not examining the relevant material in our English State Papers France, Spain and Portugal, nor knowing that we had ships in the battle in 1582) alluded to but omitted to copy or translate one of the most important of the Simancas MSS, namely King Philip's own account to Mendoza in London of the conflict at the Islands. This cannot now be found at Simancas.

There is, however, in our Cal: S.P. Foreign 1582, No. 362 (2 pp. of print) an unsigned report (from S.P. France VIII. 57.) based on news sent by King Philip "to his Ambassador here" (Paris) and on statements of Strozzi's secretary (Fournicon). It is not the P.R.O. version as calendared which is now quoted, but the version in Lord Burghley's own papers, Lansdowne. 100. 5. This is useful as a correction to some omissions and distortions in the long French Discourse (S.P. France VIII. 51) quoted and analysed, ante.

accompanied him became discouraged by "*the evident daunger of fightinge without the succoures of the rest,*" is the way the story is told in "*A Copy of that w^{ch} passed in Mons^r St(r)ozzo's defeat, and of his valorous manner of supporting him self.*"¹

After some of the ships which at first assisted him were reduced to retiring, and Strozzi's immediate following "were slaine or wounded," he sent for men from other ships close by, and most resolutely continued the conflict.

"After that his fresh succours were slaine," and "the marriners discomfited with the long fight, and S^r de Beaumont (unto whom the ship belonged) slaine, the Comte Vimiose Conestable of Portugall and the said Mons de Strosso" were mortally wounded; whereon the Spaniards took possession of the ship: "and as the said Marquis St. Crosse entred the ship, asking for Mons^r S(t)rosso," the defeated Admiral,—"*forcing him self to answer the marquis,*"—was too exhausted so to do, and "*fell downe there and died in the Marquis sight.*"²

This statement based on information given out by the Spanish Ambassador in Paris, does not tally with what was afterwards said as to Strozzi being slain in cold blood.³ There is no attempt to deny his "vallor and resolution": or disguise that his defeat was largely due to the desertion of those who should have supported him.

A later half of the report adds that

"the enimie hath not taken of this our armie" any vessel except that "wherein Mons^r de Strosso was imbarqued, and one other like barque, w^{ch} the said Marquis St Crosse caused to be sett on fire the next night, be cause he found it emptie, beinge the same barque which brought supplie of men (during the fight) unto Mons^r Strosso.

"*The Ambassador of France resident in Spaine, hath sent hether a discourse imprinted at Lisbon, w^{ch} Conteineth howe the marques arriving atte Isles of St Michell, hath caused all the french gentlemen to be beheaded, and the soldiours and mariners w^{ch} he had taken by force or found in the said Island to be hanged.*

"*But those w^{ch} were latelier come from Tercires⁴ bringe noe certeine report thereof, neither knowe they as yet certeinlie Mons^r de Strosso his death or overthrow, because the thirtie shippes of our Armie w^{ch} are retired thither could not signifie other than that he fought valiantly; but lastly (they) perceived his shipp to be taken and carried away by the ennemy.*"⁵

"Farther the King Don Anto: who the daie before the battaile was gone to the Terceres to make his entrie . . . had sent some Trompetters and Dromers unto St Michell for to enquire" as to the "slaine men and the prisoners taken, *the w^{ch} Trompetters weare retained, contrarie to all right of warre.*

"Don Anto^o lamenteth greatlie Mons^r de Strosso his death . . . by lettres written unto the Quene mother. . . ."

As the Captain of King Antonio's Guard had arrived at Terceira from Rochelle "with some shippes and French souldiers" (no numbers given) a rumour had arisen as to a victorious French counter attack, and the rescue of Strozzi, wounded but still living. This which had been believed for a while, "is Understood to the Contrarie now, by the certeine knowledge of the death and overthrowe of Mons^r Strozso"

¹ Unpublished Lansdowne MS. 100. 5. ² Ib. ³ "*Generall Hist. of Spaine,*" &c., cit ante. p. 193.

⁴ Later than the date of the Lisbon information. ⁵ They had allowed his ship to be taken.

⁶ The report ends with a Latin couplet as to Strozzi in his darkest hours being valiant to the last.

In all this there is not a word of the "*three English ships*" which had accompanied Strozzi when he led the onset: showing how unsafe it is to take any one narrative as representing the whole course of events. But as we have now learnt that it was "*an Irish footman of my Lord of Leicester's . . . in Count Brissac's ship*" who was sent from Paris to report to Walsingham all "*such particulars as he saw*" during the fight,¹ it will surprise us the less to find King Antonio's "second self" Diogo Botelho addressing to Leicester, in Portuguese, from Terceira, on the 8th of September, an urgent appeal for further assistance.²

"Not to fatigue you with a long letter I will write to the Doctor" (presumably Lopez) "in detail as to the . . . fleet in which the King my master came; and he can tell you about it." *I wish only to remind your Excellency that now is the time when good friends are needed; and as the King my master relies upon you as one, you must not fail him.* Recall to the Queen the promise she made to the King my master: And as he has done what Her Majesty counselled in coming to this island, and without her succour he cannot regain his kingdom nor defend himself against the King of Castille: and as it is of paramount importance to this kingdom and to the whole world that the King of Castille be not allowed to become master of Portugal, I am confident that your Excellency will demonstrate your great worth in this work; using every means possible to help the King my master as he deserves.

"Commending myself to serve the illustrious person of your Excellency, which may God guard, together with the Countess, I kiss the hands of your Excellency and of the Countess.

"From this island this VIII of September (M.D.) LXXXII.

DIOGO BOTELHO."⁴

This would have been brought to England by the same messenger who carried King Antonio's letter to "*Ill^{mo} Sig^r Conte Borley Tezoreiro maggior dela Ser^{ma} Regina d'Inghilterra*";⁵ and (lest he be away from the Court) a precisely similar communication "*A Ill^o ser frances Vualsingan primo secretario de la Ser^{ma} Regina d'Inghilterra, et del suo consiglio priuato.*"

Sealed with the Royal Arms of Portugal, signed in the Portuguese fashion by his title, not his name, this is remarkably self-controlled and temperate in expression.⁶

"Illustrious Sir Francis Walsingham.

"I send this gentleman Thomas Sheges⁷ to the Serene Queen of England to inform her of the [ill] success of the fleet and the state of my affairs: assuring myself that she will not fail to give me every assistance, seeing the good will she has always shown, and the present unhappy end to a favourable beginning."

Referring to "our friendship" he asks Walsingham to "be pleased to hold out your hand" to this messenger, "and to take him under your protection," so that he may return with word of the Queen's wishes.

¹ Cobham to Walsingham.

² Orig: Unpublished Cotton MS. Nero B.I. f. 221 (formerly 259) Now first translated.

³ This letter to "the Doctor" is not to be found. ⁴ or Botellio; difficult to read.

⁵ Unpublished Lansdowne MS. 35. 62. f. 180. Not holograph, but signed "Rey." Endorsed by Burghley's secretary "*X^o Sept^r 1582. K. Antonio to my L.*"

⁶ Orig: A. P. Portugal I. 85. Only briefly calendared. Now first translated in full.

⁷ "Io mando questo gentil'huomo Thomasse Sheges." This name is difficult to identify; possibly an officer from one of the English ships which had taken part in the fight.

There could be no more seasonable occasion to give aid than in such a crisis as the present; "... believe surely that I will never forget the favour, but will recompense it ... where and whenever the occasion shall make possible.

"Of the particulars of what has happened, and also of what I hope from the Queen, I will say no more now, so as not to weary you: I set it all forth to the said Sheges, in whom you can have faith, for to him I give all necessary information: Praying (Illustrious Sir Francis Walsingham) that Our Lord may have you in his holy keeping:

"From Angra, on the X of September of 1582.

THE KING."

In the midst of griefs acutely felt, and of dangers hourly increasing, there is not one word of complaint, nor any outpouring of emotion. Nor did Dom Antonio show any vindictive feeling. Of "a generous minde" he "would not imitate the Marques" of Santa Cruz in harshness. "Being solicited" in Terceira to put to death fifty Castilian prisoners at Angra, in order "to revenge the death of those that had been executed in the Island of St. Michael," he utterly refused.¹

If after the defeat of Strozzi, Dom Antonio, aged 51, had been too disheartened to contemplate further risks, if he had abandoned the struggle and retired into private life in England or France, he might have claimed at least that he had done more than any other of his countrymen against the conqueror. But he did not fall back upon Christian resignation until Christian initiative had been tried again and again. In Terceira,—defiant of the Spanish garrison in the neighbouring island of St. Michael's,—he set to work to amplify and strengthen the defences: and to prepare for another active venture:

"... gathering together all the ships as well frenche as others" (meaning by "others" English) "which were at the sayd Island of Tercera and other places thereabouts, to the number of seven and thirty shippes," he "embarqued himselfe with two thousand french soldiers and as many Portugalls, to th' intent to pass therewith to th' island of Madera, belonging to the Crowne of Portugall, but then holden by the King of Castile."²

But "the month of October was come (at what tyme the sea beginneth greatly to swell in those parts)" and when he set sail with 37 ships, "there arose so mighty and furious a tempest in the midst of their journey" that "it was impossible for them to passe any further" or for their ships to "keep company together." Beaten back by the storms and "dispersed divers ways," some set their course for France, and some came back with the King to Terceira.

On the 5th of December, our Ambassador in Paris, Sir Henry Cobham, wrote to Sir Francis Walsingham that Dom Antonio was said to have landed at Belleisle, and was daily expected to come privately to the Court. It was believed he would appeal to the "Duke of Brabant" (Francis, Duke of Alençon and Anjou, Queen Elizabeth's suitor).³ On the 7th December Cobham added that, since his last letter,

¹ "Gen: Hist: of Spaine," p. 1225.

² "Explanation," 1585, p. 42.

³ Cal: S.P.F. 1582, No. 497.

"I have been . . . more particularly informed, by letters from Nantes, of the 29th of last month.

"They are advertised from the Terceras that Don Antonio departed on October 11th from that isle towards Madeira, with 26 ships, in which were 3000 Portuguese and 2000 French. And so sailing, after much travail, perceiving that they could not, through contrary winds and rage of the sea, proceed on their enterprise," after losing fourteen ships "through foul weather, with greater discomfiture than they suffered on the day of Strozzi's defeat, they returned back to the Terceras: where Don Antonio arrived with his forces again." Though "thinking to have rested himself," he had no relief from toil; for he discovered "a conspiracy which King Philip had wrought by the practise of Duarte de Castro."¹

This conspiracy was such that Dom Antonio thought it needful to remove all the gold and silver stored in the island. Putting it in chests, he had embarked it in the same ship "wherein he sailed hitherwards, and is arrived at Belleisle. I was further informed to-day that he took post . . . seven leagues from Nantes on the Loire," and so would soon be at the Court.²

King Antonio's "*Explanation*" is more reticent. After stating how the foul weather forced his fleet back to Terceira, he is described as remaining there "about twenty dayes," and as having "sette suche order in the island as was convenyente": after which he departed with five ships "towarde Fraunce," and "with a favourable wind" arrived "within twelve dayes, taking in his company Ciprian de Figueiredo (who till then had governed the Islands of Assores)."

This Cyprian de Figueiredo de Vasconcellos was one of King Sebastian's old officers, left by him in Terceira when he went on his last fatal expedition. At the end of 1581, however, Captain Henry Richards had written from Terceira privately to Secretary Walsingham asking him to influence King Antonio to appoint a new Governor. That he thought Figueiredo not strong enough to cope with the troubles ahead is the reasonable inference; for upon the Governor's personal character there is no stigma. He and his brother were devotedly loyal to their chosen master. Till the end of Dom Antonio's life they were to share his fortunes and misfortunes; and we shall find Cyprian de Figueiredo still in the service of King Antonio's sons after Antonio's death.³

¹ Ib: No. 498.

² The Spanish conspiracy is ignored in the "*Istoria*," 1585, ("*Hist: of the Vniting*," 1600,) but to distract attention, an account was there given of Dom Antonio's rule in the Azores: it being alleged that "Church causes" were mishandled, and that no man's property nor any woman's honour could be safe while he remained in Terceira; he "having too familiar accesse unto the monasteries of religious women . . . with no small scandal" &c. (p. 29). None of this is borne out by the MS reports; and it all is directly contrary to Antonio's military code, in which "*l'honneur des femmes*" was a primary principle, bracketed with respect for all institutions for "the honour of God or in aid of the poor." (His "*Responce*" &c., first to be published later.)

³ The grand-niece of Cyprian de Figueiredo, Madame de Saintonge, issued "*Histoire de Dom Antoine Roy de Portugal Tirée des Memoires de Dom Gomes Vasconcellos de Figueiredo*," which Memoirs she described in her preface as "*un manuscript que l'on trouva dans le Cabinet de mon Grandpère après sa mort: Il estoit . . . frère de Scipion de Vasconcellos; and both brothers 'avoient . . . trop de part aux malheurs de Dom Antoine, et a la confidence des Princes ses fils . . . pour n'estre pas pleinement instruits de tout ce qui se passa . . . en France, en Angleterre,*" etc. Pages 69-85 of this work relate to the Azores; but not knowing how much is from the Figueiredo Memoirs, and how much Madame de Saintonge's adaptation, reduces the value of the production. The B.M. ed: No. 611. b. 30, was printed at Amsterdam 1696, "*suiuant la copie de Paris.*"

Towards the end of 1582, before sailing for France, King Antonio left in Figueiredo's place as Governor of the Azores, Emmanuel de Silva, whom he had created Count of Torres Vedras: the only peerage he conferred.

A more hazardous position it would hardly be possible to have accepted at that juncture, the Spaniards being now in full possession of St. Michael's, and King Philip "seeking by all possible means" to bring the entire Azores under his own jurisdiction.

After Strozzi's defeat, (and especially considering the behaviour of Sansoleme,) the "Earle of Torres Vedras" must have felt heavy apprehension for the future. Whether England would continue assistance, or regard the situation as hopeless and abandon the Portuguese cause, he may well have wondered. Certainly the fate of the French prisoners at Villa Franca was enough to discourage Frenchmen in future from fighting in circumstances wherein they were called "thieves and pirates," and executed accordingly. Afterwards, in effort to belittle his self-sacrifice, the enemies of Torres Vedras set it about that he did not know enough of war to understand his danger; that in his "overweening" pride he expected to prevail: and was ambitious for place and power. But a woman or a child could have seen the danger; much more a man of the world, who knew that not only would the armies and navies of Spain be brought against him, but every secret means used to undermine his authority.

To be sold by a traitor, or slain in the next battle, or die on a scaffold, were three near possibilities which it required no necromancer's crystal to reveal. So Torres Vedras was exceedingly brave to remain in charge of the Islands.

Whatever he may have thought of the situation, he put new heart into the Azoreans, setting them to help to build new forts and sconces; calculating that until the spring the Atlantic storms would prevent a Spanish landing.

When the news reached France of the executions at Villa Franca upon the prisoners of war (arousing both "in Court and throughout the Realm a great griefe and disdaine"), it "enflamed" the French to further efforts against the Spaniards; and "as they had Flaunders near . . . they there discharged their choler": "neither did they forbear, after the returne of Anthonie, to treat of a new preparation of an army for the summer following." This is the statement of a foe; the same who recorded the protest by the officers of the Marqués de Santa Cruz that the prisoners were no pirates but gallant soldiers, as well accredited and commissioned as themselves.

Although it was but ten years since the Queen Mother had not scrupled to have the Grand Admiral of France murdered in his nightgown, and his followers also slain at midnight to the ringing of church bells under cover of peace, the victims then were Huguenots. The execution of French and Portuguese Catholics by the Catholic Marqués de Santa Cruz was for the French Court an entirely different matter: so although King Antonio returned doubly vanquished, he was received

¹ "*Historie of the Vniting,*" etc.

with open arms by the Royal family; and encouraged to hope anew for the "recovery of his kingdom."

On the 27th of August, King Philip writing from Lisbon to inform his Ambassador in London of the battle, had bidden him "... note the effect of this both public and private in England; and *discover . . . all plans and intentions arising from it, and the negotiations . . . between the French and the Queen*. If she or her Ministers say anything to you about St Michael's, you will know how to justify me . . . *pointing out how dearly those who so unjustly offend me have to pay for their presumption, and how God punishes them*."¹

Either using "hope or fear" as may be most advisable, the Ambassador should discover all Queen Elizabeth's projects in time to frustrate them; and, above all, he was commanded to sow discord between Her Majesty and the French.

As to the value of French promises, our own Ambassador Sir Henry Cobham already was dubious; but, when he ventured to say as much to Dom Antonio, Antonio would not countenance any criticism against Royal personages who had given him hospitality in his distress.

"From Paris the Last of December 1582" Cobham wrote (partly in cypher) to "... Syr Frances Walsingham Knyght principall Secretary to the Queenes Majestie: At the Court," to tell him that Dom Antonio "understanding by my sendinge of Captaine Ricardes unto his Lodginge that I did know of his beinge in this Towne" invited him to come and speak with him "at night" on the 27th of the month.²

"I went, fynding him accompanied only by (Diogo de Botelho) in a meane Lodginge" not far from the Queen Mother's house. He had been the day before with the King of France, who had heard of Queen Elizabeth's offer to the Queen Mother "touching the shippes";³ but said that she "mislyked of the condicions."

Dom Antonio wished to come and "caste himselfe downe" at Queen

¹ Cal: S.P.S. III. p. 398.

² Orig: S.P. France VIII. 126. Signed. Not holog: The names of the personages and places are in cypher numbers, some of which are decoded on the orig: by an early hand. The names are reproduced in No. 540 Cal: S.P. Foreign, from which, however, a sentence about "40" is omitted and this number not identified. The numbers are as follows (supra it is convenient to use the names):

10 Queen Elizabeth
12 King of France
14 The Pope
16 Queen Mother
20 King of Spain
24 Duc d'Anjou
(40 Omitted from Calendar. Apparently the Prince of Orange.)
52 D. Antonio
56 The Azores
60 Portugal

³ It would be easy to confound this reference Dec: 31, 1582, with Walsingham's list of ships to be lent to the "Q Mo" undated but preserved among the MSS of 1581, and relating to the previous expedition.

Elizabeth's feet. Both because he is descended from Her Majesty's ancestors,—“as also in consideration he is injured and oppressed by vyolent force of a myghtie personne,” whose “over much prosperity might likewise become noysome” to France and England,—he said to Cobham how much he still hoped Queen Elizabeth would “yelde him assistance for the recovery of his right.”

Cobham “*assured him there was none in the world that had more compassion of his Estate and desyred greatlier his comphorte*” than the Queen; but added that from Dom Antonio's own experience it must be clear to him what danger it would be for Her Majesty to irritate so strong an enemy as the King of Spain, confederated as Spain was with the Pope “and other personnages of qualitic.”

Moreover, Her Majesty was “the rather diswaded from the entringe into so great an action,” because she saw that the French King “forbareth to incounter” with Spain. Although the King of France was aware of King Philip's “practices” in Provence and elsewhere, and of his maintenance of French traitors, it appeared to Cobham significant that the French King held it “good to dissemble” and to pass over these injuries “in cylenece.”

Our Ambassador further pointed out that King Henry had not even allowed his own brother the Duc d'Anjou “sufficient maintenance for to helpe himselfe” when accepted by the Prince of Orange¹ as an ally against Spain. Asking Dom Antonio “to thinke how he had founde the actions of those of” (blank: obviously Sansolemne and the other French deserters) from his recent expedition, Cobham warned him against building on French assistance.

Dom Antonio replied that the French King “had done very muche in helping him . . . but the mischance proceeded as he sayde through cowardlenes and tretchery of some.” Refusing to “Lament him selfe” against one from whom he had received many favours, he assured Cobham that the King was still “very well bent” to continue help, and had given him a promise, which he “could not mistruste.”²

Also that there had come to him “secreatly” from Portugal, messengers who brought word how “evill satisfied” the Portuguese were with Spanish rule; and how eagerly they desired his return; they being willing to “do all things in his favour” if only he could come in strength. And he offered to send word to Cobham as soon as he had again conferred with the Queen Mother: whereat Cobham understood the audience was at an end. Telling all this to Walsingham, Cobham adds that he has since heard that the (Duc de) Joyeuse and Monsieur “la Chastre” had been with Dom Antonio. (Notice the name of “la Chastre,” for we shall hear it again, in circumstances fulfilling Cobham's warning.)

Cobham further relates that it is rumoured the King of France and the Queen Mother “do pretend only to send some small help” for the maintenance of the Azores, without intending “further dealing.” “They say in Court” that the

¹ “40” in the cypher.

² This so characteristic of Antonio, is omitted without asterisks from Cal: S.P.F. No. 540.

King would like to buy Portugal for one of his favourites; and that Dom Antonio had "offered to sell."

At this point the decoding of the letter ceases, the word "sell" being written above one hieroglyphic, but the rest of the sentence remaining uncertain. The editor of the Calendar fills it in at a venture as "sell his claim and right in Portugal": which is the last thing that King Antonio would ever have consented to do. Moreover Antonio (after June 25, 1580) never refers to his "claim," but to his "*right and title*." No matter what Cobham might have been told that "*they say in Court*," Dom Antonio up to his last breath, thirteen years later, stood inviolably firm. (His final action on his death-bed was to be a letter beseeching an English peer and Privy Councillor, who was also a warrior, to effect the deliverance of Portugal.)

Cobham in 1582 was writing to Walsingham who knew how Dom Antonio in 1580 had refused to sell himself to his cousin the King of Spain; so the gossip was passed on without comment, merely to show that there was not much of a party at the French Court for the independence of Portugal.¹

Cobham adds that the Venetian Ambassador was seeking to confer with Dom Antonio; and might have "some extraordinary charge," as "he receaveth oftener despatches" than before.

It was not Cobham's business to offer advice to Principal Secretary Walsingham; but it is manifest that he regarded the French support of Dom Antonio as unlikely to be strong enough to encourage Queen Elizabeth to declare war upon Spain. As Don Bernardino de Mendoza over and over again described to King Philip his own labours in London to prevent the uniting of France and England on behalf of "Don Antonio," we should recognise that both the weakness of the last Valois King and the consequent hesitation of Queen Elizabeth made it easy for Mendoza to stand in the way of Antonio's projects.

Antonio's argument was that as he had been dethroned by force he should be restored by force; also that the increased power of Spain, menacing to France, was equally dangerous for England. But Mendoza by every possible artifice set himself to aid his master in keeping a grip of Portugal; and how audacious a tone he took to "frighten" the Queen of England, is the measure of what he felt behind him of the power and magnitude of the Spanish Empire; increased as it was by acquirement of Portugal and dependencies,—the East Indies, Brazil, Madeira,

¹ In our own day, De la Roncière, "*Hist. de la Marine Française*," Vol. IV, reprinted "*La Vie, Mort, et tombeau du . . . Seigneur Philippe de Strozzi*," Paris 1608, by Torsay, wherein it is alleged that the "*prieur de Crato*," "*le prétendant au trône de Portugal*" had promised the Queen Mother to cede Brazil to France if he were reinstated by French means; and that Strozzi was to have been the first French Viceroy of Brazil. No trace of any such intention appears in King Antonio's own letters; and as Torsay treats Antonio as a "Pretendant," whereas Strozzi died in defence of Antonio's right as King of Portugal, Torsay's word is of no value unsupported by other evidence.

² Many letters, Cal: S.P. Spanish, Vol. III.

and parts of Africa,—though not yet of the Azores, except St. Michael's. Until all the Azores could be conquered, the Portuguese crown sat uneasily upon King Philip's head.

Disregarding Sir Henry Cobham's forecast, Dom Antonio believed implicitly in the French profession of aid: and was further comforted by assurances from Queen Elizabeth of her continued sympathy. Writing to her "from Paris the 19th of January" his tone is resolutely hopeful. Instead of resenting her not having reinforced him on a larger scale, he tells her that her "faithful friendship" heartens him to stand up to the world, against all his misfortunes. Or rather, the "two letters which I have received from your Majesty on the same day truly indicate a change of fortune." Despite all he has suffered there is not one acrimonious word, even in this private letter. His victorious cousin is "poor Philip" (*il povero Felipe*); and instead of brooding over his own wrongs, the "very sweet" compassion of Her Majesty of England is his theme.

As to "these Princes" in France they show "more warmth than ever." He therefore can "hope for good success with the help and favour of your Majesty."

"I hear good news of Castiglio de la Mina, of Brazil, and all other parts of the Ocean. For the rest I pray your Majesty to put faith in Antonio de Vega, and keep him in your good graces.

"Serene Majesty, may the Lord preserve your life and increase your powerful estate, as your Majesty deserves."

Though sealed with the Royal Arms this is not signed "*Rey*" like his official letters, but "*Il marinaro de E. R.*" ("The sailor of Elizabeth Regina").

We may wonder how or why at this juncture he refers to his cousin as "*poor Philip*." The possible reason is that the news would have arrived in France of a heavy affliction which had befallen the King of Spain towards the end of 1582: the death of his little son Prince Diego, whom he had named in 1581 as his heir to the Crown of Portugal, and to whom he had required the Portuguese nobility to swear fealty. Though Antonio, in his capacity of elected King, was resolute in persevering for the liberation of Portugal, he was capable of feeling pity for this sudden sorrow of the kinsman who was his worst enemy. Some other Portuguese, however, recalled that it had not been long after the Duke of Alba defeated Dom Antonio in 1580 at Alcántara that Queen Anna, whom the King brought to Badajoz in readiness for triumphal entry into Portugal, had died of malignant fever. Some argued that this and the death of Don Diego were signs of Heaven's anger. And though the forces of Spain won victory through the Marqués de Santa Cruz in the

¹ Holog: 2 pp. Now first translated from Hatfield MS 185. 130. (Cal: XIII, pp. 217-218 gives it in Italian.)

² Misread "J.R." in Hatfield Cal: Vol. XIII. p. 218.

summer of 1582, the "proud and superb" Duke of Alba died less than five months later "in the pallace of Lisbone" at the age of seventy-four.¹

He is described as having "met the approach of death dry-eyed" and stoical; being one whose face had never been seen to change, "good or ill fortune" always having left him equally self-possessed and "inexorable." Stern to any who failed, his influence had been the stronger in that he had never spared himself.²

"Of a goodly stature, of visage leane and grave," he had "rare gifts of nature and fortune, which he augmented much by arte; he was of a noble minde; of a ready and subtile spirit, assured in judgment, and peaceable."

Though this last epithet may startle us as applied to one whose life had been spent in a series of wars, yet as the aim of such wars was peace on the conqueror's terms, and as the Duke's reputation certainly had contributed to shorten the war in Portugal, the word "peaceable" in the Spanish sense is comprehensible. It comes from the pen believed to be that of the Portuguese Count of Portalegre, who in or before 1580 had compounded with Spain. Writing soon after the Duke's death, this historian continues:

"He was not greedy of worldly wealth, . . . but he was generally hated, for that he treated prouddie with his inferiors, and his equals hated his greatnes . . . , Withal he was not much pleasing to [the Emperor] Charles and less to Philip, although from their birthes untill their later daies he had served them 60 years"

"Hee was greatly enclined to warlike discipline, wherein hee was so cuning, as *there was not any captaine of his nation in long time comparable to him*"

In war he "did willingly hazard his own person"; but was careful of his soldiers, "trusting more to policy than fortune. . . . He served his Kings in greatest charges, and with greater authority than ever any of their subjects, and it may be *there hath not beene in many ages a Captaine which hath so long managed armes, nor displayed his ensignes in so manie countries: For he hath made warre in Italy, Spaine, and Fraunce, in Hungarie, Germanie, Flaunders and Affrick.*"

But not in England. This is the General (here we depart from the text) who in 1569 was to have aided the Earls of Northumberland and Westmorland to substitute Queen Mary of Scots for Queen Elizabeth, had not Thomas Earl of Sussex defeated the rebels. Though the Duke's few communications to the Queen of England are phrased with the stately courtesy proper to a Grandee of Spain, his feelings may be seen from the statue in which she figures as one of the three heads of the hydra he was endeavouring to overthrow.³ But as Destiny did not allow him the fulfilment of this desire, Englishmen now may look upon him more dispassionately than such of their ancestors who, with adequate reason, reckoned him one of the most determined foes of themselves and of Elizabeth Regina.

Though the Duke had been so consistent a toiler on behalf of the Spanish Empire, King Philip showed scant grief for his death. While alluding to this

¹ "Hist: of the Vniting," pp. 300-301.

² Don Juan de Colmenar: "*Annales d'Espagne et de Portugal.*" (Amsterdam) 1712. Vol. II. p. 136.

³ Plate facing p. 76 of "*Discurso del Ex. S^r Duque de Berwick y de Alba.*" Madrid, 1919.

"*gran pérdida*," he added that as it was the will of God there was nothing more to be said than to give the Almighty "thanks for all."¹

It may be that the death of the veteran General was what encouraged some of the Portuguese to show anew their antagonism to Spain, and their affection for the old dynasty. But even previously a rumour had arisen that King Sebastian had not perished of his wounds, but that he lived and would return. These hopes and conjectures crystallised into assertions, which grew and multiplied. King Philip then was in the palace at Lisbon; and for answer he "caused the bones of King Sebastian to be brought out of Affrick . . ." and had them "solemnly interred in the church of Belem neere to the other Kings of Portugal."²

With "sompitous obsequie, with great shews" the remains of King Henry the Cardinal were moved from Almerin to Belem;³ and "from divers parts of the realme unto the said monasterie" the ashes and bones of other descendants of King Emanuel the Fortunate were also brought for reinterment: with intent to emphasise that the dynasty of Aviz was dead and buried.

But though the island of St. Michael had been brought under Spanish domination, the other islands, Terceira, Santa Maria, St. Jorge, Fayal, Pico, Graciosa, Flores and Corvo, ruled by Dom Antonio's Governor Emanuel de Silva, Count de Torres Vedras, were yet unsubdued. Wherefore a fleet and army yet more extensive than those of the previous summer were prepared by King Philip in readiness to attack the Azores the following year.

¹ "El sentimiento de Felipe II por la pérdida de un hombre a quien tanto debía, está bien patente en la frase de su carta al Duque de Medina Sidonia: 'Lo que decís de la muerte del Duque de Alba es muy propio de vuestra prudencia, porque, cierto, ha sido muy gran pérdida; pero como son obras de Dios, no hay que decir más que darle las gracias por todo.'" "Discurso del Excelentísimo Señor Duque de Berwick y de Alba," Madrid 1919, p. 95. And the Duke adds (p. 96): "Bien cabe recordar aquí la máxima citada por el embajador D. Juan Zúñiga al hablar de la ingratitud de cierta nación para con el Rey de España, 'que un gran beneficio no se podía pagar sino con una gran ingratitud.'"

² "Hist: of the Vniting," p. 302. Elsewhere we see that the instructions of "D. Felipe por graça de Deos Rei de Portugal e dos Algarves" etc., etc. are dated from Lisbon, 14 July, 1582. He orders that the corpse of "Senhor Rei D. Sebastiao meo Sobrinho . . . que hora esta depositado na Cidade de Ceuta" is to be brought to Belem by D. Alonso Perez de Guzman, Duque de Medina Sidonia. ("Historia Chronologica": p. 401, cit in "Carta . . . Da Morte d'El Re D. Sebastião," etc. Lisbon, 1808, p. 30.) Though becoming King of Portugal by force in 1580, Philip II waited until '82 to ransom King Sebastian's corpse from the "paynims." The tradition that this King, though overthrown at Alcacer, would return, did not end in 1582 with the burial of his bones. It was renewed in the persons of more than one alleged King Sebastian. (Vide "Generall Historie of Spaine," Continuation, 1612, and see Vieira's picture, II. 4. 2 (c), (ante).)

In 1808 was published a collection of quotations from 16th century materials stating King Sebastian's death in battle: "Carta em Resposta de Certo Amigo Da Cidade de Lisboa a outro da villa de Santarem, em que se lancam os fundamentos sobre a Verdade, ou inteirza da Morte d'el Rei D. Sebastiao XVI Rei de Portugal, Na Batalha de Alcacerguibir em Africa [quotation from Cicero. Royal Arms] Lisboa, Na officina de João Evangelista Garcez 1111DCCCXVIII." (This ends, p. 83, "Deos guardi a V. M. etc., Lisboa 29 de Maio 1808," and is signed "F.") It is derived largely from Spanish sources, or from writers like the so-called "Conestaggio," who certainly had not wished for King Sebastian's return. But the persistence of the popular dream that King Sebastian would come back and turn defeat to victory,—a belief handed down for centuries, and not extinct when Sir Richard Burton visited Portugal in the 19th century,—is at least a proof how deep an impression had been made by the tragic fate of the young King, in whom Camoens had seen the "sure hope" of Portugal's redemption.

³ "Hist: of the Vniting." Book 9. p. 302.

“CARRIED TO HIS GRAVE IN TRIUMPH”:

The Great Duke of Alba. 1582.

In Father Strada's retrospective history, "*De Bello Belgico*," King Philip is depicted as sometimes harsh towards the Great Duke in his life but deploring his death:

"... Whilst the Duke [of Alba] overtoyled himselfe at Lisbon he fell desperately sicke, the King comming often to visit him on his deathbed: and the Sacraments of the Church being administered to him by Lewis of Granada . . . he departed this life; whose death . . . hapening in the height of that Prosperity, grieved the King so much that he was heard to say, "*he never had greater experience of the incertainty of humane things: because when his fortunes were raised to so high a pitch, by the addition of many Kingdomes, he was then deprived of the Heire apparent to his Crowne, of the Queene his Wife, and of this his great and faithfull General.*" And truly the Duke of Alba, descended from great Warriours, had military Prudence by a Kind of Inheritance. His Father was that Garzia, who in the African Warre being created Admirall, in the Isle of Gerben (where about 3,000 Spaniards fell by the Sword and Famine) . . . , endeavoured to stop the flight of his men by wresting a Pike out of the hand of a common Souldier, and valiantly fighting with it, was slaine by the Moores. His Grand-Father was Federico, Cosen German to King Ferdinand, who . . . gloriously put an end to the Warre of Granada, . . . and with the same courage defended the Appennine and all the Borders of Spaine against the French. Lastly it was his fortune to joyne the Crown of Navarre to the Spanish Empire" [i.e., the 1st Duke of Alba]. "But Alva himselfe farre transcended all his Ancestours in the vertues of a Generall. . . ."

Unselfish devotion to the Crown was his ruling principle: "So much his Majesty confided in the man, he thought Alva might be uncertaine of his Favour, yet he scure of the Fidelity of Alva: Whose obedient Loyalty seemes to merit the honour he had, to die in the King's speciall grace, in his Court, and almost in his Armes: and, having to his owne wishes ended the Warre, among the Applauses of Victory to be carried to his grave in Triumph."¹

¹ "*De Bello Belgico. The History of the Low-Country Warres. Written in Latine by Famianus Strada. In English by Sr. Rob. Stapylton, Kt.*" (especially for King Charles I): ". . . London. Printed for Humphrey Moseley . . . the Princes Armes in St. Pauls-Churchyard, MDCL": Book 7, pp. 82-83. Engraved portrait (head and shoulders) faces p. 25, Book 6: "Ferdinand of Toledo, Duke of Alba, Governour of the Low-countrys. Ro: Vaughan sculp." (B.M. 1055, b. 9). See also "*Famiani Stradae Romani. . . De Bello Belgico*," licensed by the Emperor Ferdinand, 1646; and by Pope Innocent X, 1647. In the edition of 1652, the folding plates of battles (pictorial plans) are given with the names of the Governors at the top; those during the rule of "Albano Gubernatore," face pp. 216, 226, 232, 248, Lib: 7.

For Bibliog: of works relating to the Great Duke, see the present Duke of Alba's "*Discurso*," &c., 1919, pp. 169-172. But since that was published, His Grace has found a "*Recopilación de la felicísima jornada que la Católica Real Magestad del Rey Don Phelipe Neustro Señor hizo en la Conquista del Reyno de Portugal*," &c., "*siendo Capitan General el Ex^{mo} D. Don Fernando Aluarez de Toledo Duque de Alua. Compuesta por Antonio de Escobar, vecino de Valladolid*": (pp. viii, 112), printed in Valencia by "*La Vidua de Pedro Huerte*." Dedicated to the King. Containing prefatory sonnets, 1586. The Librarian to His Grace The Duke of Berwick and Alba reports, just as "Elizabethan England" is passing through the press, that Escobar was a Spaniard, not apparently any relation to the Portuguese of that name: "El autor asistió a toda la compañía combatiendo en ella con su persona y armas, criados y caballos. Cuenta todo lo que pasó y describe las operaciones militares, entradas, desembarcos, llegada y recibimientos del Rey, pero no hace juicios criticos ni calificaciones estratégicas de la campaña." The book does not contain any map or plan. But for newly discovered plan of the battle of Alcántara by an anonymous (Spanish) officer, see E.E. II, 4, 7, ante (plate d).

HITHERTO UNKNOWN PORTULAN CHART:

Signed, on scroll on top left hand corner, Bertolameu Lasso" (Bertolameu Lasso).

From the original in possession of the Marquess of Salisbury, K.G.
at Hatfield House.

See Portfolio No. 10.

In colours upon vellum; 2 feet 9 by 3 feet 6.

Pierced with holes all round, as if used for a "seacard." The metals in the coats of arms are tarnished and in some parts blackened.

Undated, but made subsequent to 1580, as only the arms of Spain are on the Peninsula.

Whether this chart came into England by purchase, or capture, there is nothing to indicate.

Unlike the chart by Borough of Frobisher's Navigations, and unlike the drawing of the Escorial, it is not docketed on the back in Lord Burghley's hand.

This Portulan chart when published in the "*Elizabethan England*" Portfolio, January, 1932, was stated from internal evidence to be Portuguese under Spanish influence. (Brochure No: I, pp. 11-12). The inference was correct. Lasso passed an examination in Lisbon in 1564 and was authorised to make nautical Charts and instruments (MS. in the Torre do Tombo, published by the Marques de Sousa Viterbo, "*Trabalhos Nauticos dos Portuguezes nos Seculos XVI e XVII*," Lisbon, 1898, pp. 169-171). But after the conquest of Portugal by the Duke of Alba in 1580, Lasso's services were transferred to King Philip II; and on 17th April, 1592, the States General of the Spanish Netherlands granted to Cornelis Claesz, Printer in Amsterdam, license to print twenty-five "*particuliere zeearten*" from "*Bartholomeo de Lasso cosmographo ende meestre de zeevaent des Coninex Van Spaengien*" (Vide F. C. Wieder, "*Nederlandsche Historische Geographische Documenten in Spanje*," Leiden, 1915, p. 168.) In 1915, eight MS. maps and charts by Lasso, dated 1590, were brought from Spain by Dr. F. C. Wieder to Holland, and were acquired by W. A. Engelbrecht of Rotterdam. Described by Dr. Wieder in his "*Monumenta Cartographica*," The Hague, Vol. II, 1927, pp. 34-35, they relate to N.E. America, Central America, Brazil and N.W. Africa, S.E. Africa and Madagascar, N.E. Africa, Arabia and Persia, Hindostan, Indian Archipelago and Philippine Islands; New Guinea and the Solomon Islands; and Europe. The Linschoten Society reproduced parts of two of these in 1925: "*De Eerste Schipvaart der Nederlanders naar Oost Indie onder Cornelis de Houtman in 1597*" (Vol. II). For drawing the present writer's attention to these publications the Librarian of the Royal Geographical Society, Mr. Edward Heawood, M.A., is to be thanked; and Dr. Wieder has since examined the Portulan chart at Hatfield, and confirms the inference that it is an earlier example of Lasso's work than those he discovered in Spain.

Lasso's unknown Chart was included in the "*Elizabethan England*" Portfolio for three reasons:

1st, that it had belonged to the Lord High Treasurer, Burghley, whose patronage of "*Noble Arts, especially Maps*," this work is the first to illustrate.

2nd, that the Royal Arms of Portugal and Spain on the respective territories conquered by the Portuguese and Spaniards made it peculiarly appropriate to the only English history which has attempted to do justice simultaneously to both those nations, which have always been antagonistic to each other.

3rd, that references of Mendoza to English projects in relation to Florida in 1582 suggested the desirability of a map or chart including that region.

Sto vi da.

Mar ocei no.


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PART II.

“Particularly the Power of Spain.”

CHAPTER 6.

“HIS COUNTRY’S SERVICE AND HIS OWN HONOUR.”

SECTION I.

“Without any charge to Her Majesty.”

(*The last enterprise of Sir Humphrey Gilbert, 1583*).

“I will at all times be ready to take anything in hand ; . . . not respecting the danger ; and therefore I beseech your Honour not to regard my life but the service of her Majesty and Country.”

Sir Humphrey Gilbert to Lord Burghley.
From Flushing, 13 Aug: 1572. (First published ante.)

“ . . . which places if they be peopled and well fortified, . . . wee shall be lordes of the whole fishing in small time if it doe so please the Queens Majesty.”

“ . . . a report of the true state and commodities of Newfoundland,
by M. Anthonie Parckhurst Gentleman 1578.”

“ . . . my case is thus evil, not through want of her Majesty’s most gracious and bountiful consideration, . . . but through my evil hap otherwise . . . (I) that have served her Highness from a boy to the age of white hairs.”

Sir Humphrey Gilbert to Principal Secretary Sir Francis Walsingham,
“from Minster in Sheppey, the XI of July, 1581.”

“ . . . seeing the Queen’s Majesty is to have a fifth of all the gold and silver . . . without any charge to her Majesty, I trust her highness . . . will not deny me liberty to execute that which resteth in hope so profitable to her Majesty and crown . . . especially seeing I have her Majesty’s grant and license under the great seal of England . . . ”

Sir Humphrey Gilbert “To the right Honorable Sir Francis Walsyngham knight Principall Secretarye to her matie.”
7 Feb: 1582-3. (orig: S.P.D.E. CLVIII. 59).

We shall see Sir George Peckham harking back in 1583 to the precedent of "Christopher Columbus of famous memorie";¹ a good example of how sympathetically the men of the 16th century honoured those who had gone before. His reference to dull minds scorning Columbus for "the plainness of his garments" and the vastness of his hopes, needs supplementing by the reminder that if the Sovereigns of Castile and Aragón hesitated at first, yet the royal recognition ultimately took a form lasting to this day: For in 1493 Christopher Columbus (Cristóbal Colón) was created by King Ferdinand and Queen Isabella *Hereditary Admiral of the Indies*. In the next century, his son was made *Duke of Veragua and La Vega, and Marquis of la Jamaica*.

In "*The General Historie of Spaine*," 1612 (translated and enlarged from "*Histoire Generale d'Espagne*," 1586), p. 881, after describing Colombus, Louis de Mayerne Turquet says of his son: "Among many deeds worthe of commendation of this Admirall . . . hee gathered together, in the citie of Seville, one of the greatest and goodlyest Libraries in Christendome; seeking out . . . all good books in what language soever: so as there was above twelve thousand volumes; for the keeping, maintenance and increase of which librarie he left sufficient rents."

Counting MSS., there were nearer 20,000; some being papers of Christopher Columbus, bearing on his discoveries in the *Nuevo Mundo*; signed by him and by others concerned. Early printed books, and poetry, and romances of Chivalry, were included. Gradually the library was enlarged to some 40,000 volumes. It is still attached to the Cathedral at Seville.²

(The house of Colón was divided into several branches: Colón; Portugal or Gelves; and Colón de Larreategui. From Mariano Colón, born 1769, descends Don Cristóbal Colón y Aguilera, 15th and present Duke of Veragua, Marquis of la Jamaica, &c.)

The first Duke of Veragua had a daughter Isabel who married George of Portugal, grandson of the 2nd Duke of Bragança. George of Portugal was created *Count of Gelves*, on 1st June, 1529. On 31 December, 1716, the heiress of this title, Doña Catalina Colón de Portugal, married the grandson of the last Stuart King of England *de facto*: namely James Francis FitzJames Stuart, Duke of Liria, who, when his father was killed, in 1734, succeeded as 2nd Duke of Berwick.

See "*El Mariscal de Berwick. Bosquejo Biografico. Por El Duque de Berwick y de Alba. Madrid. 1925*" Lámina XVI, portrait of "*Catalina Ventura Colón de Portugal, Duquesa de Veragua. Mujer del ii Duque de Berwick*," by J. M. Nattier: Palacio de Liria; also a beautiful picture, by Richard, of her husband. Lámina XV.

The Columbus papers did not all descend to the Dukes of Veragua. Some, including a sketch map of Columbus, came through the wife of the 2nd Duke of Berwick into possession of the Dukes of Berwick; and are in the collection of the present (10th) Duke of Berwick, James Charles Manuel FitzJames Stuart, 17th Duke of Alba. Vide "*Catálogo de las colecciones expuestas en las vitrinas del Palacio de Liria. Le publica La Duquesa de Berwick y de Alba, Condesa de Siruela*," Madrid, 1898: Number 87 (p. 83); 97 (p. 91); 101 (p. 95); and 109 (p. 104). The Duchess also published "*Autógrafos de Cristóbal Colón y Papeles de América*," Madrid 1892; and "*Nuevos Autógrafos de Cristóbal Colón y Relaciones de Ultramar*," Madrid, 1902.³ The Columbus maps are now in process of being printed for the Hakluyt Society; and it is no secret that the Duke of Berwick and Alba has been for some years engaged upon a monumental work which is to include all the Spanish 15th century maps bearing upon the achievements of his ancestor Columbus, and the subsequent Spanish cartography of the 16th and 17th centuries in relation to America.

¹ In "*A True Report of the late discoveries*," etc.

² "*Catálogo de los libros de la Biblioteca Colombina de Sevilla, publicado del bibliotecario D. Servando Arboli, con notas bibliográficas de D. Simón de la Rosa*," Sevilla, 1888, &c. 6 vols.

³ See also Henry Vignaud, "*La Maison d'Albe et les Archives Colombiennes*," Paris, Société des Américanistes, 1904.

PART II.

“Particularly the Power of Spain.”

CHAPTER 6.

“HIS COUNTRY’S SERVICE AND HIS OWN HONOUR.”

SECTION I.

“Without any charge to Her Majesty.”

(*The last enterprise of Sir Humphrey Gilbert, 1583*).

“EVER since Almighty God commanded Adam to subdue the earth,” there have not lacked “heroicall spirits, which in obedience to that high mandate, either from manifest reason alluring them, or by secret instinct inforcing them thereto, have expended their wealth, employed their times, and adventured their persons, to find out the true circuit thereof.”¹

Though this was written in relation to “*The voyage about the world, by Sir Francis Drake*,” and though Sir Humphrey Gilbert was born under a less fortunate star, yet he was surely one of the “heroicall spirits” who both by “manifest reason” and “secret instinct” performed such services as “have deserved great commendation of their own ages,” and should have “purchased a just renowne with all posterity.”

In Hakluyt’s collection of “*Principal Navigations*,” as dedicated to Sir Francis Walsingham in 1589, there appeared a graphic narrative of the final voyage of “*Sir Humphrey Gilbert, Knight, who was the first to erect an habitation and government in those Northerly Countreys of America*” in “*the yeare of our Lord 1583*.”² Yet from the mid 18th century up to date, the fancy to treat Sir Walter Raleigh as the “pioneer coloniser” has so dominated the minds of even professedly grave historians that while the figure of Raleigh attains gigantic stature, his elder half-brother Sir Humphrey Gilbert has been dwarfed, and in some cases forgotten. In the memorial window presented in our day by American lovers of history to St. Margaret’s, Westminster, among the scenes depicted are the embarkation of Raleigh from Plymouth for Virginia; and his landing in Virginia. Frescoes of the same subjects were about to be ordered for our Houses of Parliament; but it was pointed out, just in time, that Raleigh never set foot upon Virginian soil.³

¹ “*The World Encompassed*” (1652). p. 1.

² Best modern ed: MacLehose’s Hakluyt. (1904). Vol. VIII. p. 38.

³ It was Guiana, not Virginia, he visited, 1595.

Whereas Gilbert expended his time and resources in thankless labours, and was not ambitious to shine "in Court," Raleigh (as one of his biographers expressed it) "shone in splendid raiment, in costly silver armour, in gems and great pearls"; and had his portrait painted repeatedly in these sumptuous costumes. But the only contemporary picture of Gilbert which now survives is crude and hard; and he, a scion of an ancient and knightly house, is clad as plainly as any "simple" person.² Two other portraits of him which once existed are lost. But full-length and three-quarter figures of Raleigh in gorgeous attire so abound that from their multiplicity and magnificence it is now inferred he must have been in the front rank of importance.³ It was not until June 1585, *when Elizabeth Regina had been nearly twenty-six years on the throne*, that Don Bernardino de Mendoza referred to "*Raleigh the Queen's new favourite*."⁴ He seems first to have come to her notice in connection with the projects of his half-brother, Sir Humphrey Gilbert.

It had been in June 1578 that the Royal permission was "graunted by her Majestie to Sir Humphrey Gilbert, Knight, for the inhabiting and planting of our people in America." But this attempt to "search out and view" remote "heathen and barbarous lands not actually possessed of any Christian Prince or people," had failed to answer expectations. The particulars are not recorded by Sir Humphrey, but he states to Walsingham that he "returned with great loss, because *I would not myself, nor suffer any of my company, to do anything contrary to my word given to her Majesty and yourself: For if I had not far preferred my credit before my gain, I needed not to have returned so poor.* . . ."⁵

The same year that Gilbert came back baffled, "Anthony Parckhurst, Gentleman" wrote "from Bristow the 13 of November" to Richard Hakluyt, describing fervently the "commodities" of the Newfound Land or "terra nova."⁶ He deplored that whereas Spaniards, "Portugals," and Bretons were in the habit of thronging there each fishing-season, our fishermen, though well-equipped, were fewer in number.

To demonstrate "the fertilitic and goodnesse of the cuntry," Parckhurst

¹ Stebbing. p. 25. ² See reproduction, II. 6. 2. Plate 18.

³ "Multiplicity," even counting only authentic portraits. The "Sir Walter Raleigh" at Longleat is Sir Carew Raleigh; another so-called Raleigh is Robert Earl of Leicester, etc., etc. Two of the best portraits are reproduced in later volumes, when treating of years during which Raleigh actually was conspicuous.

⁴ Paris Arch: K. 1565.72. Cal: S.P. Spanish. III. p. 538. But even W. G. Gosling, (1911), the first to protest against our current over-estimate of Raleigh as an explorer, states (p. 213) that by 1582-3 Raleigh "*had rapidly won the position of the Queen's chief favourite*." And (p. 240) in reference to Gilbert's laws for Newfoundland, the third of which was against speaking evil of Her Majesty, Gosling asks, "Had some whispering tongues already breathed scandals about Queen Elizabeth? Her sudden infatuation for Raleigh must doubtless have been well known, and its bearing upon the voyage could not but have been commented on." (The word "doubtless" is too often used when offering some such flight of mere fancy.)

⁵ Orig: S.P.D.E. CLVIII. 50.

⁶ "*A letter written to M. Richard Hakluyt of the middle Temple containing a report of the true state and commodities of Newfoundland*, by M. Anthonie Parckhurst Gentleman 1578." MacLchose's Hakluyt's "*Principal Navigations*" (1904). Vol. VIII. pp. 9-16.

related that he had sown "in sundry places" wheat, barley, oats, peas, seeds of herbs, and kernels of nuts, "all which have prospered as in England."

Fruit trees grew freely; and "as for Roses, they are as common as brambles in England: Strawberries, Dewberries and Raspis as common as grasse." The timber, though mostly fir, includes oak, birch, alder, pine, apple, willow, "and thornes." The climate is "not so colde as foolish Mariners doe say."

For game, "plentie of Beares every where, so that you may kill them as oft as you list: their flesh is as good as young beefe Of others we may take store. There are Sea Guls, Murres, Duckes, wild Geese, and many other kind especially at one Island named Penguin Nowe againe, for Venison plentie"; wolves and "many other kinds of beastes"; also foxes black and white. The bears appeared unafraid of man: they "will not spare at midday to take your fish before your face, and I beleeve assuredly would not hurt anie bodie unless they be forced"

"Now to show you . . . what places I suppose meetest to inhabite in these parts discovered of late by our nation": at the mouth of the great bay, the harbour called by the French 'Chasteaux' and an island termed by them "Bell Isle: *which places if they be peopled and well fortified . . . wee shall be lordes of the whole fishing in small time, if it doe so please the Queenes Majestie*; and from thence send wood and cole with all necessities to Labrador lately discovered"

"I found also certain Mines of yron and copper in S. Johns, and in the Island of Yron, which things might turn to our great benefite"

" if I had not been deceived by the vile Portugals descending of the Jewes and Judas kind, I had not failed to have searched this river and all the Coast of Cape Breton . . . but they breaking their bonds and falsifying their faith and promise, disappointed me of the salte they should have brought me in part of recompense for my good service in defending them two years against French Rovers, that had spoyld them if I had not defended them. By means whereof they made me lose not only the searching of the countrey, but also forced me to come home with great losse above 600 li. In recompense whereof I have sent my man into Portugall to demand justice at the King's hand"

If King Sebastian should refuse reparation Parckhurst would appeal "to the Queenes Majesty and her honourable Councell . . . for that her Majestie and the councell doe tender poore fisher men, who with me have sustained three hundred pound losse in that voyage. . . ."

To make of Newfoundland a flourishing English settlement was the confident hope of Sir Humphrey Gilbert. But his projects were sorely hampered by lack of money; and from "Minster in Sheppey,"² the XI of July 1581, he implored Walsingham's "speedy furtherance" of payment of arrears still due to him for his last service in Ireland in 1578. He had then been some £2000 out of pocket; and for want of means he had been "stayed here, and could not be permitted to return into Ireland, to save my ships and goods; which were stolen and carried away, as your Honor and my Lords do very well know." The reckonings had been "set down under the Auditor's hand, of Ireland. . . And my Lord Deputy that now is wrote his letters to my Lo(rds) of the Council long sithence for my payment; but as yet I can get nothing."

That he, "*having served her Majesty in wars and peace above seven and twenty*

¹ "Yours to use and command. Anthony Parckhurst." (Op. cit. p. 16.)

² "Menster in Shippey." (Sheppey Island, Kent.)

years," could nevertheless be reduced so low as to be daily in danger of arrest for debt, was "a miserable thing." He was even "forced to gadge and sell all my wife's clothes from her back, who brought me so good a living."¹

His plight would certainly have been still worse had his wife not been an heiress.² But his main hopes were in the Queen:

[She] "did never yet deny me anything that I ever asked; *although I never enjoyed anything to profit that ever her Majesty gave me.* So that my case is thus evil, not through want of Her Majesty's most gracious and bountiful consideration, . . . but through my evil hap otherwise. Therefore my most humble suit is that your Honor will vouchsafe without delay to present this my pitiful petition to her Majesty's own consideration; who I am sure will never detain my owne from me, . . . *that have served her Highness from a boy to the age of white hairs.* . . .

Your Honour's most humble to command

Hy GYLBERTE."³

Over three months later, 25th October, 1581, Sir Humphrey again wrote sorrowfully to Walsingham:

"It seemeth your Honour thinketh it much that I should be allowed the sum set down by the auditor in my accounts for the service of three of my ships in Ireland. Truly I am not allowed so much as I ought; for I was appointed Admiral of all the ships that served then in Ireland, until Sir John Perrott came over with her Majesty's shipping"; during which interval his pay had only been reckoned at eighteen pence (xviij^d) per day, an "ordinarie Sea Captaines pay." "Also the Anne Ager⁴ was a ship of two hundred four score and thirteen tons or thereabouts"; but in the reckoning "she is set downe but two hundred and fifty tons; so I am wronged thereby thirty seven pounds ten shillings.

"Also I had in the Anne a hundred and twenty men, of my own Company, besides thirty that were Mr. Savill's, and the Provost Marshal's men, whom I victualled at my own charge: as I did all the rest: and am allowed but for a hundred. . . ." leaving a loss of £41. 10. 4.

Further corrections of the official reckoning follow; and as to the service in Ireland, "the Rebels did twice or thrice offer to assail the town of Kinsale"; but durst not," because of "the fear they had of the Artillery of the Anne Ager . . . And for the relief, she . . . went to Youghall,"⁵ where were two French ships well ordinated and manned; and entered them by force and took them both."

The Frenchmen had been helping the rebels against Her Majesty's forces; and

¹ The Countess of Leicester calculated £100 as the cost of a dress suitable to present to the Queen; and Lord Burghley allowed more. Though a dress for a Knight's wife would have been at a less high rate, a lady's garment, embroidered and jewelled, was not then worn for six months and cast away; but preserved and handed on to descendants. See the Will of the Duchess of Northumberland, ante, Prologue, sec: X.

² Lady Gilbert was only child of John, younger son of Sir Anthony Ager or Aucher (Herald's Visitation of Kent. Not heiress of Sir Anthony himself, as stated by Gosling.)

Sir Anthony Aucher of "Ottringden" (now Otterden) had been head of the family. Brasses of his mediaeval ancestors are in the church in Otterden. A junior branch was settled in or before 1575 at Yokes Court, (Manor House of Frinstead near Sittingbourne), one of whom, Henry Aucher or Archer, seems to have been identical with Henry Archer, Gentleman of the Earl of Leicester's Guard, who gave Stow a graphic account of the battle of Zutphen, 1586 (see under date.)

³ First printed by Gosling, (in orig: spelling), pp. 160-161. Whereabouts of MS. not stated.

⁴ His flagship in 1578. ⁵ "assayell the towne of Kynsall." ⁶ "yohall."

the Queen's men could not cross the river because of the French marine artillery, until Sir Humphrey captured the ships. It had been his "frygott" which had been employed between Ireland and England to carry despatches. Moreover:

"there was at that time my own powder spent in my said ships, and employed by the Lord Justice, to the value of sixteen pounds sterling that these ships served the Queen in such sort . . . is manifestly known unto my Lords of the Council as also by my Lord Grey's letters² . . . dated xxxth of January, 1580. . . ."

If he is not paid what remains due to him, he will be "utterly undone, not able to show my head" (for fear of being arrested for debt).³ Actually he had to wait until July 1582 before recovering his losses.⁴ And meanwhile in 1581 came further vexations. An Act of Council was passed at Richmond, 22nd of October, that whereas Sir Humphrey Gilbert had made "deputations for the transporting of victual out of the Realms, . . . grounding the same upon . . . her Majesty's Letters Patents . . . certain years past, . . . forasmuch as his intended voyage and discoveries have taken no effect," their Lordships order that he should be sent for, and should hand in the Patent; and also provide Mr Secretary Walsingham with a note of the names of the persons he had licensed, that order might be taken for "revoking" them.⁵

Secretary Walsingham presumably remonstrated with the Queen. For although a year elapsed before the signing of Sir Humphrey's Articles of Agreement with the Merchant Adventurers, these Articles are based on "her Majesty's Letters Patents" bearing date at Westminster the ii June 20th Elizabeth (1578), namely the original authorisation to Sir Humphrey "*from tyme to tyme and at all tymes forever hereafter to discover, searche, finde out and view . . . remote heathen and barbarous lands . . . not actually possessed of any Christian Prince or people. . .*"⁶

The Articles of 1582 give to the port of Southampton the sole rights of trading with Sir Humphrey's new dominions; and provide for many and various exigencies.⁷

On the 8th of July, 1582, "Sir Humphrey Gilbert of Compton in the County of Devon, Knight"

¹ The "Squirrell." ² Lord Deputy of Ireland.

³ "The xxvth daie of October, 1581. Yor ho. moste hble. to co'ande H^y. Gylberte." Gosling, (1911). pp. 161-165. No MS source given.

⁴ Gosling, p. 165.

⁵ There were present in Council on this occasion (*Acts of the P.C.*, Vol. XIII. pp. 239-240) the Lord Chancellor (Sir Thomas Bromley), the Lord Treasurer (L^d. Burghley), the Lord High Admiral (Earl of Lincoln), the Earl of Leicester, and Lord Hunsdon, the Comptroller (Sir James Crofts), the Vice Chamberlain (Sir Christopher Hatton) and the Principal Secretary (Sir Francis Walsingham). As Burghley, Leicester, and Walsingham were sympathetic to Sir Humphrey's ideas, the revocation is perplexing. Gosling when mentioning the Act of Council that Sir Humphrey "could no longer claim the privileges of his patent, and that . . . his letters Patent should be revoked," adds "*Further consideration, however, resulted in the cancelling of this irritating and unjust ruling.*" He does not document his statement. There is not any Act of Council 1581-82 withdrawing the decision; but after that date a Register is missing, which may have embodied such an Act. (There does not appear to be any relevant letter or paper in the State Papers Domestic or among the Hatfield MSS.)

⁶ Patent Roll. 1178. pt. 4. m. 8. ⁷ S.P.D.E. C.L.V. 86. App: infra. p. 254.

"... calling to mind the mortality of mankind and the uncertain event of long voyages in marine and martial affairs, . . . lest through my death, captivity, or other mishap, and the minority of my next heir, this intended enterprise might quail, . . . assign unto my well-beloved brother Sir John Gilbert of Greenway in the County of Devon Knight, Sir George Peckham of Denham in the County of Bucks Knight, and William Aucher, of Borne in the County of Kent Esquire, all such estate . . . as I have . . . by virtue of the said Letters Patent. . . ."¹

Sir John Gilbert and Sir George Peckham are authorised to ratify grants of land, to dispose of offices "for the countries now to be discovered . . ." and to govern the same and dispose of the revenues, "to the best behoof of my wife and children. . ." Though all customs, rents, royalties and jurisdictions, were to be reserved for his male heirs, Lady Gilbert was to receive during their minority, one third of the revenues; reduced to one fifth when the eldest son attained his majority. Lady Gilbert was also to have one entire "seignory" of fifty English square miles; which she was to bequeath to be a jointure for the wife of the Chief-Governor of the Country, under the Crown of England "for ever."

Each of Sir Humphrey's six sons was to have "a like seignorie at the least"; and to each daughter 20 square miles (he had only one daughter in 1582). Each was to execute justice within his or her own domain, and to contribute to the general purse, and furnish a well-armed soldier on horseback. The executors could dispose of lands to settlers; but must reserve sites for towns and forts, and make provision for common and pasture land. For the better encouragement of poor persons, ten acres of land were to be presented for every house built, on payment of a small rent for the house. Each person sent out of England was to have a lease for three lives, of 60 acres of land, with allowance of wood for repair of houses, hedges, and farm implements: for all of which the small tenants should pay small rent, and a "heriot."² They were each expected to bring provisions to the following value:

a quarter of wheat . . .	20s.	
four bushels of barley . . .	6s.	8d.
" " " oats . . .	3s.	4d.
two " " beans . . .	5s.	
two " " peas . . .	4s.	
Also one hatchet . . .		12d.
one pickaxe . . .		12d.
one handsaw . . .		12d.
one spade . . .		12d.

Total 43s

If men came furnished at their own expense with "a sword, a dagger, and a

¹ Gosling, pp. 201-2, summarises the ensuing points, but does not state what the document is or where; and as he calls it Sir H. Gilbert's "Will," it was first sought for the present work at Somerset House. Not being there, the quest was continued at the P.R.O. It is Close Roll, 24 Eliz. P^b. 7.

² "A feudal duty . . . to a Lord upon the death of a tenant, consisting originally of the horses and arms lent by the Lord to his men; later, of the best beast or chattel of the tenant, and now . . . in some cases merely a money payment."—Webster's *New International Dictionary*."

hargabusse," they were to receive six score acres. Each gentleman who brought five men fully equipped and furnished, was to be granted 2000 acres in fee simple; if ten men, 4000; and so forth in proportion. Every one of the men thus brought was to have his own six score acres.

Sixty-acre-tenants had the obligation to maintain a longbow, a sheaf of arrows, a sword, dagger, and wooden target. Tenants holding 24 acres were to provide for one soldier (besides themselves); and the gentlemen of 2000 acres were to keep a light horse furnished for war, "after such time as God shall send sufficient horse in these parts." Meanwhile "two men for shot" were to be kept "in lieu of such horses."

The tax for maintenance of Navy and Army and the general defence of the country was one halfpenny per acre. Provision was made for maimed soldiers; also for "learning," lectures, schools, and such "other good and godly uses" as the "chief magistrates and law-makers" should decide.

Every parish was to be three miles square, "with the Church in the midst thereof"; and each clergyman, besides his tithes, should have 300 acres, as near the Church as possible. Bishops were to have 10,000 acres; the Archbishop 20,000. But any minister who absented himself for more than six months out of any year was to forfeit his living.

The rents were not to be paid until seven or ten years after the lands had been occupied.¹

In Gilbert's Patent of 1578, Queen Elizabeth had specified that the new settlements must be according to the laws of England, even in matters ecclesiastical. But Sir Humphrey entered into an arrangement with Sir George Peckham, Sir Thomas Gerard, and other "Popish" gentlemen, to lease to them in advance a considerable proportion of the territories yet to be occupied.² Moreover, permission was sought for Catholic Recusants to leave the realm and settle in this the intended first Crown Colony. It might be supposed that the project would have been regarded as an act of mercy, enabling Catholics to escape from the irksome Statute Laws at home. But the Spanish Ambassador was annoyed when he heard of the plan. He preferred all Catholics to remain in England, under such disabilities as should make them the readier to welcome the invasion intended by the King of Spain. From London he wrote to King Philip, 11 July 1582, that the object of the

¹ Francis Bacon in his essay on "*Plantations*," many years after, stated that "planting of countries is like planting of wood, for you must take account to lease almost twenty years profit and expect your recompence in the end. For the principal thing that hath been the destruction of most plantations hath been the base and hasty drawing of profits in the first years." Bacon does not mention Sir Humphrey Gilbert; though he was in 1610 himself a shareholder in the Company which planted Guy's Colony at Cupid's Cove, Newfoundland, in fulfilment of Sir Humphrey's intentions.

² Cal: S.P. Colonial, Addenda, 1574-1674 (1893), No. 22, notes "Articles of Agreement between Gilbert and Peckham as to 'Dee River . . . in septrionall latitude about forty-two degrees' . . . the islands newly called Cinq Isles . . . and 1,500,000 acres along the coast towards the river of Norumbeage." Close Roll. 25 Eliz: Pt. 8.

voyage was "to gain a footing in Florida": "not only prejudicial to your Majesty's interests, but injurious to the Catholics here, whilst benefiting the heretics."

According to Mendoza, it was Walsingham who had "indirectly approached two Catholic gentlemen, whose estates had been ruined, and intimated to them that if they would help Humphrey Gilbert in the voyage, their lives and liberties might be saved."¹ He does not mention their names; and the lives of Sir George Peckham and Sir Thomas Gerard were not in danger. They were among those who had not accepted the Pope's pronouncement that Elizabeth Regina was a "pretended Queen," to be rejected by every Catholic.

Mendoza states that in consideration of the aid to be given by the Catholic gentlemen, the Queen was to be "asked to allow them to settle" in Florida,

"in the enjoyment of freedom of conscience, and of their property in England: for which purpose they might avail themselves of the intercession of Philip Sidney."

"As they were desirous of living as Catholics without endangering their lives, they thought the proposal was a good one; and they gave an account of it to other Catholics who also approved of it, and offered to aid the said enterprise with money.

"Petitions were presented to the Queen upon the subject, and *she has granted them a patent under the Great Seal of England to colonise Florida where they are to be allowed to live as their conscience dictates, and to enjoy such revenues as they may possess in England.*

"This privilege is not confined to those who leave here for purpose of colonisation, but is extended to all Englishmen away from England, even to those who may have been declared rebels, whom the Queen now restores to her Grace and favour, embracing them once more as her loyal subjects."

But the Spanish Ambassador refused to believe she could have benevolent intentions:

"The only object of this is to weaken and destroy them, . . . they have now discovered that persecution, imprisonment, and the shedding of martyr's blood,² only increase the number of Catholics."

He protests that if Catholics become Colonists in the New World "the seminaries abroad cannot be maintained"; nor could the priests coming into England from the seminaries continue their work of conversion if there were not a number of Catholics in England to "shelter and support them."³

"By this means what little sound blood be left in this diseased body would be drained. I have given notice to the Catholics, through the priests who go amongst them, what was the real object of the Queen and Cecil⁴ in extending this favour to them; and also that *the country in question belonged to your Majesty, and was defended by fortresses, so that directly they landed they would be slaughtered.* . . .

"In addition to this I say that their consciences will be touched, as they will be acting against the interests of His Holiness; who should be informed of the matter through Dr. Allen; so that they might learn whether they could properly continue the voyage.

"This action of mine has caused some of them to withdraw; whilst others out of

¹ Cal: S.P. Spanish. Vol. III. No. 272.

² i.e., the execution of Father Edmund Campion, S.J.

³ Editor of Cal: S.P.S. Vol. VIII (No. 275) renders this "for the priests . . . to continue their wide propaganda," a word not used in 16th century English.

⁴ Lord Burghley.

indifference persist in their intention; believing that it is not really against Your Majesty, because in the map the Country is called New France; which they say proved that it was discovered by Frenchmen: and that since Cortes fitted out ships . . . to go and conquer countries for the Catholic Church, they should do the same.

"I have also written about it to the Abbot Briceno in Rome, as well as to Dr. Allen, pointing out how important it is that they should make every effort to prevent the enterprise," as it would be against "the interest of the Conversion of England."

Though Sir George Peckham and Sir Thomas Gerard were not under the Spanish Ambassador's influence, he on the 25th of the same month (July 1582) was able to tell King Philip that "*the ships which . . . the Catholics were fitting out, here, have now been reduced to two.*"¹ These two were to be taken by Gilbert to reconnoitre "the best place to land next year." They were waiting in "Southampton water" for a fair wind to sail.

Among sympathisers with Sir Humphrey, excepting only Walsingham, few had been more steadfast than Robert Earl of Leicester, Sir Henry Sidney, and Philip Sidney. On "the 7th day of July, 24 Elizabeth" (1582) certain "*Articles of Agreement*" were concluded "*betweene Sir Humfreye Gilbert of Compton Co Devon and Philippe Sidneys of Penshurst Co Kent Esquire.*"²

Beginning by reciting the Letters Patent of the Queen, ii of June, 20th Elizabeth, (1578) granting Sir Humphrey license to discover remote heathen and barbarous lands, and govern them, it is further set forth that

"as well for the more speedy execution of Her Majesty's said grants and the enlargement of Her Majesty's dominions and governments,"—and also for the better encouragement of "Philip Sydney and his associates in so worthy and commendable an enterprise," Sir Humphrey now covenants with Sidney that he and his heirs and assigns, adventurers and people, may for ever have full power to "*discover and view any thing not before discovered, searched, found out, viewed or inhabited by Sir Humphrey Gilbert and his heirs and assigns.*"

Sidney and those he may appoint are authorised to "enjoy to their own use so much of the said lands and wood by them discovered as shall amount to 30,000 acres of ground and woode . . . with power and authoritie to inhabit, people, and manure the said thirty hundred thousand acres of ground."

All jurisdiction, liberties, and benefits, for the "governing, inhabiting, disposing" and peopling the said "premyses" are to be held of Sir Humphrey Gilbert and his heirs, successors and assigns, "by fealty in free socage"; and after the first seven years, Sidney and his heirs are to pay thirteen pence and two-fifths of all the gold, silver, pearl, and precious stones which may there be discovered, out of which the Queen's part, reserved by Gilbert's Patent, is to be allowed.

After ten years, there is to be a tax of a halfpenny an acre; "which money shalbe yerely ymployde towards the mayntenance of a *Navye and soldiers for the*

¹ Ib: No. 277.

² Close Roll 1153. 25 Eliz: Pt. VII. This agreement is summarised by Gosling (pp. 197-199) without stating where he found it. He refers to it as a "deal" made "in July 1583." But the arrangement was made in July 1582. The *enrollment* was in 1583 (25th Eliz: 27th June: with "Mem, that on the day and year afore-written Humphrey Gilberte knight came into Chancery and acknowledged the said deed.")

generall defence of those countries, territories, Islands and Dominions, as a treasure of the people."¹

One sixtieth of all lands of every temporal man, and one fortieth of the lands of every "spiritual person" shall be allowed yearly "*for ever, for the mayntenance of maymed soldiares, and (for) learning*, and to be ymployde to such other good and necessary uses for the Common Wealthe" as the Chief Governor and his thirteen Councillors shall deem best.²

Sidney and his heirs, assigns, adventurers and associates shall have "free liberty" to trade and traffic "into all the Islands and Countries whiche Sir Humfrye and his heirs shall possess" by virtue of his Patent. And Sidney and his heirs shall be responsible for the execution of all laws within the specified 30,000 acres; "as also upon the sea costes so farr as the said land shall extend."

It is contracted that Gilbert will "furnish" better assurances to Sidney within three months after the "first and next" return of Gilbert or his assigns, consorts, adventurers or associates from the voyage of discovery by Gilbert now intended. And Sidney undertakes to

"doe his best endeavor to procure and obteyne her maiesties leave and good lykinge, that all those whoe have or shall adventure with the said Sir Humfrye or [with] Sir Thomas Gerrard, Sir George Peckham, Knight, or the said Phillipp Sidney, or any of them, into the said country" who "shalbe willing to travayle into any of the said remote countryes, maye freely passe into those countryes, there to remayne or tourne back" whichever they wish: their names being entered into a register book."³

If any settlers conspire against Sir Humphrey Gilbert, his heirs or successors, or commit capital offences, or break any of the laws, Sidney must not protect them from justice. And if Sidney "willingly" allows any act tending to the destruction or subversion of Gilbert and his heirs or successors, or his principal Governor, or if Sidney countenances piracy or commits hostility against any Christian Prince or People, except those with whom England may go to war, the present covenant will become null and void.

Early the following year, Sidney was knighted; and in July, 1583, he delegated all his rights and privileges in heathen lands to Sir George Peckham.⁴ As in the spring he had engaged himself to marry Secretary Walsingham's daughter, and

¹ A "treasure house" is to be kept; and the money expended by "consent of the chiefest Governor of the said Countries, . . . with the consent of the more parte of thertene suche as shalbe chosen by the consent of the people to be *Counsellors for marciall and maryne causes*."

² Gosling comments (p. 199) that "the maintenance of maimed soldiers" and "the encouragement of learning" were "equally worthy objects, but *here curiously associated*." That in 1911 it appeared "*curious*" to refer to valour and scholarship in the same sentence, shows scant comprehension of the Elizabethan spirit.

³ Had it been noticed by Drake's biographers that in 1582 it was Philip Sidney who was to procure the Queen's consent to this arrangement, they would have felt the less surprise that in 1585 Sidney was expected to help Drake at the Court.

⁴ Cal. S.P. Colonial. Addenda 1574-1674, (No. 29) notes in July 1583 Articles between Sir Philip Sidney and Sir George Peckham, (S.P.D. Eliz. 161, No. 44); and reciting Articles of Agreement between Gilbert and Sidney (7th July 1582.) Calender states that Sidney for the encouragement of Peckham and his associates will make assurance to Peckham of the "30000 acres assigned to himself (Sidney)." (This should be 30,000,000.)

Walsingham was most anxious to keep him at home, this may be the explanation why he withdrew from active participation in the enterprise.

Sir Humphrey's projects had excited widespread interest; and among the most responsive to his ideas was Stephen Parmenius of Buda, a Hungarian Protestant refugee, living in London: "an unknown foreigner" he called himself in a letter "to the noble and illustrious Humphrey Gilbert Knight"; adding that for three years he had travelled in Europe, studying the habits and customs of the various nations, but no country pleased him so well as England. Richard Hakluyt had taken him to visit Sir Humphrey; "informing me of your intention of founding at an early date, a colony in the New World." Hearing Sir Humphrey speak upon this theme, Parmenius had been moved to compose a Latin Ode, "to discharge in some measure the debt of friendship and devotion due to you and your country."

After an apostrophe to the Thames, Parmenius salutes England as "a land of glory" where "the Most High is" worshipped, and "great men" and "godly and inspired youths hasten to obey the divine commands." In England he dreams he is living in the "Golden Age": and the "Amazonian Queen, dear to God," he likens to "a starry goddess, not yet returned to Heaven." Remaining as she does to dwell among mortals, does not her presence "prove the Golden Age"? "Golden liberty protects unfenced walls"; tranquility is enjoyed by this land "impatient of all tyranny." Ideas of liberty are relative. This Hungarian had seen his native country conquered by the Turks. But England he recognises as safe, because possessed of "*arms potentially terrible to threatening neighbours.*" The youth of the land, having been "*trained to war,*" can the more righteously "*cherish peace, and the delights of friendship.*"

In apostrophising Sir Humphrey,—"May the tropical world from East to West yield her secrets to thee; may the lands beneath the Pole withdraw their veil for thee, O Gilbert!"—Parmenius is not forgetful of the English heroes in the past.

"Not in vain did Willoughby sail to the frozen North. . . ."

"Not in vain did Frobisher make his voyage for two years . . . upon those seas where the waters strike terror . . . amid perennial ice.

"Not in vain did Jenkinson travel through the Crimea, and across Eastern rivers, neighbours of the Scythian forests, to Persian cities, and to Bactrian forts, and the very confines where reign Indian Kings.

"Not in vain has Drake of late encircled the immense Globe"

Because England is vigorous, she can be the more gracious. "England's hosts of heroes" can go about in safety with "breasts unarmoured."

"And amidst so many Chiefs and leaders . . . the glory of our Gilbert rises pre-eminent, extolled by the Muses, and saluted joyfully by admiring Pallas."

¹ Vide "*De Navigatione Illustris & Magnanimi Equitis aurati Humfredi Gilberti, ad deducendam in novum Orbem coloniam suscepta*" by Stepheni Parmenii Budeii (with address to "*fortissime Gilberte*," dated "Kalen. Aprilis 1583" MacLehose's Hakluyt, (1904) VIII, pp. 23-33. W. G. Gosling, "*Sir Humphrey Gilbert*" etc. (1911), pp. 217-221 was the first to give an epitome in English; without, however, mentioning the title of the original poem or indicating where it could be found.

² Sir Hugh Willoughby, temp: Edward VI. Our first Arctic explorer, frozen to death. See MacLehose's Hakluyt, vol. II, p. 192-224: and "*Eliz: Eng.*," Prologue, XI, Note.

³ The next verse is obscure, and may be intended either as a reference to Sir Humphrey's own services in France, Ireland and the Low Countries, or a tribute to England's martial record.

To see how Sir Humphrey was regarded at the time, when he had conquered objections and inspired confidence, has been necessary as a corrective to the modern habit of relegating him to a subordinate place. Under the title of "*Shakespeare and the Beginning of English Colonial Policy*," Alfred Zimmerman stated that

"about 1583, Leicester, Raleigh's early patron, Sir Humphrey Gilbert, Raleigh's half-brother, and above all Raleigh himself, were the leaders in promoting the colonisation schemes that distinguished the era."¹

As long as Raleigh is thus made the centre around which all his contemporaries revolve, our pseudo-Elizabethanism will continue to shut out the actual Elizabethan era. The earliest indication of the Queen's interest in "our Servant Walter Rawley" is in a letter of April 1582, to the Lord Deputy, bidding that the Foot Band of Captain Appesley deceased, should be "committed to the said Rawley, for his better experience in Martiall affaires, and for the special care we have to doe him good in respect of his kyndred that have served vs some of them (as you knowe) neer aboute our Person. . ."²

Sir Humphrey Gilbert's last voyage, both for its particular interest and its ultimate consequences, should be familiar to every Englishman. But contemporary descriptions, though in print nearly three centuries and a half, have not met with the attention they deserve.³ The fullest is that of Edward Haie or Haies of Liverpool, owning and commanding the *Golden Hind* (presumably thus named after the ship in which Drake had circumnavigated the globe).⁴

"The first discovery of these coasts . . . was well begun by John Cabot the father, and Sebastian his sonne, an Englishman borne, who were the first finders out of all that great tract of land stretching from the cape of Florida into those Islands which we now call the Newfoundland: all which they . . . annexed unto the Crown of England. Since when, if with like diligence the search of inland countreys had been followed . . . no doubt her

¹ "*Deutsche Rundschau*," vol. cxviii, p. 9. Cit. H. Pemberton, Jr. "*Shakespeare and Sir Walter Raleigh*," Philadelphia and London, 1914. p. 104 (an effort to "prove" that Raleigh was Shakespeare).

² S.P.I. In extenso, Sir J. Pope Hennessy's "*Sir Walter Raleigh in Ireland*" (1883) p. 31. Previously in 1581, Raleigh had been asking for an estate in Ireland; and he subsequently, 1586, secured 42,000 Irish acres. Ib: pp. 61-65.

³ First printed in the first edition of Hakluyt's "*Principal Navigations*," dedic: to Sir Fra: Walsingham, 1589. Best modern edition, MacLehose, 1904. Gilbert items, including his 1578 Patent, Vol. VIII, pp. 9-132.

⁴ "*A report of the voyage and successe thereof, attempted in the yeare of our Lord 1583 by Sir Humfrey Gilbert knight, with other gentlemen assisting him in that action, intended to discover and plant Christian inhabitants in place convenient, upon those large and ample countreys extended Northward from the Cape of Floride, lying under very temperate Climes, esteemed fertile and rich in Minerals, yet not in the actual possession of any Christian prince; written by M. Edward Haie, gentleman, and principall actor in the same voyage, who alone continued unto the end, and by God's assistance returned home with his retinue safe and entire.*" MacLehose's Hakluyt, VIII. pp. 34-77.

Seemingly not remembering Anthony Parckhurst's description (13th November 1578), Haies in 1583 exclaimed that it was "chiefly by the travell and report of other nations, and most of the French" that Englishmen know of these "ample and vast Countreys" of the Newfoundland. But the French "vexed with the calamities of intestine warres" lacked leisure "to plant," such "as we have had by the inestimable benefit of our long and happy peace,"—meaning by "peace" the readiness to fight abroad.

Majesties territories and revenues had been mightily enlarged and advanced by this day. And which is more: the seed of Christian religion had been sowed amongst those pagans . . ." Haies claims that "a vertuous and heroicall mind" in discovery and exploration will prefer "chiefly the honour of God," and "compassion of poor infidels, . . ." and be willing to advance "well-disposed countrymen," for the "reliefe of sundry people within the realm distressed."¹

The historical argument seemed to him so important that he repeated it twice in his discourse:

"For not long after that Christopher Columbus had discovered the Islands and Continent of the West Indies for Spaine, John and Sebastian Cabot made discovery also of the rest from Florida Northwards, *to the behoofe of England*. And whensoever afterwards the Spanyards (very prosperous in all their Southerne discoveries) did attempt anything into Florida and those regions . . . , they proved most unhappy, and were at length discouraged utterly by the hard and lamentable succeſſe of many both religious and valiant in armes, endeavouring to bring those Northerly regions also under the Spanish jurisdiction; *as if God had prescribed limits unto the Spanish nation.*"

The French had less right than the Spaniards: because though the Spaniards made the first discovery of that continent northward, "the French did review that before discovered by the English." Haies remonstrates with Frenchmen for giving names in their own language to countries, rivers, bays, capes and headlands, "as if they had been the first finders, . . . which injury we offered not unto the Spanyards. . . ." Surely the English had a right to

"these countreys of America from the Cape of Florida Northward *by the privilege of first discovery, into which Cabot was authorised by regall authority, and set forth by the expense of our late famous King Henry the seventh, . . .*" a fact which "may greatly encourage us" to "plant religion" and take "*full possession of those so ample and pleasant countreys appertaining to the Crowne of England.*"

¹ "All these be honourable purposes," he wrote; little foreseeing that a careless posterity would class the venturers as "pirates," and a generation of agnostics would treat as mere hypocrisy their zeal for Religion. Haies, like his Commander, felt convinced that Newfoundland had been reserved by Heaven "*to be reduced unto Christian civility by the English nation.*"

² Op. cit. pp. 37-38.

APPENDIX A.

NOTE ON THE PROJECTED CATHOLIC COLONY. 1582-83.

The plans to which Don Bernardino de Mendoza refers¹ are presumably those recorded in an Agreement of Sir Thomas Gerard of Brynne, (Lancs) and Sir George Peckham of Denham (Bucks). They are not arrangements with the Crown, but with Sir Humphrey Gilbert.

In the Calendar S.P. Colonial, Addenda, 1574-1674 (1893) No. 14, the note on these Articles is brief and insufficient. The actual Close Roll, 24 Eliz: No. 1126. p^t 6, 6th June, 24 Elizabeth, (acknowledged in Chancery, 20th June, same year,) has now been consulted. It opens by reciting Gilbert's Patent, inclusive of the clause that *the privileges could not extend to fugitives or such as depart the realm without license*. For the better encouragement of Gerard and Peckham in their worthy enterprise, and for their sure warrant to carry out the same *orderly according to the laws and statutes of the Realm, and in consideration of their having disbursed as principal adventurers with Sir Humphrey Gilbert*, towards his now intended voyage, he grants to them that they and their associates may have authority to discover those lands and isles upon that part of America between the Cape of Florida and Cape "Briton" and the seas thereunto adjoining, and to occupy to their only use "for ever" two islands of every four of them to be taken; and so much of the land within the supposed continent as shall amount to 1500,000 acres as near the said islands as conveniently may be.

They are to pay Sir Humphrey £10 per annum for each of the isles; and all the gold, silver, pearl and precious stones there found; out of which the Queen's part is to be allowed. After seven years occupation, they are to pay Sir Humphrey yearly for every 1000 acres 15 pence, or two fifths of all the gold, silver, pearl, and precious stones. Of other clauses, the 6th is that every 10th person they shall take shall be such as have not any certain means to maintain themselves in England.²

There is no indication of how the Queen answered these requests. Neither on the Patent Rolls nor the Confirmation Rolls can anything relevant be found. Possibly an Order of Council was given; but the P.C. Register for the probable time is missing. There exists, however, a copy, unsigned, of "*Articles of petition to the righte Honorable Sr Francis Walsingham knight . . . by Sr Thomas Gerrarde and Sr George Peckham . . .*"³

They explain that whereas Sir Humphrey Gilbert has granted them, by virtue of his Patent, authority to discover and possess certain heathen lands, it is desirable

(1) that persons named in a certain book should have license to travel to those countries "at the next voyage for conqueste."

(2) *That Catholic Recusants, "of abilitie," that will travel as aforesaid, may have liberty, upon the discharge of the penalties due to her Majesty [i.e. payment of their fines] to prepare themselves for the voyage.*

(3) *That other Recusants, not having the wherewithal to pay the fines, may have liberty nevertheless to prepare for the voyage; on the understanding that they need not pay their "penalty" until God shall enable them so to do.*

¹ Cal: S.P. Spanish. Vol. III. 11 July, 1582, and 25 July 1582; and 17 March 1583; and 6 May, 1583.

² Calendar, No. 15; undated. Queried by editor as Aug: 1582.

³ Endorsed "Petition of Sir Thomas Gerrard and Sir George Peckham." S.P. Don: Eliz: CXLVI. No. 40.

As Gilbert's Patent specified that the laws of the new lands were to be based as nearly as possible on those of England,—and we shall find him on the 5th August 1583 repeating this proviso,—and also as Sir George Peckham temporarily conformed to the Church of England during the arrangements with Sir Humphrey,—there must remain considerable doubt how far it was intended to relax the Penal Laws against the "Papists": if at all.¹

Much has been said about the founding of a Catholic Colony; and from Mendoza's objections, as expressed to King Philip, we do see it was an actual project. Mendoza's wish to keep all the Catholics in England, in readiness to welcome a Spanish Invasion, may supply the explanation of the Queen's non-ratification of the reasonable requests of Sir Thomas Gerard and Sir George Peckham: for Mendoza's influence upon Her Majesty was over and over again successfully exerted.²

¹ In "*American Historical Review*," XIII, (1908) Roger Bigelow Merriman issued "*Some Notes on the Treatment of the English Roman Catholics in the Reign of Elizabeth*," based on State Papers, and (as to payment of fines) the Recusant and Pipe Rolls; but nothing from private MSS. He refers to the plan of Peckham and Gerard (and had compared Mendoza's letter of 11 July 1582 as Calendered by Martin Hume with the original and found the translation correct). He considers that Walsingham originated the project of the Catholic Colony; but that it collapsed when Sir Humphrey Gilbert was drowned in September 1583. He treats the Catholic problem without any reference to the Bull and Declaration of Pope Pius V (without which the position is not politically comprehensible).

² Sir Thomas Gerard, of Bryn, despite his Catholicism, prospered; and was ancestor of the present (3rd) Baron Gerard, Royal Horse Guards, M.C. (twice wounded in the Great War), who still possesses the ancestral estate of Bryn (Lancashire).

APPENDIX B.

"WITHOUT ANY CHARGE TO HER MAJESTY."

UNPUBLISHED ARTICLES BETWEEN SIR HUMPHREY GILBERT AND THE
MERCHANT ADVENTURERS. 2nd November. 1582.¹

It was in 1566 that the Merchant Adventurers Company had been incorporated: the same year that Sir Humphrey Gilbert wrote his *Discourse*, and, "being one of the same Company," petitioned the Queen to license him "*for the discovery of a passage to Cathay, and all the other rich parts of the world, hitherto not found: which . . . shall be great honour and strength to Your Majesty with immortal fame, . . . besides the great enriching of your Highness and your Country with increase and maintenance of the Navy . . .*"²

At that time, however, the Queen would not listen to his proposals, but sent him back to Ireland, bidding him plant a colony there instead.

After 16 years delay, he was at last approaching the time when he could make his own terms with the Merchant Adventurers. His 15 Articles dated "2nd November 1582 in the 24th year of the reign of our Sovereign Lady Elizabeth, by the Grace of God Queen of England" etc., are long and elaborate. Reduced to the main points, they are as follows:

(1) That the Adventurers and their children and posterity shall have free intercourse and trade in all dominions whatsoever which Sir Humphrey and his heirs may discover by right of the Queen's Patent. But "free" does not mean untaxed, for they shall pay Sir Humphrey "the half custom, and their apprentices the whole custom due for all goods brought thither" after the first voyage.

(2) "A perpetual staple and repository" is to be established in Southampton. Through that port and no other in England shall the Adventurers trade.

(3) That Sir Humphrey before his departure shall select a Governor, Treasurer, Agent and Secretary for the Society; and that if any of these should die, the nomination of successors shall be by Sir Francis Walsingham, who is "appointed by Sir Humphrey Gilbert to act in his absence as Chief and Principal Patron and Governor . . ." The Society shall submit names to Sir Francis, and his choice shall be made within twenty days.

(4) On the 1st of August, and 1st March each year, the Governor and Officers shall meet "in some open and commodious place," at 8 a.m.; and, after divine service, they shall name "8 of the wisest and discreetest persons" to assist them in making "orders, decrees and statutes."

(5) Relates to terms of admission; £5 constituting "a single adventure" or share; a 5th part of the money subscribed being reserved to Sir Humphrey and his heirs (with qualifications).

(6 and 7) Further particulars as to conditions of adventure; every £5, giving the right to 1000 acres of land under terms defined.

(8) The favourable conditions given to those who "shall now in this voyage adventure in stock and also go in person."

(9) Every man who goes in the voyage with Sir Humphrey, and remains with him for 8 months, is to have "double the proportion of land."

¹ Though Gosling, p. 209, refers to these Articles (as not containing "any cant") he does not say where they are to be found, nor give any detailed summary.

² P.R.O. Cit. Gosling; with 6 Articles of the Petition, pp. 69-71. Answers, pp. 71-72.

(10) Conditions of "free soccage tenure."

(11) "That in further reward and for perpetual memory of all those who now . . . do adventure with Sir Humphrey Gilbert," they and their heirs and successors "*shall be for ever free from all tortures, marshall law and arrest . . . of their bodies and goods . . . both by water and land . . .*"

(12) All who are kindred in blood to Sir Humphrey and his wife shall enjoy all the aforesaid liberties, without fines, in as ample a manner as any of the Merchant Adventurers.

The Merchants of the Muscovy Company are excluded; as also are their children; and such inhabitants of Southampton as neither adventured with Sir Humphrey in 1578 "nor now in this last voyage."

(13) Any persons who are certified under Sir Humphrey's hand and seal as adventurers in the previous expedition, "and also all those which continued with him in the voyage until the breaking up thereof at Kinsale in Ireland" are to be as "free to all intents and purposes in all those dominions now to be discovered . . . as the present adventurers."

(14) "Towards the comfort and relief of the poor travellers and decayed persons of the Society, and other good uses to be bestowed within the Town of Southampton," Sir Humphrey gives to the Society 10,000 acres of land in soccage tenure," and £1 yearly out of every £100 "that by God's providence and their good industry" shall accrue.

(15) That Sir Humphrey and his heirs and successors in the new dominions shall ratify and confirm all these liberties and commodities. And that any differences of opinion which may arise between Sir Humphrey's heirs and the Merchant Adventurers shall be "referred for settlement to the Lord Chancellor of England."

The Indenture is sealed on the one part with Sir Humphrey's seal, and on the other with the Seal of the Mayor of Southampton.¹

There follows a list of "*high and honourable Personages*" to whom Sir Humphrey and the Company of Merchant Adventurers give "lawful freedom and free trade and merchandising in all the countries . . . now intended to be discovered" The chief of these are:

Sir Thomas Bromley Kt. Lord Chancellor of England, William Lord Burghley Lord High Treasurer of England, The Earl of Sussex High Chamberlain of England, The Earl of Warwick, The Earl of Leicester, Sir Christopher Hatton Kt. Vice Chamberlain to her Majesty, Sir Francis Knollys Kt., Sir James Acroft Kt., Sir Walter Mildmay Kt.,² Sir Henry Sidney Kt.

A further list ensues, of lesser knights, with "esquires and gentlemen," the whole galaxy headed by "*Philip Sidney Esquire*." They include two of Sir Humphrey's wife's kinsfolk, "William Archer Esquire, and William Archer Junior, his son, gentleman," "John Dee, gentleman, Anthony Pa(r)ckhurst Esquire," Richard Bingham Esquire (perhaps the same who, as Sir Richard, afterwards attained renown in the wars against Spain).

The names and contributions of persons adventuring in money, are headed by "Sir Francis Walsingham Kt, £50." (The total subscribed is some £555.)

Then follows a list of 12 adventurers, mostly yeomen of Southampton; and a further list of men who adventured in money or commodities in Sir Humphrey's first voyage (1578). These include "The Lord North, Mr. Edmondes of the Privy Chamber," Sir Matthew Arundel, Sir George Peckham; Sir Humphrey's brothers Sir John Gilbert and Adrian Gilbert Esquire; Walter Raleigh and Carew Raleigh, Esquires; Charles Arundel, Thomas and John Dudley, Henry Knollys, George Cary of Cockington, Charles Champernoun, Edward Bartley, George Carew (all Esquires); John Robartes, gentleman; "Mr

¹ There follow three additions to these Articles (S.P.D.E. CLVI. 13), the second being that Sir Francis Walsingham shall have power to "admit to this action for Discovery" any persons he thinks fit, upon the above conditions. If however they attempt to "destroy" Sir Humphrey's right and title the agreement becomes null and void.

² Founder of Emmanuel College.

Hayes, gent, of Liverpool" (whose narrative of the voyage we will consult); Mr. William Hawkins, gent; William Martin, Merchant; and others. The list however is incomplete; a blank space being left for other "persons whos names are hereunder written" who had been with Sir Humphrey at Kinsale. Likewise a blank is left for the names of Adventurers from Totnes and Dartmouth, "under the name of Sir John Gilbert," and others adventuring "under the name of *Bernard Drake* Esquire¹ or Anthony Brigham, gent." Blank also is the space for the "names of all such as now in this present Discovery adventure in person with Sir Humphrey Gilbert"; and for "the names of the four principal officers of the Society . . . chosen by Sir Humphrey Gilbert before his new departure out of England."

We have no complete list of Sir Humphrey Gilbert's "adventurers" on his final voyage.

¹ Drake of Ashe. Subsequently Sir Bernard.

PART II.

“Particularly the Power of Spain.”

CHAPTER 6.

“HIS COUNTRY’S SERVICE AND HIS OWN HONOUR.”

SECTION 2.

“In the right of the Crowne of England.”

(Sir Humphrey Gilbert’s taking possession of Newfoundland.

5 August, 1583).

“The time approacheth, and now is, that we of England may share, . . . both with the Spaniard and Portugal, in part of America and other regions yet undiscovered.”

Richard Hakluyt to “master Philip Sidney, Esquire”:

Dedicating to him “Divers Voyages touching the discoverie of America, and the Ilands adiacent. . . .” 1582. (B.M. C.21.b.35.)

“Brother : I have sent you a token from Her Majestie, an ancor guided by a Lady as you see ; and farther, Her Highness hath willed me to send you worde that she wished you as great good hap and safety to your Ship as if she herself were thear in person : desiring you to have care of yourselfe, as of that which she tendereth . . .”

Walter Raleigh to Sir Humphrey Gilbert, 7 March, 1582-3.

“I departed from Plymouth on the eleventh of June . . . On the fifth of August I entered here in the right of the Crowne of England ; and have engraven the Arms of England : divers Spaniards, Portugals and other strangers witnessing the same . . . Be of good cheare, for I have comforted myselfe, answerable to all my hopes.

Sir Humphrey Gilbert to Sir George Peckham,

“From St. Johns in the New Found Land, the 8 of August, 1583.”

NOTE on the Maps in Hakluyt's first publication:

"DIVERS VOYAGES TOUCHING THE DISCOVERIE OF AMERICA, AND THE ILANDS ADIACENT UNTO THE SAME, made first of all by our Englishmen, and afterwards by the Frenchmen and Britons:¹ And certaine notes of advertisements for observations, necessarie for such as shall hereafter make the like attempt. With two mappes annexed hereunto for the plainer understanding of the whole matter. By Richard Hakluyt.

Imprinted at London for Thomas Woodcocke, dwelling in paules Church-yard, at the signe of the blacke beare. 1582." (B.M. C.21. b.35.)

"The Epistle Dedicatorie"

"To the right worshipfull and most vertuous Gentleman master PHILLIP SYDNEY, Esquire," is 6½ pages, on the subject of the book. In the peroration Sidney is described as "alwaies so readie to pleasure me . . ."²

MAPS

(A) "*Orbis universalis Descriptio*." (Map of the World: 16½ x 9 inches, on a sheet 17¾ x 11½ inches).

Inserted where there begins "*A declaration of the Indies . . . and Rich Countries . . . which . . . master Robert Thorne exhorted King Henrie the eight to take*." The Map, on the upper part of the sheet, extends from Figueras, "*Hispania noua*," & "*Mare Australe*" (West), to "*Cathayo orientalis*, *India superior*, *Chimba*, *Juba maior*, and *Silam*" (East).

Below, on the left side, are printed various memoranda in Latin; and on the right is Hakluyt's descriptive note:

"This is the forme of a Mappe sent 1527 from Siuill in Spayne by maister Robert Thorne marchant to Doctor Ley Embassadour for King Henry the 8 to Charles the Emperour. And although the same in this present time may seem rude, yet I have set it out, because his book could not well be understood without the same. The imperfection of which Mappe may be excused by that tyme, the knowledge of Cosmographie not then being entered among our Marchantes, as now it is."

In this map the Northern part of the Americas is "*Noua terra laboratorum dicta*." Along the coast is "*Terra hac ab Anglis primu fuit inuenta*." (Not now reproduced, because already available in MacLehose's Hakluyt, Vol. II, (1903) p. 1701.)

(B) Second Map: inserted just before "*The relation of John Verarxamus a Florentine . . . 1524*." (18½ x 12 inches). Headed "*Illustri viro Domino Philippo Sidnaeo Michael Lok Curio Londinensis Hanc Chartam Dedicabat. 1582*."

There is a list of voyages, from Portuguese 1520, to English 1580; and on the map, below *Meta Incognita*, the name of Frobisher is conspicuous.³ Labrador is marked; but there is no reference by name to Newfoundland.

In the Epistle to Sidney, Hakluyt says, "The mappe is master Michael Lockes, a man for his knowledge in diuers languages and especially in Cosmographie, *able to doe his country good*, and wortheie, in my judgment, for the manifolde good partes in him, of good reputation and better fortune."

¹ i.e. Bretons.

² "Heere I cease, craving pardon for my over boldnesse, trusting also that your worshippe will continue and increase your accustomed favour towards these godly and honourable discoveries. Your worshippes humble always to commande. R.H."

³ For reproduction, see MacLehose's Hakluyt (1904) Vol. VII, p. 368 (from the copy in the Hunterian Library, University of Glasgow).

SIR HUMPHREY GILBERT:

*From the original on panel in possession of his present representative,
Commander Walter Raleigh Gilbert, of Compton.*

This was first reproduced (in half tone) in Mr. W. Gilbert Gosling's "*Life of Sir Humphrey Gilbert*," 1911, with a so-called Sir Walter Raleigh, also then at The Priory, Bodmin, which latter picture is certainly misnamed.

In cleaning these pictures in 1929, Sir Humphrey's was found to have in the background, above and below his motto *Quid Non* (What not?), the astrological signs of Mercury and Mars. Prince stated in "*Worthies of Devon*" that "His devise was Mars and Mercury conjoined by a Cross." (The cross is part of the sign of Mercury; not extra to it.)

A painting of Sir Humphrey Gilbert which belonged to Robert Earl of Leicester, mentioned in the Inventories of his possessions, 1588, has vanished: nor does Commander Walter Raleigh Gilbert know the whereabouts of "this noble Knight's lively effigies" described in 1701 in Prince's "*Worthies of Devon*" as "yet remaining in his grandnephew's" (should be great-grandson's) "house at Compton, Humphrey Gilbert Esq^r," which I have there seen; . . . the one hand holdeth a General's truncheon; and the other is laid on the Globe of the World, Virginia is written over; on his breast hangs the Golden Anchor, with the Pearl at Peak. . . ."

As it was on 7th March, 1582-3, that the Queen sent Sir Humphrey, by Walter Raleigh, a "token" of "ancor guided by a lady," if the "Golden Anchor" he is wearing in the portrait is Her Majesty's gift, this lost picture must have been painted after 7th March and prior to his departure in June.

This seems likely; as in the same letter Raleigh tells Sir Humphrey that the Queen "commandeth me that you leve your picture with me."

Prince, however, in 1701, either mistook the inscription, or the inscription had been added subsequent to the Elizabethan era: for the name "Virginia" (as applied to the colony in America) appears not to have become current until 1585; and Sir Humphrey Gilbert's death was in 1583.



QVIA NON

SYR
HVMFRYE · GILBER
KNIGHT · DROWNED
IN THE DISCOVERY
OF VIRGINIA
ANNO 1584.

PART II.

“Particularly the Power of Spain.”

CHAPTER 6.

“HIS COUNTRY’S SERVICE AND HIS OWN HONOUR.”

SECTION 2.

“In the right of the Crowne of England.”

(*Sir Humphrey Gilbert’s taking possession of Newfoundland.*

Aug. 1583).

“EXAMPLE is of greater force than precept. It therefore behoveth a General as well to be a good soldier as an able director: that by his presence and personal performance of what he commands others, they may be encouraged to endure any pains, or undergo any danger. For upon his actions and virtue especially dependeth the success of all the service.”¹

This, written before Humphrey Gilbert was born, was an axiom Queen Elizabeth imperfectly comprehended. Time after time we will find her professed solicitude for her champions taking the form of desiring them to hand over the command of their expeditions to subordinates, and remain at home. That the voluntary recruits who had undertaken to serve under one especial leader, would consider themselves wronged if ordered to entrust their fate and fortunes to a lesser man, she could not see. When in London in the spring of 1583 the Hungarian Parmenius was acclaiming her as a “*starry goddess*” under whose rule the “*Golden Age*” had come again, the actual Elizabeth Regina appears to have been criticising Sir Humphrey for his delays, and threatening to revoke her permission to him to command the voyage in person. In a letter to Walsingham, February 1582-3, he defends himself with arguments which would not have been necessary for Walsingham, but may have been intended to be shown to the Sovereign. Now first published in extenso, this protest is both characteristic of Gilbert and illustrative of the difficulties inseparable from the service of the Virgin Queen.²

¹ F. Guicciardini: “*Aphorismes Civill and Militarie*,” Lib. 5. Aph. XXXIII. Dallington’s translation, 2nd ed.: 1629. p. 333.

² Orig: S.P.D.E. CLVIII. No. 59. ff. 140-141. Not holog: Addressed To the right Honorable Sir Francis Walsyngham knight. Principall secretarve to her matie.” Docketed “1582, 7 Feb. Sir H. Gilbert. That he may be suffered to continue his voyage.” Spelling now modernised; W. G. Gosling, “*Life of Sir Humphrey Gilbert*,” etc. 1911, pp. 211-213 drew attention to this as a “most interesting letter”; but without saying where it was to be found. As he only paraphrased the first half, the second which he quoted verbatim was the less effective.

"Right Honourable.

"Whereas it hath pleased your Honor to let me understand that her Majesty of her especial care had of my well-doing had wished my stay at home from the personal execution of my intended discovery, *as a man noted of no good hap by sea*: for the which I acknowledge myself so much bound unto her Majesty as I know not how to deserve the least part thereof, otherwise than with my continual prayer, and most faithful and forward service during life: And now to excuse myself and satisfy your Honour touching the objections made of my stay, it may please you to be advertised that *in my first enterprise I returned with great loss, because I would not myself, nor suffer any of my company, to do anything contrary to my word given to her Majesty and your self: For if I had not far preferred my credit before my gain, I needed not to have returned so poor as then I did.*¹

"And touching this my last stay at Hampton,² it hath proceeded by South West winds, of God's making and sending: and therefore not my fault or negligence: But if I were guilty of delay, *the principal charge is my own and no loss to any other*; for my adventures as I had them for the most part in wares, so I have them still without any loss to any of them. And in truth the outrage of this winter hath been a common hindrance to all men of this realm southward bounde. *Yea, and the winds so contrary that it hath driven ships from the Isles of the Azores upon the coast without spreading any sail at all: a thing I never heard before. And the King of Portingale being at the Terceira could not in all this time recover the Madeiras.*³ How far impossible had it been for me to have performed my journey this winter your Honour can judge, dwelling so far to the northwards of the place intended to be discovered. *And seeing the Queen's Majesty is to have a fifth of all the gold and silver there to be gotten without any charge to her Majesty, I trust her Highness of her accustomed favour will not deny me liberty to execute that which resteth in hope so profitable to her Majesty and Crown.*

"The great desire I have to perform the same hath cost me first and last the selling and spending of a thousand mark land a year, of my own getting: *besides the scorn of the world for conceiving so well of a matter that others held so ridiculous, although now by my means better thought of.*⁴

"If the doubt be my want of skill to execute the same, I will offer myself to be opposed by all the best navigators and cosmographers within this realm.

"If it be cowardliness, I seek no other purgation thereof than my former service done to her Majesty.⁵

"If it be the suspicion of daintiness of diet or sea sickness, in those both I will yield myself second to no man living, because that comparison is rather of hardness of body than a boast of virtue. *But how little account soever is made either of the matter or of me I trust her Majesty, with her favour for my XXVII years service, will allow me to get my living as well as I may honestly (which is every subject's right), and not to constrain me by my idle abode at home, to beg my bread with my wife and children: especially seeing I have her Majesty's grant and license under the Great Seal of England for my departure: without the which I would not have spent a penny in this action:* wherein I am most bound to her Majesty for her great favour, which of all things I most desire; and take comfort in protesting that *no man living shall serve her Majesty more faithfully and dutifully during my life, with all the good fortune that God shall bestow on me.* And thus I trust I have satisfied your Honour of all my intents and proceedings.

"Leaving your Honour to the tuition of the Almighty.

"From my house in Redcrosse street the 7th of February 1582.

"Your Honour's most humble

H. GYLBERTE."

It was in this February 1582-3 that Queen Elizabeth wrote to the Emperor of India, Akbar the Magnificent, introducing John Newbery, a merchant fitted out by Sir Edward Osborne. Commending "*the great affection which our subjects have*

¹ When Gosling (pp. 211-13) summarised the first part of this letter, he stated that Gilbert "*darkly hints*" that his expedition of 1578 "need not have turned out so badly had he not preferred his credit to his gain." But there is no "hint"; Sir Humphrey makes a plain statement of having given a promise he would not break.

² Southampton.

³ See ante, II. 5. (6), for King Antonio's baffled attempt.

⁴ These last words first quoted by Gosling.

⁵ In France, Ireland and the Low Countries.

to visit the most distant places of the world," and the "courteous and honest boldness" of Newbery, who "doth repair to the borders and countries of your Empire," Her Majesty doubted not that the Emperor in his "royal grace will favourably accept him . . . for our sake. . . ." She also addressed the Emperor of China: trusting in his "*Imperial clemency and humanity*" to welcome Newbery, who was undertaking so difficult a voyage and facing many perils in the hope his enterprise should "bring some profit." The Queen adjured the Emperor to behave as "a most honourable and liberal Prince; and deserve so much of Us, as by no continuance or length of time shall be forgotten" But though it was not until the 7th of March that Walter Raleigh could write, from Richmond Palace, of her being gracious towards Sir Humphrey, he shows her as then brought to an entirely favourable frame of mind:

"Brother,

"I have sent you a token from Her Majestie, an ancor guided by a lady as you see; and farther, Her Highness willed me to send you worde that she wished you as great good hap and safety to your ship, as if she herself were thear in person; desiring you to have care for your sealf, as of that which she tendereth; and therefore for her sake you must provide for it accordingly.

"Further, she commandeth me that you leve your picture with me. For the rest I leve till our meeting, or to the report of this bearer, who would needs be messenger of this good newse. So I commit you to the will and protection of God, Who send us such life or death as He shall please, or hath appointed.

Your treu brother

W. RALEGH."³

Ten days later, 17th March, 1582-3, Don Bernardino de Mendoza notified to the King of Spain,

¹ Arber's "*English Garner*," Vol. III. pp. 167-168.

² Ib: p. 169. Narrative of Ralph Fitch, of London, Merchant, who accompanied the mercantile expedition of John Newbery, merchant, with William Leedes, jeweller, and James Story, painter: fitted out by Sir Edward Osborne (ancestor of the Duke of Leeds).

³ Gosling, after quoting this letter, (p. 214) makes (p. 215) a just protest against the erroneous inferences drawn from it by Raleigh's biographers: who have magnified him into the "prime mover and organiser of the expedition. Although Gilbert began his plans when Raleigh was a schoolboy, . . . although he was a prominent man, a leader and Commander in Ireland and the Low Countries, when Raleigh was an unknown subaltern serving under him: although Raleigh obtained his first command at sea under Gilbert in 1578, although Gilbert was ceaselessly working out his plans, . . . making desperate efforts to raise money for his expedition, while Raleigh was serving in a subordinate position under Grey in Ireland; and although the progression of Gilbert's ambitions is manifest, from the beginning in 1566 until the final attempt in 1583," yet Raleigh is metamorphosed into the leader; and one modern writer even declares that Gilbert obtained his Patent in 1578 "through Raleigh's influence" (at a time when Raleigh had not yet come to the Court).

The best "*Life of Sir Walter Raleigh*" is that of Edward Edwards, London, Macmillan, 1868, 2 vols, "Based on contemporary documents preserved in the Rolls House, the Privy Council Office, Hatfield House, the British Museum, and other Manuscript Repositories, British and Foreign, together with his Letters; now first collected."

For lists of modern memoirs, and contemporary accounts of voyages, see "*A Bibliography of Sir Walter Raleigh Knt.*" By T. N. Brushfield, M.D., F.S.A., 1886 and 1908 (Commin, Exeter), an exceedingly useful work. But in all the biographies, we should recognise a disproportion, arising from the 19th and 20th century convention of placing Raleigh in the centre of the Elizabethan Court.

"The ships I have mentioned, that Humphrey Gilbert was fitting out with design of taking Catholics to the Coast of Florida" are now about to sail: ". . . the two ships they sent last summer to explore seem a long while gone."¹

On the 6th of May the Ambassador wrote again,

"The Council have suggested to the Catholics to contribute a sum of money to carry on the enterprise in Florida: upon which Humphrey Gilbert has sailed with the ships I described to your Majesty: in which case they promise to release the prisoners, and will allow them to live without persecution." But having been "warned" (by Mendoza) that the expedition is "illicit," the Catholics fear that the offer is "only a trap"; and so are "*keeping in the background, although some few Catholics, out of indifference and penury, have gone with Gilbert,*" selling for the purpose "what little property was left to them."²

Sir Humphrey had not yet sailed. He was delayed until June. And when he embarked, there do not then appear to have been any Catholics with him; though Sir George Peckham, a Catholic who had outwardly conformed to the Established Church, was to remain ever his devoted admirer.

That Sir Humphrey had been expected to set out in the spring of 1582-3 is clear not only from Mendoza's letters to King Philip, but from the Embarkation Ode of Stephen Parmenius, "*Navigazione . . . in novum Orbem,*" dated "*Kalen Aprilis 1583.*" (To that Hungarian Protestant, the Pope was scarcely less terrible than the Grand Turk; so a Colony of Catholic Recusants would not have had a place in any Arcadia he extolled.)

"While I write, the nymphs are gathering on the green sward; twining their hair with laurel and fresh olive leaves; thronging to honour our Elizabeth, Queen of the Sea. She from her lofty tower near the cool river, looks forth, and even now, on Father Thames, she sees Gilbert's slanting sails gradually fade away in the distance"

Her Majesty is adjured to stretch her "beneficial hand" towards the region already discovered for England long ago by Cabot, now to be possessed for her by Gilbert: "Lay there thy sceptre. May it be ours to hope for some measure of repose through thee; and may the era of gladness dawn."

Saluting "*our glorious Gilbert*" as the most renowned of English Captains, Parmenius marvels the more at this Commander's unselfishness, that "for the peace and good of the human race," he not only dares "all the mischances and dangers of the seas," but leaves "a family yet young,"

"and the sweet embraces of his cherished wife; she . . . counting one by one on her slender fingers the thousand dangers . . . he must incur."

She also comes of a valiant house: "whose father⁴ and brother . . . of high example for their country's honour, . . . besieged within the gates of Calais, preferred to die rather than join with those who surrendered the city with ignominy to preserve their lives."⁵

It would have been at Minster in Sheppey that Sir Humphrey said goodbye to

¹ Cal: S.P. Spanish. No. 322. ² Ib: No. 336.

³ Actually for England's benefit in particular. ⁴ Grandfather.

⁵ Gosling, p. 219, renders it "betrayed the city." But despite rumours of treachery in Calais, that the garrison was numerically insufficient explains the loss. (See Prologue, Sec: XIV).

his wife, and seven children: six sons and one daughter. (When, fourteen years later, Francis Bacon, himself a single man, described a wife and children as obstacles to any exalted enterprise, and asserted that all great achievements are performed by unmarried men, he either was unobservant or forgetful: for all our great English men of action were married).

Sir Humphrey embarked from Plymouth: "... the ankers being already weyed, and our shippes under sail, having a soft gale of winde, . . . upon Tuesday the eleventh day of June" 1583. There were only five ships:

1. The *Delight* (alias the *George*), 120 tons "Admirall" (flagship) "in which went the Generall" Sir Humphrey Gilbert; William Winter, Captain; Richard Clearke, master.
2. "The *Barke Raleigh* set forth by M. Walter Raleigh 200 tunnes" (Vice Admiral).
3. "The *Golden hinde*, . . . 40 tunnes in which went Edward Hayes captain and owner, and William Cox of Limehouse master."
4. "The *Swallow* . . . 40 tunnes: . . . Captaine Maurice Browne."
5. "The *Squirrel*, . . . 10 tunnes. . . ."

The entire force only numbered "about 260 men": including "Shipwrights, Masons, Carpenters, Smiths, . . . Minerall men and Refiners"; also musicians.

"... for the solace of our people, and allurement of Savages, we were provided with *Musicke in good variety*: not omitting . . . toys, as Morris Dancers, Hobby horses, and Maylike conceits to delight the Savage people, whom we intended to win by all fair meanes possible"

Haies notes how every ship received two "scrowles": "the one sealed up in waxe, the other left open: in both which were included severall watch-words. That open, serving upon our own coast, or the coast of Ireland: the other sealed was promised on all hands not to be broken up till we should be cleer of the Irish coast": which from thencefoorth was to serve until the fleet met at Newfoundland: "the sayd watch-words being requisite to know our consorts, whensoever by night, either by fortune or³ weather, our fleet dispersed should come together again; or one should hale another; or if by ill watch and steerage one ship should chance to fall aboard of another in the darke."

Sir Humphrey Gilbert's biographer in 1911 objected to the sealed "scrowles" as "rather a childish precaution."¹ But this is to overlook Haies' statement of the reason for the sealing: it was "*to keepe secret that watch-word, while we were upon our owne coast, lest any of the Company stealing from the fleet, might bewray the same: which knownen to an enemy, he might board us by night without being mistrusted, he "having our own watch-word."*"⁵

¹ Haies's Narrative, MacLehose's Hakluyt, VIII, p. 46.

² Ib: p. 47. ³ printed "of." ⁴ Gosling, p. 228.

⁵ "A report of the Voyage" &c., MacLehose's Hakluyt, VIII. p. 43. On the 12th December the previous year Sir Humphrey had chosen the watchwords and compiled the chief orders, as we see by a memo of that date, docketed "*Instructions left by Sir Humphrey Gilbert unchangeably to be observed.*" (S.P.D.E. CLVI. 13.):

"The yellow wax is to be broken at the Land's End of England, and not before, for that it is for their course only. The red wax is not to be broken before they come upon the coast of America or within a hundred league thereof."

Meanwhile those, "with 12 of the same bales for direction," and "one little roll with a label wrapped up in red wax and sealed,"—also "the Letters Patent, the grant to the town [of Southampton] and the Sea Card and all other things touching the matter"—were to be put "into an Iron Chest with three locks . . . whose three keys are to be kept, the one by the Mayor of Southampton," the other by two officers named. Signed H.G.

Having settled the Orders "to be observed by the fleet," Sir Humphrey left Plymouth on Tuesday the 11th of June.¹ Though on the first day the weather was "faire and good, . . . a great storme of thunder and winde fell the same night." By Thursday evening the *Bark Raleigh* signalled that "very many of the men were fallen sicke." And about midnight this ship forsook the fleet: although by then the wind was favourable. It was afterwards said that her crew were "infected with a contagious sicknesse, and arrived greatly distressed at Plimouth: the reason I could never understand," adds the Captain of the *Golden Hind*: "sure I am no cost was spared by their owner Master Raleigh in setting them forth. . . ." But whatever the cause of the defection, the others were "not a little grieved with the loss of the most puissant ship . . . after whose departure the *Golden Hind* succeeded in the place of Vizadmirall, and remooved her flagge from the mizon unto the foretop."

The four ships (the largest of which was 120 tons and the smallest 10 tons), encountered "much fogge and mists." The *Delight* and *Golden Hind* were "dissevered" . . . from the *Swallow* and the *Squirrel*, until on the 20th July they met each other again near the coast of Newfoundland. They had been seven weeks at sea before they "got sight of land," on Tuesday 30th of July. "Great hase and fogge" prevented them from discerning more than an outline of what Haies calls "*that uncomfortable coast . . . hideous rocks and mountanes, bare of trees and voide of any greene herbe.*"

Passing Penguin Island, they "came to the Iland called Bacalaos . . . to the South thereof lieth Cape S. Francis, 5 leagues distant from Bacalaos; between which goeth in a great bay, by the vulgar sort called the bay of Conception.

"Here we met with the *Swallow* againe, whom we had lost in the fogge"; and "for joy" the seamen "spared not to cast up into the aire and overboord their caps and hats . . ." The Captaine, "very honest and religious," was not fortunate in the men he commanded: "who for the most part were such as had been by us surpris'd upon the narrow seas of England, being pirates . . ."

By law they could have been hanged. They were given instead a chance to make an honest living. Hayes reveals that the ship "now called the *Swallow*" was actually a pirate ship, captured after she had taken two French ships, one laden with wine, another with salt. These French "we rescued" and set free. The converted English "pirats" behaved according to their kind. When separated from Sir Humphrey, they had asked leave to go aboard a "newlander" ship in friendly sort, and borrow apparel which might easily be spared to them, because the ship was "bound homeward." The Captain trusting them, gave leave; bidding them "deal favourably." But they rifled the fishing vessel of "tackle, sailes, cables, victuals, and the men of their apparell: not sparing by torture . . . to draw out

¹ For Instructions as to lights, signalling, &c., &c., vide Haies, in MacLehose's Hakluyt, VIII, pp. 43-45; and for the "course unto Newfoundland" and Notes thereon, pp. 45-46. Flaving called the secrecy as to the watchword "childish," Gosling (p. 228) objects to Sir Humphrey's method of signalling as "clumsy." Even the best of modern biographers seem to regard it as a duty to the present to be condescending towards those in the past whose work was infinitely more difficult than anything we now do by sea.

² Ib: pp. 47-48. "Vice Admiral" referred to the ship and not the officer commanding.

else what they thought good." They then took their cockboat to return to the *Swallow*; but "it was overwhelmed in the sea, and certaine of those men were drowned." Others owed their lives to the very fishermen they had plundered, "who saved them and delivered them aboard the *Swallow* . . ."¹

After the *Golden Hind* and the *Delight* met the *Swallow*, they all held on their course Southward, till they reached the harbour of St. John, on Saturday the 3rd of August, and there found the *Squirrel* at anchor.

The little fleet then made ready to fight if encountering resistance: "But first the Generall dispatched a boat" to carry tidings that he had "Commission from her Majestie."²

When Parmenius the Hungarian, in London, in the spring, had acclaimed Sir Humphrey Gilbert as "*a lasting ornament of the British race*," and congratulated him on being about to take possession of a land which had never known "the rule of Babylon, Persia, Macedonia, Rome," or the tyranny of the Turk and Spaniard (whom he execrated in one and the same verse), he had imagined the "Golden Age" about to dawn in an "unknown world, across an almost unknown sea." (This last is poetic license; for our fishing fleets had performed the voyage to and from Newfoundland many times during the previous reigns.) Parmenius had at first hesitated to face the hardships of the voyage. But a wish to sing "the praise of our hero" to "stir the hearts of wondering grandsons," inspired him; and his fancy painted a glowing picture of the new land peopled by "a race of mortals" descended from "ancient Fauns, sprung from Mother Earth," devoid of the "fraud or guile" of civilised and corrupted man.³

His Utopian imaginings on the banks of the Thames (in Latin hexameters) are less interesting than his letter dated "*In Newfoundlandia apud portum Sanctii Johannis, 6 Augusti, 1583*," describing to his "friend and brother" Richard Hakluyt of Christchurch, Oxford, "Master of Arts and Philosophie," what he actually had done and seen.⁴

In the happiest frame of mind,—for though Sir Humphrey "by reason of the multitude of his men, and the smalnesse of his ship, had his company somewhat sickly," Parmenius himself had never felt "more healthie,"—he relates how the General "*tooke possession of the Countrey, for himselfe and the Kingdome of England: having made and published certain Laws, concerning religion, and obedience to the Queene of England.* . . ."

" . . . we found in this place about twenty Portugall and Spanish shippes," besides English: which last were "of themselves strong ynough" to have made resistance. But seeing Sir Humphrey's authority was by the Queen's Letters Patent, they showed him "all maner of duety and humanitie."

¹ Haies. Op: cit. pp. 50-51. On the disgraceful conduct of the ex-pirates, he comments in disgust.

² Ib: 51. ³ "*Navigacione . . . in novum Orbem*," &c.

⁴ MacLehose's Hakluyt. VIII. In Latin, pp. 78-80; and English, pp. 81-84.

As for the Country, it is "a very wilderness," with fish in "incredible abundance." The land is full of "hilles and woods. The trees for the most part are Pynes and of these some are very olde . . . a great part . . . being fallen by reason of their age."

Bears had been seen; but whether any people might be dwelling inland, Parmenius knew not.

The August weather was hot. But "how cold it is in the winter, the great heapes and mountaines of yce in the midst of the Sea have taught us"

The Hungarian was not to experience winter in Newfoundland; and the narrative poem by which he meant to "eternise" the voyage, remained unwritten; nor was he fated to see England again.

Sir George Peckham, subsequently deriving his information from "Master Edward Hays" of the *Golden Hind*, related how Sir Humphrey on his arrival at St John's found the English fishing fleet in harbour; and how "the Masters and chief Mariners," on hearing the purport of his Commission, and receiving his promise as "her Majesty's Lieutenant" to treat them honourably, welcomed him "in the best they could, and shewed him all such courtesies as the place could afford" "Then he went to view the Contrey, being well accompanied with most of his Captaines and souldiers"

On Monday, 5th of August, Sir Humphrey had his tent set upon the side of a hill, in the view of all the Fleet of Englishmen and foreigners, between 30 and 40 sail.

Then came his glorious hour: and little can any of the assembled company have suspected that he had less than five more weeks to live.

Attended by "all his Captaines, Masters, Gentlemen and other souldiers," he demanded that the principal Officers of all the ships, Spaniards, "Portugales" as well as English "and of other nations" should come to his tent. "*And then and there, in the presence of them all, did he cause his Commission under the Greate Seale of England to bee openly and solemnly read unto them, whereby were granted unto him, his heires and assignes, by the Queenes most excellent Majestie, many great and large royalties, liberties, and priviledges*"

He spoke in English; and the substance of his speech was "signified unto the strangers by an Interpreter."

He then took possession for the Queen, "by digging of a Turffe, and

¹ ". . . we mooved the Admirall to set the woods afire, so that wee might . . . take view of the Countrey:" which suggestion did not displease him, except "for fear of great inconvenience that might thercof ensue: for it was reported . . . that when the like thing happened by chance in another Port, the fish never came to the place about it, for the space of 7 whole yceeres after, by reason of the waters made bitter by the Turpentine and Rosen of the trees, which ranne into the rivers" when the woods were burnt.

² Ends with compliments to "my Patrone Master Henry Umpton": (afterwards Sir Henry; and Ambassador to France).

³ lb: pp. 90-91.

receiving the same with an Hasell wand, delivered unto him, after the manner of the law and custome of England."

That these territories would henceforth be governed by laws "so neere as might be" to the laws at home, was his pronouncement:

"First that Religion pibliquely exercised should be such, and none other, than is used in the Church of England.

"The second, *that if any person should bee lawfully convicted of any practise against her Majestie her Crowne and Dignitie,*" he would be adjudged *as a traitor.*

"The third, *if any should speak dishonourably of her Majestie,* the partie so offending, to loose his eares; his ship and goods to be Confiscate to the use of the General."

"All men did very willingly submit themselves to these Lawes. Then he caused the Queenes Majesties Armes to be ingraved, set up, and erected with great solemnitie."

Though Henry VIII had decreed that England should be an Empire, our real Colonial Empire first came into being on this 5th of August, 1583; and to Sir Humphrey Gilbert belongs the honour of having taken the initial steps.¹

Immediately Sir Humphrey had set up the Royal Arms of England, and declared himself the Queen's Lieutenant,

"divers Englishmen" of the fishing fleet "made sute" to him that they might keep "their accustomed stages, standings and drying places, . . . which he granted unto them in fee farme. And by this meanes he hath possession maintained for him in many parts of that Countrey . . . he did let, set, give and dispose of many things, as *absolute Governor there, by vertue of her Majesties letters patents.*"²

To his faithful friend Peckham he wrote:

"Sir George. I departed from Plymouth on the eleventh of June with five sails, and on the thirteenth *the Barke Rawley ran from me in faire weather, having a large wind. I pray you solicit my brother Rawley to make them an example to all knaves.*

"On the third of August we arrived at a port called St. John's, and will put to sea from thence (God willing) so soon as our ships will be ready. Of the New Found Land I will say nothing until my next letters. Be of good cheare, for if there were no better expectation,³ it were a very rich demaynes, the Countrey being very good and full of all sorts of victuall, as fish both of fresh water and Sea fish. Deere, Pheasants, Partridges, Swannes, and divers Fowles else. I am in haste; you shall by every messenger heare more at large.

"On the fifth of August *I entered here in the right of the Crowne of England;* and

¹ It is now usual to allege that the British Empire was begotten of "unrest"; and came into existence haphazard, its promoters scarcely knowing what they were doing. Actually its foundations were essentially monarchical; their declared object being the expansion of the power of the Crown; when the prestige of Monarchy and the welfare of the subject were thought to be synonymous. According to Sir Humphrey Gilbert's Patent (ante) the settlers were defined as subjects of Her Majesty and of her heirs and successors, and their children and descendants the same in perpetuity.

² Sir Geo. Peckham. "*A True Report,*" &c. p. 91. (full title, p. 278).

³ i.e., even if there were not minerals to consider.

have engraven the Armes of England; divers Spaniards, Portugals, and other strangers witnessing the same.

"I can stay no longer; fare you well with my good Lady: and *be of good cheare, for I have comforted myselfe answerable to all my hopes.*

"From St. John's in the New Found Land, the 8 of August 1583. Yours wholly to command, no man more.

HUM. GILBERT."¹

When Hakluyt in 1582 had dedicated to Philip Sidney the first of his published works, he had declared how the time had come when "we of England" could share the New World with the "Spaniard and Portingale"; to the great interest and advantage of England.² Moreover,

"if we would beholde with the eye of pitie howe al our prisons are pestered and filled with able men to serve their Countrie, which for small robberies are daily hanged up in great numbers, even twentie at a clap out of one jayle, . . . we would hasten . . . some colonies of our superfluous people into those temperate and fertile parts of America, which being within sixe weekes sayling of England are yet unpossessed of any Christians.

How these "superfluous people" had behaved in the *Swallow*, we have already noticed. Mere change of air did not bring change of mind. As Edward Haies of the *Golden Hind* expressed it,

"While the better sort of us were seriously occupied in repairing our wants . . . for the commoditie of the voyage, *others of another sort and disposition were plotting of mischief.* Some casting to steal away our shipping by night, watching opportunities by the Generals and Captains lying on shore."

These conspiracies were discovered and frustrated. But when prevented from making away with Sir Humphrey's ships, the traitors escaped to a harbour (unnamed), seized a foreign vessel laden with fish, put its lawful owners ashore; and sailed for a destination unknown.³

¹ Name so spelt in "*Purchase his Pilgrims.*" Ed: MacLhose. And Gosling, pp. 252-253.

² This and the following sentence are quoted by Gosling, pp. 224-225, but without name of book; which is "*Divers Voyages touching the discoverie of America, and the Ilands adiacent unto the same, made first of all by our Englishmen, and afterwards by the Frenchmen and Brilons. And certaine notes of advertisements for observations, necessarie for such as shall make the like attempt. With two mappes annexed hereunto for the plainer understanding of the whole matter.* By Richard Hakluyt. Imprinted at London for Thomas Woodcocke, dwelling in paules Church-yard at the signe of the blacke beare. 1582." Dedication (6¼ pp.) "To the right worshipfull and most vertuous Gentleman master Phillip Sydney Esquire." (B.M. C.21.b.35.)

³ Gosling (1911) began his chapter XIII (p. 254), "Sir Humphrey was now to pay the penalty for having recruited his men largely from the ranks of pirates and buccaneers that swarmed the English Coast." But it was only the *Swallow* (40 tons) which was a converted pirate ship. Previously, pp. 204-5, Gosling remarked, "Gilbert did not, however, realise, as Bacon did, that the idle and vicious would not make good colonists. His proposal to employ them arose from a confusion of ideas." "The mother country was to be benefited by relieving her of 'those needy people who were daily consumed of the gallows.' . . ." (But when the death penalty was imposed for offences now dismissed with fines or short imprisonment, a man saved from the gallows was not necessarily a hardened criminal.) Gosling continues "*Bacon detected the fallacy.* 'It is a shameful and unblesed thing,' he wrote, 'to take the scum of the people' . . . for such purposes, 'for they will ever live like rogues . . . to the discredit of the plantation.'" But Bacon did not in 1583 "detect" any "fallacy." It was in 1597, fourteen years after Gilbert's death, that he wrote the above words. Gosling's reference to Gilbert's "*fatal error*" of trusting in "scum" which Bacon disdained, is the less felicitous in that the rogues in 1583 had to escape to avoid punishment.

Of the others, many were ill. Sir Humphrey first licensed them to depart in any homeward bound fishing vessel they could find. Then, as this was too uncertain, he gave up the *Swallow* for "transporting home the sick people." Among these was the Captain of the *Delight*, in whose stead was appointed Captain Maurice Browne formerly of the *Swallow*.

Sir Humphrey himself hoisted his flag again in the *Squirrel*, ten tons: she being the "most convenient to discover upon the coast, and to search into every harbour or creeke, which a great ship could not doe." In preparation for meeting possible enemies, the *Squirrel* was prepared with "nettings" and ordnance.

At St. John's, the fleet was replenished not only with necessaries, but "commodiously" with "wines, bread or rusk, fish wette and drie, sweete erbs, . . . marmalades, figs, lymmons barralled"

On the 20th of August the *Squirrel*, *Delight*, and *Golden Hind* weighed anchor from St. John's. The next day they passed Cape Race. Being there becalmed, they "layd out hooks and lines"; and in two hours took fish "in such abundance that many dayes after we fed upon no other provision." Next they shaped their course for the Island of Sablon.²

Along the coast from Cape Race to the North West, they put some men ashore "to take view of the soyle . . . whereof they made good report." Between Cape Race and Cape Breton, "87 leagues," they spent eight days; for although the winds were not unfavourable, the navigation was hindered by the currents; and they "fell into flats and dangers."

Haies of the *Golden Hind* afterwards alluded to various evil portents noticed by the mariners in the *Squirrel*; but adds "I omit to recite frivolous reportes by them in the Frigat of strange voyces the same night, which scared some from the helm."

On Wednesday the 28th of August, "the evening was faire and pleasant, yet not without tokens of storme to ensue."⁴

¹ Haies does not explain how these were procured; presumably by purchase from the foreign ships.

² Now Sable Island.

³ "That thereby the flats and dangers may be inserted in Sea cards for warning to others, . . . I have set downe the best reckonings that were kept by expert men, William Cox, Master of the *Hind*, and Iohn Paul his mate, both of Limehouse." (MacLehose's Hakluyt, Vol. VIII.) Gosling (p. 257) quotes these "Reckonings kept in our course from Cape Race towards Cape Briton, and the Island of Sablon, to the time and place where we lost our Admirall," and adds (p. 258, note) "The courses steered by Sir Humphrey Gilbert's fleet as laid down by William Cox, master, and John Paul, master's mate of the *Golden Hind*, have been carefully worked out for me by Capt. William English, Harbour Master of St. John's. They prove that John Paul was the better navigator, for his reckoning leads exactly to the northern end of Sable Island, where we may conclude that the *Delight* was lost; while Cox's reckoning indicates a point fifty or sixty miles to the Eastward. The description of the wreck, the flats and shoals, and the great variation in the soundings in short distances, confirms the decision."

⁴ Ib: MacLehose's Hakluyt, Vol. VIII. p. 65.

PART II.

“Particularly the Power of Spain.”

CHAPTER 6.

“HIS COUNTRY’S SERVICE AND HIS OWN HONOUR.”

SECTION 3.

“As near to Heaven by sea as by land.”

(The death of Sir Humphrey Gilbert, 9 Sept: 1583).

“Another land waits to be rendered famous by thee : a land which has never felt the rule of Babylon, Persia, Macedonia, Rome, or the terror of Mahomet . . .

“ . . . amongst throngs of heroes, . . . pre-eminent rises the glory of our Gilbert, extolled by the Muses . . .

“May the tropic world from east to west yield her secrets to thee ! May the lands beneath the Pole withdraw their veil for thee, O Gilbert.”

*“De Navigatione Illustris & Magnanimi Equitis aurati Humfredi Gilberti, &c.”
By Stephen Parmenius, of Buda in Hungary. Dated “Kalen Aprilis 1583.” (ante).*

“Monday the ninth of September, in the afternoon, the Frigat was neare cast away . . .

. . . the Generall sitting abaft with a booke in his hand, cried unto us in the Hinde, . . . ‘We are as neare to heaven by sea as by land,’ . . . the same speech well beseeming a souldier resolute in Jesus Christ, as I can testifie he was.”

*“The Maner how our Admirall was lost.”
Narrative of Edward Haies, of the ‘Golden Hind.’*

“Death-scorning Gilbert, chronicled by fame,
To England’s Monarchess did force to yeeld
The savage lande that New-found now we name,
Making wilde people milde, submisse, and tame.
O, were mens lives unto their praises tied,
Then, noble Gilbert, never hadst thou died.”

Charles FitzGeoffrey. Oxford, 1596. (B.M. C.57.k.12).

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“As near to Heaven by sea as by land.”

(*The death of Sir Humphrey Gilbert. 9th Sep: 1583*).

“ALL things requisite for a worthy General are in himself, either by nature, precept, or experience: save only Fortune,” which should crown his efforts “with the wreath of glory,” wrote Guicciardini, who had himself been a General as well as an Ambassador.¹ But “to be fortunate” is not in our own power: and, alas, “Knowledge, Valour, Foresight and Authority” lead the vanguard with small success “unless Fortune bring up the rear.”

Five years previously Sir Humphrey Gilbert had written pleading with the Queen to avoid delays; “for the wings of man’s life are plumed with the feathers of death.”

In 1582 he had meditated upon the sad uncertainty of “marine and martial ventures.” But in the summer of 1583 his “fervencie of mind” kept him happy, and he was most hopeful on the eve of his final disaster.

On Thursday August the 29th, the wind rose and blew “vehemently at South and by East,” with rain, and so thick a mist that they could not see a cable length before them. Early in the morning they were “folded in among flats and sands.” The *Delight* (120 tons) ran aground, and had “her sterne and hinder partes beaten in pieces.” Owing to the heavy weather, “the sea going mightily and high,” it was not possible to save the ship.²

¹ “*Aphorismes Civill and Military.*” Dallington’s trans: (1629) Lib. 4. Aph: XLII.

² Gosling points out (pp. 260-261) that although Clarke (Master of the *Delight*) blames Sir Humphrey for the loss, this is answered in the “*Discourse of Western Planting*,” 1584, with the suggestion that a school of Navigation should be established, and all Mariners compelled to pass various tests before being allowed to become ship-masters: “which order, if it had been established in England, such grosse and insufficient fellows as he that caste away the Admirall” (flagship) “of Sir Humfrey’s company with an C[100] persons in her, to the West of Newfoundland this tym twelve monthes, had not been admitted to so great a chardge.” Gosling (p. 261) in comment on Clarke’s statement that the course which brought the ship to its ruin was kept at Sir Humphrey’s express order, adds the 1584 marginal note, “*Herein Clarke untruly Chargeeth Sir Humphrey Gilbert.*” Gosling shows “That the discovery of their danger was first made by the *Golden Hind*, although a considerable distance in the wake of the *Delight*, is condemnation sufficient of Clarke” (i.e. as a navigator). He was a courageous man; and after the wreck, resourceful.

The *Squirrel* (10 tons) in which was Sir Humphrey, and also the *Golden Hind*. "cast about East south east, bearing to the south, even for our lives." "We desired to save the men" of the *Delight* "by every possible meanes . . . all day and part of the next, we beat up and downe as neere unto the wracke as was possible, . . . looking out if by good hap we might espie any of them." But none were found.

"This was a heavy and grievous event, to lose at one blow our chief shippe . . . with great provisions, gathered together with much travell, care, long time and difficultie. But more was the loss of our men." About a hundred were drowned; including Stephen Parmenius the Hungarian, "born in the citie of Buda, called thereof Budaeus, who of pietie and zeal and good attempts adventured in this action," intending to "record in the Latine tongue" all things "worthy of remembrance . . . to the honour of our nation."

Not only was this "rare Poet of our time" lost, but "our Saxon Refiner"; also Captain Maurice Brown, a "vertuous, honest and discreete Gentleman." Advised to save himself in a pinnace, he had continued to "exhort his people not to despaire nor to leave off their labour"; and preferred rather to sacrifice himself than to forsake them: "With this mind hee mounted upon the highest decke, where he attended imminent death and unavoidable."

Meanwhile Clarke the shipmaster, and fourteen or fifteen of the men leapt into the small pinnace the size of a Thames barge, and "committed themselves to Gods mercy, amidst the storm and rage of sea and windes, destitute of foode." As it happened, after six days and nights afloat, thirteen were driven back "upon the Newfoundland."¹ But Sir Humphrey continued beating up and down to seek them; his companions "losing courage dayly," and the weather continuing "thick and blustering."

The reserve of provisions having perished in the *Delight*, the crew of the *Squirrel* were "already pinched with spare allowance" of food, and also want of warm clothes. They besought Sir Humphrey to take them home to England "before they all perished"; for in their "thinne and ragged clothes" they were in no state to face the rigours of winter.

The "Generall" had "compassion of his poore men," who lacked not "good will" but only the means to perform the desired actions. So he sent for the Captain and Master of the *Golden Hind*: "*Be content*," he said; "*we have seen*

¹ Vide "*A relation of Richard Clarke of Weymouth, master of the ship called the Delight, going with Sir Humphrey Gilbert, 1583. . .*" MacLehose's Hakluyt, VIII. pp. 85-88.

They suffered so much from starvation that by the 5th day in the barge one died, and "we were very weake and wished all to die, saving only myselfe." On the 7th day they got to land, and "kneeled down . . . and gave God praise that he had dealt so mercifully with them." They then "made a little house with boughs" and rested and recovered their strength. Ultimately a Spanish ship "of Saint John de Luz" took pity on them: "the Master of the shippe was our great friend, or else we had been put to death if he had not kept our Counsayle." When interrogated about them, "as it is the order in Spain," he gave misleading replies, and afterwards by night put them ashore, when they had only "ten or twelve miles" to walk to get into France. Thence they came home to England, towards the end of 1583.

enough. . . . I will set you forth royally the next Spring, if God send us safe home."¹

On Saturday afternoon, 31st of August, as they changed their course, the wind remained high, and the sea was so rough that the *Squirrel* (10 tons) "wherein the Generall went, was almost swallowed up."

On Monday afternoon, 2nd September, they passed Cape Race; and that day Sir Humphrey came aboard the *Golden Hind* to get the surgeon to dress his foot "which he hurt by treading upon a naile." They "comforted each other," he and Haies, by hoping that the worst fortune was behind, and good to come. The "Generall" refused then to "tarie in the Hind," the safer ship. After another storm was successfully weathered in the *Squirrel*, he returned aboard the *Hind* again, "to make merrie together with the Captaine, Master and Company. . . . During which time there passed sundry discourses, touching affaires past and to come." He lamented greatly the loss of the *Delight*, and more still of the men; "*but most of all of his bookes and notes*"; also some other treasure, the nature of which his followers "could not draw from him." But Haies suspected it to be the samples of ore which "Daniel the Saxon had brought unto him in the New found land."

Those in the *Hind* questioned Sir Humphrey what means he would have to meet the charges of so great an expedition as he meant to make the next Spring. "*Leave that to mee (hee replied) I will aske a pennie of no man. I will bring tidings unto her Majesty who will be so gracious to lend me 10,000 pounds.*"²

In his "great fervencie of minde" he resisted the "vehement perswasion and intreatie" of those in the *Hind* that he should travel home with them, and not hazard himself in the *Squirrel*. This was afterwards to be quoted against him as "wilfulness." But his answer merits lasting remembrance: "*I will not forsake my little company going homeward, with whom I have passed so many storms and perils.*"

He provisioned the frigate *Squirrel* out of the *Hind*; "and so we committed him to God's protection, we being more than 300 leagues onwards of our way home."³

Haies states that the frigate was "overcharged" on the deck with nettings; and with artillery "too cumbersome for so small a boate that was to passe through the Ocean sea at that season" when there was likelihood of "foule weather." But this was being wise after the event.

Just before leaving England, Sir Humphrey had alluded to the tempests off the Azores, the previous autumn, preventing "the King of Portingale" from reaching Madeira. In such storms it was Sir Humphrey's own destiny to vanish. When his two ships were south of the Azores, and they "got unto the height and elevation of England," they encountered "terrible seas, breaking short and high,

¹ p. 69. ² p. 72. ³ p. 73.

Pyramid wise." Even men who "all their life time had occupied the seas" said they never saw weather more "outrageous."

On Monday afternoon and evening the 9th of September, the frigate *Squirrel*, after being much "oppressed by waves," seemed as if she would ride out the tempest:

"The General, sitting abaft with a booke in his hand, cried out unto us in the Hind (as often as we did approach within hearing) *We are as neere to heaven by sea as by land*: Reiterating the same speech, well becoming a souldier resolute in Jesus Christ. . ."

But at midnight "or not long after, the Frigat being ahead of us in the Golden Hinde, suddenly her lights went out, . . . and withall our watch cryed the Generall was cast away; which was too true. For in that moment the Frigat was devoured and swallowed up by the Sea. . ."

"In torment of weather and perill of drowning," the *Golden Hind* struggled on. Reaching Falmouth on Sunday the 22nd of September, she thence went to Dartmouth, to give Sir John Gilbert, Sir Humphrey's elder brother, the sorrowful news. As he had no children, and his brother Humphrey was his next heir, he had at first attempted to divert him from his dream of finding the North-West Passage. Subsequently entering into the Newfoundland projects, and aiding them with influence and money, Sir John in September, 1583, strove to persuade himself that even though the frigate had perished, his brother might have escaped and got to land in Terceira. But no man who had experienced the Azorean storms encouraged him in any such hope.²

Haies in his narrative blamed Sir Humphrey as "both too prodigal of his own patrimony, and too careless of other men's expences"; and while admitting his "high and noble mind," and temper refined and chastened by 'crosses, turmoils and afflictions," heaped the 'Generall's' memory with ungenerous

¹ Ib: p. 74. If Sir Humphrey's last recorded words had emanated from Shakespeare, they would be recognised as sublime. An unconscious echo of them, in our own day, merits remembrance:—In 1916, during the Battle of Jutland, when the destroyer, H.M.S. *Nestor* was sinking, riddled with shells from the German High Sea Fleet, her Commander gave the order to "Abandon ship." To Lieutenant Bethell, who was standing beside him, he then said "Now, where shall we go?" The answer came swiftly, "*To Heaven, I trust, sir.*" At that moment Bethell "turned aside to attend to a mortally wounded signalman and was seen no more, amidst a cloud of fumes from a bursting shell . . ." As the ship sank, the Commander and others sang "God save the King." Vide "*Falklands, Jutland and the Bight, by Commander The Hon. Barry Bingham, V.C., R.N., Commanding Officer of H.M.S. Nestor at Jutland.*" (John Murray, London, 1919).

See also Ch: III, of "*The Fighting at Jutland. The Personal Experiences of Sixty Officers and Men of the British Fleet. Dedicated to the Memory of those who gave their lives . . . 31st May to 1st June 1916.*" 1st edition; pp. 60-62. Refused by many publishers; privately printed for Lieuts. H. W. Fawcett and G. W. W. Hooper, R.N.; and sold by them to officers on Active and Retired lists and their relations. Ultimately published in an abbreviated form by Messrs. Macmillan & Co., London.

² We do not know when the news was received by Lady Gilbert at Minster Manor, Sheppey Island, Kent. Sir Humphrey left seven children, of whom six were sons: See Pedigree, ante. The eldest, John, was knighted thirteen years later by the Earl of Essex at Cadiz. The youngest Raleigh, was concerned in the colonising of America in the next century.

reproaches.¹ But Sir George Peckham, who had just as much reason to be disappointed, defended Sir Humphrey resolutely, and rebuked the world for not understanding the great projects intended.

Looking to the future, Sir George drew inspiration from the thought how "Christopher Columbus of famous memorie" had not at first received the credit he deserved. Rather were his hopes "derided and mocked generally, even here in England," and by "the Spaniards themselves":

"And while he was attending there to acquaint the King of Castile . . . with his intended purpose, . . . some scorned . . . the plainnesse of his garments, some tooke occasion to jest at his simple and silly lookes, others asked if this were he that lowts so lowe, which did take upon him to bring men into a Country that aboundeth with Golde, Pearle, and Precious stones? . . . *Thus some judged him by his garments, and others by his looke and countenance, but none entred into consideration of the inward man.*

"In the ende, what successe his Voyage had, who list to read . . . the Historie of the West Indies, the conquest of Hernando Cortez about Mexico, and those of Francesco Pizarro in Peru . . . may know." And these can be studied in the English tongue. But when Columbus first spoke, his "devise was then accounted *a fantastick imagination, and a drowsie dreame. Withall, how mightily it hath enlarged the dominions of the Crowne of Spaine,*" and enriched the Spanish subjects, "*let all men consider.*"

Peckham adjures Englishmen to emulate Sir Humphrey Gilbert in following this good example. Those who are no niggards of their purses "*in buying of costly and rich apparel, and . . . in setting forth of games, pastimes, feastings and banquets,*" should employ some of their wealth in the furtherance of what "these valiant Gentlemen" Sir Humphrey and his associates had "so nobly begun."²

Adrian Gilbert, the younger brother, laboured to continue this work; and secured Royal Letters Patent the following year. But that Sir Humphrey, except by those who shared his aspirations, was imperfectly appreciated, appears from a protest made in 1585, to "worthy Sir Francis Drake that hath so nobly adventured in many calamities," by "Your worships poore country man . . . H. R." Henry Robarts. Deploring that "a great many Ignorant people" ask "mutteringly" why should gentlefolks wander far away, when they could "staye at their own pleasure" to enjoy their wealth at home, Robarts rebukes "base fellowes," who are as "*unanswerable to the mindes of the valiant as the flint stone to the precious diamond. . .*" When great deeds have been performed by those who hazard themselves abroad, the grudging "enviuousnesse" in some of our countrymen "is such as they disdaine to give them the honour they have gained . . ." especially "that worthy Knight Sir Humphrey Gylbert whose valour deserved thanks . . . the which they be lothe to bestowe upon him, but he is dead, and in countreyes cause shortened his life, leaving many (to) sorowe for his death. . ."

¹ p. 77. op. cit.

² "*A true Report of the late Discoveries, and possession taken in the right of the Crowne of England of the New found Lands, By that valiant and worthy Gentleman, Sir Humfrey Gilbert Knight. Wherein is briefly set down her highnesse lawfull Title thereunto . . . Written by Sir George Peckham Knight, the chiefe adventurer . . .*" (MacLehose's Hakluyt, VIII. pp. 89-132.) See Note, Columbus and his heirs, ante, II. 6. 1. p. 238.

"... it were great pity . . . that his valiant name should suddenly die with his bodie, without some remembrance whereby his children hereafter might reape the rewarde of their father's fame. . ."

His children,—not least the youngest, Raleigh Gilbert,—endeavoured to carry on their father's principles: bearing in mind what he had written in 1566 to his brother Sir John, in his "*Discourse of a Discoverie of a new passage to Cataia*":

"Give me leave . . . to live and die in this mind: that he is not worthy to live at all, who for fear or danger of death shunneth his country's service and his own honour."

Here we have the quintessence not only of Gilbert's own character, but of the spirit which was to make Elizabethan England a "wonder of the world."

¹ "*A most friendly farewell, . . . to the right worshipful Sir Frauncis Drake, Knight, Generall of her Majesties Navy . . . 1585 . . .*" By "Henry Robarts of London, Citizen." (Reprint 1924. B.M. 11626. f. 11.)

² Nothing could be clearer than Gilbert's definition of his own code, and his repeated statements of his reasons for his acts. But even his eulogistic biographer in 1911, cited as an "illuminating paragraph," and "particularly applicable," the following inconsequent generalities from Froude:

"*The springs of great actions are always difficult to analyse, impossible to analyse perfectly: the force by which a man throws out of himself a good action is invisible and mystical, like that which brings out the blossoms and the fruit upon a tree.*"

(Sir Humphrey repeatedly defined his own purposes. And as a tree is known by its fruit, so is a man by his deeds.)

"*The motives which we find men urging for their enterprises seem often insufficient to have prompted them to so large a daring,*" declares Froude.

But in the 16th century the motive was seldom left unexplained. The year after Gilbert was drowned, Hawkins wrote to Lord Burghley that though of his own natural disposition he loved nothing better than peace and quiet, yet when he considered the intentions of the King of Spain, he knew no means of saving England except by an enhanced vigour and valour in our nation. This equally applies to Gilbert, as we saw from his "*Discourses how hir Majesty may annoy the King of Spaine.*" But Froude, in effort to be "mystical," alleged of the Elizabethans "*They did what they did from the great unrest in them which made them do it.*" And in 1911 Gilbert's biographer repeated, (p. 279)

"While in this study of his life an attempt has been made to analyse his motives and trace the influence which surrounded him, perhaps Froude's explanation is nearest the truth, that he did what he did from the 'great unrest' in him."

Rather it was the "unrest" of King Philip which aroused Gilbert and Drake to expend their utmost energy in resistance to his claim to be Lord of the Ocean-Sea and to "rule thereafter over the whole world."

As Hawkins, Drake, Gilbert,—and subsequently Essex, and the others, lucidly defined the motives and aims of their respective undertakings,—and Walsingham and Burghley left on record also the reasons for their statesmanship,—we should for ever discard the random and imaginary explanations of 19th Century men of letters; and go instead to the Elizabethans themselves for knowledge of the why and wherefore of their strenuous and far-reaching labours.

MEMORIAL PORTRAIT OF SIR HUMPHREY GILBERT:

"*Humfridus Gilbertus Miles Auratus*": With his motto *Quid Non?*

From Henry Holland's "*Herwologia Anglica hoc est clarissimorum et doctissimorum aliquot Anglorum qui floruerunt ab Anno Christi MD usq ad presentem Annum MDCXX, vivae Effigies, Vitae et Elogia, duobus Tomis. Impensis Crispini Passaei Calcographi et Jansonii Bibliopolae.*"

(B.M. Print No. 201. b. 2.)

"*Gilbertus ciues alium deduxit in orbem
Quo Christi imbuerit barbara corda fide.*

A.B."

(The identity of A.B. is unknown).



GILBERTVS ciues alium deduxit in orbem.

Quo CHRISTI imbuerit barbara cotta fide B

APPENDIX A.

SIR HUMPHREY GILBERT'S MAP. CIRCA 1582.

Signed by Sir Humphrey Gilbert, and countersigned with a cabalistic figure similar to one used by Dr. John Dee, this map remained at Petworth House in Sussex; from the days of Henry Percy, 9th Earl of Northumberland, who lived in the reign of Queen Elizabeth and King James the First, until April the 23rd, 1928, St. George's Day.

To the sorrow of the promoters of our National Maritime Museum, it fell to Dr. Rosenbach; and—in company with other unpublished treasures from Lord Leconfield's collection (including a description of Virginia by George Percy, brother of Henry Earl of Northumberland),—was lost to England.

Though called by Messrs Sotheby only "*North America and the Arctic Regions*," the map showed almost half the world, with the North Pole for centre: China and Japan therein being nearly as conspicuous as North America. Messrs Sotheby offered the following conjectures:¹

"The Map may have been taken on Sir Humphrey Gilbert's last voyage in 1583, and used and another corrected chart compiled from it on the way out as the discoveries proceeded; if so, it must have been relegated to another ship on the way home, and so escaped the wreck of Gilbert's ship the 'Squirrel.'"

"Later, perhaps, it passed to Raleigh, and from him to Northumberland when both were in the Tower together; or it may have been returned to Dee and been given by him to the Wizard Earl, a man of kindred spirit to himself."

But it is not a "chart" on vellum intended for hard wear as a "sea card." It is a sketch on paper (24½ by 19¾ inches) such as Elizabethan cartographers used to draw prior to making durable "plats." Being in perfect condition, which would be impossible had it suffered the wear and tear of being used "*as the discoveries proceeded*," there is no reason to assume that it was taken on the Newfoundland expedition. It might have been one of several maps drawn in relation to the larger scheme of 1582, in which Dr. Dee was an eager "adventurer," and secured a grant of land from Gilbert.

The conjecture that prior to Sir Humphrey's death it was "*relegated to another ship*," is as fanciful as "*that later, perhaps, it passed to Raleigh*." Why should it pass to Raleigh? Sir Humphrey Gilbert's Will left all his "goods and chattells whatsoever" to his wife, at whose "discretion" his affairs were to be arranged; subject to the aid, not of his young half-brother Walter Raleigh, but of his elder brother Sir John Gilbert, his brother-in-law William "Awchier" of "Bourne," Kent, with Sir Thomas Cornwallis, his trustees. Raleigh is not mentioned in the Will; and to suppose him the inheritor of Sir Humphrey's possessions is to forget Sir Humphrey's seven children, and his brethren.

There is not any foundation for the theory that from Raleigh the map was acquired by Northumberland when he and Raleigh "*were in the Tower together*," or rather were each prisoners in different parts of the Tower, under James I.

The other fancy that "*it may have been returned to Dee, and been given by him to the Wizard Earl, a man of kindred spirit to himself*," is also insubstantial. Apart from the fact that the haughty

¹ p. 33. No. 78. "*Catalogue of Extremely Rare and Valuable Americana with some Important English Books and Manuscripts largely from the Library of Henry Percy, 9th Earl of Northumberland (1564-1632) at Petworth House Sold by Order of his Descendant The Right Honble Lord Leconfield*." Sotheby & Co.

9th Earl of Northumberland condescended to admit few "*kindred spirits*," he had not in 1582-3 succeeded to the Earldom, nor was he then a patron of Dr. Dee. Dee's special patron (as Dee's own Diary proves,) was Sir Francis Walsingham; whom Sir Humphrey Gilbert's letters also show to have been the chief promoter of his plans at the Court at a time when Henry Percy future 9th Earl of Northumberland was still in his teens.

Furthermore, although the words "*For Navigation*" are written on the back of the map, as it is not a seaman's chart the meaning more likely is that these were the regions the navigation of which Sir Humphrey desired to attempt.

The most practical hypothesis as to how it may have reached Petworth would be that when the plans of Sir Humphrey were being put before Sir Francis Walsingham, Dr. Dee, who at Mortlake lived near Sir Francis's country house of Barn Elms, may have been sent by Sir Humphrey with the map to Sir Francis, for it to be kept by him for reference.

At Walsingham's death, 6th April 1590, his sole heiress was his daughter Frances, widow of Sir Philip Sidney. Though the State Papers which had been in Walsingham's possession were examined by Order of Council, and kept for the Queen's service, his personal effects remained Lady Sidney's property. Her clandestine marriage to Robert Earl of Essex took place soon after; but was not announced until the following October.

Henry Earl of Northumberland, who had succeeded to the title in 1585, married in January 1595, at Essex House, Essex's sister Lady Dorothy, widow of Sir Thomas Perrott. On April 14th of the same year, Henry Earl of Northumberland was godfather to Lady Essex's third son Henry, christened "in my Lady Walsingham's howse." In June and July that year (as Essex's unpublished household expenses show) the Countess of Essex spent a month with Lord and Lady Northumberland at Petworth. For Lady Essex to have inherited the map from her father, and given it to her husband's brother-in-law, would have been natural; and is the more likely in that she continued to be a friend of Northumberland up to the end of the Queen's reign. It was in his care that, in March 1603, she chose to send her precious only surviving son, aged twelve, to hear King James of Scots proclaimed King of Great Britain.

In 1595 Lady Essex was godmother to Dr. Dee's daughter Margaret.¹ Also, one of the most interesting astrological MSS in the collection of the "Wizard Earl" of Northumberland, not at Petworth to-day but in possession of the Duke of Northumberland at Alnwick Castle, is there noted as having come from the library of Robert 2nd Devereux Earl of Essex.²

The current assumption that no Elizabethan item of interest is complete unless it can be associated with Sir Walter Raleigh is a reversal of the state of affairs during his life: Raleigh after his rise to prominence being one of the few Elizabethan courtiers disliked by the populace. But "good Sir Francis Walsingham" as Dr. Dee calls him, was a centre of benevolence. That his merits survived in his daughter was a more than merely conventional compliment on the part of Henry Lok (whose brother Michael was concerned in many plans for oversea exploration.)³

The main point of the map, however, is not through whose hands it passed, but that it bears upon Sir Humphrey Gilbert's great project, which not his half-brother Raleigh but his brother Adrian in 1584 aspired to carry on.

From a map signed by the founder of our first Crown Colony to have been removed from England would have been less regrettable if it had gone to one of our own Dominions. And if Sir Humphrey Gilbert had been adequately appreciated in 1928 it might have been saved.

Englishmen should awake to the meaning and value of what their predecessors have preserved.

¹ By proxy of "Mistress Beale," Lady Walsingham's sister. Dee's *Diary*. Aug. 27, 1595. Camden Soc: 1842. p. 531.

² Facsimile pages forthcoming in "*Elizabethan England*."

³ "*Whose virtue him surviveth crowned in you*" Sonnet to the Countess of Essex. 1597 (see under date.)

Within the memory of generations now living, Italy was in danger of similar depletion. Suitable legislation met the menace; and Italy to-day reaps the benefit a thousandfold.

It is natural that cultured Americans wish to acquire as much as they can of England's wealth of antiquity. But nothing is more unnatural than the apathy with which too many Englishmen allow English historical relics to be taken away; and make no protest when disproportionately heavy taxation of landowners compels the heads of our ancient houses to part with precious MSS which their ancestors preserved. It is as "*Americana*," and fancifully associated with Raleigh, that the Gilbert map brought £2,800. But if any one man of our race deserves to be called the father of Imperial Unity and Co-operative Defence, it is certainly Sir Humphrey Gilbert: as must ultimately be recognised. *Tempus ad lucem ducit veritatem*.¹

As this work is passing through the press, the 350th anniversary of the Annexation of Newfoundland to the Crown of England is being commemorated in a series of 14 Newfoundland postage stamps: the subjects being: (1) Sir Humphrey Gilbert's portrait; (2) Compton, Devon (the Gilbert home through many centuries); (3) Sir Humphrey's coat of arms and crest; (4) Eton College, where he was sent in 1551; (5) The token from Her Majesty; (6) Queen Elizabeth giving Gilbert his patent for colonisation, 1578; (7) his squadron leaving Plymouth on his final expedition, 1583; (8) arriving at St. John's, 4th August; (9) the Annexation Ceremony, 5th August; (10) the Royal Arms of England; (11) Sir Humphrey's last words; (12) Map of Newfoundland, 1624; (13) Queen Elizabeth; and (14) the statue of Sir Humphrey Gilbert on Truro Cathedral.

APPENDIX B.

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE OF CHIEF SERVICES
OF SIR HUMPHREY GILBERT TO QUEEN ELIZABETH, 1562-1583:
WITH SOME CONTEMPORARY PUBLIC EVENTS.

Note that from December 1571 to March 1578 n.s. there was no Spanish Ambassador in England; and that Sir Humphrey Gilbert's aid to the Dutch, who were at war with Spain, was given in 1572, subsequent to Queen Elizabeth's dismissal of the Spanish Ambassador. Also that Gilbert's "Discourses how hir Ma^{tie} may annoy the King of Spaine" were written in 1577, when the relations of Spain with England, though not yet those of open war, were not terms of assured peace.

In 1577 Sir Nicholas Bacon warned the Queen of the need to hold England in perpetual readiness to withstand her foreign enemies.

Note also that Sir Humphrey's career ended a year and a half before the knighting of his young half-brother Walter Raleigh, to whose head Gilbert's laurels as founder of our Colonial Empire are now commonly transferred by popular historians, both in England and America.

In Sir John Millais's picture of "The Boyhood of Raleigh," Raleigh and Gilbert, as lads of about a year's difference in age, are depicted listening together to a seaman's yarn of the Spanish main. Actually Humphrey Gilbert was at least twenty-three, and had performed martial service at Havre, when Walter Raleigh was ten years of age. That Raleigh adopted some of the ideas of his half-brother is indisputable; but that Raleigh was the pioneer of colonisation is a belief arising from forgetfulness of the actual pioneer.

MEMORABLE EVENTS.

- 1558. (17 November) Accession of Queen Elizabeth.
- 1559. (n.s.) (25 January—8 May) 1st Parliament of Elizabeth. Law passed prohibiting any subject from holding office, lay or clerical, without taking the oath of the Queen's supremacy in Church and State.
- 1560. Peace negotiations in Scotland by Cecil.
- 1561. (22 January) Birth of Francis Bacon.
- 1562. Shane O'Neill's visit to London.
Ecclesiastical Conference agrees as to XXXIX Articles.
(September) English military expedition sails for Normandy, under Ambrose Earl of Warwick, Lt-General; to aid the Huguenots in Havre.
(December) Defeat of Huguenots at Dreux.
- 1563. (n.s.) (12 January to 10 April) 2nd Parliament of Queen Elizabeth.
(24 February) Death of Duke of Guise (assassinated).
28 July. Capitulation of the English in Havre, after a gallant defence.

HUMPHREY GILBERT.

- 1558. (Aged 19 or more. Exact date of birth being undiscovered his age can only be approximately stated.)
- 1562. (Aged 23) Gilbert takes 100 Devon men to "Newhaven" (Havre de Grace).
- 1563. (Aged 24). Gilbert "first got his reputation at New Haven" (Havre) "where he served with great commendation" and was wounded, 5 June (mis-dated in D.N.B. 26 Sep: two months after our troops were withdrawn).

MEMORABLE EVENTS.

HUMPHREY GILBERT.

1564. (23 April) Birth of William Shakespeare.
1564. Building of the Royal Exchange, by Sir Thomas Gresham.
1565. (May) Defence of Malta against the forces of Sultan Solyman the Magnificent.
Prayers ordered in every Church in London for the victory of the Knights of St. John.
(7 September) Relief of Malta by Don Garcia de Toledo.
1566. (10 November) Birth of Robert, son and heir of Walter Devereux, Viscount Hereford (subsequently Earl of Essex).
1566. (30 September to 2 January 1566-7) Parliament of Queen Elizabeth: counting as part of her second Parliament, which had been prorogued but not dissolved in 1563.
1566. Royal Act founding Merchants Adventurers.
1567. (April) The Duke of Alba appointed Captain-General of the Netherlands.
1568. (June) English embassy to Russia.
1568. (March) Prince of Orange published his "Justification."
(April) Execution of Count Egmont and Count Horne.
(May) Defeat of Mary Queen of Scots at Langside by the Regent Murray.
Her flight to England.
(July) Declaration of the Prince of Orange against the Duke of Alba.
(September) Attack by the Spaniards on Captain John Hawkins, at S. Juan de Ulloa.
1569. (October) Battle of Moncontour: defeat of Coligny and the Huguenots.
1569. (November) Rising of the Earls of Northumberland and Westmorland on behalf of the Pope and the Queen of Scots.
Forces of the two Northern Earls dispersed by Thomas Earl of Sussex, who carried the war into Scotland.
- 1569-70. (March) Pope Pius V declared "Elizabeth the pretended Queen" unfit to reign; dispensed her subjects from their allegiance, and pronounced that all who obeyed her should be anathematised with her.

1566. (June). Gilbert wrote to his brother Sir John Gilbert "*A Discourse of a Discovery of a new Passage to Cataia*" (printed ten years later).
(July). Sailed from Bristol for Ireland, commanding a company of Devon men.
Took part in Colonel Randolph's victory over Shane O'Neill, near Lough Foyle.
Sent to England with despatches.
- 1567-68. Gilbert in Munster, as Colonel, commanding "Harquebusses on Horseback" (Elizabethan equivalent to Mounted Infantry).
1568. Gilbert fell into "dangerous sickness."
1569. Colonel Gilbert repressed, with great severity, the rebellion in Munster; captured Garrystown, and put all the inhabitants to the sword.
1570. Colonel Gilbert knighted by Sir Henry Sidney, Lt. Deputy of Ireland.

MEMORABLE EVENTS.

1570. Execution of certain Catholics for "High Treason"; especially for circulating the Pope's Declaration.
1571. (2 April to 29 May) 3rd Parliament enacted that it was High Treason for any subject to attempt to decide who should be the Queen's successor; and prohibited the bringing in of papal Bulls or Declarations.
- (September) Discovery by Hawkins of Spanish plot for the conquest of England.
- (7 October) Victory of Don John of Austria and the Holy League, over the fleet of Sultan Selim II, near Lepanto.
- (December) Dismissal of the Spanish Ambassador by Queen Elizabeth, for conspiring the invasion of England and the transference of the crown to Queen Mary of Scots.
- 1571-2. (January) Arraignment and condemnation of Thomas Duke of Norfolk.
1572. (April) Treaty between Queen Elizabeth and King Charles IX, signed at Blois.
- (8th May to 30th June) 4th Parliament of Queen Elizabeth.
- (2nd June) Execution of the Duke of Norfolk.
- (June) Francis Duke of Montmorency, Ambassador Extraordinary to England, installed Knight of the Garter.
- (24 August) Execution at York of the Earl of Northumberland.
- (August) Marriage of King Henry of Navarre and Marguerite of Valois.
1572. (24 August) Massacre at midnight of Admiral de Coligny-Chastillon and other wedding guests, who had come to Paris on King Charles's assurance of protection.
- (September) Lord Burghley appointed Lord High Treasurer, in place of Marquess of Winchester deceased.
1572. Captain Francis Drake sailed on his first independent expedition.
- SIR HUMPHREY GILBERT.
1570. (Aged 31 or 32) Sir Humphrey married Anne, heiress of John, 2nd son of Sir Anthony Aucher (or Ager) of Ottringden (now Otterden) Kent.
1571. (13 April) Sir Humphrey Gilbert, M.P. spoke in defence of "the prerogative Imperial." (Vide Journal of H. of Commons; D'Ewes, *Parliaments of Queen Elizabeth*. 1682, p. 168. Commentary by P. Wentworth, p. 175.)
- (26 May) Sir H. Gilbert one of a Committee for enquiry into a statement that certain M.P.'s were open to bribes (had taken "money for their voices." p. 189).
1572. English aid sent, under Sir Humphrey Gilbert, to the forces of William Prince of Orange (against the Duke of Alba's army).
- Siege of Tergoes; and occupation of Flushing, by Sir Humphrey Gilbert, Roger Williams, and Thomas Morgan.

MEMORABLE EVENTS.

1573. (25 March) English aid to the Huguenots at Rochelle.
 (1 May) Edinburgh Castle besieged by the English.
 (8 June) King Philip confirms Articles of Accord signed by Duke of Alba and Lord Burghley on 5 March.
1574. First North African expedition of Sebastian King of Portugal.
1574. Spanish siege of Leyden.
1575. (July) Queen Elizabeth entertained at Kenilworth by Robert Earl of Leicester.
 Francis Drake in Ulster, as one of the sea-captains under Walter Earl of Essex.
- 1575-6. (8 February to 15 March) Parliament: 6th Assembly, classed as continuation of 4th Parliament.
1576. Spanish sack of Antwerp.
1576. (21 September) Death of Walter Earl of Essex in Ireland, £10,000 in debt to the Queen for his expenses in her service in Ulster.
 and Voyage of Martin Frobisher.
1577. (June) Philip Sidney sent in June to Prague and Vienna, on embassy to the Emperor, Rudolph II.
 Returned in September.
 Advice of the Lord Keeper Sir Nicholas Bacon to the Queen that she would best keep the peace by having her defenders in readiness for war.
 (15 November) Captain Francis Drake sails on his voyage of circumnavigation.
1578. 3rd Voyage of Frobisher.
 (4 August) Battle of Alcacer-Kebir, defeat and death of King Sebastian of Portugal.
 (1 October) Death of Don John of Austria. Appointment of Alexander Farnese, Prince of Parma, as Governor of the Netherlands.

SIR HUMPHREY GILBERT.

1573. Sir Humphrey, living at Limehouse, at work on "sundrie profitable and verie commendable exercises . . . perfected painefully with his owne penne."
 (See II. 2. 1.)
1575. (15 June) Sir Humphrey constituted by Royal Letters Patent "Surveyor for seven years," for maintenance of "Artillery, Armour and Weapons, and the Suppression of Unlawful Games."
1576. Publication of "*A Discourse of a Discoverie for a New Passage to Cataia*" (written in 1566.) Now issued by George Gascoigne without Sir Humphrey's consent. (" . . . it treateth of a matter whereof no man hath heretofore written particularlie." Gascoigne's excuse for publishing it. 12 April. 1576.)
1577. (6 November) Sir H. Gilbert's "*Discourses how Hir Majesty may annoy the King of Spayne*."
1578. (June, aged 39 or 40). Patent to Sir H. Gilbert to seek out, discover, annex for the Crown, and inhabit, strange lands.
 (26 September) Embarkation of Sir Humphrey, with six vessels: *Anne Ager* (250 tons); *Hope of Greenway* (160 tons); *Falcon* (100 tons); *Red Lyon* (110 tons); *Gallion* (40 tons); *Swallow* (40 tons); *Squirrel* (8 tons).
 Churchyard's poem "*touching the Journey of Sir Humphrey Gilbert*."

MEMORABLE EVENTS.

1579. King Philip's overtures to the Portuguese. Dom Antonio, Prior of Crato, returns from Morocco and claims Succession to the Crown of Portugal.

Further negotiations for French marriage of Queen Elizabeth.

1580. Plot to kill the Queen.

1580. (*January*) Death of Henry the Cardinal-King of Portugal.

(*23 and 24 June*). Election of Dom Antonio by the Three Estates as King of Portugal.

(*25 August*) Defeat of King Antonio by the Duke of Alba; and surrender of Lisbon to the Duke.

Philip II of Spain proclaimed King of Portugal and dependencies.

(*September-November*) Invasion of Ireland by Spanish and Italian troops, which occupy Smerwick.

(*September*) Return of Captain Francis Drake from his voyage of circumnavigation; to find that all the Portuguese Empire, except the Azores, had fallen into the hands of Philip of Spain.

(*November*) The Lord Deputy of Ireland, Arthur, Lord Grey of Wilton, recaptures Smerwick.

Spanish and Italian officers put to ransom; rank and file slain. (Walter Raleigh serving under Grey.)

(*December*) Sir George Peckham and his wife imprisoned in the Marshalsea for having harboured "*Campion the Jesuite*."

1581. (n.s.) (*16 January to 18 March*) Parliament of Queen Elizabeth. (7th Assembly; but classed as part of 4th Parliament.)

(*February*) Lady Peckham given permission either to repair to her own house, or join her husband now in the Tower; where he was granted greater freedom "*in consideration of his present conformitie . . . to the church*."

(*March*) Release of Sir George Peckham, on condition of his attending the Established Church.

(*4 April*) Francis Drake knighted at Deptford by the Queen, on board his ship *Golden Hind*.

SIR HUMPHREY GILBERT.

1579. "Simon Fernando, Mr. Sec(retar)y Walsingham's man," former Master of the *Falcon*, "went and came to and from the said coast" (of Newfoundland) "in three months in the little Frigatt" (presumably the *Squirrel*) "without any other consort, and arrived at Dartmouth from whence he embarked when he began his viage." (Cit. Gosling, p. 196.)

1580. Services by sea on the Irish coast, against the rebels at Kinsale.

1580. (*28 August*) "Treaty" of Dr. John Dee with Sir Humphrey. (Dee's *Diary*, under date).

(*10 September*) "Sir Humfry Gilbert graunted me my request to him . . . of the royalties of discovery all to the North above the parallel of the 50 degree of latitude, . . . and thereupon he toke me by the hand with faithful promise . . ." Dee's *Diary*.

MEMORABLE EVENTS.

1581. (*August*) Lord Burghley's project for "a great and roiall" expedition under command of Sir Fr. Drake "to serve Don Antonio K(ing) of Portugall who hath a just war against the King of Spain."
 Don Antonio welcomed in England.
 Protest of King Philip.
 Captain Richards takes a squadron to aid the Azores, which, except St. Michaels, refuse to accept the sovereignty of Spain.
 Defeat of the Spaniards, under Don Pedro de Valdez, at Terceira, by the Azoreans under Figueiredo de Vasconcellos.
1581. (*1 December*) Execution of Father Edmund Campion S.J. at Tyburn for "High Treason" (First English Jesuit martyr).

SIR HUMPHREY GILBERT.

1581. (*July*) Sir Humphrey protests that he has not yet been paid for his services in Ireland the previous year.
1582. (*19 April*) "... a muttering among ye papists that Sir Humfrye Gilbarde goeth to seeke a newe founde land. Sir George Peckham and Sir Thomas Gerrard goeth wth him. I have heard it said among ye papists y^t they hope it will prove ye best journeye for England y^t was made these fortie yeres." (Anon: letter to Sir Fr. Walsingham. Cit. Gosling p. 189.)
 (*29 April*) Spanish Ambassador, Mendoza, informs King Philip that "Humphrey Gilbert is fitting out 3 more ships to go to Florida."
 Mendoza endeavours to dissuade the Catholics from associating themselves with the project.
1582. (*6 June*) Articles of agreement between "Sr Humphrey Gylberte of Compton," and two Catholic Knights, Sir Tho^s. Gerard of Brynn, and Sir George Peckham, by which Sir Humphrey leased some of the rights the Queen had granted to him: viz. license to explore the American coast from Cape Breton to the Cape of Florida; to select two islands from any four found by them, and plant a colony; and also on the mainland to have 1,500,000 acres of land; Peckham and Gerard to pay a small rent and two fifths of any gold silver and precious stones found thereon.

1582. Continued negotiations for the marriage of Queen Elizabeth with the brother of the King of France.

MEMORABLE EVENTS.

1582. (*June*) Expedition of English merchants to Russia, with ten ships and one bark, "for discovery of new trades."

1582. (*July*) King Antonio's expedition to the Azores, with a French Navy and Army, under Strozzi; and some English ships flying the French flag.

Successful landing at St. Michaels; followed by defeat and death of Admiral-General Strozzi, in "one of the greatest (battles) within the bounds of the ocean."

(*September*) King Antonio still holds Terceira; and all the Azores except St. Michaels.

1582. (*October*) King Antonio's Madeira expedition beaten back to Terceira by storms.

(*5 October*) Pope Gregory XIII reforms the Calender, making the 5th the 15th. All Catholic countries conform to the *stilo novo*; but England keeps *stilo nostro* (our style).

1582. (*December*) Death of Fernando, Duke of Alba, the General "exceeding all Spaniards of his time" (against whom Sir Humphrey had fought in 1572).

Renewed Portuguese hopes of throwing off the Spanish yoke.

SIR HUMPHREY GILBERT.

1582. (*6 June*) Agreement of Sir Humphrey separately with Sir G. Peckham, granting him 500,000 acres adjacent to the 1,500,000 assigned to him and Gerard jointly.

(*July*) Agreement of Sir H. Gilbert with Philip Sidney: that Sidney his heirs and successors may discover and occupy 30,00,000 acres, paying for every 1,000 acres 15 pence and two fifth of the gold and silver found; making various allowances for cost of a Navy and Army; and the encouragement of learning.

(*8 July*) Sir H. Gilbert made his Will: lest "death, captivity or other mishap" might overtake him during his "marine and martial affairs."

(*August and September*) Evidence given "before Sir Fraunceys Walsingham . . . and divers others of good judgment," regarding "ye Contrie Sr Humphrey Gilberte goeth to discover." (Gosling, p. 194, points out the Cal: S.P. (C). erroneously conjectured the date as 1580, and 1583.)

(*2 November*) Royal Letters Patent for "the Merchant Adventures with Sir Humphrey Gilbert"; Sir Fra: Walsingham being "Chief and Principal Patron," contributing £50. The Earls of Sussex, Warwick, and Leicester, Lord Burghley, Sir Christopher Hatton, Sir Fra: Knollys, Sir Henry Sidney, Philip Sidney, Dr. John Dee, and Anthony Parckhurst, "Adventurers."

1583. (n.s.) Having granted Sir Humphrey leave to depart on his voyage, the Queen demurs, and wishes him not to lead it in person.

(*7 February*) He protests to Secretary Walsingham,

MEMORABLE EVENTS.

1583. (June) Sir Jerome Bowes sent as "Ambassador, Orator and special Commissioner" from Queen Elizabeth "unto the Emperour of Russia."

1583. (July) Victory of the Marqués de Santa Cruz at Terceira.

1583. Execution of E. de Silva, Count of Torres Vedras, King Antonio's Governor of the Azores.

Spain believes subjugation of these Islands a prelude to conquest of England.

Continued negotiations as to possible marriage of Queen Elizabeth with the Duke of Anjou.

1583. (5 August) Gilbert read to the "merchants and masters" his Commission "whereof he took possession in the same harbour," and of 300 leagues each way; and "invested the Queen's Majestie with the title and dignitie thereof" as Sovereign of Newfoundland.

Also ordered maps of the country to be made (These are not now known).

(8 August) Wrote to Sir George Peckham, "... be of good chcare, for I have comforted my selfe answerable to all my hopes."

(20 August) Sir Humphrey Gilbert, with the *Delight*, *Golden Hind* and *Squirrel* sailed from St. Johns; intending to return in the spring with settlers.

(29 August) Encountered heavy weather. The *Delight* wrecked with nearly all hands.

(September) Sir Humphrey caught in the same annual Azorean storms upon which he had commented as frustrating the enterprise of "the King of Portugal."

(9 September) Sir Humphrey's last words, in the *Squirrel*, heard in the *Golden Hind*: "We are as near to Heaven by sea as by land."

About midnight the "littel *Squirrel*" (frigate, 10 tons) with "the Generall" Sir Humphrey Gilbert and all hands, lost in the storm near Terceira.

SIR HUMPHREY GILBERT.

1583. (7 March) Raleigh transmits to Sir Humphrey "a token from her Majestie: an ancor guided by a lady . . .": she having withdrawn her objections.

(31 March) "Embarkation Ode" to Sir H. Gilbert by Parmenius of Buda, in Latin hexameters.

(11 June) (aged 44 or 45) Sir H. Gilbert sails from Causand Bay, Plymouth; with the *Delight*, (alias *George*), 120 tons; *Bark Raleigh* "set forth by Mr. Walter Raleigh" 200 tons; *Golden Hind*, and *Swallow* (both 40 tons); *Squirrel*, 10 tons; and some 250 men. (*Bark Raleigh* deserted).

(30 July) Gilbert's fleet saw land "hideous rocks and mountains, bare of trees and void of any green herbe" (perhaps Labrador. Gosling. p. 230.)

(3 August) Gilbert landed at St. Johns, Newfoundland.

*ELIZABETH, DAUGHTER OF SIR WILLIAM CECIL, 1st LORD BURGHLEY;
AND WIFE OF THOMAS WENTWORTH SON AND HEIR OF THOMAS, BARON WENTWORTH*

From the original by Lucas de Heere;

(Panel, 41½ x 35 inches).

*In possession of The Marquess of Salisbury, K.G.
at Hatfield House.*

Shown in 1866 at the Portrait Exhibition at South Kensington (No. 240);
but apparently never reproduced until now.

Younger daughter of Burghley, by his second wife Mildred, daughter of Sir Anthony Cooke. Elizabeth Cecil was born 1st July, 1564, the 6th child of her mother.

While she was still in the nursery, many overtures were made for her hand; most notably from Walter Earl of Essex for his son Robert Viscount Hereford; from the Earl of Shrewsbury for one of his younger sons; and from Thomas Sackville, Lord Buckhurst for his son and heir Robert Sackville.

Burghley declined them all. In 1575 he wrote to Lord Shrewsbury,

"I have determined (notwithstanding that I have been very honourably offered matches) not to treat of marrying her, if I may live so long, until she shall be above fifteen or sixteen; and if I were of more likelihood myself to live longer than I look to do, she should not with my liking be married before she were near eighteen or twenty."

(Talbot Papers. Vol. F. fol: 117, Lodge's "*Illustrations of British History*," etc. 2nd ed: 1838. Vol. II. p. 53).

In 1581 Burghley married her to Thomas Wentworth, son and heir of Thomas Lord Wentworth who had surrendered Calais to the Duke of Guise in 1557-8.

On 7th November 1582 the young husband died of the plague, in his father-in-law's house of Theobalds: and was buried at Cheshunt.

G.E.C.'s *Complete Peerage*, (1898), Vol. 8. p. 97. note. G.E.C. does not give any date for Elizabeth Cecil's birth or marriage either under Wentworth or Burghley; and the D.N.B. has confused her with her elder sister Anne, Countess of Oxford.

Surviving her husband only five months, she died childless, April 1583, in her nineteenth year, just at the time her father was increasingly apprehensive as to King Philip's determination to subdue the Azores entirely, and then to attempt the conquest of England.





QUEEN ELIZABETH I
BY MICHAEL KNIGHT

PART II.

“Particularly the Power of Spain.”

CHAPTER 6.

“HIS COUNTRY’S SERVICE AND HIS OWN HONOUR.”

SECTION 4.

“He that dies nobly, lives for ever.”

(*The last stand of Emanuel de Silva, Count of Torres Vedras, 1583*).

“The desire the King has to have Englishmen in the Island is because the people of the country agree best with them . . .”

Edward Prin Corea to Secretary Walsingham.
7 May, 1583. (Cal: S.P. Foreign, 1583, No. 298).

“He who doth enter upon Danger without consideration of the fierceness and nature thereof, hath in him of the nature of the brute; but he is truly valiant who, knowing the Danger, doth enter thereupon boldly . . . for some honorable cause.”

Francis Guicciardini. Aphorism 108: circa 1525.

“There is nothing in nature more general or more strong than the fear of death . . . But martyrs for religion, heathens for glory, some for love of their country, others for affection to some special person, have encountered death without fear . . .

He that dies nobly, lives for ever; and he that lives in fear dies continually . . .”

Robert Devereux, Earl of Essex, (1595). *Eliz: Eng:* Book V.

“After the taking of the Ile of Terceras, the Captaines which accompanied the Marquesse de Santa Cruce . . . said openly Now that we have all Portugall, England is ours, and little by little we shall gaine France also.”

“A Treatise Paraenetical. . . . By a Pilgrim Spaniard. . . . Translated into the French . . . and now Englished.
London. . . . 1598,” p. 91.

“WORTHY AND VALYANT ACTES,”
“OUT OF THE PORTINGAL TONGUE.”

Nicholas Lichefield's rendering of the 1st Book of the "Historia do descobrimento e conquista da India pelos Portuguezes. Feyta per Fernão Lopez de Castanheda": for title-page of which see "*Livros Antigos Portuguezes. Early Portuguese Books,*" by H.M. King Manuel of Portugal, 1932, Vol. II, p. 272, and notes pp. 273-281.


First issued at Coimbra, approved "*pelos senhores e depudos de sancta Inquisição,*" 1551, (B.M. c. 33. g. 30,) this *Historia* was translated into French, 1553; and Spanish, 1554 (dedicated to "señor don Luys de Avila y Zuñiga"); and into Italian in 1578, by Alfonso Ulloa, at Venice.

The English version, as the Stationer's Register shows, "*Decimo nono die Decembris,*" was licensed to Thomas East "under the handes of the Bishop of London and bothe the Wardens," at the end of 1581,—the year during which Queen Elizabeth had been summoned by King Philip to "deliver up Don Antonio" to him, and had refused. Had she not intended to continue her countenance to the elected King of Portugal, against the Spanish Conquerors, Nicholas Lichefield would not have been encouraged to put into the vulgar tongue the ancestral glories of the vanquished,

"of whose valiantness . . . none . . . of any age or antiquitie . . . did excede . . . no nor yet were equall with them," as their historian claimed when dedicating his labours to King John III."

"There was never Conquest of the Barbarous, nor of the Greeks, no nor of the Latynists, the which was of like difficultie . . . neither yet Kinge nor Captaines of none of all those nations was so equall in force nor yet in valyauntnesse as those of your Father and Yours."

In the fifteen months that elapsed between the licensing and issuing of Lichefield's translation, two reverses had befallen King Antonio, and a number of his adherents had perished on scaffolds. Yet this was the time chosen to teach the unlearned the triumphal record of the Portuguese "Discovery and Conquest" of the Indies; and the popularity of the work was ensured by the dedication "From London the fift of March 1582" (3), "To the right Worshipfull Sir Fraunces Drake, Knight,"—"for that I know your worship, with great perill and daunger, have passed those monstrous and bottomlesse seas. . . ."



Nicholas Lichefield's 'simple translation' of the '*Descobrimento e Conquista*' of the Indies.

Dedicated to Sir Francis Drake, 5th March, 1582-3 (see opposite).

B.M. 502. c. 4. Quarto. B.L. Book I only; the narrative ending in 1525.

ENGLISH SOLDIERS IN TERCEIRA, 1583

According to "*The Generall Historie of Spaine*" (1612, p. 1226), there were garrisoned in Terceira and Fayal in 1583, 700 French, 300 English, and 3000 or 4000 Portuguese and Azoreans. The 1585 "*Istoria*" refers to "one onely Company of English in Terceira." (Until the Dutch War when Lord Leicester reduced many of his Companies to 100 and 150 men each, a Company might be 300 or more).

There is no list of these soldiers in our Calendar of English *State Papers Foreign*. Our Calendars of *State Papers Spanish (Simancas)* likewise make no reference to them. Nor does the Calendar of Domestic State Papers. Even the unpublished *Exchequer Accounts* and *Declared Accounts* show no sign of payments to these soldiers. But it does not follow that we need doubt their existence. "Footmen" (foot soldiers) of "my Lord of Leicester" had been in the battle of St. Michaels in 1582; and he also may have armed and equipped those in Terceira in 1583. On the 7th of May that year, Edward Prin Corea wrote to Sir Francis Walsingham on behalf of Dom Antonio,

"If it were possible to have 400 or 500 Englishmen for the Island of Terceira, the King would gladly have had them, because he had planned [to have] as many English as French there; but lack of money has been the only cause that means were not made.

"But if you could, by means of some Gentlemen and Captains whom you would appoint, do the King that pleasure, you might be assured. . . . it should be accomplished to your great fame.

"The desire the King has to have Englishmen in the Island is because the people of the country agree best (sic) with them than with the Frenchmen. Furthermore he could not leave all French in that Island, by reason of many prejudicial causes that may grow thereof. . . ."¹

There were then many English "Gentlemen and Captaines" ready to "see new sights" and "win renowne."² And if in 1583 they were placed under French command, as in 1582, and sent to the scene of action "*secretly*," the silence of English official history in this connection is sufficiently explained.

¹ Cal. S.P. Foreign: January-June 1583. No. 298. S.P. Holland and Flanders, XIX. 26.

² Humphrey Gifford. "*For Souldiers*," in "*A Poesie of Gilloflowers*." 1580. (B.M. 239. 8.33.)

KING PHILIP'S ARMADA AT 'TERCEIRA. 1583.

Portion of fresco in the Escorial.

Photograph, Llado, Madrid.



*KING PHILIP'S ARMADA, APPOINTED UNDER THE MARQUÉS DE SANTA CRUZ:
for the conquest of Terceira, July, 1583:*

*From the frescoes in the Sala de Batallas, Escorial,
by Nicholas Granello (a Genoese); painted in 1590.*

(See Portfolio, Nos. 8 and 9).

Showing operations both afloat and ashore, the detail of the ships is specially interesting, no naval painting of this date and quality being extant in England.

According to the 1585 "*Istoria*" the Spanish King's fleet, not counting zabras, caravels, and barks, numbered "above three score," and included 2 galleons, and "about 30 great ships," with 10,000 soldiers aboard, 1,000 being Germans, two Companies Italians, and two Portuguese: the rest mostly Castilian veterans.

It was a Portuguese who informed the Marqués de Santa Cruz where it would be the least difficult to land. The Terceirians expected him at Angra or Peggia, but under cover of night he anchored at Mole near Saint Sebastian, ten Spanish miles away from Angra; and brought his troops ashore in the early morning.

Unlike the battle of St. Michael's the previous July, the battle of Terceira was not primarily naval. Yet though the main fighting took place on land, the possession of a great fleet gave the Spaniards mastery.


The reward to the victor was his promotion in 1584 to the exalted office of Captain-General of the Ocean Sea. (Vide volume V, under date, his Commission, first translated and published from the original in possession of The Duke of Berwick and Alba).

Notice the galleys in the bay. A now current belief that after the battle of Lepanto, 1571, galleys were little used in great actions, is based on oblivion of the battle of the Azores.

Forty years after the conquest of Terceira, the circumstances were still being quoted in England: Spanish Councillors being represented as urging King Philip to use of galleys for the invasion of England:—

"And whereas it may be objected that the gallies . . . do you no service, . . . your enterprise of Portugal and of the Islands . . . did much abate that superstitious credulity of ours that those Vessels are not good at any time to passe the Ocean withall; . . . there is no doubt but that gallies may securely pass, and hazard themselves in that sea in the summer, for three months. . . ."

"*An Experimentall Discoverie of Spanish practises or the Counsell of a Well-wishing Souldier*," etc., Anno 1623, p. 23. (By Thomas Scott).



*"An accurate map of the town and citadel of ANGRA in TERCEIRA:
chief of the ISLES OF THE AZORES, and the richest. . . ."*

*Now first reproduced from a plan made 12 years after the Spanish conquest of the Islands;
and published under Royal authority, with approval of the Bishop, the Governor, and the Senate.*

Drawn by Jan H. Van Linschoten, 1595.

Dedicated (vide right upper panel) to

"the most illustrious and noble lord, Christopher de Moura, a man of the first rank among the nobles of the Council of State; Councillor in Portuguese affairs; a vigilant administrator; Commendator of the Order of Alcantara: . . . his most worthy Lord and one deserving of honour by many titles."

(Such praises of Moura would have given bitter offence to the Terceirians, who resented his having thrown in his lot with the Spaniards against his own countrymen. He was to the end of his life a devoted servant of King Philip: who created him Marqués de Castel-Rodrigo).

Latin verses, signed "P. Ioogerb", decorating the plan:

(In right lower panel):

"Lofty Tercera, greatest among her neighbours of the deep, stands out in the Western Waters, washed by the sea; strong on account of her rocky base, exceedingly rich with her grain . . . (and) bearing good fruits."


(In left upper panel):

"This is Angra, crowded with inhabitants, and agriculturalists who plough with oxen the fertile soil of Terceira. She is safe on account of her citadel; illustrious because the Senate here has its seat; and she gives to the King the Empire of the sea.

I do not know whether the Islands are named Azores because of their resemblance to falcons (açor). . . ." (Picture of a falcon)

An excellent *printed* map (not chart) of "*Açores Insulae*" by Lewis Teisera, Cosmographer to the King, 1584, will be reproduced: not under its date, but in 1589, with the expedition of George Clifford Earl of Cumberland: as it is the most likely map for Cumberland to have studied beforehand.

Edward Wright's now familiar Chart of the Azores, made during or shortly after Cumberland's voyage of 1589, was not published until 1599. A now common assumption that Englishmen knew little of "Azorean geography" till Wright enlightened them, has arisen from non-realisation of the existence of Lord Burghley's "*Considerations*" of 1581 as to a war for the Islands, and the adventures of Englishmen in this connection from 1581 to 1583.



A CIDADE DE ANGRA DO HEROÍSMO DA TERCERA QUE ESTA EM 50 GRADOS

The City of Angra do Heroísmo is the chief city of the island of Terceira, and is situated on a hillside, and is the most beautiful and fertile of the islands of the Azores.

ANGRA DO HEROÍSMO
A Cidade de Angra do Heroísmo é a capital da Ilha de Terceira, e está situada no topo de uma colina, e é a mais bela e fértil das Ilhas dos Açores.

As ruínas das fortificações da cidade de Angra do Heroísmo, e a vista da cidade e da ilha de Terceira.

A vista da cidade de Angra do Heroísmo, e a vista da ilha de Terceira, e a vista da cidade de Angra do Heroísmo, e a vista da ilha de Terceira.



PART II.

“Particularly the Power of Spain.”

CHAPTER 6.

“HIS COUNTRY’S SERVICE AND HIS OWN HONOUR.”

SECTION 4.

“He that dies nobly, lives for ever.”

(The last stand of Emanuel de Silva, Count of Torres Vedras, 1583).

SIR HUMPHREY GILBERT’S reference to the tempests of October 1582 having frustrated the expedition of “the King of Portingale” to Madeira,¹ reminds us that when Gilbert sailed from Plymouth in June 1583, the Azores, excepting only St. Michael’s, were still flying the Portuguese Standard, and were administered by Dom Antonio’s Count of Torres Vedras. But before September, when Sir Humphrey, in the *Squirrel* was swallowed up by the storm off Terceira, the King of Spain had become master of all these Islands: the final decisive battle having been fought while Sir Humphrey was on his outward voyage to Newfoundland.

Previously the death of the Duke of Alba at Lisbon on December 12th, 1582, encouraged the “Portingales” to hope for emancipation from King Philip’s rule. From Rouen one of Dom Antonio’s followers wrote to Sir Francis Walsingham, “to let you understand some part of the last news that my King and master receives out of Portugall from some gentlemen of the country”:²

“The King is informed that this present month of March King Philip pretends to depart for Spain, and with him he carries the most part of the best gentlemen of Portingall, and leaves to govern the country the Cardinall his brother-in-law,³ with the Grand Prior son unto the Duke of Alba.

¹ S.P.D.E. CLVIII. 50 (ante).

² “In Rowane the xij day of Marche Anno 1582.

Yo^r honors too use too my power
Edwarde prjnn Corea.”

Holog: S.P. France. IX. 55. 2 pp. not easy to read. (Spelling modernised supra). This “Captain Prin” (as his English friends called him) was a Portuguese with English ancestry, or rather “an englishman” born in Portugal.

³ The Cardinal was brother-in-law as well as nephew to the King: being son of his sister the Empress Maria, and brother of his fourth Queen, Anna, Archduchess of Austria who had died at Badajoz in 1580.

"The King is likewise informed that in *St. Michaels in November last the people of the Island did rise in arms against the Spaniards that were there in garrison, and killed many of them, putting the rest to flight: the which took the castle for their refuge where they do now remain*"

How formidable a foe to England the Cardinal-Archduke Albert of Austria was to prove, and how able a Viceroy of Portugal in the interests of Spain, time was to show. But in the spring of 1583 the Portuguese believed his tenure of office would be brief; and certain Portuguese nobles withdrew from the Spanish Court and retired to their country estates: hoping that the fidelity of the Azores to Dom Antonio would provide him with a base of operations whence to recover the kingdom.

On the 1st of November 1582, from Lisbon, King Philip had written to Don Bernardino de Mendoza,

"As it is very important that I should know about the ships being fitted out in Holland for Don Antonio, you will have very minute enquiries made on the point, both as to the burden of the ships, their character, their ordnance, their stores and victuals; and also what troops are to be shipped; who is paying for them, and all other particulars. . . ."

That same day, Mendoza from London had sent news that "When Leicester and Walsingham again pressed the Queen on behalf of Don Antonio's factor and the man from Terceira, to help him with money, she replied that when the forces which were to go to his aid had been got together she would assist by giving him money and ships.

"I understand that the ships that are to go to Terceira with men and stores have not yet sailed; and in consequence of the last news received, Leicester is having some wheat shipped in them.² I learn that four other ships are leaving Havre de Grace and Honfleur with stores and provisions for Terceira. The fleet being fitted out in Flushing and Sluys is being paid for by the rebel States. . . ."

Shortly before this, the Portuguese Governor of the Azores, suspecting the Commander of the fortress of Saint Sebastian in Terceira to be a traitor, had informed Dom Antonio; who decided to move this Captain, Cristobal Lamos de Faria. The Portuguese Governor's suspicions were correct; for Faria had already sent letters both to the Marqués de Santa Cruz and to King Philip, with offers of "service." But, as Mendoza relates, when Faria received a warning that "Don Antonio intended to withdraw him, and therefore . . . he saw that he would be unable to surrender it, [the fortress], he decided to leave the island in order to arrange for its capture, which he says he can do with 20 soldiers."⁴

On the 6th of January following (1582-3), Mendoza had to admit to King Philip that he could not discover whether Dom Antonio had gone to France, or was at Southampton, or Dover, waiting to get to Flanders; or was "hidden in one of Leicester's houses."⁵

By the 14th of January he reported that the Queen had sent orders to Hawkins to report secretly "what would be necessary for . . . arming 4 of her

¹ Cal: S.P.S. (Simancas) III.

² Notice this, in relation to Note, ante, "English Soldiers in Terceira."

³ Ib: p. 409. ⁴ Cal: S.P.S. (Simancas) Vol. III.

⁵ Cal: 3. p. 433.

own ships and six merchantmen" to go and assist the fleet being raised by the Queen Mother for Dom Antonio, whose going to Flanders was confessed.

In April Dr. Lopez was sent to Dieppe; but, according to Mendoza, brought news that Dom Antonio was in "misery"; and that the ships which "profess to be ready" were not in fit state to sail.¹

In May the Spanish Ambassador was able to enclose to King Philip intercepted letters which the Governor of the Azores had sent for Dom Antonio. The ship carrying them had been wrecked near Sluys, and they had been "bought of a sailor by one of my men," says Mendoza.²

Meanwhile, "at the Terceras," relates the hostile historian, writing in 1585, "Emanuel de Silva" . . . showed himselfe an obstinate enemy of the Catholique King, a faithfull servant to the Prior" (King Antonio). There ensues a long description of "De Silva's" "pride and arrogancie," in a work wherein all firmness on the part of a Portuguese is called "overweening," cruel, or presumptuous; and, with rare exceptions, violence on the part of Spaniards is praised as pious and expedient.³

Actually Torres Vedras deserves to be honoured as a patriot who endured to the end. But whereas a soldier will often do justice to a gallant opponent,—our sole knowledge of the heroism of Vercingetorix, for instance, comes through the testimony of Julius Caesar who overcame him,—the political historian, not content with his party's triumph, commonly heaps obloquy upon the defeated.

To deride the smallness of the force with which Torres Vedras held the Islands was with intent to make him look insignificant. But in the same breath as his troops are called contemptible, he is represented as a heavy-handed ruler whose "tyrannie" kept eight out of the nine Islands in subjection. His determination would have won great praise had he been a Spaniard controlling a vanquished people, instead of a Portuguese holding out on behalf of his native-born and elected Sovereign.

"There was within the Iland little above seaven hundredth French soldiers, *one onely company of English*,⁴ and about three thousand Portugalls; it was fortified on all partes . . . with about thirtie fortes and manie trenches made, with such arte and diligence as it seemed impossible to enter . . . yet Silva [Torres Vedras] judged it stronger than it was, and did trust (as a man of no experience) more in the defenders than was convenient."

It was not a question of what was "convenient," but of making the best of such forces as could be kept together, in expectation of further succours from France and England. No Spanish or Italian historian blames Grand Master de la Valette that in 1565 he refused to surrender Malta to the enormously superior

¹ Ib: p. 434. ² Ib: p. 467. ³ Conde de Torres Vedras.

⁴ "The Historie of the Uniting of the kingdom of Portugall to the Crowne of Castile . . . 1600." Book X. from *Istoria etc.* 1585. (Title II. 4. 1 and 8 ante.)

⁵ (Or more) "General Hist: of Spaine," (1586), 1612. (p. 1226.) says 300 English.

numbers of the Turkish Fleet and Army. All commend his courage in fighting stubbornly until help came from the King of Spain. In La Valette's case Don Garcia de Toledo with the fleet arrived just in time to avert irrevocable disaster. But Torres Vedras was victim of promises not fulfilled; and the result to himself was less the penalty for "inexperience" than the price of loyalty.

King Philip meanwhile was preparing at Lisbon a force far larger than that of the previous year. The Marqués de Santa Cruz was again appointed to the command.

"In Spaine there were divers opinions concerning this armie. . . Such as were not to be employed in this action" represented it as easy, "saying that the people were alreadie so wearied, poore and oppressed, . . . as the armie should no sooner appeare but they would bee at the King's devotion":

having been restrained hitherto only by their Portuguese Governor. "On the other side, such as imbarcked with the armie" were aware of the Azoreans as determined, and the Islands as well populated, supplied with victuals, "rocked rounde about," and "seated in the most inconstant sea that is," where a hostile fleet could hardly ride in safety during three months out of the twelve; to which drawbacks were added "the obstinate disposition of the people" and the way they were protected by excellent fortifications newly built under French direction.

In France Dom Antonio was begging for more help to be sent to his Island subjects. Accordingly "mounsier de Chattes, a Knight of Malta, who was gouvernour of Deepe, being experienced in these later warres," set sail for the Azores in the summer of 1583, with "twelve hundredth Frenchmen," bringing letters of commendation to the Governor, not only from Dom Antonio but from the Queen Mother of France and King Henry III; with the assurances that yet more French aid would follow.¹

As certain Portuguese ships which had succeeded in carrying artillery from Cape Verd, came into Angra almost simultaneously with those from France under the Governor of Dieppe, Torres Vedras had reason to believe he could hold out until he received larger reinforcements. But the author of the 1585 "*Istoria*" would not allow that a Portuguese could act wisely,—except if he submitted to King Philip. If a "Portugall" resisted Spain, he was "*overweening*": if he refused to rely blindly on incompetent men, he was "*fearful*"; if he had confidence in his soldiers, he was "*careless*": and so on.

While the Portuguese and the French Commander were both disappointed, the first having expected a bigger contingent, and the second having believed the existing defences would have been stronger, "the Catholique Kings armie . . . departed from Lisbone the eve of Saint Iohn Baptist,"² being in number above three score ships, besides Zabras, Caravels, and barkes; for there were twelve

¹ "*Hist: of the Vniing.*" In K. Antonio's "*Explanation*," "de Chartres." Not to be confounded with the Vidame de Chartres.

² 23 June (1583).

gallies, and two galliasses, . . . five gallions, and about thirtie great ships of divers nations: there were few lesse than ten thousand souldiers, the greatest part Castellians, having no other nations but a thousand Germanes, two companies of Italians," and two companies of Portuguese. These last not being trusted were put under a Spanish officer.

"This armie though it were not verie greate in number, yet we may say the Catholique King had never so many trained Spaniards as this: For besides that the greater part had beene in Italy," many were veterans who had stricken the Turks at Lepanto in 1571, and others had come from the "warres of Flaunders."

Santa Cruz steered for Terceira. Anchoring his fleet at Saint Sebastian, he was received with artillery fire; which he did not return. Contriving to keep out of range of the guns on shore, he sent a herald and trumpeter, offering "to all such as were in the Island a generall pardon in his Majesties behalfe if they would yeeld."

After his executions of prisoners the previous year at Villa Franca in St. Michaels, the Terceireans did not believe in his overtures; and on his "approaching to land, he was unkindly kept back by their Artillery." Not much attention was paid to his herald's oration, which "concerned the succession of the King to the crowne, the disobedience of the Island" (meaning its obedience to its own King): and "the clemencie of his Majesty" in offering to all such as were born in the Azores "their lives and goods if they would yeelde obedience." To "strangers" (Frenchmen or Englishmen) he would allot "ships to transport them into their countries, with their goods, armes and ensigns."

But the artillery fire continued. Santa Cruz then "sent two of the Portugals secretly to land," with written conditions of surrender addressed to the Governor. But Torres Vedras declined to hear of capitulation on any condition whatsoever. Not only did he refuse to read the overtures of the Marqués, but he told the two renegade "Portugals" that he would hang them if they disclosed to any Islander the offers they had demeaned themselves by carrying.

Meanwhile Santa Cruz went in person in a small bark, with a few officers, on a tour of inspection round the coasts, to try and discover a safe and easy place for landing. He found the new fortifications more substantial than he had expected. But some of the "Portugals" told him that Mole near Saint Sebastian had fewest artificial defences. Believing "Nature" there to have built sufficient barriers against invasion, Torres Vedras had caused the strongest forts to be erected elsewhere.

To understand what follows we should know the setting of this drama. As "*Insula de Jesus Christus de Tercera*" was strong in natural defences, "walled round about with Cliffes," Torres Vedras had reason to hope he could hold out until relief arrived.

" . . . betweene fiftene or sixteene miles in compasse " Terceira "hath no Havens nor entrance of waters for the securitie and safetie of the shippes," except "before the chiefe Town" the open Haven of which "in forme is like a Halfe-moone, by the Portugals called Angra, whereof the

Towne hath her name.¹ It hath on the one side, in manner of an elbowe sticking forth the two high Hills, called Bressyle which stretch into the Sea, so that afarre off they seeme to bee divided from the Iland.

"Those Hills are very high, so that being upon them a man may see at least tenne or twelve and sometimes fiftene miles into the Sea, being clear weather.

"Upon these Hills there stand two small stone Pillars, where there is a Centinell placed, that continually watcheth to see what shippes are at Sea, and so to advertise those of the Iland: for that as many shippes as he seeth coming out of the West, that is from the Spanish Indies, or Brasilia, Cabo verde, Guinea, and the Portugal Indies, and all other wayes lying South or West, for every shippe hee setteth a Flagge upon the Pillar in the West; and when the shippes which hee descrieth are more than five, then he setteth up a great ancient,² betokening a whole Fleet of shippes.

"The like he doth upon an other Pillar, which standeth in the East, for such shippes as come from Portugall, or other places out of the East or North parts: These Pillars may bee easily seene in all places of the Towne, by reason of the highnesse of the Hills, so that *there is not one shippe or sayle that is at Sea, or maketh towards the Iland, but it is presently known throughout all the Towne and over all the whole Iland: for the watch is not holden onely upon those two Hills jutting into the Sea, but also upon all . . . hills and Clifes throughout the Iland;* and as soon as they perceive any shippes, the Governour and Rulers are presently advertised thereof, that they may take such order therein as neede requireth.

"Upon the furthest corner into the Sea standeth a Fort, right against another Fort that answereth it; so that *those two Forts doe shut and defend the Mouth or open Haven in the Towne where the shippes lie in the Road, and so no shippe can either goe in or come forth, without the license or permission of those two Forts.*

"This Towne of Angra is not onely the chiefe Towne of Tercera, but also of all other Townes within the Ilands therabouts. Therin is resident the Bishop, the Governour for the King, and the chiefe place of Judgment . . . of all the Ilands of Acores.

"Three miles from this Towne lieth another Towne towards the North, called Villa de Praya" [the town on the Strand]: "it lieth hard by a great strand, and for that cause there is little traffique thither, as not having any convenient place for shippes . . . : yet sometimes there cometh some one that by reason of contrary winde cannot get before the Towne of Angra," wherefore their goods had to be landed at Praya and carried to Angra.⁴

In July 1583 the weather was favourable to the Spanish Navy; and under cover of night the Marqués de Santa Cruz, "during the greatest calm that was ever," brought his fleet to anchor close by Mole, exactly as the renegade "Portugalls" had advised. (He had been expected to land at Angra, or Peggia.)

He disembarked his troops so quietly that his presence was not discovered until daybreak. Though taken by surprise the garrison resisted gallantly. They were few in number, mostly Frenchmen; and with comparatively little loss the Marqués made himself master of the forts and trenches, and continued landing his forces.

Though the French twice rallied, their plight was the harder in that they could not expect immediate reinforcements. They despatched a messenger to the Governor; but "the way was long and uncase."

"The Countrey is very hilly, and in some places woddy, full of bushes and trees: it is hard to travell, because their wayes for the most part are stony, so that for a mile, or a mile

¹ See Map of town and citadel, ante.

² Ensign. ³ Immediately.

⁴ "The description of the Ilands of Acores, or the Flemish Ilands, taken out of Linschoten . . ." (1592): "Hakluytus Posthumus or Purchas his Pilgrims." 1626. Reprint 1907, Vol. XVIII. pp. 360-374.

Though Linschoten's account of the Islands was written subsequent to their conquest by Spain, it is applicable to Portuguese rule, even to the system of flag signalling.

and a halfe together, men can see no ground but onely stones, which for sharpnesse . . . shew like pointed Diamants, whereby one can hardly treade upon it, lest it should cut through both shooes and feet: and yet it is all planted with Vines, so full and thicke, that in Summer time you can hardly see through it, for that the rootes thereof doe growe betwene the stones. . . .”¹

Such was the ground across which Torres Vedras had to lead his men: and they did not arrive until almost noon. The 1585 historian pours scorn on the Islanders “*which esteemed themselves so great warriors as they would never hear motion of accord, peace or pardon,*” but who ran away after one fight. That “the people” have neither constancy nor valour, and that whoso relies on them is riding for a fall, is the moral pronounced by the historian. But as Torres Vedras had promises of further aid from France, his idea was to get away with the minimum of loss, fall back upon the mountain fastnesses, into which Spaniards, Italians and Germans would be unlikely to penetrate. To denounce him as “obstinate” and “foolish” for refusing capitulation is wide of the mark; and it is inconsistent when the same writer who scoffed at King Sebastian for staying to be slain at Alcacer, blamed Torres Vedras for not allowing his men to remain to be cut to pieces uselessly. To draw off his forces, and order the French to do the same, and keep as much of the army as possible intact for further operations, was certainly right. Though it left the way open to Angra, this distressed him the less, as the castle and town had been evacuated.

The same critic who is so stern towards the Azoreans, expends compassion upon the thirst and fatigue of the German mercenaries, who on this “verie hot” day did not enjoy their march of ten Spanish miles from Mole to Angra.

Santa Cruz had arranged for a double assault; the army to capture Angra by land, and the fleet to attack from the sea. Considerable powder and shot were spent upon the forts, before he realised that they had been left empty.

On becoming master of Angra and finding only a few slaves and criminals in occupation, the first action of Santa Cruz was to release the criminals from prison; and for three days the Spaniards, Italians and Germans competed in sacking the city. But Torres Vedras betimes had commanded the people to carry away their valuables to the mountains; so the victors found relatively little upon which to congratulate themselves. What Torres Vedras hoped was that the invader’s mercenaries would get out of hand; then corrupt their associates; and that the concealed Azorean patriots could bide their time until the arrival of ships, men, and munitions promised from France and England: whereon Santa Cruz would be between two fires.

The Portuguese Governor was not outwitted by the enemy: he suffered the worse calamity of being forsaken by an ally. While reserving his hardy and resolute little army to await the hour when the Spaniards could be attacked, his colleague Monsieur de la “Chattes” secretly decided to offer terms of capitulation. In Malta as a Knight of St. John this Frenchman had made acquaintance with

¹ Linschoten, op. cit. p. 364.

one of the Spanish officers now attending on Santa Cruz. His first step was to "write his mind" to the Spaniard, and recall to him their former meeting. He then enquired whether he could expect advantageous conditions of surrender for his own men and for "all Portugalls that would imbarke with him." But the "Portugalls" did not mean to capitulate; and Santa Cruz was not inclined to extend to them the peace they had rejected.

After several days of parley it was decided "that the French should deliver up their armes and ensignes, *retaining onely their swordes*"; and that they should be allowed "shippes and victuals to return into France."

"The accorde was no sooner made than it was put in execution; for the thirde of August the French came from the mountaine, and . . . delivered up their armes with eighteen ensignes, their drums and phifes, . . . and entered disarmed into the citie. . ."

Though thus deserted, the Count of Torres Vedras still held out. In the mountains, among a courageous and faithful people, he might remain long hidden. As in 1580 and 1581 Dom Antonio after his defeat at Alcántara had been concealed in Portugal for eight months, with a price on his head, and the Duke of Alba though master of Lisbon had been unable to discover him, Torres Vedras hoped to keep hidden until King Antonio contrived the sending from France of the other reinforcements. He did not believe that any Azorean would betray him. Nor was it an Azorean. A Moorish slave was the traitor.

Surprised and captured, Torres Vedras took upon himself the entire responsibility for the resistance of the Islanders. The only favour he asked was that the whole vengeance of Spain should fall upon him, and the islanders be spared.

The last scene is thus described by the chronicler employed to vindicate the compulsory "*Uniting of the kingdom of Portugal to the Crown of Castile*":

"... being of a lovely countenance, and having in this last hour with great resolution confessed himself culpable,"—for which read having proudly admitted to the full his determination to hold out as long as possible,— "... he demaunded pardon of one after another of all such present or absent as he thought to have wronged, saying that he alone . . . ought to suffer the punishment; the which . . . did move the hearts even of his enemies. . ."

But Santa Cruz remained inexorable: and "they cutte of Emanuel de Silva his head, with a sword, after the Germaine fashion, to the general griefe of all. . ."

His title of Count had been conferred by King Antonio; and therefore could

¹ Though "disarmed" they still kept their swords, which were articles of everyday wear.

² The dates are so given in "*The Historie of the Vniting*" etc. 1600, first published in Italian 1585. In a broadside news letter the 27th of July is the day of entry into Angra; the 28th to 29th as spent in "discussions" with the French. On the 30th the Marqués issued his orders for capture of the Island of Fayal. The surrenders of Fayal, San Jorge and Graciosa are briefly stated; and under 31st of July the departure of the French in 6 Biscayan ships, 4 of their Captains and a Colonel being kept by Santa Cruz as hostages: "*Report and Summary*;" (title, p. 304).

not be recognised by Spain. But that he was beheaded instead of hanged was a concession to his noble birth.

"His head was set up publicly in that place from the which that of Melchin Alphoso was taken, whom a little while before he had put to death for being affectionate to the Catholique King" (that is for endeavouring to betray the Islands to Spain). "And it was observed that being required by the kinsmen of the dead to take it from thence, he made answer that it should be removed when his own stood in the place: which he meant should be never."

What makes the end of Torres Vedras doubly tragic is that the Frenchman who deserted him gave so false a version of the facts to King Antonio, that in Antonio's *Explanation* it is not Torres Vedras but "Mounsir de Chartres" who is the hero: "a noble gentleman of great valour, of whom the queen mother had made special choyse": and it is Torres Vedras who tries to "save him selfe by flight" and is only prevented by some women, who (for what motive not explained) "brake in peeces" the barks in which he and others might have escaped.¹ No regret is expressed for what he suffered, and the last scene is dismissed in a few cold curt words: "Neither could therle of Torres Vedras escape his fortune . . . he was found among the rockes by means of a maid slave bewraying him, and thereupon was beheaded."²

In the same year as "*The Explanation*" was printed in England and the Netherlands, there was issued in Genoa the defence of the union "*del Regno di Portugallo alla Corona di Castiglia*": and only when or if this work reached Dom Antonio's hands, would he have learnt from the enemy how gallantly Torres Vedras had held out to the last. Certainly he had been animated by

"Love of country,
Not moved by hope of vile reward,
But noble, and as it were, eternal."³

With him ended—for more than half a century—the Portuguese dominion in the Azores. But the Marqués de Santa Cruz did not accept the head of Torres Vedras as a sufficient sacrifice. There were numerous other executions:

"They did hang many; and many (especially of the French,) taken prisoners before the capitulation were sent to the gallies.

"The Marqués" had been "commaundede to dispatch with all speed, and to goe with his armie to Cales: . . . And therefore having left John de Urbino, with two thousand Spanish foot for the guard of the Island, he sailed with the rest of the fleete and the rest of the soldiers towards the porte of Andolouzia: and in the mean time, both in Castill and

¹ Op. cit. pp. 43-45.

² Had the Portuguese Samson been shorn by a Moorish Delilah the sarcastic "*Istoria*" would hardly have refrained from appropriate quips. But the "*Istoria*" only says that a Moresco slave was the betrayer; and does not bring any women into the case at all.

³ "Amor da patria não movido
De premio vil, mas alto e quasi eterno."

Luis de Camoens, "*Os Lusíadas*" (1572).

Portugall, they made great joy for this victorie, with publike feasts, but not so great as was the grieve of Anthony and his followers”¹

So long as Terceira and the neighbouring islands had been able to defy the power of Spain, King Antonio had been hopeful. And could France and England have combined strongly enough against King Philip, as Lord Burghley wished in 1581, the independence of the Azores might have been preserved.

A forecast in 1579 of the impending fate of Portugal had been a main reason for Burghley’s anxiety to bring about the French marriage of Queen Elizabeth; which King Philip’s Ambassador had determined to frustrate.

Despite Burghley’s emphasis upon the need of a “great” war, the English assistance rendered to the Islands “secretly” in 1581 and ’82 was on too small a scale: and how much was lost by not sending a fleet and army to help the Islanders in 1583 (the English in garrison in Terceira then only being a few hundred),—we shall increasingly grasp as we enter into the events of 1584 to 1589.

In 1588 Queen Elizabeth was to authorise, and then delay what Burghley had endeavoured to persuade her to undertake in 1581: namely the restoration of “*Don Antonio King of Portugal who hath a just war against the King of Spain.*” It was too late in 1589 when George Clifford, Earl of Cumberland was allowed to take his small squadron to the Azores. He proclaimed himself, on landing, “*a friend to King Don Antonio*”; but the Spaniards had then been masters too long for a few English ships (even though commanded by the famous “*Conde de Chiumber Land*”) to dislodge them.

Not Philip II of Spain but Elizabeth of England was the procrastinator; hence the confident hopes of her enemies.

What King Philip thought of the achievement of the Marqués de Santa Cruz we shall learn when scrutinising the powers conferred by the Sovereign upon the victor when making him Captain-General of the Ocean Sea, the following summer.² Meanwhile, immediately after the taking of Terceira, the Spanish Captains “openly” exclaimed, “*Now that we have all Portugal, England is ours; and little by little we shall gain France also.* . . .”³

¹ “*The Historie of the Vniting of the Kingdom of Portugall to the Crowne of Castill.*” (From Italian of 1585.) London. 1600. p. 322-324.

Domingo de Campo, in command of one of the sloops that accompanied the Spanish fleet, left Angra with the returning fleet on the 12th of August, became separated from it, and arrived in Lisbon on the 22nd. From his narrative was composed a Spanish folio broadside “*Report and summary of all that which has happened in the Island Tercera from the time of the Marqués de Santa Cruz set foot there which was on the 26th day of July of this year, until its complete pacification.*”

In the broadside the Count of Torres Vedras is called “Manuel de Silva.” De Campo “could not remember” the names of “others of the principal ones” who were beheaded, nor the names of the “residents of the said island” who were hanged.

Broadside not in Palau’s *Bibliographical Manual*, but described in Messrs. Maggs Bros’ Catalogue, No. 495, “*Spanish Books.*” Item 128; p. 108. There dated conjecturally 1581: should be 1583.

² Burghley’s “*Considerations*,” first published II. 5. 2 ante.

³ His Commission will be first published under date.

⁴ “*A Treatise Paraenetical By a Pilgrim Spaniard . . . Englished.*” “*London . . . 1598.*” p. 91.

Small marvel therefore that Don Bernardino de Mendoza in London was emboldened to wade deeper and deeper into the same sort of plots which had led to the dismissal of his predecessor Don Guerau Despes in 1571.¹

If Mendoza was vigilant, so also were those responsible for the defence of England. "*Certes, there is no Prince in Europe that hath a more beautiful or gallant sort of Ships than the Queenes Majestie,*" wrote Holinshed in his Chronicle, "*at this present which is the four and twentieth of her reign*"; 1582-83.

These ships "are of such exceeding force that two of them, being well appointed and furnished as they ought," will not hesitate to "encounter with three or four of those of other countries, and either bowge them or put them to flight, if they may not bring them home.

"Neither are the moulds of any foreign barks so conveniently made to brook so well one sea as another, lying upon the shore in any part of the Continent, as those of England. And therefore *the common report that strangers make of our ships amongst themselves is daily confirmed to be true: which is that for strength, assurance, nimbleness, and swiftness of sailing, there are no vessels in the world to be compared with ours.* . . .

"The Queen's Highness hath at this present . . . already made and furnished to the number of four or five and twenty great ships, with lie for the most part in Gillingham Road: besides three galleys. . . ."

¹ How little this war is now understood, we see by current comments: In "*The Mariners Mirror*," Vol. XVI, No. 4, Oct.: 1930, p. 431, treating of "*Subsidios para a Historia Militar Maritima da India (1585-1669)*" Por Alfredo Botelho de Sousa. Imprensa la Armada, Lisboa, 1930," the reviewer says,

"Commander Botelho de Sousa puts an end to the legend, so dear to the heart of some of the more Chauvinistic of his countrymen, that the decadence and fall of *India Portuguesa* were entirely due to the Spanish usurpation of 1580-1640 . . . the seeds of inevitable decay had been sown long before . . . Nor did the fact that the Portuguese were fighting for a Spanish King make any appreciable difference . . . It was not until the time of the Conde-Duque Olivares that the Spanish monarchy tried to incorporate Portugal as an integral part of the Iberian Peninsula, and then the harm suffered by Portugal was chiefly owing to the fact that her best officers, men and ships were requisitioned for service in Flanders and Italy for purely Spanish interests . . ."

etc., etc.
Certainly the Duke of Alba in 1580 could not have conquered Portugal in so short a time had not the decline of the ancient Portuguese vigour previously resulted from the corruption of the race by Asiatic intermarriages. But it is a mistake to state that the loss of national independence in 1580 did not make "any appreciable difference." We shall see that up to the death of King Antonio in 1595 many Portuguese still hoped for his restoration.

The reviewer's belief that "*it was not until the time of the Conde Duque Olivares that the Spanish monarchy tried to incorporate Portugal,*" etc., is surprising; as the Grandee mentioned, the Chief Minister of Philip IV, was the one who had to announce to the Sovereign the loss of Portugal. It is likewise astonishing to see Olivares cited as the first who endeavoured to use Portuguese ships and men for "purely Spanish interests." The Marqués de Santa Cruz used Portuguese soldiers so early as 1582 and 1583 to serve Spain against the Azores; and always put "Spanish interests" in the front place. Moreover the Great Armada in 1588 sailed from Lisbon, and the Portuguese nobility were requisited then to fight against England, the country in which the Portuguese elected King Antonio was taking refuge.

² He adds "The names of so many ships belonging to her Majestie as I could come by at this present: The Bonadventure, Elizabeth Jonas, White Beare, Philippe and Marie, Triumph, Bull, Tiger, Antelope, Hope, Lion, Victorie, Marie Rose, Foresight, Swiftsure, Aide, Handmaide, Dreadnought, Swallow, Genet, Bark of Bullen, Achates, Falcon George, Revenge."

"It is said that Her Grace doth yearly build one ship or other to the better defence of her frontiers from the enemy; . . . if they should be driven to service at one instant (which God forbid), she would have a power by sea of about nine or ten thousand men, . . . besides the supply of other vessels appertaining to her subjects. . . She hath likewise three notable galleys: the Speedwell, the TryRight, and the Blacke Galley; with the sight whereof and rest of the Navie Royall it is incredible to say how greatly her Grace is delighted: and not without cause (say I), since by their means her coasts are kept in quiet, and sundry foreign enemies put back, which otherwise would invade us. . .

"I might take occasion to tell of the notable and difficult voyages made into strange countries by Englishmen, and of their daily success there": but prefer rather to "understand somewhat of great masses of treasure daily employed upon our Navie: how there are few of those ships, of the first and second sort, that, being apparelled and ready to sail, are not worth one thousand pounds or three thousand ducats at the least. . . What shall we think then of the greater, but especially of the Navy Royall, of which some one vessel is worth two of the other. . ."

Holinshed rebukes some person unnamed who objected to "good provisions for armour, wishing the Queenes money to be laid out to some speedier return of gain, . . . because the realm (saith he) is in case good enough"

But how long would it so remain, without "good keeping of the sea?"



Printed for the Author
At the Sign of the Dove with the Griffin
at Royal Leamington Spa
in the County of Warwick

MCMXXXIV



